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ABSTRACT
This work discusses the growth of a 'Galtonian tradition' in Science,
notably as developed by Karl Pearson and his colleagues. It traces
the development from Galton's ideas,in Britain, of the disciplines of
Statistics,Biometrical Genetics and the Psychology of individual
differences. These developments were linked with a number of philosophical
and ideological commitments on the parts of the scientists
concerned, and the work examines the interplay between these
commitments and the theorising of the scientists.It looks also at
the relations that may have held between these commitments and the
social milieux of the scientists. Particular attention is giv!n
tc the role of the strong and influential Eugenics movement which
flourished in Britain at the time of these developments.
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2(a) Sate rationales
The nineteenth century is distinquisbed by its biologically
minded philosophers. One thinks imt3iately of Chambers, Darwin,
Haeckel, Spencer or Huxley. Yet, in truth, few of these can rank
in consequence with Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton (1822-1911).
He was the founder of a wh1e Galtonian tradition of Darwinian
social biology and psychology, which, in its exfoliation, has given
rise to several multi-million dollar ]cnz1edge industries.
Galton conducted his research inathnatically, and set in train
a series of intellectual and institutional developlEnts eventuating
in the ntdern discipline and profession of statistics - irore
precisely, of mathaoatical statistics. This is ncw widely pursued
and taught either as an end in itself, as a methodology capable of
rendering the social sciences truly scientific, or as a technology
capable of inproving the productivity of agriculture and industry.
Because he desired to kncz the differences between men, and
between classes and races of men in respect of their mental
constitutions, Galton undertook work that laid the foundation for
a strong 'individual difference' tradition in psychology. Its
developtent has resulted in a series of statistical theories
of intelligence and in the cognate social technology of mental
testing. Testing requires testers, and they need rroney. It is
illuminating to note that by 1954 the Carnegie Foundation alone'
had allocated over six million dollars tc mental testing.
Being a Darwinian thinker, Galton investigated heredity in man.
Thereby he founded a tradition of niathnatica1 biology which, over
tine, and via several controversies, has developed into the
ndern discipline of biatEtric or quantitative genetics.
This has notable applications in agriculture and in the
controversy as to whether observed differences between races
in performance on standardised tests are of mainly genetical or
of mainly environmental origins. There is a direct link, as we
shall see, between the thought of Galton and the genetics of
Sir Ponald Fisher, and another direct link between these and the
work of arthur Jensen.
3Here, then, we have the develoiirent of three disciplines -
statistics inathanatical genetics and the psychology of individual
differences, iz all elevated to the status of major knowledge
industry. They all stan in good degree fran the thought of Galton,
Iran that of his greatest follower, Karl Pearson (1857-1936), and,
of course, fran the thought of iren who interacted with them. These
included man such as William Bateson the geneticist, Bonald Fisher
the geneticist and statistician, Charles Spearrnan the author of the
notion of a central factor of 'intelligence', and Sirs Cyril Burt
and Godfrey Tharson the distinguished rrental testers. The essay that
follows examines the developtQnt of the various disciplines fran
Galton 's and Pearson's thought, not in a 'whiggish' fashion, but
1n a manner that fo1lcyis historical dead ends as well as the
historical paths of glory.
So far, I hope to have established the notion that Galton was
influential, in the sense that his ideas were taken up and
developed by many others into acadaiic disciplines and cognate
technologies. And, it might be argued that the fact that this
pattern of develont has raDained unstudied is sufficient reason
for embarking upon such a study. But, the reasons for looking at
the Galtonian tradition go deeper than its unstudied condition and
manifest influences. For, its developnent offers a first class
case-study of scientific growth which can illuminate the roles of
human values, of ideology and of mataphysics in the production and
consurption of scientific theories and of associated technologies.
The tradition, we shall see, was organically connected with philosophical
and ideological views. The essay that follows, then, examines the
htia3n well springs of scientific endeavour in sate particular cases.
Galtcn himself, and many of his followers - including Pearson, Burt
and Fisher - were ciinitted eugenists. That is to say, they believed
that alcoholism, pauperism, nental defect and many other conditions
were due predaninantly to inherited dispositions or 'diathese.s', and
that inprovarent and advance would be best achieved by differential
breeding fran those sections of the cairnmity whan they judged to be
the 'fit'. They praxoted the view that class differentials in fertility
were bringing about national decay via genetic erosion. Eugenics, as we
shall see, was generally closely linked to another creed of the age -
that of 'social Darwinism' which cmployed Darwin's theory to obtain
'natural' guides to morality and social policy.
4Social Darwinism was not the only form of 'extra-scientific'
a*iinitmant found anong the developers of the Galtonian tradition.
Karl Pearson, for exairple, held to an extrae positivism and intended
his statistical biology to be an exrplar of his philosophy of science
- making him one of the few philosophers of science ever to attt to
practice what he preached. Charles Spearinan was also heavily involved
In, and notivated by philosophical and social considerations. In the
work following I shall trace the strong interactions between the
developrent of the Galtonian tradition arid these and other philosophical
and ideological strands.
So far, it might be thought that the developient of the Galtonian
tradition was an exclusively British phencirenon. This is not the case.
In iterica too there was a strong pattern of activity. 2½s in Britain,
there wex 'Galtonian' statisticians, 'Caltonian' geneticists arid
'Galtonian' psychologists. above all, there was a eugenics mnovrerit
whose influence quite outstripped that of its British counterpart.
While the British Eugenics Edution Society was still discussing the
leg lity of voluntary sterilisation, Airerican states had gone ahead arid
passed a veritable spate of canpulsory sterilisation laws. By January
1, 1958, there had been sate 31,038 sterilisations carried out, of which2
no fewer than 7,518 had been conducted in California, then, as now, in
the van of change. It was America too which saw the early flowering of
mess mental testing - in the form of the Army alpha tests, which assigned
first world war recruits to privatehood or to off icerhood, to potato
peeling or to intelligence work.3
By ri the picture should seen large, if sketchy. In Britain and in
America (and in Europe too), patterns of work growing out of Galton's
ideas led to important developnts. It is not that every statistician,
psychologist or geneticist of note can be seen as in any strong sense
following Galton's progrm. But a goodly nurier of inortant ones can.
7nd, several of the others can be seen either as reacting against the
tradition or as working fran institutional bases established y adherents
of the Galtonian tradition. Lancelot Hogben is an example of the first
sort, George Udny Yule an example of the second.
The whole canvas cannot be covered in detail in a reasonably
1ength5 work. A focus is required. Here, it lies squarely with
the seminal contributions of Karl Pearson and his 'Biaretric School'
5of biologically orientated statisticians which developed in London in
the last decade of the nineteenth century, arid in the first decades of the
twentieth. Pearson's school played a crucial role in transforming Galton's
ideas into a series of powerful scientific movements. Roughly speaking,
it was Pearson and his school which developed Galtan's ideas while creating
a new would-be science of biartry - or, inatheniatical evolutionary biology.
C*it of biaTetry caire forth statistical ideas and institutions, including
the world' s first ever statistics department in an anglophone university,
the journal Biaretrika, a good deal of inathnatical genetics and a
methodology which enabled interested psychologists to follai through and
develop certain of Galton's ideas in a quantitative fashion. Pearson is
frequently regarded as the founder of the modern discipline of statistics.
The Zicrretric hool under Pearson was also heavily involved in eugenics,
which it attarted to establish as the social science par excellence. In
1925, Pearson set up the Annals of eugenics, which still survives, arid,
indeed, flourishes, as the Annals of hi.man genetics. In short, Pearson
and his school are the key figures in the developrent of the Galtonian
tradition.
(b) Sate issues in explanation.
In preceeding paragraphs, I have suggested that the Galtonian tradition
was developed by men with strong political and philsophical beliefs. Arid,
in what follows, I will examine with sate care the ways in which these
'extra-scientific' beliefs affected the course of scientific deve1oznent.
The effect, I will suggest, was a very considerable one. Both the
perception of problens as problens, and the nature of attetpts made to
resolve them, it will be argued, can frequently be understood only by
understanding the philosophical and ideclogical condition of the minds doing
the perceiving and the resolving. There is, I consider, absolutely nothing
in such a claim that modern philosophers of science would find izrplausible.
lv!en like the late Imre Lakatos have repeatedly stressed that science
develops within research prograirrres which, aver time, refine, expand arid
generally articulate scire strongly held initial hypothesis beloved of the
scientist in charge of the progranne. Lalcatos and others have also
stressed that the process is one that requires an active, imaginative nund
The initial hypotheses have to be actively conceived, for they cannot fall
out of the data in the menner once imagined by the more witless of Bacon' s
followers. Quite possibly therefore, we shall find that the scientist's
style of creativity harnonises with, reflects, and, indeed, may be explained
by, his more general 'extra-scientific' values. To suggest this is not to
6suggest a relapse into relativism. For the initial creation and the
subsequent attipted developtnt of hypotheses are two different things.
Vthether the realities of nature will allcM any particular develoiuent to
go ahead is a matter for irical test. A cheese-rronger may hypothesise
that the on is made of gorgonzola, but the reports of astronauts may
kill the hypothesis. Of course, feci interesting hypotheses stand in such
a sirtple relation to potential falsifying observations as that, but, nost
philosophers would agree, the fate of an hypothesis is not independent
of sai external reality.
But, supposing for the itient that a man's value may affect his science,
then hcw are we to explain his having these values in the first instance?
Do they aite to a man by accident, or, are they determined by his social
position? How shall we explain thent?
Clearly, values are not rigidly determined by social position. Only
one wounded Spanish noblenan became a Loyola. Sate millionaires live
like tramps. If we looked for rigid determinism in human affairs, we
would be defeated at every turn. But, we know, explanation is possible
and the basic tack taken here will be roughly as follows. Groups of
man within society tend to adopt ideologies and desired social blueprints
within which they play estered and valued roles. Thus, for example,
a proletarian may propose the dictatorship of the proletariat as a source
of sweethess and light; a professional man may perceive the virtues of
a state run by h\A and his fellows according to sate suable professional
ideal, and an aristocrat will perhaps extoll the virtues of a hierarchical
civilisation in which the rapacious manufacter is restrained within his
proper place by the exercise of feudal pc71ers. We cannot hope to predict-
what the nErers of a group will recciimend, because, generally, there are
several possible social scenarios in which the group may discern an elevated
role, and, of course, because many groups and individuals are so worn dc'vn
by prevalent power structures that they are unable or unwilling to entertain
such speculations. But, the group's recatixndations once known, we can
saretimes see its social role as an iitortant determinant of what was
recarmnended. It is nuch like the case of a moan who develops a disease.
We can discern that his exposure to mumps virus is the cause of his distended
cheeks without supposing that everyone so exposed will so wax. We cannot,
of course, prove that the explanation given is correct, but it may perhaps
be defended if attacked. In this work, several examples of this strategy
will be developed. At least on occasions, I shall suggest that a particular
scientist's values may bexined by exhibition as the ocaiiton and
7appropriate values of the group to 'hich he belongs. There are many
severe difficulties associated with such a strategy, and it is perhaps
better to deal with than as they arrive than to offer an essay on
historical mathodology at this point.
(c) Sane background develonts
This study deals with scientists who, for the nost part, were
located within the social constructions of Victorian and Edwardian
gland. ?nd, if the sorts of explanation just mantioned are to
feature in the study, it may be well to include, within this
introduction, an indication of sate major changes in social structure
during this period.
A developint of great significance1 as Donald MacKenzie and others
have pointed out1 is the eirergence of a strong and powerful professional
middle class, distinguished fran the orking class, the entrepreneurial
middle class and the aristocracy. This develoznent has been fruently
rarked upon, notably in Professor Perkin's Origin2of nodern English
society, wherethe author discusses in sane detail the rise of an
independent professional class, in the mid and late Victorian period,
aancipated fran dependence upon the aristocracy by increased demand
created in turn by the rise of incanes and by the urbanisation produced
in the industrial revolution. These new man, described by Hobsbawm
as occupying a 'nouvelle couche sociale', with their 'canparative
aloofness fran the struggle for incane', increased in numbers aud
power during the nineteenth century, arid, as Perkin has noted, were the
authors of various social blueprints. At first, he argues, 'professional
n noralized the ideals of other classes by transforming than frau mare
apolpgetics for self interest into noral theories of society', but, with
the passage of time, he ho1d , 'the professional ideal became uppentost
in the minds of the professional thinkers, and increasingly alienated
their adopted class'. Many of the man studied here fall into this group,
or identified with it, and could see their science as advancing the ideals
of the group.
Fran the 1830's to the 1870's, Britain was taken as closely as any
society ever has to a condition of canplete laissez faire in ecananic
matters. 6 l½nd, with notable exceptions, the intellectuals anong the
professional middle classes given to thinking about such things eeined
happy with the arranganent, discerning within it all sorts of advantages.
The early ut.ilitarians could ally themselves with an entrepreneurial class
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against 'idle' property arid 'corrupt' patronage, as exerrplif led by the
aristocracy. But, as Hobsbawn and others have noted, the conditions -
social, military and industrial - which underpinned an ideology of atornistic
individualism began to cnirr1e in the 60's arid 70's, and there etierged
onto the scene new groups of middle class ideologues stressing the need
for collectivism of one sort or another and &rhasising the role which
the cultivated expert, the professional man himself, would play within a
new and reforrred order. Natthew arnold' s Culture and anarchy, providing
'inspiration for a system of universal education' cane out in 1869. And,
in short order we have the British positivists under Harrison, the Hegelian
1iberali.n of T. H. Green, the professional 'social m' of the Fabians and
a new breed of social 1ierialists, willing and anxious to contribute to
the 'national efficiency' novement which was such a prcminent feature of
the first years of the twentieth century, in which fear of growing Japanese
and German cczretition was irobilised to support social change in the
direction of a nore collectivist, a nore 'efficient' state. How much
actual social reform can be laid at the feet of, say, the Fabians or
the pupils of T.H. Green or Bosanquet is an issue unwise to address lightly,
especially as the anDunt of paper produced by a group gives no accurate
guide to the power it exercised. But, what is Important, is that, with the
century's ageing, man could argue for collectivist measures of one sort or
another without being thought stupid, dangerous or crazy.
This shift was paralleled in the field of what has became loosely known
as 'social Darwinism'. Poor Darwin, one feels, would have turned in his
grave had he been aoguainted with this creation, particularly with same of
the turns it was to take at the end of the century. But, there was a long-
standing tradition of melding biological and social thought. The first
'social Darwinist', of course, was Herbert Spencer, who spoke of the
survival of the fittest' saie years before that phrase's adoption by
Darwin. Spencer was the popular philosopher of mid-Victorian times, and
offered guarantees of unstcppable human progress in the form of an
integrated or 'synthetic' system of biosocial philosophy. Improverent
in society would care about by adaptation to social conditions, arid the new
habits of mind which this adaptation engendered within the su4vors would
be trannitted by inheritance to a following generation, which would start
the cycle of adaptation and transmission once again - leading ever onwards
and upwards, so to speak. This adaptation was to be facilitated by a
social policy of laissez faire, of letting the individual rub up against
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the reality of his or her existence. Spencer' s philosophy was, generally
speaking, one of hope, and involved the extinction of the less fit only
if they failed to make appropriate adaptations. The great thing,
biologically speaking, was that these adaptations 'were supposed inheritable,
and the analogy of nature led Spencer to doctrines which, in practice,
came close to darrtding laissez faire as a biological necessity - the
oldest and crudest form of social Daxwinism. But, with the passa of
tine, this form of Daxwinism, though beloved of the great captains of
American industxy7 tended to give way to another. Towards the end of
the century, and in parallel with the shift fran soci 1 atanism to varieties
of collectivism and national efficiency, there arose a now 'external'
form of social Darwinism. This, we shall see, emphasised struggle too,
but the struggle featured was a different one. Progress, in this now
perspective, was the consequent not of the struggle of eveznan with his
neighbour, but of the struggle of group with group. The analogy of nature
was now seen to demand the analogue of a well organised herd. Such a
herd, with rational division of labour 'would win in inevitable group
struggle, especially against groups peinitting damaging intestin
strife. Evidence for these remarks will he brought forward where
appropriate, but, for the mnt, a flavour of the shift may be garnered8
fran Sidney Webb's tract in the Fabian essays of 1889. We find him arguing
that,
'we know now that in natural selection at the stage of
developnt where the existence of civilised man is
at stake, the units selected are not individuals but
societies.
It is against these trends in British society that the events discussed
in the remainder of the work were played out. At each stage I shall
attpt to spell out these events in greater and adequate detail.
We will see that the scientific advances which the work studies cannot
be understood in isolation from these trends and changes.
-	 (d) Content.
In the body of the study, the order of procedure will be s follows.
Chapter 2. The first substantive chapter analyses Galton hiirse1f. It
depicts lthn as a man whose time finally came, because in his old age,
British society was at last prepared to receive his doctrines. These
were inappropriate when first expounded in the 1860' s • He is shown
as a man who entered science as a consequence of a now ideology, which
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he hoped to articulate and spread via science. For, in the late 50's,
like so many other Victorians, he threw over Christianity and
istructed for himself a perful though intellectually shaky,
Daiiinian weithild. The new social order discerned within this order
was the eugenic order - an order in which progress would be produced
by controlled human heredity, with the control in the hands of the
'nan of science' 'whan Galton so loved to study. It was an order
unattractive to the individual i n of mid-Victorian Britain, but, by
the end of the century and beyond, Galton was able to attract a following
for his eugenic ideals - or, at least, for reinterpreted versions thereof.
It was in the hope of providing a scientific basis for such an eugenic
order that Galtan's scientific work - in heredity,statistics and psychology
was performed.
Chapter 3. The argutnt of this chapter contends that Pearson and his
school acted as midwife and nurse to the Galtoniari tradition. They took
in hand Galton' s ideas and developed then, institutionalised then and made
then available for consumption by others. Galtan 'S statistical ideas
were greatly advanced in the course of Pearson's attaipt to create a new
science of mathanatical evolutionary biology (or biaretry as it was known)
in the last decade of the 19th and the first decade of the 20th centuries.
It was Pearson's develont of these ideas that enabled, for example, the
rapid develoxrent of the statistical study of individual differences by
psychologists in the early 20th century. 2nd, it was Pearson who did rrst
to institutionalise eugenics as an acadenic discipline. Again, it was
Pearson's iceas that set the starting point for Sir Ronald Fisher's
influential work in genetics.
Now, much as the first substantive chapter seeks to explain the
production and reception of Galton' s work, so the student of the bio-
metrical school must wish to explain why it rose when it did, and to such
effect. This task is taken up in the third substantive chapter (ie,
chapter 4). The third chapter paves the way, giving a descriptive 'outer'
history of the biaretric school. It describes Pearson' s early work with
Weldon, and the way in which this led onto a science of bianetry, at first
undifferentiated fran mathenatical statistics, and centred about the journal
Bianetrjka, founded in 1901. It discusses the relations between bicmtry,
statistics and eugenics, outlines the farrous 'biaretric-rndelian debate'
of the early 20th century, in which Pearson was decisively defeated by the
new Mendelian geneticists in a struggle for hegenny in evolutionary
biology, and analyses also the not-quite-so-well-known n±ers of the
biaritric school - man like G.U. Y$le, W.S. Gossett arid Major Greenwood.
-.1)
The aim of this chapter, in rief, is to discuss the developtent of
w'
Pearson's biaietric school, and1to give an account of the ways in which
it led on to the formation of a new discipline and profession of statistics.
Chapter 4. This chapter offers an explanatory or 'inner' history of sate
of the events described in the previous chapter. It looks at Pearson
and his school, but, particularly at Pearson - the central and dominating
figure. It asks why he should have taken up xrathanatical biology, though
he was no biologist, and, why he should have done this in a manner productive
of statistics. The answer is given in terms of Pearson's traverse through
late Victorian society, In which be adapted philosophical and ideological
ideas which, in the context of the period, could make the doing of a certain
type of mathematical Daxwinin seen a very attractive proposition. It was
just the 'ort of mnathenatical DarwiniEn that would lead to statistical
itethods being developed, and just the sort of Darwinism that led on to a
strong interest in eugenics. We shall see why, in the early 20th century,
Galton was prepared to donate, and Pearson prepared to receive, very large
suns of ironey to foster the developuent of eugenics as an academic discipline.
Chapter 5. This chapter tries to give an explanatory analysis of the
faitous 'biatetric-Nendelian' debate mentioned above. It explains why
the opposing sides - a London group led by Pearson and a Canridge group
led by l3ateson - should have continued for so long in total opposition,
instead of coming to the obvious ccanpranise, namely that the two approaches
were carpl€nentary, the one dealing with phenotypes, the other with
genotypes.
In the chapter I am critical of extant attøtpts made to analyse and
understand the debate, which, increasingly, is bening a standard object
of historiographical discussion, and, of course, provide what I hope is
a superior approach.
Chapter 6. In the aftermath of chapter 5, I have thought it strategic
to include a discussion of the grth, waxing and ultimate deflation of
the I arrous 'law of ancestral heredity', which, for many years, was the
basis of the bionotric school's central claim to biological fame and success.
It was a law which essayed to predict the, say, probable height ox
intelligence of a man on a basis of a kixMledge of the heights or
intelligences of his parents, grandparents, great grandparents, and so on.
The chapter discusses the various reformulations which the law went
through, fran its first introduction by Galtan in the 1880 t to the time
of its Meze1ian reinterpretation y bir konaJ.a .isner in r.ne .uici
decade of the 20th century.
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By this stage then, I shall have examined Galton's ideas and the various
ways in which they gave rise to major deve1oinents in statistics and
biology. o other substantive chapters deal with the other main pillars of the
Galtonian edifice - eugenics and psychology.
Chapter7 Here, eugenics is put under the microscope, and I argue that
while, in Britain, it was scarEthing of a flop, both as a popular novarent
for social refonn and as a would-be acadanic discipline,it did have a
stliiulating effect on science - particularly upon genetics and
psychology. Psychology being the preserve of the eighth chapter,I here
discuss the impact of eugenic ideology upon Mendelian genetics, finding
reasons for supposing that it was a desire to resolve eugenic problans that
led R.A.Fisher to undertake the work which underpins the trodern notion
of heritability.This argument care at the close of a chapter which examines
and explains the rise of a popular eugenics Ircvarnt in the years prior
to the fist war, and which also analyses and reviews attenpts made,
by Pearson and others, to create a 'science' of eugends, aimed at
dristrat1ng, airongst other things, that heredity in general was
enonously tiore infuential than environment in human affairs, and that
shifts in fertility patterns made it likely that a rapid decline in
national intelligence, by genetic erosion, was taking place.
Chapter 8. Here I examine the developrnt of Galton 'S ideas into a
tradition of statistical 'individual differences' psychology, via the
taking up into psychology of statistical, or, as they were then known,
'bicitetrical' methods • Workers here discussed include William Brown,
Godfrey Thanson and Cyril Burt, but the main focus is upon Charles
Speannan and the role he played within the developing studies of human
intelligence that were pioneered in the first couple of decades of the
present century. Between 19(X) and 1910 significant theoretical noves
were made, and, by 1918, the associated technology of mass mental testing
was being widely applied.
Few theoretical aspects of these deve1opints outrank Charles Spearman's
production and prarotion of the doctrine of 'g' - the supposed general
factor in intelligence. The doctrine has led to Speaxman' s being canpared
with John Dalton, and had done sterling service in accounting for what it
is that intelligence tests really measure. The chapter addresses the why
and the how of Speannan's production and prarotion of his conception, and
does this by locating his thought within a framework of philosophical and
idealogical concern - including eugenics - of which scans were general to
the period, and others specific to Spearrnan.
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Chapter 9
This discusses the foregoing, and	 C the roles of values, or,
rrre generally, of r.on-irical propositions within the scientific
process. In particular it analyses the possibility of giving a sociological
explanation of the rise of the Galtonian tradition, seeking to locate
its exponents at sate point between the two extraies of (a) 'disinterested'
searchers after 'pire' knowledge, and (b), distinguished soldie(.s in
the British Class War.
The extent to which the chapters are original varies considerab1 j , with
the first two substantive chapters showing the nallest anDunt of originality.
But, what is, and what is not thought to be novel is, I hope, always
clearly indicated. One isrortant word of caution should be added, riairely that
the work that follows discusses the contributions made to various
disciplines by man and wanen, who, in senses to be clarified, partook in
a Galtonian tradition. Fran this it should not be inferred that these
were the only persons involved in these disciplines. Notes in the text and
footnotes shou1 make this clear.
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(a) Introduction
The founder of the Galtonian tradition was Francis Galton
(1822-1911). As has been suggested, and as will be shn, the
developxent of the tradition hinged crucially upon recruiting
Karl Pearson (1857-1936) to his cause - or, perhaps, to a different
b.it similar cause, Pearson found that Galton' s ork1
first freed ire fran the prejudice that sound inathanatics
could only be applied to natural phenarena under the
categoiy of causation. Here for the first tirre was a
possibility - I will not say a certainty of reaching knowledge
- as valid as p1sica1 knowledge was then thought to be -
in the field of living forms and above all in the field of
human conduct.
Now, the literature on Galton is large, repetitive and growing.
The chapter analyses the main planks of the Galtonian tradition as
developed by Galton, and explains how Galton caire to his views.
Sate aspects of the analysis and explanation are traditional,
others are novel. We shall have to lcok at Galton' s thoughts on
statistics, human biology, psycharetrics arid social policy.
(b) Early career
Galton was a late developer. The career for which he is fanous
did not carnence before his thirties and it is useful to make first
contact with him aged 27, when he was approaching the end of what
Pearson has called the 'fallow years' • In that year the popular
'scientific' novErent icnc,wn as ptirenology 2 was on the decline, but,
nevertheless, still lingering on. Pougly, phrenology asserted a correla-
tion between head shape and brain shape, and between brain shape and
personality in a broad sense. At root lay doctrines of cerebral localisa-
tion first expounded by Call and Spurzheim. Those who nowadays might
visit a career quidance specialist could then call upon the services of
the phrenologist, a sort of primitive irental tester, for diagnosis and
advice. Galton, presumably disturbed by his showing in life hitherto,
visited the London Phrenological Institute arid had a phrenological analysis
drawn up by the phrenologist Donovan. 3
 mis carre in tw, parts: i, a
printed sheet
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recording the degree of develorztEnt attained in many faculties -
amativeness, adhesiveness, caution, time, tune, canparison, causality
and so on - arid, (ii), a hand written report with the following
peroration.
n so organised do riot attach themselves to literary
pirsuits fran choice; nor do they distinguish them-
selves in universities. They love bodily exercises
and need sports too much to permit them to devote
thatiselves to philosophy and literature. But if
circstances cafl upon them to work at such matters
they can do so, with tolerable success - though it
costs them a good deal of effort to keep pace with good
ni. In a work - as scholars, they are not 'fast men'
though they are by no means incapacitated fran taking
-respectable positions, if they will work hard - if they
resolve to succeed. Their firmness and self esteem work
well for them, when they are enlisted on the right side.
As regards the learned professions I do not think the
gentlaran is fond enough of the midnight laITp to like
them, or to work bard if engaged in one of them. To
ne he seems best fitted for the army, in which I think
he would do well. For he is a fairly good observei- is
practical in his turn of mind - rather than speculative;
and has, altogether, a good working intellect. His verbal
ury is quite strong enough and he has enough of imagination
and initiative to help him upiards and forwards.
The report was perceptive enough, and one likes to suose that it
had saie effect. In the following year, with the good wishes of the
Grgraphical Society, Galton took an expedition to South West Africa.
This was the age when the 'dark continent' was opened. The expedition
was successful, and Galton was ushered a new life by his success.
It gained for him an entree into Victorian scientific circles. There-
after Galton perceived himself as a 'man of science'.
He had been born near Birmingham in 1822, son of S.T. Galton (1783-1844)
and F.A. Violetta Darwin (1783-1832). The father was the son of Samuel
Galton F.R.S, (1753-1832). The nother was the daughter of Erasmus Darwin,
F.R.S. • Era&rius and Samnel were both menbers of the Lunar Society of
Birmingham, which also numbered Joseph Priestley and Matthew Boulton anong
its xnanbers The family noney on the paternal side came fran armaments
manufacture, and later on, fran banking. The Darwins too were well off.
Erasnuis was a successful physician, and his son Robert, the father of
Charles Darwin (who was Galton' s cousin) also made a great deal of nDney.
'tiuel was a quaker, but was discned by fellow quakers for manufacturing
the instrunnts of war. S.T. Galton was an .lnglican.
S.T. Galton was keen to propel Francis into a profession, to
get him into 'an occupation useful to yourself and to others', and,
to this end, sent him to the King Edward's School Birmingham, and then
in 1838, to the Birmingham General Hospital, where Francis was accepted
as a house pupil. His school life appears to have been one long round
of japes, thrashings and other punis1nents. His hospital life appears
to have been itore congenial, though Galton was never able to resign
himself to the terrible cruelty of surgical practice. at that period.
In 1838, Galton transferred to King's College London for further
training in anataty, ysio1ogy and chatiistry, and, in the following year
Vve)	 1
went to Cambridge to take a mathanatics degree - a	 practice for
aspirant doctors in those days before the introduction of the Natural
Sciences Tripos in 1851. Galton was a Trinity man, though he sens 1-o
have had little respect for its master, Whewell.
Just how hard he worked at his mathanatics is hard to say. Letters
to his father indicate that he worked at full steam, but there is also
evidence that Galton was at least ordinarily fond of ocia life and the
bottle. We know him to have been a fashionable dresser,anong literary
reiiains of this Cambridge period is an ode to miB punch, lamenting over
indulgence and hang-over. Possibly Pearson is right when he suggests that
Galton tried to burn both ends of the candle too brightly. In the event
ftJC
the mathematics was the one thatextinuished i and, after suffering a
DEntal breakdown, Galton opted instead for a pass degree. Lfle his cousin
Charles Darwin before him, he went out in the poll.
We know little of Galton's Cambridge days, apart fran the facts that5
he was friendly with the future Sir Henry Maine, with Henry Hallam, brother
of Tennyson's ?rthur Hallam, with F. Caitipbell and several others of sa'ie
note. There is not inucth documentary evidence4that Galton was actively
involved in religious or political controversy in Cambridge, apart frcui
a couple of minor vignettes. The first concerns Galton's 1843 entry for
the Canden madal. This took the form of a poan which, as he put it,
was 'relative to the present great controversy as to whether man has a
conscience (innate I DEan) or not'. It was a long poem, but included the
following lines :6
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Well may we loathe this world of sin, arid strain
As an iirrisoned dove to f] away;
Well may we burn to be as citizens
Of sate state, mdeIIed after Plato's scheixe,
And overruled by Chrstianity,
1ere justice, love4 truth and holiness
Should be the ircving principle of all,
And God ac nowledge as its prop and stay.
How foolish and how wicked seems the world,
With afl its energies bent to amass
Wealth, faire or knowledge.
The second vignette is political. Galton, whilst an undergraduate,
foid -hiie]± in -a railway _ LVcLtLerit alongwith a trEnber of the
Reform Club, a 'ne plus ultra radical'. 2rid, to his family he wrote
We had a red-hot argunent on politics, which I finuly
believe neither of us knew anything about but he would
talk about then, arid as I must answer yes or no, even
Bessy will euse iry not assenting to a radical's ideas.
After taking his degree, Galton returned briefly to his nedical
studies, arid cane very close to beccxning qualified to practice. But, in
1844 his father died. Galton inherited noney and becane free fran his
father's desire that he should becane a self-supporting professional man.
He quit nedicine in an instant, with no regrets.
Thereafter caire the 'fallow years' • In 1845-6 be travelled in
Egypt, Sou&.n and Syria, returning to Britain in Novarer 1846. His
tours were adventurous but unscientific, though they broadened his mind
towards religion. One particular incident is generally noted. Galton
and his colleagues, after a debauch, net with a sheikh, fresh fran prayer
in the desert. He recalled that he 'felt swinish in the presence of his
noslein purity and iitosing mien'. This, Pearson suggested ) is an indication
)f Galton's caxiing to think that the Christian faith in which he had been
reared was not the only possibility.
On his return to Britain, Galton took to the life of the hunting,
shooting and fishing country gentleman. Pearson his biographer clearly
found his involvarent hard to caTprehend.
the strange thing is that it seemed to absorb his whole
nature, and to be done not for the sake ofperience,
but in the pure pursuit of occupation. '
2(
1849-50 was sanething of a watershed, Galton visited Donovan
in the London Phrenological Institute, and, through his cousin Douglas
Galton, gained an introduction to the Geographical Society. Mter
discussions, he set up an expedition to Mrica - at a tine When/the
opening of the dark continent was a major British interest - and set
out for South West Africa in 1850. This kept him out of England until
1852, and his expedition was described by him in his Tropical South
Africa. 9
 For his exploits, Galton received the gold medal of the
Geographical Society. By turn he threw himself into the affairs of the
society, thereby gaining an entree into the British scientific establish-
uent of the period. Geography led him naturally into metrology. In
1856 he was made fellow of the Royal Society for his contributions to
science, and by then be was three years married to Louisa Butler, a
member of Britain' s 'intellectual arist.cracy'. Galton, of course, had
plenty of spare tine for science, as he was able to live the life of the
rentier, nuch like his cousin Darwin.
It was not just the Geographical and the Royal societies which
received Galton' s attention. For, he soon became a great supporter
Jc!5- the British Association for the Advancement of Science, an
organisation in which he was to 11d high office. He was a natural
'man of science', being, in fact, the one that Beatrice Webb singled
out as the finest exairple of the genre. She saw him as Irre outstanding
than his colleagues Huxley, ¶Lyndall, Hooker and Lubbock.1°
to a recent and enisiastic convert to the scientific
method, the nost relevant of Galton' s many gifts was the
unique contribution of three separate and distinct processes
of the intellect; a continuous curiosity ab3ut 1 and rapid
apprehension of individual facts, whether carnon or uncairron;
the faculty for ingenious trains of reasoning; and, nore
admirable than any of these, because the talent was wholly
beyond my reach, the capacity for correcting and verifying
his own hypotheses, by the statistical handling of masses
of data, whether collected by himself, or supplied by other
students of the prob1n.
For Galton, the 6rerging man of science, 1859 was sanething of an
annus inirahilis. This was not because it was the year of Mill's On
liberty or because it was the year of Marx's Critique of political
econat, but because it was the tine for Darwin's Origin of species.
2Galton ' s interest in the book was anthropological. Like the
listeners to T. H. Huxley's addresses he was interested in Darwin for
what he might say about man and society. For Galton, a traditional picture
of mien' s place in nature could not be set aside until the Origin: after
the Origin, it could not be sustained. In particular, it freed him fran
the 'argunent fran design', whereby a long line of British scientists
had argued for the existence of a beneficent God. The leading exponent
of this tradition at Galton' s tine was William Paley, whose works all
Cambridge students were catpulsorily familiarised with That he was glad
to escape fran Paley' s logic cannot be doubted) given a letter written to
Darwin, inich Galton thanked his cousin for liberating him fran an
intolerable burden of superstition',2
I used to be wretched under the weight of the old fashioned
argurrents fran design of which I felt, though I was unable
tt prove iryself, the worthlessness. Consuently the
appearance of your Origin of species forned a real crisis
in n' life; your book drove away the constraint of nrj old
superstition as if it had been a nighthare and was the first
to give ire freedan of thought.
Shortly after reading Darwin' s Origins Galton pzho had made a study of
the races he had encountered in Africa, joined the Ethnological Society,
a descendent of the Aborigines' Protection Society set up in 1837 to
-tê€. 1ere.s1 f 'p rh.' epIe?3. The Ethnological Society was an academic
branch of the parent and was directed in the first instance by men like
Janes coje. Pri chard,(1Th 6 - 'gl-g )and Thanas Hodgk9 (!T- i )wiio were
much concerned with whether man had had a single origin (the ironogenist
position) or a multiple origin (the polygenist position). At the time of
Galton 's joining, the secretary of the Ethnological Society was Jarres Hunt,
a strong racialist sarewhat in the tradition of the anatanist Robrt I<nox.
Hunt, like other irnbers of the Ethnological Society, held for example,
that negroes and white mien constituted different species, though he believed
in divine creation rather than in Darwinian emergence of species.
In 1863, along with sate other nibers,Hunt seceded fran the Ethnological
Society arid founded the Anthropological Society, which could soon count on a
fairly diverse nnbership, including', for example 1Captain Buxton. Its
n'nbership resolved to 'study man in all his leading aspects, physical,
mental and historical'1 b lit, the 'Darwinian' faction, including Galton,
Lubbock, Huxley and Busk stayed behind and daninated the Ethnological Society.
After Hunt's death in 1869, the two groups were reunited, forming, in 1871,
the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. Galton thereby
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became associated with the official centre of British anthropology,
and was to serve as president of the Institute.
So, by the early sixties, Galton had visited Africa, had lost
his Christian faith, had encountered the radical racialin of James
Hunt and the advanced Darwinian ideas of T.H. Huxley, and, noreover,
jixigirig fran his writings and correspondence, seans to have d
philanthropic turn of mind. As catrtntators have noted he wanted
to be of sate use in the world. We krx, too that during his African
expedition he had foni a low opinion of the negro, cczraring the
inbers of one tribe unfavourably with his spaniel as regards irental
capacities •15 He was a ready subscriber to doctrines of black inferiority
which constantly recur in Io1)erA history - whether it he Linnaeus designating
the negro as phlegmatic, cunniri,lazy, lustful, careks and go med by
caprice, or the l½nthropological review writing in 1866 that,
As the type of the negro is foetal, so that of the Mngo1 is
infantile. And in strict accordance with this we find that
their government, literature and art are infantile also. They
are beardless children whose life is a task and whose chief
virtue consists in unquestioning obedience.
(c) Forging a new perspective
SciTehow,	 out of this melange of observations and perspectives -
strengthened by his having noticed that Britain was developing an apparently
hereditary 'intellectual aristocracy' (Galton belonged to two branches of
this, the Butlers by marriage and the Darwins) - Galton cane forth with a
new world view which1as Ruth Cowan and others have noted, replaced his old
Christian standpoint and offered him a way to he of use in the world.
This was his new 'eugenic' weltarischaiig which he proposed for the first
tine in his paper on 'Hereditary talent and character' in 1865.
This paper was, at root, the application of Galton' s reading of
Darwin's Origin to produce a new account of the order of things. One of
the key ideas of the new order, perhaps the key idea, appears in the first
paragraph of the paper6
The pcwer of man over animal life, in producing whatever varieties
of form he pleases is enonrously great. It would seen as though
the physical structure of future generations was aim3st as plastic
as clay, under the control of the breeder's will. It is my desire
to show nore pointedly than - so far as I am aware - has been attrpted
before, that mental qualities are equally under control.
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Here we have it. Nan himself is subject to selection, which is
capable of altering not just his physical nature, but also his
psychical nature. Consequently,19
ethe prtj
?'n and wanan/are to those we might hope to bring into
existence what the pariah dogs of the streets of an
Eastern town are to our own highly bred varieties.
If this were all that Galton wishes to assert, it would be
interesting enough. it his claims were wider. He also argued that
a variety of social phenana of first rate importance could be given
a Darwinian explanation. Items like parental and social affection, he
argued, were explicable naturalistically,, because it was obvious that
groups of mien developing these characteristics would cohere and prosper
better than groups that did not° Religious sentiments, he argued, were
no miore than a transmuted form of these evolutionarily founded socia1.
sentiments, and a feeling of original sin was no nore than a consciousness
of recent barbarity. All of this was a good example of the sort of
perspective that reading Darwin was liable to produce in Victorian men
of science - not in all of them of course, but in that pugnacious fraction
including mien like 'I,nal 1 and Clifford, who actively opposed the force of
science to the force of religion. Galton' s nost interesting doctrine,
however, was a statrent of what we now refer to as Weismann's principle
of the isirortality of the genii plasm, which asserts that there can be no
inheritance of acquired characters. In this paper Galton threv. suspicion
on supposed cases of the inheritance of acquired characters, and, after
arguing that 'there is nothing in the thryo of an individual that was not
in the eiryos of its parents' ,We* on to claim that21
We shall therefore take an approximately correct view of
the origin of our life, if we consider our own emiryos to
have sprung immediately fran those embryos whence our parents
were developed, and these fran the ertryos of their parents,
and so on forever, we should in this way look on the nature
of mankind, and perhaps on that of the whole animated creation,
as one continuous system, ever pushing out new branches in all
directions, that variously interlace, and that bud into separate
lives at every point of interlacement.
In short, Galton had a whole new view of things as early on as 1865.
The old Christian cosnology was abandoned, and, in its place he substituted
a thoroughly naturalistic view, which explained away items such as religious
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sentimants in a 'Darwinian' manner. The whole picture of man, which
insisted that the individual was merely the product of the exfoliation
of the potentialities built into his rbryo, was a clean break fran the
old picture. In the new view, the pcier of envirornent was minimal,
leaving genetic selection as the only source of human iirprovanent.
It is totally different franSpencer's view (see belj) which a11ced
that heredity could pass on the adaptive mdifications made during one
generation's becaning adapted to its conditions. Sare evidence for mental
heredity was produced in the 1865 paper, but not a great deal - and,
certainly, nothing that would force anyone to change his or her mind.
Having rejected any divine source for nr,ra1 guidance, Galton was obliged
to look elsewhere - and found the source that many another agnostic or
atheistic Victorian was to alight upon, namely biological historicism.
He argued, implicitly in 1865, and explicitly ].ater on, that one COUi
discern a necessary tendency of the Cotos? 2 This was the production of
'inDre and nore fit animals'. What else could norality be except the
pavighe way, in kindly fashion, for changes that nature would effect
anyway? Natural selection, Galton felt sure, would, in the long run
at least, do with great suffering what planned human breeding of humans
could do painlessly, or, at least, relatively painlessly. Therefore,
planned human breeding as a policy could be defended.
But, the argumentation was not as bloodless as that. Galton might
be pitting away religion, and replacing it with a natural systen of
xrorality, but he did so in a very religious way. He was1 after all a
colleague of the aggressive Tyndall, whose Belfast address to the British
Association in 1874, usually taken as the classic statement of the anti-
religious case, gave a wholehearted acknc1edgenent of the existence of
the religious instinct and argued that providing the sentiarit with
satisfaction was 'the problen of problens at the present hour' Galton
was a close friend of Tyndall, and so, perhaps, it is not a rE'atter for
surprise that he chose to depict the policy of planned human breeding, or
'eugenics' as he called it fran 1883 onwards, as a new, secular religion.
Naturally, it was to be a religion guarded by a new scientific priesthood.
Galton, like sare of his fellcw leading Victorian men of science, wished
to replace the existing Anglican clergy with a new scientific clerisy,
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and it is clear fran his writing that an flrortant aspect of the work
of this clerisy within the scientific state of the future (as planned
by Galton) would be the superintendence of a ne,' state religion of
eugenics.
The religious feeling which he developed for eugenics is clearly
laid out in the closing paragraph of his (Galton's) Iriries into human
faculty of 1883, where he wrote the folling, 24
The chief result of these inquiries has been to elicit
the religious significance of the doctrine of evolution.
It suggests an alteration in our marital attitude, and
Imposes a new itoral duty. The new mental attitude is
one of a grea1(sense of noral freedan, responsibility and
opportunity; the new duty which is supposed to be
exercised concurrently with, and not in opposition to the
old ones upon which the s<xial fabric depends, is an
endeavour to further evoluL.ion, especially that of the
human race.
Here then we have Galton In full voice. He fervently desired a new,
post-Christian source of norals. For him, as for many other Victorians
- e.g., in their different ways, Spencer, the brilliant W.K. Clifford
and Clifford's successor Karl Pearson - evolution would fill the bill.
A non-negotiable view of nature was used to produce a non-negotiable
set of noral principles. Nothing would shift Galton fran his outlook,
not even his friend Huxley's inveighingthis line of biological historicisxn
in his fanous address on 'Evolution and thi' in l8 3. This is the sort
of metaphysics which underlies Galton' s work, and that of a great deil of
his follcMers.
In its full foimi, the Galtoriian perspective could take on airrost
mystic qualities. We find, for exanpie, that Hereditary genius closes
on the follcwing note.26
Nature teans with latent life, which man has large pcers
of evoking under the forms and to the extent which he
desires. We must not permit ourselves to consider each
human or other personality as satthing supernaturally
added to the stock of nature, bit rather as a segregation
of what already existed, under a new shape, and as a regular
consequence of previous conditions. Neither must we be
misled by the word "individuality", because it appears fran
the many facts and argints in this book, that our personal-
ities are not so independent as our self-consciousness leads
us to believe. We may look upon each individual as sarthing
not wholly detached fran its parent source, - as a wave that
has been lifted and shaped by normal conditions in an unknown,
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illimitable ocean. There is decidedly a solidarity
as well as a separateness in all human, and probably
in all lives whatsoever; and this consideration goes
far, as I think, to establish an opinion that the
constitution of the living Universe is a p.lre theism,
and that its fonn of activity is what may be described
as co-operative. It points to the conclusion that all
a is single in its essence, but various, ever varying,
and inter-active in its manifestations, and. that man and
all other living animals are active workers and sharers
in a vastly xtore extended systEn of cosmic action than
any of ourselves, much less of then, can possibly can-
prehend. It also suggests that they may contribute, irore
or less unconsciously, to the manifestation of a far higher
life than our own, sar .ihat as - I do not propose to push the
metaphor too far - the individual cells of one of the iiore
ix,lex animals contribute to the manifestation of its higher
order of personality.
(d) Interpretations
What are we to make of all of this - of the new post-Christian
weltanschaung of Galton, with its thoroughgoing evolutionism, its
determination to explain all human sentistnts in evolutionary terms,
its insistence on the like heredity of mental and physical characters,
its 'pure theism', and abcve all, its insistence on the religious
izr,eratives of eugenics - of the iir?rovarnt of the human race by
selective breeding?
Certainly, the new view was totally different to that which had
been adopted by Victorian England's favourite philosopher, Herbert
Spencer (l8ø- 1'1o3). 	 Spencer, in ni.merous tracts and books,had argued
that laissez-faire social policies obliged men adapt their social habits
and mental powers to the circumstances of their lives. By the inheritance
of acxauired characters, the lessons 'learned' by one generation in the
process of iirroving their adaptation could be transmitted to the next
generation, which, accordingly, began its progress fran a new and higher
base-line?7
 Galton 's views were directly opposed. There was, for him,
no inheritance of acquired characters, and it was state intervention in
eugenics, not laissez-faire that would soonest lead to progress. Of course,
in the sixties, Spencer's views fitted well with arti -collectivist per-
spectives then daninant in social thought.
Evolutionism, perhaps, was a reasonably camon option for Victorian
man of science opposed to the Christian tradition in which they had been
raised, and against which they saw the possibility of opposing a 'scientific'
picture of things. Galton was restive in his Christianity, but experienced
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the strong religious instinct or tendency to which 'ndall alluded.
The new view did service in this area of Galton 'S marital life - enabling
him to be both religious and non-Christian at the sane time. The
religious elErent should be clear enough in sane of the extracts quoted
above. At the sane time, the adoption of the doctrine of xtental
heredity gave Galton a practical policy for human reform. It gave
his new religion a practical side, caiibining so to speak, a doctrine
of predestination (one was what one's genetic makeup determined one to
be) with scope for good rks (having children in good numbers if one
was talented). Galton, interestingly, was childless.
	
28Ruth Cowan, discussing the doctrine of mental heredity, points out
that Galton' s early carinibtt to the doctrine exceeded that which was
justified by the slim evidence he had been able to amass in the sixties
and seventies. Furtheniore she points out with perfect justification
that the doctrine of the non-inheritance of aog4red characters was quite
out of step with the biological views of the period. Darwin and Spencer,
for example, ware firm believers in the inherited effects of use and disuse
- roughly, that a blacksmith might transmit strong arms to his offspring, even
though the strength of his arms had been achieved by continual exercise rather
than by direct heredity.
In order to explain this devotion to nature rather than to nurture,
Cowan suggests that 2we might do well to look to Galton 'S
conservative nature (he was a firm supporter of Lord Salisbury) and to his
attested desire to be a philanthropist, to be of 'sane use in the world'.
Certainly, the adoption of the new view of mental heredity enabled Galton
to canbine a posture of ilanthropic reform with a continuing anti-
egalitarianism. The social ideal o which he rked was one in which
meritocratic ideas Loaned large. He wrote for exanpie, that his Utopia
would be one in which
incomes were chiefly derived Iran professional sources,
and not much through inheritance; where every lad had
a chance of showing his abilities and, if highly gifted,
was enabled to achieve a first-class education and entrance
into professional life, by the liberal help of the exhibitions
and scholarships which he had gained in his early youth;
where rn3rriage was held in high honour as Sn ancient Jewish
times, where the pride of race was encouraged (of course I do
not refer to the nonsensical sentiment of the present day, that
goes under that name), where the weak could find a welcare and a
refus in celibate nonasteries or sisterhcods, and lastly, where
the better sort of emigrants and refugees from other lands were
invited and welcaied, and their descendants naturalised.
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Given that Galton was so grossly out of step with the doctrines of
the tines when he first prcragated his views in the sixties and seventies,
this line of approach seems very helpful. For, whenever we find a scientist
holding views which are at variance with established views, we should,
presinably expect to find sate underlying reason leading him either to
(1) suppose that be might be correct and that further work will shari this
to be the case, or (U), to actually suppose that his case has been proved.
Ga].ton seems to have fallen into the second category, to have gone beyond
what	 evidence would support at the tine. If we think about why this
should have been the case, we can see that his total perspective contained
many features agreeable to a man cons€ituted as he was - that is to say,
one who was disillusioned with Christianity but still of religious
disposition, and, at the sane time, philanthropically but anti-egalitarianly
ndnded.
Ce) Social biology and statistics
Let us naii turn to the scientific career which these background
beliefs generated. Though personally convinced of the correctness of his
views frcrn the outset, Galton desired always to develop them and to produce
evidence capable of convincing others. These desires led to seminal
work in quantitative social biology, in psychology and in the field of
building up an institutional franework to support his ideas.
We may start with quantitative social biology.
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After the papers for !'Laci'i11an's, Galton went on to produce
Fiereditarv genius in 1869.This work extended an aspect of the
production of 1865 by providing further biographical evidenceç q.4'14. V't&J
that talent was strictly hereditary.Interestingly, it was not
well received the Times (Jan 7,1870) wrote that the proposition
that'very high. abilities are very seldom destroyed in the germ
is a proposition contrary to all analogy', and the Morning s
 Post
(April 16,1870) wrote that Galton's statistics 'fail altogether
in attempting to confirm the continuous descent of genius'.
With hindsight,we should say of Bereditary genius that it isnotab1e
for its employment of the normal or Gaussian curve to
describe the distribution of human abilities.Galton assumed that
'natural ability', a sort of precursor of the I.Q.notion, followed
such a distribution.After all, ' he reisoned, were not several
pkrsica1 characteristics such. as height so distributed, and was
this not the pattern that obtained among sets of examination markS
(See Fig.1 and Fig.2)
The first point, if not the second, bad been remarked upon by the
Belgian astronomer and statistician Quetelet (1796-1874), who
had shown that several human attrjbutes, considered over the
whole population,
isV
an approxim3tely normal distribution?2 Galton sflr1y appropriated
this view and applied it to xrtal characters. Apparently henvinced
helf that what could be shown for one normally distributed character
would hold for any other. ccordimy, we find that his subsuent work
frequently did not deal with the faof utal inheritance direct1,.
Bather, he sought to establish hishcase by shciwing what were the principles
governing the inheritance of physical characters such as height, and by
arguing that what held for the physical would assuredly hold for the mental
too. The reason for this tactic was the simple one that mental xreasurnt
was an undeveloped line in the seventies. Galton had no IQ scale with which
to operate. On the other hand, 'objective' physical data was easily procurable
ar4 denr.nstrable.
ien Galton began to consider heredity, when he began to consider
the inheritance of normally distributed physical characters such as
stature, he effected what is best thought of as a considerable revolution
in statistical thought. Before outlining this, it Irust be said that in
Britain in the sixties and seventies there existed no tradition of what
we would cafl mathematical statistics. The nearest approach to be found
was the 'error theory' tradition of astronc*msrs, who were familiar with the
nthnatics of the normal curve, but in the context of a desire to use such
mathatics to excise observational error fran their work? 3
 It is true that
there did exist statistical societies: what was to becane the Royal
Statistical Society had been set up in 1834. But, these societies, in the
sixties and seventies at least, were essentially information gathering bodies.
As such they were doggedly anti-theoretical, and the London Statistical Societ
went so far in this 'Baconian' direction as to adopt for its embln a wheatsheaf
decorated with a banner bearing the irotto 'alliS exterendum' ?
Those wno did apply the results of error theory to human data remained,
nevertheless1 isi the grip of the metaphysics which surrounded error theory.
Quetelet, for example, exemplified this to the point of seeing the mean
man, 'l'hatme moyen' as the ideal, error-free man. He made a virtue of
what Galton would perceive as 'mediocrity'. Victpr Hilt2 5has shown, that
Quetelet was in the grip of a philosophy derived fran the views of LaPlace,
which made both LaPlace and Quetelet see deviations fran the mean of a normal
curve as due to 'accidental' cses, not subject to properly scientific study.
But, for Galton the euge.n.ist, the normal curve was not a curve of error,
but a curve of distribution. For Queteld there could be no science of
individual differences, but for Calton there could. This different
Uperspective was to lead Galton onto his greatest statistical discoveries
- which dealt with the properties of deviations fran the itean and with the
way in which two or more distributions of these might be related.
Galton the eugenist saw the normal curve with new eyes. If we take
the distribution of Triatural ability', then people taking values in the left-
tail of the curve would be seen as eugenically dangerou and those in the
right-tail as eugenically very sound. As Galton put it, 'these errors of
deviations were the very things I wanted to preserve and know about'.
1re generally tIx)ugh, he had fallen in love with the normal cunie, which he
called the 'suprene law of unreason', and wkch, he considered, the Greeks
would have deified had they krxn of it. For,37
whenever a large sample of chaotic elatents are taken
in hand and marshalled in order of their magnitude,
an unsuspected and nest beautiful form of regularity
proves to have been latent all along.
Unsurprisingly therefore, Galton noved on to address the heredity
of normally distributed human characters, taking height as the subject
of a first study. This desire led him to spend a great deal of time and
energy setting up anthropatejric laboratories for the collection of human
data, and eventuated in his finding that two generations of hunens, in
respect of stature, were related by linear regression. That is to say,
he found that if one took all the fathers in a population who deviated
in respect of height by z inches fran the population mean (in a positive
or in a negative direction), then, if one took all of the sons whcan they
produced, one found that, on the average, these sons deviated by only az
inches, in the sane direction of deviation as the father. In his work1
Galton fixed upon a value of a as equal to 1/3, though later researches
resulted in a larger figure. He found noreover, that the variance
of the gioups or arrays of sans was the sane for each array and was such as
just to counteract the variance-contracting tendencies of linear regression
between father and son. So, regression to the mean did not connote a
progressive diminution of variance fran generation to generation.
The general pattern of these discoveries can be garnered fran
adjacent tables and figures and their notes. Table 2 is of particular
interest as it shows that the frequency distribution of pairs of sons and
'iniciparents' (Note, 'midparent' is a sort of parental average, arid is
explained in the note to Table 23 in a sample of observations carried out
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Fig. I. A nornai curve: the y axis dendtes frequency, and the x axi8
the quantity -e.g., hwnan stature — whose vczrious values take the
different frequencrz.es nth.cated by the curve.
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Table I A classifwatwn of men on the basis of the normal curve
drawn up by Galton in Fleredi.tary genwe - the 'grades of natural
abz.li-t,' repr-saat equal ntervals along the x 	 measured 'zn
a 'standardi..sed' retr2.c - namely some multiple of t1e 'standard devi.ation'.
Image removed due to third party copyright
4)
4.,
	
Table 2 Taken from Natural inheritance. This shows the frequencies of
_pairs of rnidparent wid chil4 of different statures.
Image removed due to third party copyright
Fig. 2 Thia ShOWS the salient facts of rnidparental regression.
Mid-parents of deviation a have, on the average, offspring that
devicte from.. tha offs''ing mez by only 2/3 a units.
fFigure 3 A bjvariate normal surface of frecuency s isthe axis of	 35
pquency, and x and y stand for the cLimenswns whose joint frquencies are
t1'"	 iJ	 'fac. I# Ga1to, '.c cas&, fot'	 ihy uki4 fJtal%Z
for the	 tures of midparents and of sons.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Fig.4. Galton's frequency ellipses. This ellipse of constant frequency
'observed' by Gaiton corresponds to the ellipse of constant frequency
indicated in Fig.3.
Image removed due to third party copyright
ai upper middle class Britons. (ie can see that, if drawn out as a
urface of frequency, the data of Table 2 could give a surface corres-
ponding quite well to the bivariate normal surface (Figs 1 and 3). Galton
realised this approximation in the late 1880's, and caused sane
inathanatical vestigations to be made of the surface by a Caithridge
inathnatician. Galtori knew the equation for the surface because he
realised that the joint distribution could be regarded as the product
of the marginal distribution of mid-parents (normal, with knn variance)
and the coôoI distribution of sans (normal, with knn variance).
For, just as the probability of a joint event - e.g., having two daughters,
is the product of the probability of the one (eg. having a first daugher)
tunes the concUtional probability of the second (eg. having a second, y'esi. oiJZ
daughter), so the joint distribution of two variables (heights of inidparents
and sons) can be gotten by multiplying the relevant marginal and conditional
distributions. ( See figs. 2,3 and 4)
The inathanatician in question was J. Hamilton Dicksctof Peterhouse,
Cantridge. Dickson, (1849-1931) had been fifth wrangler in the Cambridge
mathanatical tripos in 1874, and his answers to Galton' s queries were
published as an appendix to Galton's Natural inheritance of 1889. Let us
briefly recall what it is that Dicksc*idid. Galton told him the nature of
his data. He had observed a marginal distribution of midparents with a
normal form and a 'probable error' of 1.22 ins. He knew also that sans
regressed linearly on their midparents with a regression coefficient of
2/3 arid were normally distributed about 'regressed means' with a probable
error of 1.5. ins. In other words, the array of sans due to mid parentages
•	 deviating by d inches fran the midparental mean would be normally
distributed, with a probable error of 1.5 ins about a mean stature deviating
by (2/3)d inches fran the general mean of sons. Thus Dickson could
inirediately write the equation for the surface of frequency for filial and mid-
parental deviations jointly. For, multiplying these two distrih.itions in
accordance with the principle just described - that is to say, a normal
• distribution with probable error 1.22 ins and a conditional distribution,
also normal, about a 'regressed' value of the midparental variable, he
obtained the surface of frequency z=f (x ,y) which was such that 'the
exponent, with its sign changed, of the exponential which appears in the
value of z in the equation is, save to a factor
+2y
(1.22)2
(3x -
9(1.5)2
1
3
2/3
(1.22)2
(1.7)2
.	 .	 .
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Dickson carried out a variety of investigations of such a
surface. But ortresult, perhaps, was of the greatest inortance.
This was that the ratio of the sqjiared probable errors of the to
variables in the surface was equal to the ratio of the twv regression
coefficients. Thus, in the particular case of sons and xnidparents,
we have the equality
This equality was to be very flrortant for Galton, for it provided the
key underpinning for his fanis notion of mathEnatical correlation,3IYe " 'Z.
This arose in the first instance out of Galton's acquaintance with a nz04
systen for the identificationproposed by the French criitiinologist Alphonse
Bertiflon° Bertillon's systan involved taking a large number of anthroço-
ntric itasures on criminals - eg, arm, leg, head uasurents and so on.
The underlying idea was that these itasurnts were independent ones.
Galton was unhappy about this, for he felt sure that bodily maazurnts
tended to 1° together, although no one to his knciledge had attaited
to nasure tne degree of correlation. It was a question that he collected
data upon in 1888 in his anthropciretric laboratory.
As soon as Galton began to tabulate results for the joint distribution
of pairs of rneasurerrents taken on a large number of people, he found a very
familiar pattern.41
No sooner had I begun to tabulate the data than
I saw that they ran in just the sane form as
those that referred to family likeness in stature...
A very little reflection made it clear that family
likeness was nothing nre than a particular case of
the wide subject of correlation, and that the
whole of the reasoning already bestowed upon
the special case of family likeness was equally
applicable to correlation in its irost general aspect.
The probln of how to give a measure of the degree of correlation
was solved in his 1888 paper an 'Co-relations and their measurement,
chiefly fran anthropanetric data' in which he showed mathnatical1y
and empirically, that if the two variables in what we now call a binonnal
distribution were maasurezt in terms of their own variance, then the
regression of the first on the second 'would equal that of the second an the
first. Furtherirore, the 'regression' in such cases could not exceed unity.
Thus, argued Galton, he had found a measure of the degree of correlation
between two organs. It took the form of the coefficient of correlation 'r',
which, as discovered by Galton, was a parameter in the bivariate normal
surface. He was not nu.ich aware of the difference between population arid
sarr?le values of the coefficient, was uncertain how to estimate its
inagniture fran any given set of bivariata data, and certainly did not
invent the faitous product-mztxmt coefficient of correlation. We shall
see the genesis of this in a later chaj.Ler.
Hence it was that Galton discovered the correlation coefficient,
which opened up to social scientists the possibility of making mathematical
connections between variables even though there was no strictly functional
connection to be had. Galton realised, of course, that the array of x or of
y (as the case might be) corresponding to a fixed value of y or x had the•
variances (l-r2 ) 6
	
and (l-r2) c	 respectively3
¶ID points perhaps should be made. The first is that Galton's
discovery of correlation cane only after he encountered the need for such
a coefficient. In work on heredity he had been satisfied with using the
regression coefficient, even though ir cases where the two variables had
different variances - eg., xnidparental and filial statures - the regression
of the first variable on the second did not equal that of the second on the
first. But, in forming a coefficient of correlation when considering the
general problem of finding a mnathanatical measure of association, he WcLS
obliged to fornujlate a measure which made the association of x with y equal
to that of y with x. The second point is that historians who have dealt
with Galton' s discovery of the correlation coefficient have depicted hisu as
making the discovery piricafly, by noting that when two variables were
measured in terms of their own variances, the regression of the first on
the second came to equal that of the second on the first. Doubtless this
arirical aspect did exist, but as an explanation of Galton's discovery of
the correlation coefficient its citation is on a par with explaining
9U
Pythagoras' discovery of the right angle triangle theorn by referring
to fleasurEflents 'wtLich he may have irade on fields. Just as we have to
shcw how Pythagoras proved the universal truth of his theorem, so, in
order to appreciate Galton's work on correlation, it is necessary to
appreciate the use he made of Dickson's results, which cei b show
the necessary existence of the correlation coefficient in every
bivariate normal surface of freqiency4
In subsequent chapters, we shall see that Galton' s interpretation of
the correlation coefficient differed sawhat fran that given it by his
various followers.
(f) The physiology of inheritance
Regression and correlation were discovered in the course of Galton' S
investigations into social biology. I have called his work 'social
biology' because thist seers to sun it up very neatly - he was investigating
a biological topic, heredity, for social reasons. The biological discovery
of linear regression was a very considerable one, as was the connected
statistical discovery of the correlation coefficient. But, this aspect
of his work did not exhaust Galton' s contributions to biology. He was
also interested in the theoretical side, in, so to speak, the physiology
of heredity. Like Darwin, he wished for sara account of the physiological
nechariism by which hereditary characters were transferred frau one genera-
tion to another. Like all scientists of the period (or, at least, like very
many of then) he wanted to account for trarinissicn and developuent in his
theorising.
Darwin himself had addressed heredity in his study of l86cZ, with its
theory of parigenesis 5
 Darwin's views on heredity were highly Larnarckian,
in the sense that he allowed that there could be a significant inheritance
of aoguired characters, and held that changes in the environment were
ultimately responsible for biological variation. His theory of pangenesis
was an attenpt to provide a physiological scenario for all of these processes
Reduced and splified, the theory asserted that reproduction was the passing
on of grrnules, srrall hereditary particles, germs capable of growing into
adult features. The new individual was the product of the gamiules
liberated by his parents, who, by turn, were subject to environmantal
influence. The individual was seen as liberating gErrruiles fran all parts
e)
of his or her body at all times, and these germiules reflected the state
of his body at the tinE of their release. Accordingly, when a character
became developed by, say, the effects of use or disuse, a ccupleient of
getinules reflecting this fixation in their propensities would be released,
and could be passed on in the process of reproduction.
The beliefs that, sanehaw, heredity was a particulate process,
that, on the whole, it yielded fonns intennediate between the parents and
that the process was subject to environmental interference vW generally
held during much of the second half of the 19th century. Mendel 's
ideas, CQ w-	 fe1 b Gk	 , his ideas went
forgotten until the turn of the century in 1900. The general point can
be made by referring to Spencer, whose quasi-environmentalism has already
been mentioned.
N q, if sate form of quasi-environmentalism, sane belief in the
inheritability of acquired characters was quite general in Spencer' s
and Darwin's days, there was a shift away fran this position at end-iôt' of ido.O
century due to thecontinuIty of the genn plasm in the 80's. VIQAsw'o Vt
view, however, was bac1not by 'direct empirical evidence - sate
microscopical deitonstration for example - but by plausibility arguments of one
sort and another, whose forcefulness depended upon many things, including
an acceptance of his views about the material bases of heredity in the
chrarosaies of the cell. The rate at which 'Weismannism' overthrew
'Lamarckism' in the late 19th and 20th centuries remains unchronicled,
though it is clear that Weisrnann had made great strides by 1910. But, right
up until 1910 it was quite easy to find reputable Lamarckians, especially
perhaps in Atrenco. , where neo-Laxnarckianism had been a significant develop-
in evolutionary theory.47
Weismann and Spencer debated the issue in the 1890's in the
Cntarporary review, with Spencer for one admitting that48
a right answer to the question whether acquired
characters are or are not inherited uncrlies right
beliefs not only in biology and psychology, but also
in education, ethics and politics.
We may return to this point at a later juncture. 	 For the rrnent
it should be noted that Galton' s first nove into the field of the physiology
of heredity led to a brief controversy with Darwin. Galton, no doubt
keen to discredit the idea that acquired characters might be inherited, sought
to s1 that germules did not travel in the blood stream. This he did by
transfusing the blood of one br1&Jf rabbit into that of another
irmdiately before the mating of the rabbit 'which bad received the
transfusion. Galton reasoned that if grrnules were carried in the
bloodstream, the rabbit receiving the blood wuld receive a ccltplErent of
gmules also, and, since the rabbits were chosen for dissimilarity,
'aild show the effects of this in the nature of off4ing produced.
No startling progeny were in fact conceived, and Galton concinded
against g?gttrnhles in the blood. Darwin responded by denying that he had
ever claimed that the blood was the site of gerrrruile transfer within the
49
body. Galton withdrew his criticisms of pangenesis.
This episode, however, did not prevent Galton fran going on to offer
tils own theory of the physiology of heredity, which resanbied Darwin's
in many points except that it allowed very little scope for the inheritance
of aoguired characters. Poughly speaking, Galton suggested that in c:.ich
zygote there were several geni contending for developtnt into each
character and feature of the adult, with each germ being derived fran one
ancestor . Those genns that did not develop or become 'patent' went to form
the generative organs of the individual formed fran those that did.
Thereby, these germa could be passed on for another chance of'patency'
or, fMling that, for another round of transmission in 'latent' form.
In this way, the germ-plasm was seen as being separate and unto itself
and relatively lirmune fran the activities and influences attending the
body in which the germ plasm was contained. The system proposed by Galton
was not dissimilar to Darwin' s, b.it was reorganised in a manner which made
the inheritance of acxjuired characters an inprobable event • Wallace
recalls in his autobiography that he was a quick convert to the idea of
the non-inheritability of acxjuired characters, despite his orginal regard
for Darwin' s pangenesis, and that Galton' s 'work had a great effect on him,
materially affecting his view of Darwin's systan.51
It is only with sa knowledge of Galton' s physiological system of
heredity that we can understand what was perhaps his most famous contribut-
ion to the science of heredity in the 19th, century, namely the so-called
law of ancestral heredity'. This appeared in his 'work in the early 1880's,
and was generally presented as a derivation from statistical data - for
the inheritance of continuously varying characters such as hei ,ght. The
derivation however, is a mere tissue, and is certainly inva1id'. The law
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was really a restathrent of an old halving thesis, being based on the
idea that there must be a transmission of only a half of the genii plasm
of each parent at reproduction - otherwise, successive genexations 'vld
contain successively doubled quantitites of genii plasm.
As stated, the law clairred that
the influence, re and sin?le, of the mid-parent may
be taken as ½ arid that of the mnidgrandparent as ¼
arid so on. Consequently, the influence of the individual
parent would be ¼ and	 of the individual grandparent
1/16 and so an.
Naz, as noted, this rather vague claim was presented as a derivation
fran values for the regression of son, on parent in respect of continuously
varying characters. The derivation was invafld, but, interestingly,
Galton' s claim was applied by him to discontinuous attributes - such
as eye-colour - where he supposed that ¼ of the mnbers of a family
would exactly follow each parent, that 1/16 would follow each grandparent,
and so on. The connecting link, enabling Calton to feel confident in
mving from continuous to discontinucus characters was, I take it, his
physiological theory of heredity - for certain passages in his writings
on the physiology of heredity suggest very strongly that the t1x)ugI of the
'influences' in the quotation above as being caiplents of hereditary
partic1es?Thus, in his mind, his principle had a twofold application -
to atxibutes and to continuously varying characters. Also based in this
theory, and in several rich analogies and metaphors, was a belief that
crucial evolutionary changes might be large and discontinuous - being the
result of guantuni-liice Yoics. of the particulate arrangnent fran one
'position of stability' to another.
(g) Psychology
So far I have mientioned Galton' s statistical and biological thought,
slxwing, I hope, hc,w they related to one another and to his broad overall
eugenic and social Darwinian concerns. Now, to calete a discussion of
his 'scientific' work it remains only to allude to his labours in psychology
which are remarkable on three counts. First, there is his idea of
'natural ability' and its relation to silr?le sensory processes. Second,
there is his work on eltentary mass nental testing, and, finally, there is
his work on twins and related topics, undertaken to drive hare the massage
of nature rather than of nurture.
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Above all, Galton was interested in individual differences in
mental abIlity, and, of course, in the heritability of the same. Thereby
he differed fran continental experlinentalists, who sought the universal
not the varying features of psychological life. There is no reason to
suppose that, in psychology, he was a deep or systnatic thinker, but he
nust be appreciated as the man 'who put on the map the idea of a psychology
of individu1 differences, associated with the idea that the differences were
due to heredity rather than to environment. In this department he is
perhaps irDst notable for his insistence that men can be classed according
to a single metric - of 'what he termed 'natural ability'.. first prcrrrted in
Hereditary genius in 1869. This, he assumed, uld be found to follow a
normal curve in all races, and	 the mean levef attained by any race
tld be reflected in the proportion of great men that it produced.
Thus, the negroes, having produced few men adjudged by Galton as of great
mental gifts, could be seen as having a lower mean than the British, who,
by turn, were unfavourably canpared with the Athenians, who produced a
high proportion of great minds, auong a popiLus whosetastes, Galton noted,
were IrLich higher andLrefined than those of the British pop.ilus - a fact
ascertainable by referring to the contents of any railway station news-stand.
The argumentation surrounding this concept was, as frequently with Galton,
very bad, but the conceptMerfu1 if vague - the idea of each marber of
a carniunity having a certain numerically assessable 'natural ability',
'which 'would serve as a measure of his eugenic 'worth. This, we shall see, was
a tire that was to recur time and again in the Galtonian tradition. Later,
when we cane to discuss Galton' s rk in the field of the popularisation
of eugenics, 'we shall see the way in which the supposedly normal curve of
'natural ability' was related to the different social grades and classes
which Galton discervie in the British population.
Now, exactly what Galton meant by 'natural ability' is hard to say.
It was, in one account, cariprised by zeal, capacity and the power of 'work6
By natural ability, I mean those qualities of intellect
and disposition, which urge and qualify a man to perform
acts that lead to reputation. I do not rran capacity
without zeal, nor zeal without capacity, nor even a
ccithination of both of then, without an adequate power
of doing a great deal of very laborious 'work. But I mean
a nature which, when left to itself, will, urged by an
inherent stimulus, clirrb the path that leads to €ninence,
nd has strength to reach the sumit - one which, if
hindered or thwarted, will fret and strive until
the hindrance is overcaie and it is again free to
follow its labour-loving instinct. It is a]itst a
contradiction in terms, to doubt that such Iren will
generally became Eninent. On the other hand, there
is plenty of evidence in this volurre to show that few
have won high reputations without possessing these
peculiar gifts. It follows that the rien who achieve eninence,
and those 'who are naturally capable) are, to a large extent,
identical.
This is not nuch to go on, b 'it fortunately, at other placesGalton did
specify the natures of same of these ingredients of 'natural ability'
in a little nore detail. His thinking had two tracks - sensory
discriminatory power and 'energy'. Let us take then in order.
His thoughts on sensory discriminatory power were laid out in his
Inquiries into human faculty of 1883. Here, in a section on 'sensitivity',
he argued that the senswere the only sources of information, and
quently, that57
the imore perceptive the senses are of difference, the
larger is the field upon which our jndgrent and
intelligence can act.
Idiots, he wrote, had a low discriminatory power, 'whereas a forner Lord
Chancellor had the nost amazing power. This seened to point, along with
other evidence)to the superior sensory power of the intellectually gift1
This hypothesis was further conf lined by observations suggesting that
African natives did not have the exceptional powers of observation
sametines attributed to then by travellers, and by tie fact that nercbants
infrequently mp1oyed men as tasters. Galton,. it seens 1was not an
advocate of 'waren's anancipation. His overall conclusion was that,58
a delicate power of sense discrimination is an attribute
of a high race, and that it has not the drawback of
being necessarily associated with nervous irritability.
Galton's thoughts on energy were presented in the sane work as
were his thoughts on sensory discrimination. Once again, they are
imprecise, but suggestive. Energy, he said, was 'the capacity for labour'.
It was an attribute of 'higher races' he said, and he had found that the
leaders of scientific thought in Britain were
'generally gifted with ranarkable energy, and that they had inherited the
gift of it frtn their parents and grandparents' • Once again he concluded9
4;
In any schare of eugenics, energy is the host
iiTpDrtant quality to favour; it is as we have
seen, the basis of living action, and it is
eminently trannissab1e by descent.
Finally therefore, and p.itting together the diverse elements, it
would seen that Galton' s idea of natural ability was sarehow cczripounded
out of fine sensory powers and a very high level of energy. Perhaps
he had in mind a uodel of natural ability as due to (a) a powerful
ability to take in information, and (b) ar4 energetic and strong
processing faculty. But, saret.lires it is better to see what followers
make of ideas than to pursue the intentions of their leaders, and this
strategy will be followed here in a later chapter.
Knowledge of Galton 's concern for sensory powers and his estimate of the
camectiou of these powers with eugenic work helps us, I think, to understand
sarething of the rationale for sate of the developtents which he made in mass
mental testing. For in a series of anthropanetric laboratories, the first of
which was established at the International Health Ethibition of 1884, Galton
tested sane of the physical and mental properties of many thousands of
people. The tests included keeness of sight and of bearing; colour sense;
judgnent of eye; breathing power; reaction time; strength of will and of
squeeze; force of blow; span of ants; height, both standing and sitting;
and weight. Significantly, his account of this first laboratory was
published in the Journal of the t%-kthropological institute for l885°and we
know that he took advice and assistance fran Croom-Pobertson, Grote professor
in the University of London, and editor of Mind. Galton ineasurect sate fairly
simple functions in his anthropanetric laboratores, and the final value of
his neasurtents is not at all clears but, he did attract the discipleship
of James Keen CatteUthe Pzterican psychologist, who worked with him
for sane tine, after a period of work with Wundt, wrote a paper on their
joint anthropanetric work for Mind, and pioneered psycharetric work in the
United States, failing, however, to find the hierarchy of test scores which
Charles Speannan was later to insist upon as denonstrative of the existence of
a true central factor 'g' in intelligence.
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The third strand Galton's psychological work lay in the pioneering
of twin studies and allied investigations. Once again the hope behind
the enterprise was to show the priority of nature over nurture in matters
of marital constitution and ability. One such exercise was written up in
his work of 1874, English man of science, their nature and nurture2which
presented the results of a estionnaire-based friquiry into the ancestry,
personal qualities, intellectual biographies and education of letii ng
English men of science. This was undertaken partly in response to ke
Candolle's Historie des sciences at des savants depuis deux sicles, which
stress 3contr, Galton, the social rather than the biological sources of
scientific excellence. De Candofle put his ironey on social factors such
as 'freedczn to state and publish all opinions, at least on scientific
topics, without experiencing serious ham'. Galton we know, put his faith
inherited energy. Fran his work, Galton felt able to stress again the
importance of heredity, arid, in English man gave the first strong expression
of his hope that the 'gigantic noriopoly' of the established church might be
eliminated, aparent1y in Galton' s hopes to be replaced by another tronopoly
- of science.
This was to IDe64
a sort of scientific priesthood throughout the kingdan,
whose high duties would have reference to the health and
well-being of the nation in its broadest sense, and whose
enolurrents and social position would be made carnensurate
with the iiriportane and variety of their function.
But, though this form of psychobiographical investigation has thrived
fairly well, notably at the hands of Lewis Terman the fairous rrerican
exponent of mental testing and constructor of the St,ord-Binet scale of
IQ, it has not had the influence of another Galtonian tradition - that of
twin studies, now so much in the news after the realisation that one of
Galton ' s leading followers in this area - the Galtonian psychologist Sir
Cyril Burt 'adjusted' his data on occasions.
Galton' s o twin studies were discussed in his Inquiries into human
faculty. He was acquainted with the difference between twins of what we
would call Ironozygous and dizygous origins - referring to the former as
'due to the developrent of two germinal spots in the same oviu' His method
of inquiry was strictly non-quantitative, and consisted in obtaining
information about the developrent of pairs of twins brought up in different
ways. The details found are fascinating to read, and the conclusion is
the standard Gal
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There is xto escape fran the cx)nclusion that nature
prevails enonrously over t'Iw±1.re when the difference
of nurture do not exceed what is cartronly to be found
anong persons of the same rank of society and in the
sane country. My fear is that xry evidence may seen
to prove too much, and be discredited on that account,
as it appears contrary to all experience that nurture
sbould go for so little.
Here interestingly, it is a]nrst as if Galton were rehearsing a subsequent
controversy - namaly that of whether high in-group heritability tells one
anything about the beritabilk.y of between-group differences. 2nd, tbough
his obseivation on the role of social groupings might seen to put Mm into
the position of thinking that inter-group differences might be due nore to
environment than to heredity, he never recanted, as far as I bxiz, on his
early explanations of inter-racial differences in genetic terms.
Q) Institutions
Finally, then, we have seen what might be termal the 'scientific'
side of Galton' s work - thugh, of course, the nore we look at it, the
irore it becanes clear that his scientific work and his politics were
closely joined. He adopted a coszrology, a picture of the vrld, cc*lete
with inbuilt noral directives at an early stage, and spent the remainder
of his scientific career attempting to articulate the picture - studying
human heredity and the human psyche, looking always for an opportunity to
s1, the superiority of nature over nurture. Galton was not one to unduly
expose his theories to harsh criticism or analysis, and it is perhaps
significant that he soft-pedalled the doctrine of eugenics for thirty
years after its first appearance and poor reception in the 1865 paper.
He had to wait for the tide of opinion to turn before he vould take to the
platform and fight for his cause in open debate. However, in the 'scientific'
articulation of his rld-view, he made several vitally important innovations
in statistics, psychology, the study of heredity and in sociolcgy. In
statistics we have the idea of the correlation coefficient, which Pearson
described as lying at the root of the subsequent deve1oirent of mathematical
statistics. In psycbology he pioneered twin studies and mass irental testing.
In the study of heredity he threw doubt upon the inheritance of acquired
characters and discovered linear regression between rents and offspring,
and, indeed, between pairs of 'collateral' relatives - eg nephew and uncle,
and so on. in sociology be pioneered the questionnaire. It was, intellectuaL
4speaking1 a rost important career, making up in width and range what it
lacked in careful analytic er and ability to criticise the assumptions
which underlay his 'work. It is interesting, for exarrle, that Galton
offered no reply to Huxley's essay on evolution and ethics, though erie might
think that Huxley' s oration undermined the basis of much of Galton' s thought.
But, what of Galton as an institutional figure? I have mentioned that
he was a fellow of the Royal Society, that he was a large figure in the
Geographical Society, in the Jnthropological Institute of Great Britain
and Ireland, and in the British Association, and that he was the friend
of nn like Spencer and Tyndall, who, in their various ways were allied
with him in his desire to replace the clergy with a scientific clerisy.
These were significant figures in Victorian culture. It is not by accident
that W.H. Nallock's satire, the New republic, contains characters corres-
ponding to Tyndafl, Huxley and Clifford.67 In this closing section of the chapte
it retains to consider Galton's institutional labours in science, parti.cularly
as they related to his concern for eugenics. ?'bst of these activities were
cramtd into the last decade of his life, that is to say, into the Edwardian
era, and these we shall shortly see. But they do not exhaust his institutional
work, successful or attertpted.
Like irost scientists, Galton was anxious to stimulate the creation of
a	 of workers labouring in his own chosen vineyard - in this case
the statistical investigation of eugenics, heredity and psychology.
there being at the tine no SI to whan he could apply for the
• establishment of a research unit, and there being very little in the way of
institutionalised science in Britain - at least until the end of the c€ritury
- the prospective numbers of labourers was limited. Galton himself, in any
case, always preferred free associations of independent wor] to distinctive
schools. But, whenever possible, he would follow up chances of collaboration
with others. Ce such was the ecx2nanist, F.Y. Edgeworth, with whan Galton had
correspondence in the late 80'
	 But, as Donald Iw acKenzie has noted, there as
little meeting of minds between the two nen dgeworth, the mnathEnatical
ecvnaiist, author of a hedonistic calculus, and of Mathematical psychics was
sinly not tuned in to Galton' s wavelength. As an econaist, he could not
but consider that the probie facing society were resolwthle by econanic
reform rather than by eugenics - whereas Galton, itore of a visionary perhaps,
stressed the need to reform people rather than the systea of relations within
which they lived out their lives. Edgeworth may have had sare interest in
Galton as a patron, but it is interesting to note that when he reviewed Galton'
4c)
Natural inheritance of 1889 for Nature, he praIsed the xnathtical nEthods
rather than the eugenic 'hidden curriculum' of Galton' $ wor? and that, though
he did a certain airount of work on the calculus of correlations, he never
becarr a wholehearted follower of Galton. Shortly we shall see sarthing
of the way In which, and of the tiie at which, Galton could begin to
collect true followers.
A parallel episoLe concerns Florence Nightingale, whose formidable
aninIstrative powers were buttressed by a belief in the efficiency and
ministrative utility of statistical knowledge. She was a fervent student
of the works of Quetelet, and her copy of the Physique sociale is annotated
on airrost every page. Moreover, the fro4iece of her copy bears the
following inscription in her own hand (it was a presentation fran Quete let).
The sense of infinite power
the assurance of solid certainty
the endless visits of i.nprovrent
Nightingale knew of Galtan through his works on caITing and travelling
and his concern to teach the British army how to live in rough country.
But her main contact with Galton cane in the early 1890' s. Nightingale
hoped to have established at Oxford a chair of 'social ptysics'
statistics) at Oxford. Her aim was to establish sate form of social
assay. She wanted to assess the benefits of Forster' s education act, the
results of punishments in jails, the efficacy of poor-law administration
and of its current relations with charities, the progreor otherwise of the
Indian nation, and so on. Nightingale wanted Galton to assist in drawing
up plans of research for the professorship, but Galton was very unsympathetic
He considered that a professor, being tenured, would be likely tolitt1e real
work, and that such inquiries were best perfornod by ccxrunittees of independeat
non. If Nightingale really wanted a professor, he said, it would be better
to appoint one at the Royal Institution. Galton it ses, was, at heart
a pre-professional. Pearson asks of Ms attitude 'how could a school of
trained applied statisticians haie been created by six lectures a year at the
Royal Institution'? But, one suspects, the notion of such a school was
scarewhat repellent to Galton' s view of science, which appears to have been
that of the independent man choosing of his own volition to read the book of
nature in the manner he preferred. Enthusiasm was one thing, 'training' was
azx)ther. The Nightinale schene not with no enthusiasm for him, and was
finally extinguished. 2
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Galtan' s real achievctents in the field of institutions lay in his
uiections with eugenics. His pathway into this sort of activity was
two-fold, roughly speaking academic and popular, and his twofold path
resulted in the creation of Inutria 11 y hostile institutions.
If we focus at first on the academic path, we find that, in the
late 1880's, Galton began to enter correspondence with W.F.R.. Weldon,
professor of zoology at University College London. We shall see irre of
4iis relationship in successive chapters, where sara of their correspondence
is reproduced. But, for the present, the point which should be noted is
that Weldon was a biologist anxious to praiote a new style of evolutionary
biology. He wanted to get clear away fran the itorphological paradigm which
will be
discussed ITore fully later on. He hoped1 in shcrt to revolutioriise the study
of biology, particularly of evolution, L-y the application of Galton' s
statistical methods to the study of wild populations of animals. He started
in quite a humble way, shcMing that distributions arrong shrimps in the wild
follcied the familiar normal curve. This was a novel observation at the time,
and clearly opened up an imitative research prograni. There was the law of
ancestral heredity to apply, and the correlation coefficient to use in these
studies of wild populations. Weldon did not stint, and cax into closer
contact with Galton as he had discussion after discussion with Galton about
the statistical side of his work. Weldon was far fran being mathematically
illiterate, but, being a biologist of the period,was not expert in mathematics.
Thus, with Galton's assistance, Weldon began to found a science which soon gre
into a discipline known as bicitetry.
The growth occurred in good part because Weldon met up with a colleague
at University College London, Karl Pearson, then (1890), professor of
applied mathematics and mechanics. They appear to have cat into close contact
through their joint interest in University refonn, and, before long, Pearson
was assisting Weldon with his bicmtry. Soon, a little assistance grew
into the work of an ia1 or possibly leading partner, and Pearson began to
publish, in the Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society for the nost
part, a series of works on the 'mathematical theory of evolution', in which
he explored various aspects of heredity and variation, and the statistical
problems which, in his view, the3raised. The details of all of this will be
dealt with in the next chapter; suffice it to say for the present that Pearson
5'
slowly built up a 'biattzic school' of students in his applied niathønatics
department who took his courses in statistical biology or' bic&ttry his
lectures, whose audience included men such as G.U. Yule the great author
of a standard statistical text-book, were the first lectures in
xnathnatical statistics given in Britain, or indeed, in a strong sense,
&e.
Pearson too grew increasingly friendly 'with Galton, scxretirnes
establishing contact with the old man by highlighting their camori
possession of sa caker ancestors, and, as the nineteenth century
SM+ Japassed into the twentieth, became nore and nvre the man who wascantinuing
with central areas of Galton' s research prograrrite. MDst iiprtantly,
perhaps, Pearson showed himself to be synpathetic to Galton's views on
eugenics - though there are certain key differences in their orientations,
as might be expected when it is recalled that both were iren of their periods,
and that between their birth dates there is a gap of thirty-five years.
In later chapters I will trace their growing relationship and nutual Inter-
actions. The turning point for both ixen seans to have care in 1901, when we
find pearson writing to Galtan t1iat
It uld be a very great pleasure to me to know
you were going to take the field with regard to
what I am convinced is of the greatest national
importance - the breeding fran the fitter stocks.
If one could only get sane one to awaken the
nation with regard to its future! The statesmen,
who really have the ear of the populace, never
think of the future. They will not touch the
issue of coal supply nor that of fertility,
and yet I am convinced these are far irore important
for the very existence of the nation than any question
of government, church discipline or even technical
education
Md, fran that tine onwards, we find Galton, then airrost an octo-
generian, taking to the public platform to publicise the cause of
eugenics. Pearson's biography of Galton contains a long sectIon on
'Eugenics as a creed and the last decade of Galton's life'. Pearson
notes that 'it was not till the beginning of the present century that he (Galtor
considered the tine ripe for a nore general public appeal, or sought
proselytes to the new f ih'. In this, Pearson is correct, and, in later
chapters I will consider what it was Dut this period (the turn of the
century) which could have nboldened Galton to feel that the tine was at last
ripe for the beliefs he had been nurturing for the last thirty-five years.
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on the 'intelectual side, Galton becama very busy in the
eugenic sphere during this decade after 1900. 1901 saw Galton
giving the Huxley lecture and receiving the Huxley medal of the
Royal 1nthropo1ogical Institute. Thisçwas rrkable for his essay
into the issue of the relation between class arid natural ability,
nc retitled 'c.ivic orth'. 3 his tectr€- Cpto 	 happy to make
correlations between class and social or civic worth - regarded as an
inherited catmDdity - and ina:ôe. great use of the sociologist Booth's
recent analysis of the population of London into different social groups?4
People in the left-tail of the now familiar normal distribution he
identified as corresponding to Booth's classes A and B, that is to say,
'criminals, sai-criininals and loafers, and the casually etloyed poor,
often suffering fran shiftlessness and excessive devotion to drink'.
The right tail of the curve of civic worth lie identified with independent
professionals and large eiiployers. The different values of iren fran the
two classes w€re. assessed in terms of the market price of babies of
different sorts - potential upper professional man, for example, being
worth to the nation many thousands of pounds as canpared to the worth of
five pounds for a labourer's baby as ccxpited by the statistician Farr?5
l½nd, making his central point, Galton stressed the need to encourage breeding
anixig the gifted, a priority which he put over that of stopping the
reproduction of the lowest orders. He favoured what was to becane kncwi
as sitive eugenics t( negative eugenics, and had in mind schemes to prcztote
early marriage amongst the most talented, suggesting that the fourteen
million pounds in charity then spent annually might be diverted to support
a venture in positive eugenics. In 1904, he was able to address the newly
founc%Sociologica1 Society on the topic of 'Eugenics: its definition,
scope and aims'. This attracted lively caarents fran figures inclnding
H.G. Wells, Benjamin Kidd, William Bateson, Bernard Shaw arid C.S. Loch?6
Shaw, interestingly, was most enthusiastic, and wrote that there was now
'no reasonable excuse for refusing to
	 face the fact that nothing
but a eugenic religion can save our civilisation fran the fate that has
overtaken all previous civilisations'. His response was not entirely
tI*)
unrepresentative. In the ol1owing year, there was another paper to
the Society, on 'Restrictions in marriage', with caitrents fran men of
the stripe of Westerxnarck and A.C. Haddon, orgarilser of the fairous Torres
Straights expedition. Once again, in the strongest language, there
a cail for the adoption of eugenics as a nz religion?7 Eugenics, Galton said,
sternly forbids all forms of sentinntal charity
that are harmful to the race, while it eagerly
seeks opportunity for acts of personal kindness,
as sate eaiuvalent for the loss of what it forbids.
In 1907 he was invited to Canbridge to give the Herbert Spencer
lecture, again delivered on behalf of eugenics?8 Thereafter Galton was
able to give only a few irore papers on eugenics due to his age and
infirmity, and he died in 1911.
But, his lasljtdecade was marked not only by 'intellectual'
noves but also by concrete institutional ones too. Galton, it should
be stressed, was an extrrely wealthy man. He had produced no children
himself, despite his eugenic catinitnents, and was in , a position to spend.
The first signs of his preparedness carre in 1904 79when Galton wrote to
Sir Arthur Rucker, principal of the University 	 offering 500 pounds
a year to establish the 'exact study of what may be called National Eu en,
by which Galton meant 'the influences which are socially controllable, on
which the status of the nation depends'. The University responded by the
setting up of a camtittee consisting of Sir Edward Busk, Galton, Pearson and
Halford 14ackinder. The outcare was a decision to appoint a Galton research
fellow arid a Galton scholar. The fellow's duties were as follows
"(a)To acquaint himself with statistical methods of inguiry,
and with the principal researches that have been made in
Eugenics, and to plan and carry out further investigations.
"(b)To institute arid carry on such investigations in the history
of classes and families as may be calculated to prarote the
knowledge of Eugenics.
"(c)To prepare and present to the Ccxrmittee, though not
necessarily for publication, an annual Report on his work
(to be done under general direction of the Carrnittee). To
give fran tine to time, if required or approved by the Cczrtnittee,
short Courses of Lectures on Eugenics and in particular on his
own investigations thereon.
"(d)To prepare for publication at such times and in such manner
as iny be approved by the Carrnittee (and at least at the end of
his tenure of the Fellowship), a Ioir or 1roirs on the
investigations which he has carried out".
The first fellow was Edgar Schuster, nephew of the faious
physicist Schuster. He was a pupil of Weldon, who, in 1900, had gone
to take the chair of zoology in 0xford &stayed for 3 years, being replaced
in 1906 by David Heron, who was for long to be Pearson's right-hand man.
In 1906, Galton confided in Pearson that he, Galton, was going to leave81
a very large sun of noney to the University to erxow the 'furtherance
of the study of national eugenics', which he rz defined as 'the agencies
1er social control that may iiiprove the racial qualities of future
generations either physically or mentally'. The establishtnt fran which
Schuster worked was known as the 'Eugenics record Office', and it soon had an
Pznerican irnitator 2
 In 1906, this record office passed out of Galton' s
direct supervision and into Pearson's controt changing its name, en route,
to the' Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics 83	 gave it a further
dowry of £1,000. Its staff now inc1ud Heron, Ethel Elder-ton, sister of
W. Palm Elderton the actuary and my Barrington. So, Pearson, still
professor of applied mnathatics and mechanics, iuq
 controlled, within his
department a bicitetric laboratory (of which, more below) funded by the
Drapers' CaTany 4which was a centre for statistical and bicnietrical research,
and an Eugenics Laboratory, financed by Galton. This was not all, for in
1900, with W,eldon, and with Galton's financial assistance once again, he
had founded Bianetrika, a journal for the 'statistical study of biological
prthles'. Weldon died in 1906, leaving Pearson in charge as sole chief
editor. Soon Pearson began also to publish a series of biamtric and
eugenic mEtoirs. He put out a 'nIEn3ir series', ca-rrrencing with Schuster's
Inheritance of ability of 1907, a 'lecture series' beginning with his own
Scope and mitiportance to the state of national eugenics of 1909, a series on
'Questions of the day and fray', ccmencing with Pearson's Influence of
parental alcoholism on the physique and ability of offspring, and also a
series of 'Studies in national deterioration', carrrencing in 1906 with
David Heron's study of the Relation of fertility in man to social status and
on the changes in this relation that have taken place in the last 50 years.
Pearson then, by 1906, had in a very strong sense taken up Galton's
research prograime. Only one more step in this direction rnained, and it
was taken on Galton' s death in 1911, when it was found that Galton had left
the residue of his estate to endow a chair of eugenics in the University
of London, with first refusal to be given to Karl Pearson. He accepted, and,
taking the biaietric arxl eugenics laboratories with him, left the chair
of applied iriathe'natics to foiii a new department of applied statistics in
which he sat as the Galton professor of eugen3s. In his person then, by
1911, statistics, eugenics and bicatry were all officially represented.
He held the chair till 1933, when it was taken by R.A. Fisher.
But, in a sense, Pearson was not the sole heir. For there had also
been forired, in 1907, a Eugenics Education Society.85
 This was an offshoot
of another organisation, the Moral Education League. Th Society, as we
shall see. in a later chapter, rapidly increased in nbership and influence
in the years prior to the first war, and was in fact able to stage a huge
international ccn'iference in 1912. The significance of this popular mevEnent
is that it took its lead f	 3a]ton, and was able to obtain his services
as hc.nourary president. We shall see,
	 that the Eugenics
Education Society was notably Irore populist than Pearson's mere 'acaziemic'
department, and that there were frequent c1asIes between the two groups, both
marching, though in slightly different dfrections under the flag of Galton.
So, at his death, Galton had made significant contributions to
statistics, heredity and psychology, and had set up or inspired a series
of eugenically nthided institutions which oversaw the develop'nent of these
subjects in the early years of this century. The remainder of this work
traces these develoEzrents.
Finally then, what are we to make of Galton? We can see, I think, that
eugenics was a matter of overwhelming irrortance for him. It notivated his
work in heredity, and, by making him see t.he extren or eugenic man as scirtethir
other than an error, and as a fit subject for scientific investigation 1 Ii r4.c4 	 -*AuA4-c#A V.(tftC.Thereby he was led to the discovery of regression and correlation, both,
SO to speak, as statistical and as biological phenanena. Eugenics, based by
turn on a high regard for nature over nuture, and tied in with beliefs about
the bases of intelligence, led him to pioneer various forms of psychology,
including mental testing, and, quite generally, to uncork the bottle of
differential psychology which at the time of writing, is undergoin9 an
interesting appraisal in the correspondence colurins of the Times.
What then of Galton's conversion to eugenics? We see that it was a
cariponent of a massive mental shift in which he transferred his allegiances
fran a thristian cosnology to a rather ill thought out 'Darwinian'
perspective on everything, including norals. Why Galton should have becane
so keenly attached to the principle of mental heredity isn't easy to under'-
stand. Certainly, the evidence which he managed to accunulate for the
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proposition was never compelling, except to the converted.
He was, we know, an anti-egalitarian conservative with
philanthropic desires, a a'tan who combined a number of kindly
instincts with a propensity to begin his scientific works with
passages such as the following:87
I have no patience with the hypothesis occasionally
expressed, and often implied,especIally in tales
written to teach children to be good, that babies are
born pretty much alike, and that the sole ag{Q
	 in
creating differences between boy and boy, and man and
man, are steady application and moral effort.It is in
the most unqualified manner that I object to pretensions
of natural equality.
Galton's eugenic ideas, predicated upon other ideas about
human worth and progress, fitted with his conservative outlook,
with his tendency to dismiss 'primitive' races, and so on. W
cannot explain any of these views as the 'natural' or 'inevitable'
consequences of his social position - which, in any case, is
complicated by dual roles as rentier on the one .hand and as
defender of the professiona' on the other. To take just one
point, 'thnow familiar one of Galton's insistence upon the
non-inheritability of acquired mental characters, we can see
that others of similar background - notably Darwin - found no problerr
in taking a different line, and, more significantly, as we shall
see dn the chapter on eugenics, others of conservative disposition
and reformist biosocial ideas were able to combine these stances
with. some commitment to the heritability of acquired characters.
At h2	 44 - , we can see that Galton's theoretical perspectives
did not sit ill with his social allegiances. His views, in short,
were one out of a number of possible set off ideas, each of which
might have harmonized wi h the interests Indicated by his social
position. Why he selected
	 ' the set that he did select
is a matter, one presumes, best explained by referezwe to the
particularities of his personal development. At the moment
however, the state of the art or science of psychobiography is
not such as to give one confidence that the particular episodes
f$tQ.IhVL C4i4t4
and events that one might cite - notably perhaps,(Galton's
father's continued emphasis on the need for academic prowess -
are ones that 1(,
 genuine expla o- of his later selection of
a perspective.
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Introduction
In this chapter I carnnce the task of describing and explaining the
exfoliation of the Galtonian tradition, focusing, very properly, upon
Calton's Irost influential foflcwer, Karl Pearson, and upon Pearson's deve1on
along with the biologist Weldon, of a 'Biartric School' of mathematical
biology in London in the 1890's. The izrortance of these events can
hardly be overstated, as the Bitric School ,centred upon University
College London, was to be the embryo fran which the mndern discipline of
and profession of statistics was to grcw. Pearson's nthods and ideas,
by turn, were to assist enonrously in the develojirent of the other areas
of endeavour described in the Introduction. This chapter focuses less
upon explanation than upon chronology and historical description, leaving
the task of analysis and explanation to the chapter that follows izmediately.
W.F.R We'.on (1860 - 1906)
We do well to carnence by looking at the career of W.F.R.WeldOIiL the
zoologist, who was to neet with Pearson and stimulate him into turning
his mathemnatical talents upon certain biological problemns, thereby
making massive theoretical and institutional developients in statistics.
W.F.R.Weldon was the son of Walter Weldon the industrial chemist. Walter made
a fcjtune fran chemistry, and passed a great deal on to his son. He, by
turn, harboured his resources - for his widow was able to donate
paintings by Corot, Sisley, B,lake and others to the Ashrrolean 1'kiseum
and to leave the great part of her fortune of £68,(X)0 to endow a chair
of biaietry at University College London The first incumbent was
J. B. S. Haldane.
Weldon' s youth was spent in London suburbs, and, thereafter, in Cambridge
where, as a student at St John's College, he read for the Natural
Sciences Tripos ,
	 upon biological subjects. At Can'bridge a
renaissance was taking place in British biology. Alfred Newton and C.C.
Babington4were respectively professors of zoology and botany, but, in
their hearts and in their practices, they rnained close to the old
'parson-naturalist' tradition of BrItish natural history, close,
that is, to a tradition that stressed systeinatics, egg collecting and
bird stuffing. But, a new generation of biological scientists was rging,
taking their lead in many cases fran Michael Foster (1836 - 1q07),
appointed praelector in physiology at Trinity College in 1870. His 'nEw
man' began to care to the fore in the mid and late 70' s. The
general atnosphere of change is nicely caught in a letter frat A. G.
Tansley to J. R. Baker, in which Tansley, the inent botanist, described
develorents as he saw th. Naturally, Tansley stresses the botanical
side of things.5
The group of great german botanists who flourished in the middle of the
the last century - I Irean man like Hugo:vQa Nhl, Sanio, Hofireister,
A1ec raun, Nageli , and a little later, Sachs and Pfefer, may
be said to have founded the new 'wissenschaftliche Botanik' in
contradistinction to the old 'systnatische Botanik' . That was an
exact parallel with what you nean by 'General Zoology', though
it included plant anataTy. In England, very little was known about
it, and it was not until the seventies, and particularly the
eighties that English university students began to go to
Germany to work in the laboratories of the masters and their
followers because the professors in England (with a few exceptions)
knew little or nothing about it.When they cane back they began to
teach and research along the sane lines. Meanwhile, the old
systnatIc tradition, mainly concerned with flowering plants,
was still strong. C.C.Babington was still professor of botany
at Cambridge wl-ien I was an undergraduate in 1890-93, and he
knew nothing about 'wissenschaftliche Botanik'. That was taught
by Francis Darwin and Walter Grdiner, who had 'worked in Germany.
Jfter that, the old systatic tradition was carried on
mainly by amateurs...
In zoology, inspiration also cane fran Germany, and fran Englishman
who had trained with German professors. In ology, Which was
Weldon' s favoured subject, the caning man at Cambridge in the
late 70's and early 80's were Francis N.Balfour( 1851-1882) and his
assistant P1dam Sedgwick (l854 - 1913). Balfour, by turn, was the
student of Foster, founder of the Cambridge school of physiology ,
and, like his friend and uentor T.H.Huxley, a pioneer of laboratory
tuition in British universities Like nvst Cambridge zoologists of his
period, Balfour was a norphologist, working mainly in the area of
carparative eiibryology. He produced the fanous Treatise on ocanparative
alt)ryology (1880-1881). This led to the creation of a special chair
in animal norphology at Cambridge for Balfour wo was appointed in
1882, but, shortly afterwards, fell to his death in a c1ining
accident.
Thereafter, Sedgwick took up the intellectual leadership in Cambridge
Zoology, and continued to Initiate students into the practices of
norphological research? This, it may be noted, was a style that did not
seek merely to establish the detailed structures of the different forms
of life extant and extinct, but also to establish the history of
evolution, to shci the phylogenetic connections between the different
species. In short, a major goal for Cambridge zoologists was the
establishjrent of historical, evolutionary relationships which existed
between various groups of species, extant and extinct. Here, in fact, is
one of the rationales for Balfour' s preoccupation with eibryology. For,
as tIfossil record was far frczn cczlete, the establishment of
phylogenetic relations involved a degree of theorising. And, generally
speaking, the form of theorising rrojt favoured at Cambridge was
one based upon thryology taken in conjunction with sate variant of
Haeckel's fanous dictum that ontogeny (i.e., the pattern of
arbxological developnt found in the individual inmber of a specie)
recapitulates phylogeny (i.e •, the evolutionary history of the
species itself). Balfour, for exanle, was nost iipressed by the
potentialities of such a principle. He, like Sedgwick, saw himself as
expanding Darwin's great enterprise by tracing out the partic4ar
patterns of change which had been enacted on Earth during the
history of life.Like Sedgwick and many others working in the
norphological 'paradigm', Balfour was not so nuch interested in the
nechani.ns whereby these patterns had been brought about. There was
very little work done in Cambridge, during the whole 19th century, on the
processes of variation and heredity
Weldon graduated, with first class honours in 1881. He stayed on at
Cambridge working on norphological problns arid, in 1884, was
rewarded by being appointed to a ziew University lectureship in the
advanced xrorphology of invertebrates. He was a fortunate man, as
tenured acadnic posts were particularly hard to care by at that time.
In 1884- , for exarr?le, Cambridge had only 
.3 appointments in Zoology at or
above the lecturer level. Weldon stayed at Cambridge until 1890, when
he was able to ncve to University College London to take up the Jodrell
chair of zoology and carparative anatarr in succession to E.Ray
Lankester? The grandeur of the appoinbtent shond not be overstressed,
for, at University College, the provision for zoology was less than at
Cambridge
ft
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ilst at Cantridge, Weldan began to experience doubts about the
ic.1ec4 fecundity of the mDrphological tradition in which he had
been raised, and began to look about him for new arid nore effective
irethods for thinking about evolution. He considered that there might
be an avenue of advance within Galton' s Natural inheritance , published
in l8), and a work that reviewed all of Galton's various statistical
investigations of human heredity and variation.
Weldon izrrrediately began to apply Galton' s techniques to the stiñy of
wild populations of crustacea, and was able to obtain assistance fran
Galton hi.nself. Possibly the neeting was brought about via Galton' s
refereeing Weldon' s early papers, for there is a letter extant,3 .ated
7th January 1890, in which Weldon 'writes to Galton referring to his
'cx)ndennaticxl of nw papers to the Royal Society' and expressing a desire
to 'learn the nature of my triple misconception as Soon as possible'.
Clearly, things were sorted out, as Weldon began to publish papers in
the Proceedings of the Royal Society in which he gave the results oLi-e) 9
carrying out statistical surveys of various populations - papers in which
he shcwed that nornlly distributed variations seeed to prevail in the
wild as well as in man, papers in which he investigated the values of
correlations between pairs of organs (eg., carapace length and tergurn
length in the shrirrp) in a number of local races, with the hope of
establishing a new numerical tanaiiy capable of giving a guide to
evolutionary relationships. This latter proposal did not long survive.
The essence of Weldon' s early research programre is clearly laid out
in a paper of 1893, where Weldon made a declaration seen by Pearson as
'-niaking' arid as having foirru1ated the 'fundamental principles of
bianetry'. We shall return to this statenent'2
It cannot be too strongly urged that the problns of animal
evolution is essentially a statistical problea: that before
we can properly estimate the changes at present going on in
a race or species we must now accurately (a) the percentage
of animals which exhibit a given arrount of abnormality with
regard to a particualr character; (b) the degree of abnormality
of other organs which accanpanies a given abnormality of one;(c) the difference between the death rate par cent, in animals
of different degrees of abnormality with respect to. any organ;(d) the abnormality of offspring in terms of the abnormality of
parents and vice versa. Th'se are all questions of arithmetic;
and when we know the numerical answers to these questions for a
number of species we shall know the deviation arid the rate of
change in these species at the present day - a knowledge which
is the only legitimate basis for speculations as to their past
history, arid future fate.
The statnt may be unclear, but, for its period, it was totally
different, totally unlike any other nthcdological declaration to
be found in British biology. Clearly, the research prograIrn
outlined here required statistical and xnathanatical sophistication
- more so than Galton could cain,and. Weldon had to seek mathanatical
assistance fran elsewhere - notably fran Nac7lister of Cambridge.
But, as might perhaps be expected, given the contrpora.ry nature of
niathanatical tuition and research at Cambridge, assistance of the
required sort was not easy to octe by. Other sources would have to
be investigated.
Ckie such source was inndiately to hand in the form of Karl Pearson
(1857-1936), whe had been professor of applied mathatatics at University
College since 1884. He and Weidan were scan united by their cctmn
interest in acadnic politics, which were rife in the University of London
in the late 80's. Weldcn's predecessor in the Jodrell chair, E. Ray
Lankester, had been prattLnent in the reform ztovnt, in the 'Association
for the praiotion of a teaching University for London', set up in 18842
and Weldon continued in this tradition, which contained Karl Pearson.
Pearson, Weldon and Carey Foster soon joined to form an 'Association
for prctroting a professorial University in London', a ginger group of
London acadnics urging power to the professors. Its aim was expressed thus 1
The creation of a lxxrcgeneous acadanic body with power to
absorb, not to federate existing institutions of acadanic
rank, sears the real solution of the problan. An acadanic
body of this character might well be organised so far as
teaching is concerned on the broad lines of a Scottish
University. Such a corporation may be conveniently spoken
of as a professorial university to distinguish it fran a
collegiate or federal university.
T.H. Huxley was persuaded to act as president, but was seen by Pearson
as sorrething of a trimmer, as a pragmatist rather than a true follower.
Pearson resigned his secretaryship in a strongly worded letter to the
Tines Huxley repliedith words of rebuke for 'one-eyed fanatics,
ignorant of the ccunDnest conventions of official 	 , and content
with nothing if they cannot get everything their own way'. Pearson,
naturally, saw things differently, and was to claim that, though Weldon
took up his (Pearson's) secretaryship, the actual reorganisation of the
University, achieved before the end of the century, was bitterly resented
by Weldon6
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It is hard to say which cane first in Weldon' s and Pearson's
relationship - acadartic politics or bixretrical consultations.
Certainly, extant letters suggest that it was the forner.
The first extant letter fran Weldon to Pearson dated 5 March 1892
inans t1e latter that'7
I send you the protest, which is already distributed
(by 3.0 am collection today)
I addressed with ury n hand 320 envelopes
last night: so cannot write ixuch today.
Weldon, I assut, was referring to a protest against the Albert
Charter, a schane - that was to fail - to unite University and King's
College into an Albert University of London.
No extant letters on bicvetrlc topics date fran before 27 Novanber
1892, wIn Weldon wrote discussing the probln of resolving an observed
asymnetrical distribution of crab-dinensions into the sum of two normal
ones. This letter marks the onset of a vast correspondence on bianetric
topics, and of a friendship that was to survive the strain put upon it
by Pearson's criticism of Huxley, with whan Weldon identified nost strongly.
The correspandence of Novenber 1892 led directly to Pearson's first
contribution to blanetry - to his essay on the analysis of asynretric
frequency curves into Gaussian caronents. (See F3 I and caption) 1 B
This was published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Boyal Society
in 1893 as the first of a long series of contributions to 'the mathenatical
thecry of evolution'. Thereafter, Pearson was quite caught up in matters
bianetric, publishing paper after paper on mathnatical evolution.
The significance of these we shall shortly see.
n an early stage, Weldon was. carrnitted to the view that evolutionary
change was generally a continuous and gradual process, brought about by
the operation of natural selection upon the small variations displayed by
an the nrbers of large intercrossing populations. In this respect, his
thought was attuned to Darwin's, 'w'no, especially in his later writings, went
out of his way to stress the gradualness and continuity of eyolutionary
change. For Darwin, the advocate of discontinuity was faced with many
problerts 19
lie will be further çateUed to believe that many structures
beautifully adapted to all the other parts of the caine creature
and to the surrounding conditions, have been sudddenly produced;
and of such ccxnplex and sxnd erful co-adaptations, he will not be
able to assign a snad of explanation. To admit all this is, as
it se
	 to ire, to enter into the reaj.ins of miracle, and to leave
those of science.
lr	 Fig.1. From Pearson's first biorretrir paper - showinr hi.s dJsertion of
an assymetrical curve into two overlapping srimetrical romponents.
Image removed due to third party copyright
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An insistence on grMul evolutionary change was camon airong late
19th century Darwinians, many of whan expended considerable energy
in the quest of shcwing the utility of apparently inutile chatacters.
On the other hand,- the advocates of continuity did not go carpletely
unchallenged. Huxley himself had always insisted that Darwin did ill
to rule out the possibility of altatory evolution?nd Galton himself,
as mentioned, was s1itilar1y an advocate of saltatory evolution.
Soon, Weiton found himself and his bicntric enterprise opposed by
an advocate ofntinuity, in the shape of William Bateson (l861-1926).
Bateson had graduated with first class hanours in the Cathbridge natural
sciences tripos in the year after Weldon' s graduation, (i.e. 1882 )chad gone
on to a fellazship of St. John's College and to a considerable reputation
as a rising star in zoological cirdes?-
In the mid and late 1890's, Weldon zontinued his statistical analyses
of wild populations of crustacea, sartiires with the assistance of a Royal
Society 'Evolution CaRnittee', which he and Galton 	 caused to care into
being in 1893.2 2 During this period, Weldon's irost notable worK was a series oi
observations which he interpreted2 .s shcwing the existence of a selective
death rate anongst Plyirouth crabs - a selective death rate with respect
to a nontally distributed bodily dimension, 'frontal breadth'. Interest-
ingly, he claimed to have found a stabilising selection - i.e •, one that
selectively eliminated the Irore extrare variations on both sides of the irean
frontal breadth'. This, I hope, is made clear in the accarpanying figure 2
and caption. Weldon was keen to prarote his findings as a vindication for
the Darwinian viewpoint in evolution, and this interpretation of his findings
drew him deeper into conflict with his former colleague Bateson, who, as
noted, was an advocate of the discontinuist position. At the sane tiire,
nost interestingly, Weldon abandoned - one of Darwin' s intellectual stances,
namely that of discussing 'cxp1ex and wonderful co-adaptattôris'. Weldon
thought that the arrival of statistical methods made such discussions
redundant. Fr, we find him writing that24
Kncwing that a given deviation fran the mean character
is associated with a greater or less percentage death
rate in the animals possessing it, the importance of such
a deviation can be estimated without the necessity of
inquiring hcw that increase or decrease in the death
rate is brought about, so that all ideas of 'functional
adaptation' becare unnecessary.
Such a perspective was deeply repellant to Bateson, who was led by it
to becare even nore distrustful of Weldon, and of his and Pearson' s new
7 '
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Fig.2. Based on Weldon's 1896 paper on selective death rate in
crabs. Weldon claimed that the difference between the Inner and
the outer curves represented the fraction of a crab population
destroyed by natural selection. This, he claimed, was a first
sL3istical demonstration of the opemtion of natura3. selection.
For further details, see Weldon, op.elt. (note 23, chapter 3).
'biaretric' methods. In this gring' disagreement, have the origins
of a nost fanous scientific controversy - namely the so-called 'bicvtric-
Nendelian' debate which would reach its climax in the early years of the
20th century, when Bateson and his followers adopted the ideas of Gregor
Nendel, and were opposed by Weldan and Pearson with considerable vehrence.
A whole chapter is devoted to this debate, and so there is no point in
continuing the discussion of it here.
re points on Weldon will emerge in the discussion of the bicztric -
Nendelian debate, and in the renarks on Pearson which follow. But, for
the present, it is worth noting that Weldcn novel to Oxford in 1900 to
take up the chair of zoology vacated by Ray Lankester's renoval to the
British seum. But, once again, his close connection with Pearson did not
falter. Indeed, it was, if anything, nore strengthened by their fight
against Mendelism, and by their decision to found a new journal in wnich
to develop their new 'bianetric' approach to the study of life. This, of
course, was Bicnietrika, founded in 1901 after Pearson had experienced
difficulty with the biological ners of the Iyal Society, whcm, he felt,
reacted adversely to his work as they had no conception of the izrortant
of the numerical methods that he and Weldon were deve1oping 5 Thus came
into existence what is now a forarost journal for professional statisticians,
and which, until 1948, bore the legend 'A journal for the statistical
study of biological problenis' : by 1948, however, the biological content
had long been nore fictional than real, an indication of the way in which
statistics soon separated itself fran its bianetric integVeirents.
Weldon died in 1906, fran a sudden attack of pneunonia - though
it is said that his streng had. been gravely weakened by his continuous
work, devoted largely, in his final yea,rs, to the onsiught upon the
developing discipline of ndelian genetics.
Karl Pearson (1857-1936)
In Pearsor? ie have a man of much greater achievement than Weldon,
and, quite rightly, he is the central figure in this study. But, just
as Sherlock Holmes depended upon Watson whilst at the same time surpassing
him in investigatory skills, so did Pearson depend upon Weldon whilst at
the sane tine surpassing him. Neeting with Weldon was a itatter of great
iirqortance to Pearson' s developnent. Certainly, it is hard not to agree
with the assessment of J.B.S. Haldane when he wrote that a frank evaluation
of Pearson, made in 1890, would have run as follows2.7
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He is a first rate teacher of applied mathematics,
and a scholarly catpiler of the rk of rrore original
men. He has a knowledge of literature and art irost
unusual in a professor of mathematics. He is sarQwhat
of a radical, but he is only thirty three years old.
He will settle down as a respectable and useful member
of society, and may expect a knighthood if he survives
to sixty. He will never produce work of great originality,
but the College need riot be sorry to have appointed 1dm.
Pearson, at the tiite of his meeting with Weldon, had
es per ie vc.e c')	 an intellectual arid personal developrnt which must
frequently have led him to reflect that behind t%4 flj silver liningS
there is a dark cloud. Attenpt to becc a lawyer, a philosopher,
a poet and a mothematica1 physicist had met with results ranging fran
good	 - to disastrous. t"to of his triths lay in the future.
Pearscn was born in 1857, the younger son of William and Fanny
Pearson. William was a fine example of early Victorian social nobility,
a' man wh r5 a fran a rural background, via hard work, intelligence arid
the odd stroke of luck, to beccxre established as a successful London
barrister. Fanny was the daughter of a ship' s captain and owner.
I return to Pearson's childhood in the chapter following - and it was
a- bleak travail. The father was strong and dardnating, the irother soft,
self-induI.ent and extrarely cloying. Pearson was educated at University
College School in London, though his elder brother, arthur, who seems to
have cute to a possibly disreputable end before Pearson' s thirtieth year,
was sent to Rugby.
Pn autobiographical note due to William Pearson (18-l9O7) runs as
follows 28
When I was in my 18th year I left hute for Edinburgh
where I remained over six years. My schooling had begun at
the village dane school when I learnt my a,b,c. The village
curate took a fancy to ire, and I took a fancy to hounding
him with imrçish tricks. However, he was very patient with
ire, dear fellow, and at length succeeding in driving a little
learning and sure decent behaviour into my stupid noddle. Then
I had my teaching at schools at Easingwold and Nalton. ?fter
passing through the classes at Edinburgh University I obtained
through Lord Carlisle an appointment in H .I. 'S Office of Woods
and Forests, but my rebellious spirit could not brook the 10 to
4 slavery and so I abandor that and cane to the bar. When I made
a precarious inoorre of £250 a year there I fancied myself rich
and independent and after the manner of my kind, took to marrying
- the rest you know.
7(i
William was excellently suited to the role of stern Victorian
paterfarnilias, and his letters depict him as always ready with sane
noral advice or sane schane for his son's advancnent. It is said that
exeirpluin docet, whereas eipla obscurant , and so I will give just one
example of his style of letter-writing.The extract below is taken fran
a letter to Karl, dated
I know what the first starting fran hane to begin the
battle of life is.But cheer up old boy you will soon
shake down and settle down,and although you will never
find elsewhere the tender loving kindness of hare you may
not after a little time find your associates such bad
fellows after all .Be affable and friendly with then and
you will extract their better qualities while you do not
imitate or follow their failings or their faults.They will
soon learn to respect you.Rnnber also this is the kind of
world we have to fight our battle of life in, and it is better
to begin in time and get used to the world before we have
to be dependent on it,than to plunge into the fight at once.
You are now beginning to form your future character and t'
pass through fire - the fire that is to make you better and
wiser than before.
Fanny, by oontrast, sens to have tended to hypochondria, and, clearly,
found William scxnething of a trial. She did not hesitate to unburden
herself upon her growing son, as, for example, on the 21st October, 1873,
when she wrote to Karl that, 30
Your letter and card were very welcare to your lonely
th,for though Papa renains longer in the dining roan
after dinner he is intensely dull, never speaking unless
I call it forth. I can so well sympathise with your
feeling that you are not working enough, you know that is
the only means for you to get on in life, but don't my
darling be discouraged by the inaction of others, only a
very short space of your life is to be passed there
1)3 the best you can for yourself, knowing your own future will
depend so much on yourself.
eli el'
At sixteen, Pearson was rroved fran school and sent to a cranmer
at Hitchin, where,
	
understandably1 he was malcontent and where
he loathed his loutish cairpanions. He was the subject of regular
missives fran hans. His father was preoccupied with the need for
academic success, telling his son that it could bring prefernsnt at
the bar. Letter after letter discussed Caxtridge, which college, what
scholarship - and so on. Pearson junior, it was planned, would read
for the mathratics tripos, still, in the late 70's, the xrst prestigious.
Karl spent only one year at Hitchin. In 1874 he went to Carrbridge to
be tutored by the great Pcuth and, in 1875, he obtained a scholarship
at King's College, then small and overwhelmingly Etonian.3 In late life,
Pearson ref lecthon the delights of a mathematical education at Cathbridge,
but, after his degree he showed no keenness for the place at all. He did
enjoy sate of the carpany - possibly, at times, that of Oscar Browning
the histL..rian, and certainly that of Henry Bradshaw,(whan he saw as a
sympathetic and
	
wise father figure. Certainly when, later on, Pearson
fell in with Galton, be payed him the ultimate accolade of carparison
with Bradshaw. Both men, said Pearson, filled his need for the guidance
of an older and a wiser hand.
At King' s, Pearson showed courage in bearding the authorities over
canpulsory divinity lectures and chapel attendance. These he refused,
and with some assistance fran his father, got away with his refusal.
As we shall see, his circle of friends at King's was p4bly small.
And, airong the students, the closest was 1bert Parker (185 7-19I'), future
law lord and father of Lord Chief Justice ParkJ. He was also close with
'Josh' Conway, the future Lord Conway, and with the mathematician W.H.
1acaulay.
Pearson graduated in 1879, Ererging as third wrangler - that is to
say, as third man overall in the mathematics tripos for that year. This
was a tremendous acconplishrrent, and a valuable one. Graduates of the
Canbridge tripos were highly prized, and the highest wranglers were thought
worthy of nispaper write-ups.
The next five years of Pearson's life were crucial. In 1880 he was
made a fellcw of King's - an appointment which gave him six years of
financial freedan 1 time in which to develop his mind and to decide what
he would do Is life. Iirrrediately after graduating, he went to Germany,
studying in Heidelberg and in Berlin, By 1879, he had already acxuired a
taste for German literature - particularly for Goethe. He studied physics
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and philosophy in Heidelberg, and thereafter law in Berlin. On his
return to flgland he took up a legal career, and was called to the bar in 1881.
His next major appointzrent cane in 1884 when,after several atten!pts
to obtain xratheznatical posts elsewhere, he was made professor of
applied mathEmatics at University College London, the chair having
fallen vacant.Pearson stayed at University College for the rest of his
uorking days, tluigh this was not entirely of his own choosing, for he
made various applications for other posts, notably for the Savil. Ian
professorship of gearetry in Oxford. Certainly, his life was to be
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transfonid by his meeting with Weldon in 1890, and by their joint
develoEltEnt of the would-be science of biometry.For, it is on account of
biaretxy and the statistical theory and institutions which itgeneratcd
that Pearson is principally fazTous. The matter has been pit very precisely
by the merican statistician and historian Churchill Eisenhart, whose
words are therefore reproduced belcw.34
Pearson oxrxnunicated sare thirty-five papers on statistical
matters to the Royal Society during 1893-1901. By 1906 he
had published over seventy additional papers embodying further
statistical theory and applications. In retrospect, it is clear
that Pearson's contributions during this period firmly established
statistics as a discipline in its n right. Yet, at the time,
"the main purpose of all this work" was not develorxrent of
statistical theory and techniques for their c'zn sake but, rather,
"developnt and application c'f statistical methods for the study
of problems of heredity and evolution".
The develoxrents that these led to have also been neatly encapsulated by
another author,S.Stouffer the sociologist, in an article recalling a
youthful visit to Pearson's lahoratory.The tenor of Stouffer's work is
quite as interesting as its content5
I wish I could communicate to you, and especially to those
of you who are just now beginning your professional careers
in a world of Statistics incredibly more sophisticated than
that of Karl Pearson's day, something of the thrill in
meeting in person and studying under a man of Pearson's
immense reputation. Author of the Grammar of Science;
perfecter of simple linear correlation; inventor of multiple
and partial correlation, of curvilinear correlation, of
tetrachoric and bi-serial correlation; discoverer of the
x2- function for summarizing multirtomial data with magnificent
simplicity; builder of a beautiful system of frequency curves
derived from a single differential equation which in turn
harked back to the hypergeometric series; founder of Biometri1
and author or co-author of a prolific -literature
applying these new statistics to biological and sociological
data - Karl Pearson was a hero of Asgard to an american boy
vouchsafed a visit to the home of the gods. Indeed, Pearson
was Thor himself - for the thunderbolts with which he attacked
unsparingly those who dared oppose him still were echoing and
reechoing. His battles to defend Galton's Law of Ancestral
Inheritance against the heresy of rediscovered Mendelism may
have faded somewhat in the past, but his fulmination against
those who questioned his faith in nature as against nurture
and dared to challenge voluminous correlational data which he
and his co-workers had amassed were still audible, and the air
was now electric with conflict as he stubbornly defended his
statistical system against the threats of the Fisherian
revolution.
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As we have seen, these intellectual developrents were accaripanied by
concrete ones, sanetimes literally so, as when nz buildings for
Pearson's Department of applied statistics was opened by the Minister
of Health in 1920. The transformation of Pearson's life which was begun
by the meeting with Weldon was carpleted by his subsequent friendship
with Galtan, by his achieving external funding for biatetry in 1902, by
his taking catirand of the Galton Laboratory in 1906, and by the transfer
to the new Galton chair of eugenics in 1911, about which Pearson set up his
department of applied statistics - lxzre of Bianetrika and, later on, the
Annals of eugenics. On his retirrent in 1933, Pearson's chair went to R.A.
Fisher, and a new chair of statistics was created for his son E.S. Pearson,
collaborator with Jerzy Neynian in the production of Neyman-Pearson statistics.
In 1937, as rted, the Weidon chair of bianetry was created, and its first
incunbent was J. B. S. Haldane.
what harpened during these years? We are well advised to adopc E.S.
Pearson's strategy of dividing the life into periods? 6
 The first of these is
the period fran 1879 to 1884 - fran success at Cambridge to appointment at
University College London. Once again I should add that this chapter
concentrates jiore on the chronicling of events and the posing of questions
than on the explanation of the events and the resolution of those probls.
Those its are the business of subsequent chapters.
Cambridge to London
The basic form of Pearson's life in this period is easy to establish.
He spent parts of 1879 and 1880 as a student in Germany. He was made a fellow
of King's College Cambridge in 1880, and, when not in Germany,was officially
apprenticed a lawyer. He took roans in Harcourt Buildings Inner Tatple,
in Nover 1880, read in charrbers in Lincoln's Inn, was called to the bar
in 1881 and took the degree of Li. B. 0stensth1 Pearson was forging a
legal career, thereby following many high wranglers in the Cambridge
znathnatics tripos. Then, as now, there was a good living to be made at the
bar.
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In fact, Pearson was never imich concerned to make xroney and his corres-
pondence shows that he cordially loathed the law. n illuminating letter
passed between him and Robert Parker on 24 October 1881. The following
passage is an extract fran that letter7
I went f.ran there bane. Told my Governor that Macroxy
the patent man thought that it would .e better I should
not enter his charrers at present (how I rejoiced in that
reprival three days ago!) and that I ought to go to an
equity pleader. The Governor remarked that it was high
time I did: sanething as three years were already gone and
I should want another six before I did anything at the bar,
that I must really take to reading law and only reading it.
That he would find a pleader at once, but thafr I had better
spend my time in reading criminal law, which was a xrcst
interesting science. God! interesting science! - rape,
nurder and the pettiest of thefts can form an interesting
science! How I wished he had been a person to whan I could
open my heart. I suppose there are such parents.
If it wasn't for my uxther I tnink I should realise my old
Idea of the back-oods and join Patrick in Ohio. I must have
fresh air and I cannot get it here.
Lix years of criminal law. I wonder what one will be like
at 30?	 Yours K.P.
The law, in short, was a mind-ning bore. Pearson was keen to get out
at 'alncst any cost; any cost that is, short of returning to work at King's
College. This is shown by several job applications and adjunct correspondence
A letter fran G.W. Prothero of King's, dated January 8th 1883 shows that
Pearson was thinking of a cciimercial career. This letter and others show
• that Pearson was wanted at King's, but would not care. Prothero remarks
that the 'spirit of the place is in zna/ty respects probably quite as alien to
38
ma as it Is to you'.
My dear Pearson,
I have just heard fran R.H. Macaulay that J. Bryce, who wrote
to me about University men for their business, is at present at
Rangoon. His address in "The Bcbay arid Burmah Trading Cor-
poration Ltd., Rangoon". He went out last October, and is
expected back in May. If you like I will write at once to
him, and will do so with pleasure - so don't scruple to ask.
Or if you like we can wait till he cares bane. Unfortunately
I know none of the other partners.
There is another business-house in the City, a South-1znerican
business I believe, headed by one Burke, an Oxford first-class
man - which young Zirch of this college has just gone into.
But it is a small house, and Birch says they want men of 22
or so, not older. Still they might be willing, and I will ask
if you like.
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Are you too old for any of the Civil Service appointments?
If not, I should have thought they would suit you better than
business.
i wish I could persuade you to care here - there is an opening
for you here, and what is nore there is sarething for you to
help in making - that is a new college, out of this old one.
The spirit of the place is in many respects probably qpite
as alien to Ire as it is to you, and that is just why I want
you to care - that you may introduce another element. The spirit
of a place is not permanent, and you supply just the difference
I want to see here. The college sticks in the nuid now, and it
has the makings of a big and noble place, and I want to see it
got out of its ruts. 	 y don't you care and help? There is actual
teaching work to be done. Frost will do very little nore work
ixz, and you can take his place - that gives you a footing, the
rest you can make for yourself. There is a future for the
Universities and for this college if man like you will cane and
rk at it. As to our qualifications, you needn't suppose that
a oollege Dan is such a very different perscn fran the rest of the
rld, or at any rate need be - that notion savours of your early
undergraduate days (forgive ire), and in sane ways you are qualified
very thoroughly for the post.
I wish to goodness you would think about it seriously - and let us
talk over it when you next care up, now in the midst of nest-building.
In the same year (30 July) we find that Pearson has applied for the
principalship of Firth College 1 Sheffield. A letter of recarireixiation to
Henry Bradshaw, tells the sane story. Pearson could work in Cambridge if
he desired, but is antagonistic to its conservatism.39
Nr Pearson is a fe1lci.z of my own College and I would give anything
to induce him to cane up and take University and College work, o
as to help our College to take its place and to hold its own place
in the University. If he had a distinct bent for the bar, or if he
could be at the head of a place like Fifth College, I should not grudg
losing him because he would then have scope for his powers. But if
he came here there would be all the antiquated traditions of an old
place like this mixed up with the good traditions and above all there
would be the workers and upholders of these antiquated traditions
to fight against and all this iirl1es great waste of powers and
energies at a tire that it is quite possible to find a sphere of work
free fran such friction. In a word sane man are born heads and sane
are born subordinates. Sane man will be rebels as subordinates while
they would be admirable as heads. Nr Pearson is to nrj mind one of
these.
If Cambridge and the law repelled, then other .tens had the power to attract
During this period, Pearson was close to three Cmbridge5ô W.M. Conway,
Robert Parker, and, to a lesser degree, W. Macaulay the mathematician.
And like sane of his fellows, be was doing sate University extension lectures.
In the spring of 1882, he gave a course of lectures on 'German social life
and thought' in Blackheath, in which he traced 'the rise and fall
of the successive Gennan Ideals frcin the earliest times up to 1500,
which period races the grcwth and decay of the principle of
unity in Germany, as embodied in the Holy Ranan flripire and in the
Holy Catholic Church'. In the Auturmi, he offered a course of
lectures an 'the history of the German folk (1500-1550) "The
reformation".
It was not only history that interested Pearson in this period,
for he was attrptirxg to build reputations as radical social critic
and as a man of letters. It is no surprise to find that he called
ui Karl Marx in 1881. Nor, when his views have been discussed, will
it seem surprising that Marx arid Pearson seem not to have seen eye to eye.
For, on 13 March 1881, Pearson wrote to Parker, telling him that 'Marx
wrota ire a sanewhat sarcastic note with which ends our connection' 40
What can be said about Pearson's develorirent in this period up till
his appoinbient at Unversity College? Well, we can see him trying
to develop along three main lines - mathematical, literary and
philosophical and social.
On the mathematical front, Pearson published very little - one
paper in 1879, another in 1880, and two nore in 1883. At the tiire
of his appointment at University College, he had not made great
published contributions to mathematics.
More effort, in fact, had been given to literary and philosophical
pursuits. Taking these by turn, we find that Pearson published
The New Werther in 1880, under the pen-name 'Loki', a 'Farewell to
Cambridge', in verse, in 1881, and, irost notably, The trinity. A
nineteenth century passion play in 1882.
The New Werther, literarily speaking, is an abortion, a
of Geethe's original, telling in turgid style,
the tale of a British idealist studying in Germany, who befriends a
jew, Raphael, and speaks with him of literature, philosophy and
social deiocracy. 2rthur, the tragic hero introduces Raphael to his
girl-friend, Ethel. Inevitably, Raphael and Ethel becare mutually
enanxured, and the desolate and self-pitying arthur cczrrnits suicide,
though not before putting dzn his 	 dog Casper. Doubtless,
Wertht was meant as sarething of a joke, for there is extant a letter
to )Lacau1ay telling of hcM Pearson arid t friends, being iirpecunious,
decided to write a book in 'the genuine gush style' •41
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The work was canpieted in a fortnight and offered
to Kegan Paul. But at the last minute the others
(Raphael and Ethel of the book) left me in the
lurch and the whole thing appears miird and
entirely thrcn on me. Whatever you think of it
(should you buy it, it is called the New Werther)
you must on no account reveal to anyone connection
with it, as such revelation would be simply danrping
to ny reputation, whatev,er that tray be. So rerrnber
absolute secrecy.
We shall see that 'gush style' or not, this work1universafly
and rightly corx3.rined by the critics, had a strong autobiographical
ntent' 2
 Pearson's passicn play was published anonyrrously and at his
n expense. One doubts that it ever was performed, if only because
it was over 200 pages in length. Once again the critics ware uniirressed,
though, as good Victorians, they clearly felt obliged to take seriously
ny play stuffed with the supposed speeches of Christ. A sample of this
play is reproduced below. Mary Nagdalen is the soliloquist.
?lagd (taking up skull). Would that this tary gown of flesh
Were mingled with the dust UJe thing!
Where is that brain which thought and willed,
Which sinned and suffered? Where are those eyes
Which joy bath fired and grief had dulled?
The lips which kissed or muttered curse?
The tongue which careless trailed
A merry lay, or whisper'd words
Of dark and dreadful prophecy?-
Where are they all? Gone, gone for aye!
While Inarory forgets the name
That they once dreamt was their's and their's alone.
Islter the reception accorded to his literary efforts, Pearson,
like so many before and after, appears to have accepted the judgnt of
his would-be peers, and wisely to have quit the field, enabling Mm to
concentrate trore upon philosophy, history and social criticism.
The philosophical and historical essays, in fact, f(4im the imore
distinguished part of Pearson' s literary output, and show him as
having talent in these directions. In l880 rie wrote on 'Pollock' s
44Spinoza'. In 1883, he wrote again on Spinoza, and also on Kan
a philosopher whose words he had thoroughly assimilated by that time.
There are also essays on 'Nairto\ides and Spinoza' and on various topics
in German history.46
Most notable, hczever, is the work on social criticism produced in
the period before Pearson's appointment at University College. We soon
see that if Pearson was not contrftuting frequently to the literature
of inathiatics, it was because he was engaged in the nore
preSSing task of putting the world to rights. We will have
reason to return to this literature when we consider why Pearson
was to found biaitry and statistics. For the present it is surely
sufficient to note that, as early on as 1881, Pearson was writing on47
'Anarchy'. In his paper, Pearson spoke of Marx and the history
of the International, and zroved on to divide socialists into two
classes - into 'iroderates' and 'extr€nists' in today's parlance, into
social dai)crats aid anarchists in Pearson's.
Pearson was grieved that at a meeting in london in 1881,
'a cx1ete reunion irust have taken place between the two parties'
As a result of this meeting Liebknecht and I believe
that Bebel were imprisoned on their return to exInany,
and we find Hasselrnann and Fritz sche, (both colleagues of
Liebknecht and Bebel) openly	 ssn approval in America
of the assassination of the Czar This approval is the
death blow of German soci?i I sin (under its present form)
as an open political party. We may then look upon the
German socialists and the Russian nihilists for the future
as the secret party of anarchy, and of this anarchy I
propose to say a few words.
These few worx3s were, in fact, many. But, the gist of what Pearson had
to say was that there s a secret party of anarchy in Britain,
dissitEnating its views in the pages of the Anarchist. Such documents
probably had little effect on the better class of working man, but
in the duxth helpless masses of our great towns, the
Proletariat sure and simple, they foster the process
of feimntation which is but too surely progressing.
Truly did the manifesto of 1847 declare, that the
Proletarier had nothing to lose, but a world to gain by
a forcible revolution. This opinion is daily growing
in the minds of the Proletarier thnselves and the next
ten years will certainly produce the fruit.
The chance visitor to London, said Pearson, who saw wealth and
prosperity spread around 'would scarcely believe in the anarchical
element existing in strength in such a town'. But were he to cross
Blackfriars Bridge, or to go to the Borough or to Soho, his opinions
as to the 'stability of society' would be shaken. He would see stunted
forms and pallid faces - millions with nothing to lose, millions who
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cc*ild 'sweep a few thousand police and soldiers before than as the wind
b]s a handful of chaff'. This lunenproletariat, Pearson thought,
were an entirely debased group of iten and aien. Even if a girl
of their number was blessed with the 'divine gift of beauty', the only
option for her was to cross to the West End, and to sefl her body 'to
the passions of the wealthy'. These people, said Pearson, 'are a fact,
arid the laws of political ecoriany are not logical, barely historical,
categories. Again, he stressed, indicating . - a familiarity with
azmiunist literature, 'the proletaier have nothing to lose but their
chains'. In short, there was a real prospect of bloody and ultimately
useless revolution.
What was to be done about it? Philanthropy said Pearson, could do
nothing, and was correctly bracketed by Carlyle with Italian organs
arid penny newspapers. Nothing could be expected fran the goverunent, for
to deal with the probln of the ltuenproletariat, with what one historia
has called 'Qutcast Indan', would be to court electoral suicide. No,
said Pearson, , revolution nt be carried out fran above. And,
noreover, this would have to be done in a very particular way. Nothing
could be expected fran the 2'ristocracy of wealth, but sate hierarchical
ordering of society was needed if anarchy was to be avoided. Accordingly
the question to be faced was the following one,
if we do not graduate society on the scale of wealth,
on what shall we graduate it?
His answer was that of a Cambridge third wrangler who felt himself
undervalued in society,48
So that while er matef; -al shall be divided as
equally as may be between the various classes, power
intellectual shall fonn a scale on which the necessary
graduation of socIety may take place. Power Intellectual
shall determine whether the life-calling of a moan is to
scavenge the streets, or to guide the nat-ton. With equal
educational opportunities open to all, each would stand on hi
own footing. No man could live on the power material banded
down to him by his ancestors, while power intellectual cannot
be collected and bequeathed; it bears also no interest.
But, how was this new order to be brought about? What was wanted1 said
Pearson,was a new religion, tckfonn a bond between class and class, and
between moan and man 'solely on the score of their manhoocL' But, he
admitted, no such religion was in. view. It was as if society
was being led to the abyss by 'a Priival force uncontrollable and
not to be explained'. He had little to offer by way of detailed
strategy.
I have discussed this paper in sare detail as it shows that, as
early on as 1881, Pearson saw himself as a socialist - but as a
socialist of a very specific sort. He was an elitist socialist, a man
who be]kved that the socialist route to progress lay not in 	 sare
form of workers' caitrolr, but in the wise governance of an intellectual
elite, who, having none of the pecuniary interets of the Capitalist,
would be able to use their talents in directing society in the best
manner. Pearson, as early on as 1881, was an outstanding example of
this sort of socialist, and, unlike many others, did not mince his
words. We shall see, again and aç,ain, that the idea of a rule by a
socialist elite	 was a daninating passion. In fact, his
later career as eugenist may be interpreted as an atte1Tt to provid
the sort'of guidance which such an elite would value
After the paper of 1881, the contributions to socialist literature
began to f 1CM rapidly. 1861 also saw articles entitled 'Songs of
the proletariat' and 'Political econar' for the proletariat'. 1883
saw Pearson' s paper on 'The ethic of freethought', wherein he attempted
to outline the ethical principles that should dcminate in a rationally
run society. 1883 was also the year of 'Songs of the socialists, done
into English'. 1884 saw a paper on 'Socialism in theory and',
which had been delivered to a 'working class audience'. 4 91n these
essays, Pearson argued that the 'laws' of political econany held only in
certain historical phases of society, and were not the inexorable
ccseguences of human nature. Mzre importantly, he began the task of
laying out in detail the principles by which socialist society should
be run. His work on the ethic of freethought, for example, was an
atttpt to provide a new source of rational noral guidance, sareththg
to replace the Christianity which Pearson,	 freethinker, had abandoned
We will see the detailed develoint of his ideas in a later chapter,
but it is worth noting that Pearson's ethic of freethought turns out
to be one supposedly based in the objectivities of science. Science, in
a sense,	 , was Pear5crts religion. No wonder, therefore, that sczre
of his writings on the philosophy of science have the flavour of devotion
literature. The mDst uoral of man, Pearson argued ' must be in possessic
of the highest knowledge of his day'.50
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-biaietric London
1884 was saxthing of a watershed for Pearson. At last he
ws able to escape fran a law career to which he was ill adapted.
after several unsuccessful attrpts to obtain acadnic jobs he was
appointed professor of applied InathEnatics and nchanics at
University College London. The appointhnt caire after Pearson had
acted as a locura for Professor Rowe, professor of pure rnathenatics.
Pearson had hoped to be made Rowe's successor, but the job went to
Hill. But, in June 1884, he was appointed as successor to
Henrici, the professor of applied inathnatics. In the sama year,
Pearson was invited to ccitplete Todhunter's Histry of eiasticit) and
to ociilete and edit the late W.K. Clifford's Carironsense of the exact
sciences.52
1884 also brought recognition for Pearson's social writings,
,thich, by then,
	 included his 'Socialism in theory and practice'
in which Pearson again laid out the case for an elitist and collectivist
state and showed hiiriself familiar with the rks of bix. Ctice again,
he was tphatical1y anti-revolutionary in outlook, telling his audience
tit53
You may accept it as a primary law of history, that
rgreatcnnge ever ocqprs with a 1eap no great
social reconstruction which will ever benefit any
class of the carnuinity is ever brought about by a
revolution. It is the result of a gradual growth,
a progressive change, which we tin an evolution.
This is as itnich a law of histoxyof nature.
Clearly, he sens to have accepted Darwin' s evolutionary gradualism,
i • e. the gradia1 I m accepted by Weldon but rejected by Bateson, and to
have been politically tied to it. In biology, as in politics, Pearson did
not countenance the possibility of rapid, discontinuous change leading
to ste 1e arid beneficial results. His form of 1itist, gradualist
C4a
socialism made him acceptable to established 'radicals. In October 1884,/'he received an invitation fran Caroline Wilson, the Hazrstead diseuse
fanous for the shelter she extended to the Fabians, inviting him
to participate in a select study group.54
Enclosed with Mrs Wilsor letter of an invitation was a documant
entitled 'Society for the study and discussion of Le Capital'.
People cited as nEIt,ers included F.Y. Edgeworth and Sidney Webb
(econanists), J. Hunter Watts arid Dr Burns Gibson fran the Derrocratic
Federation, Edward Pease of the Fabians together with August Bordes,
Henri Bzurden and Caroline Wilson, described as anarchists.
Others listed as 'inquirers' incinded the Revere L. Maoionald
and Mrs Macdoi-a1d, Dr. W. Boultin, Ernest Harikin, flrina Brooke,
Madenise1le Bollinger and Arthur Wilson. Others., listed as
'nnbers as yet doubtful' included Professor James Sully,
H.H. Asquith, J.E. Pease, Mrs. Bums Gibson and L.K. Burton.
Pearson was invited because it had been heard that he kn
sarthing of Marx. We know that he had read quite widely in Marx,
especially fran the paper on 'Anarchy' already referred to. It seans
doubtful however that he became a ir±er of the group as there are no
records of his attending anongst his collected papers5.5
This may have been in part due to the circnstance that, Pearson,
in 1884, was organising a group of his n - or, uore precisely, a group
that would discuss probleis close to his freethinkei4 heart. I am
referring to the foi:mation of a "men and womeris' Club in 1884, whose
purpose was to discuss, freely and fran]d, all matters relating to
relations between the sexes.
We can know a good deal about this group, as it kept good records..
Particularly interesting is the autobiographical account ker,t by Maria
Sharpe, the unmarried and younger sister of Pearson's friend Elizabeth
Cdb, who was to be the secretaty of the group and also later on to
becana Pearson's wife? 6 In her autobiographical account 7Naria Sharpe
related that the idea of the club was first mooted to her by her sister
Elizabeth Cobb in the autntri of 1884. Mrs Cobb passed on the suggestion
that she (Maria) should join with her, Karl Pearson, Robert Parker and
others 'in forming a club for discussing together subjects connected
with the relations of the sexes'. Maria Sharpe was a mattier of a
unitarian family and related, through another sister, to the fanous
Courtauld family. She had an open and liberated mind for a late-
Victorian	 and she recal? that she was attracted to the idea of
such discussions because,58
I had always since I had thought on such matters
firmly believed that it was possible for men
and woman to talk on them in perfect openness
and perfect sincerity without ham, but that had
been rather where there was practical work to be
done. I had at one time talked a good deal to
Sydney (Courtauld) on the subject of men and
prostitution, but when I felt that he had given
me all the definite knowledge in the matter which he
was likely to give ire I stopped the discussion.
Maria Sharpe recal)e also that she was particularly interested
in prostitution, which she described as 'the one great subject
known	 to girls which fills then with an enquiring fear-
fulness when they first learn of it'. She believed it to be the
'6e thought which lies at the back of any branch of the wanen's question'
She was generally favourable to the club because she saw it as a way
of serving the 'wcnEn's cause, which, sb said, she had had 'so much
at heart since the earliest clays I left school or before'. Accordingly,
she agreed to join, though little irore happened in 1884, except a
flEeting between her and her friend Lina Eckenstein and the authoress
ar feninist Olive Schreine.9 They IrEt at Hastings.
The second period of Pearson's life, which we may take as that
stretching fran his appointnEnt at University College to his xrQeting with
Weldcn, then, opens with his being ensconced axtong the London radical
___e class, and with a good, if danding job at University College.
He had given, and was to give, a great deal irore of his time to
radical writing than to applied xnathatics, or, indeed, to any sort
of mnthaiatical research till the meeting with Weldon. Daring the period
1885 to 1890, the best of his radical writing was done; -this was the
period of the men and waren 's Club.
Returning to Maria Sharpe' s account, we find that she and her sister
were invited to tea with Pearson and his friend Ralph Thickriesse in
March 1885. Thereafter, organisation of the club went cit full tilt.
The core group were joined by Kate Mills, Annie L. Eastty and others.
The first flEeting of the club was held on July 9 1885, at 27, Brunswick
Gardens. Robert Parker was elected chairman, a set of rules was
proposed and accepted.
	
Pearson arid Olive Schreiner were elected
ocxiinittee ners, and Maria Sharpe secretary. Other irenters prescnt
were Elisabeth Cobb, Huie C. Pinsent, Isabella J. Clenes, Reginald
J. Ryle, T.W. Rhys Davids, Constance Parker, Loetitia Sharpe, L. Agnes
Jones and Annie L. Eastty.
The first paper read was Pearson's 'The wanan's q.iestion'. This
paper, later published in his collected of essays, the Ethic of
freethought (1887), was renarkable for several reasons, not least of
which was Pearson's use of Darwinian language in conducting his
discussion of 'wanan's place in society. He argued that there was a need
for a 'of sexualogy', and that 'it is the ccirplete disregard
of sexualogical difficulties which renders so superficial and
unconvincing much of the wanen' s rights talk 1 , and 6 ° went on to say tha
We have first to settle what is the pysica1 capacity
of winan, what would be the effect of her eaancipation
on her function of race-reproduction, before we can talk
about her 'rights, which are, after all, only a vague
description of what may be the fittest position for her,
the sphere of her maximum usefulness in the developed
society of the future.
The paper, as a whole, was discursive - takings in, for example, the
possibility of a rational appraisal of the institution of marriage,
arid offering the possibility of a future state, 'when inan is truly
educated and eually developed with man', in which marriage would be
replaced by free union, along the lines neered by Lewis arid Elliot
-and Wollstonecraft arid Godwin. No doubt 	 thinking of his In
parents when he asked whether 'marriage, lasting when the sympathy which
led L o it has died out, do ought but make two lives miserable'
ven	 in this early phase, we can see his iroving slly tcwards a
propensity to syxrpathise with Galton in later years. We find him
asking whether the progress of the 'great mass of the people', or,
rather, the lack of it, might not be due to a correlation between
being highly educated and lacldng in philoprogenitiveness. Indeed, 2
'he was rruch interested in the aj.iestion of the right to bear children
Shall those who are diseased, shall those who are
nighest to the brute, have the right to reproduce
their like? Shall the reckless, the idle, be they
poor or wealthy, those who follcw mere instinct without
reason, be the parents of future generations?. . . It is
difficult to conceive any greater race crime. Out of
the law of inherited characteristics spring problema
which strike deeply into the very roots of our present
social habits. It is not one, but a whole crop of
questions which will be raised when the old idea of
sex-relationship is once shaken.
Interestingly, the notion of race was caning to loan large in Pearson' s
xnind For example, in his remaining survey of the wanan problem he
spoke of the ntb of wanan, the prostitutes, who paraded in London each
night. These he said, constituted 'a great race-problem'. Md, in his
peroration, he looked forward to the possibility of a society in which
wanan were emancipated but nevertheless submitted to 'the restraints
demanded by social welfare, and to the conditions imposed by race
pennanen63
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The n and Wczn's Club continued with regular iretings for the
next four years. It offered to its irbers a staple fare of serious
discussions about a variety of aspects of the relations between the
sexes. It is hard to discern any deep coherence or thread in the
minutes that ranain, though it should be said that the matters discussed
wer4topicai as, for exDle, when bert Parker spoke on the Contagious
diseases act, and on the views of Josephine Butler and others.
Similarly, a great deal of excitent and interest was created arrngst
club matters by the revelations offered by the crusading W.T, Stead in
the pages of the Pall Mall Gzette 4 Mst notable of these was his rk
on the 'Maiden tribute of ircdern Babylon' - an expose'of the horro of
prostituion in the Iridon of the 1880's • In general, however, the
Club tanded to organise talks and discussions about the nature of
ITorality, the differences between man and waten in respect of desires
for sexual intercourse and the historical developnent of the relations
between the sexes. pica1 exanpies of the latter are Maria Sharpe' S
paper of 10 October 1887 on 'The laws and regulations dealing with
prostitution in Western Europe fran 800 AD to 1500' and Pearson' s paper
of 8 June 1886 on 'A sketch of sex relations in primitive and madieval
Germany.'
The club survived for four years, until 1889. Its nei±ership
rnained fairly constant, but it had a variety of guests of interest -
these included, for exauple, the doctor H. B. Donkin, and persons consider
for matbership included Havelock Ellis and Eleanor Marx-Aveling
latter was turned down on account of her notoriety, for, above all things
the xirbers of the club desired to avoid notoriety and to escape the
slightest breath of scandal. By 1889, it was dying, but managed to get
together another three papers on heredity, of which the nost notable
was Pearson's talk on Galton' s Natural inheritance, published in 1889.6
To this talk, we shall return. For the mxtEnt, it should be noted that
the club was disbanded in April 1889, irrstly, one ixnagine 1 because it
se nev,er to have had any vexy clear purposes in mind fran the
beginning, and because the maibers were getting heartily sick of hearing
each other repeat the sama opinions as to wanan' s place in society, real
and ideal.
1t'
• The period to 1890 then was one in which Pearson reinforced a
reputation as rad.thal thinker and writer. His output was stupendous.
The bibliography of his wo'±s prepared by rant indicates that, In
the years 1885 to 1890 inclusive, he published no fewer than twenty one
articles and books classificable as 'literary and historical',
inclix3ing his Ethic of freethought of 1887 which was a cczipendium of his
works7
During the sane period, he published The carnon sense of the exact
sciences and A history of the theory of elasticity and of the strength of
materials fran Game! to the present tirre. On the literary and
philosophical side of things, he was a nodel of productivity. This
contrasted, with his productivity as a rnathnatician 8
 By 1890, he had
published, in toto, only thirteen mathematical papers - that is to say,
just over one a year since graduation. MDreover1
 his contributions to
literature seem to have attracted a. deal nore attention than his
mathnatical efforts. We shall see that his ccmnitnent became exclusively
mathematical only after he met with Weldon and began to produce
bicznetrical papers - a circumstance which suggests that his biaetrical
papers absorbed not only his inathnatical energies, but also those which
had produced the vast flow of social and philosophical writing. This
flow, interestingly, ceased a]iost on the instant ihen he began to take
up biartxy in the early 1890's.
Biaretric London
The next obvious division of Pearson's life is that which stretches
fran 1890 to the death of Weldon in 1906. We have seen already how
Weldon and Pearson came together in a context of university refona,
and how, on Weldon' s suggestion, Pearson wrote a paper, 'Contributions
to the mathematical theory of evolution' .This, it transpires, was
merely the first of a vast series, and, by 1906, we find Pearson at
on the fifteenth in a series of major menoirs,all entitled
(with the exception of the first) '14athematical contributions to
the theory of evolution'. In these papers and in associated ones,
Pearson made massive contributions to biartry and thereby to
statistics which1(Churchill Eisenhart has depicted as having laid the
foundations of the nodern discipline of statistics. These contributions
will be discussed in the next chapter, which addresses itself closely
to the crucial historical question of why it was that Pearson, after
meeting with Weldon, should have so totally devoted.
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his energies to developing the new discipline of biartry, and to why
biatry should have led to a series of major innovations in statistical
,cS O#€,
theory, includingthe nthod of Iraints for curve fitting, the series of
Pearson frequency' curves, the product-narent coefficient of correlation,
the theory of multiple correlation and the chi-squared goodness of fit test.
These are just a selection of his innovations, sate of the ones which are
frequently employed today in countless books and articles in natural
and social science.
The 1890's were a crucial period for Pearson. They were years of full
maturity when he was able to put his philosophical views before a large
audience, to pursue his collaboration with Weldon arid to make several very
inportant human tacts.
I have mantioned already that, in 1885, Pearson edited and capleted the
late William Kingdau Clifford's Camonsense of the exact sciences. This was
a work on the foundations of physics of a highly positivistic nature, a
predecessor in form, to sare of the works of the later 'Vienna Circle', formad
originally as the Ernst Mach Verein. In the preface, Pearson recalled
Clifford's dictwn that 'no mathematician can give any maaning to the language
about matter, force, inertia used in current text-books of mathematics', arid
cited 'the weighty authority of Professor Mach' as 1egitJinating his own words
on the laws of notion incorporated into the text. Pearson, already, lflc:e
Clifford and Mach, was a prototypic 'logical positivist' 69
These views becarre candidates for massive develoçrrent and expansion, when,
in 1890, Pearson applied for ant received the post of Gresham lecturer in
Geaietry, which gave him an opportunity to taTh to a popular audience on the
topic of 'the scope and concepts of rrcdern science'. The first lectures
were given in March 1891, and, in the fo11czing year, their substance was
published in the first edition of Pearson's fanous manual of the philosophy
of science The grarrmar of science As might be expected, the lectures and the
book sought to present an account of science that was free fran the
mataphysical entangleirents caritonly denounced by the follcxiers of Mach, and,
later on, of logical positivism. We shall return to Pearson's philosophy in
the next chapter.
In N0vE±er 1891 and in 1892, Pearson lectured on 'The gecretry of
statistics'. His lectures dealt with ways of representing statistical
information graphically. They were followed, in late 1892, with a series
cn 'The laws of chance', described as being 'the elenents of the theory of
probability in Its relation to thought and conduc±.' In these lectures,
Pearson began to incorporate scare of Weldon's growing bicztetric data,
and also sought to solve sane of the standard philosophical problans of
induction - though not very satisfactorily. He resigned the Greshaxn
aointinent in 1894.72
But, brief though the appointnent had been, it bore ccrsiderable
fruit. It resulted in a great deal xrxre than the Grarrmar of science ,for there
were also izrortant human contacts made. One such was with George -L3y
Yule (1871 -19 51) who wrote to Pearson on March 6 1891 raising points about
the Gresharn lectures, which, presumably, Yule had attended. Yule' S letter,
and Pearson's reply are reproduced below. Yule had been studying with Hertz
in Gennany, and, accordingly, was well fitted to discuss Pearson's vie,z of
the nature of rratter.73
152 GcMer St.,
w. C.
Friday (March 6th, 1891)
Dear Prof. Pearson,
I would like to ask you a few questions about your Gresham lectures,
which have interested ma very much. I suppose this letter will get to
you sooner at Univ. Coil.
In your second lecture you said sanething to the effect that we
hind ourselves always imagining these ultimate particles of matter
as bounded by gecinetrical surfaces'; if I understood right. What
else can an atan or any thing else be bounded by?
In the abstract of Lecture U, at the end of paragraph (b) you say
'the ultimate element of matter, whether atai or not, we have no power
to sensate. It must enable us to construct the mechanical universe,
but cannot itself be mechanical? Why not? - or perhaps I should first
ask - what do you mean by mechanical? Isn't a vortex ring or aether
squirt or wrinkle 'mechanical', and are not these theoretical atom-
forms what you mean by 'ultimate element of matter'?
At the end of yesterday' s lecture you argued that the change of shap
in the aether, necessary for it to transmit light waves etc., necessit-
ates the existence of what one may call interatanic intensities. I
don't quite see why it should. Couldn't there be waves in the sea even
if water wasn't caipressible? Again, as regards gravitation, wouldn't
nr
the aims of a flywheel, for exairie, only hold it together the better
if they had no atanic intensities.
Again, a year Lo/ so ago, when Dr. Fison read a paper before the
college physical society on 'Mxlern views of electricity', saneone
or other who asked if this didn't merely reduce the action at a
distance difficulty fran small distances to smaller ones, was pranptly
met by the retort that 'aether was continuous' (fran Dr. Fison).
That was at least distinctly my inpression. .
I must apologise for this string of questions, and I am very glad to
hear your lectures are going to be published, as one can't digest them
offhand.
My main difficulty is certainly the statement about 'aether
interstices', that 'iether as a medium exerting pressure leads us
again to action at a distance between ultimate parts of aether. It
sens to me j. would exert pressure much better if it was continuous.
You could shove a man dcMn much better with a 'continuous' broanstick,
than with an ordinary 'discontinuous' atanically constructed one.
Yours sincerely,
G.U. Yule.
Christchurch Cottage,
Hairstead. N.W.
2pril 20 '91.
Dear Nr. Yule,
I am very glad to think that the Creshain Lectures nuirered such a
one as yourself anong the audience, and I will do my best to answer
your questions.
In a lecture of my earlier course I pointed out that none of us had
evet seen a geaietrical surface. That no instrument could possibly
construct one and that the atanic structure of matter conclusively
sha.ied us that when we spoke of a body as being bounded by a surface, w
were speaking in the same metaphysical way as if we said that a swam
of bees was bounded by a surface. We have thus none of us any phyica1
experience of a gecattrical surface; it is thus an ideal we base ipon
certain of our sensations, a purely mental concept. Further I point
out that the fact that an atan could vibrate shcied it was a capiex
system, roughly speaking of an elastic and therefore not continuous
nature. I spoke of the ultiinate parts of an atan as prime atans. I
said we pictured these prii-atans as bounded by geometrical surfaces.
But if no physical body with which we have bad experience is really
rigid or bounded by a gexietrical surface, - both these ideas being
figments of the mind, we have no real right to suppose they exist for
the atan. We siniply can imagine the atari bounded by nothing else, but
some people imagine bodies bounded by them and yet this is only an ideal
boundary. Who then will venture to say that the metaphysical idea of a
geanetrical surface has a real existence for a physical, as apart fran
ideal or syi±olic atari?
or,
I undezstaixl by mechanical a system of notion and noving things
for which our ordinzy ideas of force and mass, as sum up in the
laws of notion hold. I do not think we have any right to ass.une those
laws to hold for the ether-element, at any rate as at present stated.
They probably, like the law of gravitation, largely floz fran the
oastitution of heavy matter out of etherial matter. Granted that
heavy matter is ether in spin or some form of notion, the mass of
heavy iratter nuist involve the velocity of this notion as a factor, for
i ceases to be, if we stop the notion. Hence the mass of heavy matter
is of a totally different type to the mass of an ether element. And
the action of ether elnent on heavy particle may obey sarething
different fran the 3rd law (of ratio of spurts = inverse ratio of
masses, for the ratio of the masses is no longer a mare niinber - i.e.
is probably the square of a velocity). Th.irther the 2nd law of notion
is probably untrue for nolecules as well as for ether-elements. Thus
the further we go back, the nore we may find the laws of notion,
mechanism, to be due to the structure of matter (just as the law of
gravitation is due to ether's structure). A Vortex ring is certainly
mechanical, but it won't work. An ether-squirt and a wrinkle are not
purely mechanical, (the latter especially not - it is the fir stage
to explaining by gecuetry) for they very possibly involve the mata-
physical notions of a fourth dimension. Fran the ultimate element what-
ever it may be all the laws of notion, mechanism, must floi, but this
means that it cannot itself be nechanical in our ordinary sense.
It cannot at the sane tine explain the laws of notion and obey them.
Ni as to the ether it transmits with finite velocity sane form of
notion, it is therefore capable of strain, suppose this indeed to be
only shearing strain, still a shear may be resolved into a stretch and
and a squeeze and these notions again involve the idea of bringing sane
parts together and separating others. You will find this idea perfectl
inconceivable with a medium which is perfectly continuous. Try and
conceive it if the ether-elrents were made of rigid closely packed
elarents! Try and conceive notion in an incciipressible jelly fixed to
the surface say of a sphere! - there could be no waves in the sea if
you put a rigid plane on the top of it, or extended it to infinity and
supposed it absolutely incarressible. Waves denote change in shape
and change in shape must denote roan to change shape in, even if the
change of shape denoted no change of volume. The problem of action at
a distance is just as real I fancy for the e1nents of ether as for
elements of heavy matter, only if we explain the latter by the former
we have got at least one less problem to solve.
As to your brcanstick, if it were of 'continuous', i.e. absolutely
inelastic material no wave could go above it, and I should think it
would, have instantaneously an infintely great force applied to an
infi4ely snail part, eg. a piece would snap off it. But the idea of
absolute rigidity is purely ideal, it is not a limit to the actual, for
in all cases we are easily able to shcw that the supposed rigid bodis
really strained. I cannot conceive in fact stress without strain, but
of this I am at any rate quite certain that without strain no vibration
could be propagated with finite velocity, which is certainly a feature
' the ether. There is the kernel of the matter, the ether possesses
0f the properties of an elastic solid - these seen to be
inconceivable in the case of an absolutely continuous and. therefore
rigid body.
Yours very sincerely
Karl Pearson.
The letter and response Mist have led to iruitual sympathy, for, In June
1893, Pearson toounc1 writing to Yule	 offering him work as a teaching
assistant. Yule accepted readily, thereby entering into Pearson's life,
and, as we shall see, into the history of statistics.
Another contact made was with Galton. Pearson wrote to him on 28
February 1893, asking Kim if he could deputize at a fee of seven guineas,
possibly with a lecture on the use of the laws of chance in anthropolog24
Weldon had been booked for a similar lecture, but with a biological emçasis.
Eariler on, in 1892, as a consequent of his writings on University reform,
Pearson had made contact with Alice Lee 	 , then working as a
lecturer at Bedford College London. Pearson wrote back (February 19, 1892)
reminding Lee that what he wanted was 'a great teaching University in London
on the scale of Vienna or Berlin t, and deprecating the sch for an AThert
University, then still in the air. Out of this introduction cama arxther
of Pearson's longest parthersKip. Ov , er the next several years, Alice Lee
joined him as a bictnetric helper, and is perhaps nost fanous for her joint
paper with Pearson on the laws of inheritance in man, iublished in 1903.
So far then, we have fo11cied Pearson as far as 1893. By then he was
married and had a fmi1y. His GrarTrar of science v'as, on-the whole1well
received, frequently being lauded for its Kantian overtone. The Speaker
for example, wrote as fo1lciis
No if Professor Pearson treats his analysis - as we think
he does - as covering all rrental phenariena, he does what Kant
would have done had he stopped short at the end of his Trans-
cendental Analytic.
Again, we shall return to this Kantian influence.
By the end of 1893, Pearson had aiirost but not quite entirely abandoned
'literary and historical' writings, and was beginning to focus all of his
energies on the developrnt of bicinetry. Thus, for exairLe, 1-us paper
of 1896, 'Contributions to the theory of evolution. 111. Regression,
heredity and Panmixia' advanced Galtq,n's statistical mathods of dealing with
heredity by introducing the product-Iranent coefficient of correlation and by
developing ideas of multiple correlation. Thus it ws that statistical
methods and biological inquiry so frequently went hand in hand in the pursuit
of bicretxy. The consecences for theoretical statistics of this
enterprise have been noted in the passages from Stouffer and Elsenhart
cited above.
The statistical ideas which Pearson was developing were, of course,
trarismissable, arid it is not surprising that, in 1894, Pearson began to
lecture on the new statistical methods,	 to the delight of Yule, Alice
Lee and other auditorsY8
The 1890's were marked not only by steady progress in bicznetric rk
and in the developrent of stistical teaching at University College, but also
by a growing friendship with Galton with whan Pearson had further dealings
during the lie of Galton' s and Weldon' s 'Evolution cauinittee'. Pearson acted
as a mathematical consultant, but, as we shall see, resigned his marüership
in 1697 afte4nd Weldon had becxre exasperated by the growing influence of
Bateson on the Ccmnittee.
But, resignation or no, Pearson was to receive the Royal Society's Daxwin
medal in the following year, W(blt to Galton, who, one supposes, had
assisted in obtaining the reward for Pearson, that,79
It seemis to IrQ that the only way I can look upon it,
is as a recognition of mnethcd. Therein, I think, nuist
be the satisfaction to yourself - any mathemnaticiari could
have done what I have done, a dozen of the better men
far better, - especially if they had had the suggestive
W'ldon almost daily at lunch for four or five years. Hence
the mredal is not a recognition of iry mathemntics, but-of the
fact that the quantitative treatment of biological problemns,
which you have initiated is to be in future one of the great
Instruments of research in matters of evolution. It is a
recognition which justified your methods, and will throw new
life into all the little groups, who have so unselfishly assisted
in most laborious arithmetic during the past few years.
1Hereafter, the ties with Galton were considerably strengthened.
Pearson dedicated pieces of his bianetric work to Galton, and enjoyed
a full correspondence with Kim,with Pearson always expressing
genuine respect for Galton and his work. A most significant letter,
indicating a growing harnon of interest between Pearson and Galton
passed fran the latter to the forer in the first ironth of 1901. Pearson
expressed a great regard for Galton' s ideas e±arking upon active
eugenic propagandising - sanething which, as noted in the previous
chapter, Galton had fought shy of before 1900.80
7 Well Boad,
Hairstead N.W.
Jan 10, 1901.
M dear Galton,
It would be a very great pleasure to ire to know you were
going to take the field with regard tç, what I am convinced
is of the greatest national i[rportance, - the breeding frau the
fitter stocks. If one could only get sate one to awaken the
nation with regard to its future! The statesmen, who really
have the ear of the populace, never think of the future.
They will not touch the question of coal supply nor that of fti1ity,
and yet I am convinced these are far more important for the very
existence of the nation than any question of local goverDment,
church discipline, or even technical education! I think I told
you we had nearly catpleted the reduction of our measurrent on
1100 families and one after another of the results conf inn the higher
series of values, about .5 for parental correlation, that I fcund
fran the eye and horse colour data. I shall probably not publish
these results for sane tine, as I have half made up my mind to accept
an invitation to lecture at the Lowell Instititute in Boston this year
and these materials would be a good basis for lectures on Heredlity.
alt they nphasise even more emphatically than your earlier value of
1/3, the opinions you have expressed on the great part played by
good stock in the cmnity. Heredity is really more intense than
we supposed it to be 10 years ago. Cannot this be brougl2'forcibly
hate to our rulers and social reformers?
Now the difficulty in this case sens to Ire to be twofold. How
can you (1) stop the fertility of the poor stock and (11) multiply
that of the good? The middle classes are I take it the result of a
pretty long process of selection in this country, and I believe that
they alone are the classes who largely ensure. Your scheme therefore
would at first apply only to thea, and indeed to the best of them, for
the others would not care a rap for a good bill of health, more than
they do for any moral suasion. You might influence by your health
degree a small percentage of the whole cn'ramity, say 4 percent, but
this percentage is probably identical with those you could equally
well influence by moral suasion. I mean by preaching the gospel that
the stability of the nation depends upon the good stocks breeding fully
and the weak exhibiting restraint.
But now are yqu going to get the better eap workman to see
that his checking the size of his family may make matters easier
for him, but is at the expense of the nation's future? His is
really unreachable by an assurance scheme, unless you could attach
your health degree to the proposals for old age pensions. That
seans to ma a point ' orth thinking about. As I have said elsewhere
it sens to ma that only socialistic maasures can touch this
popilatiai question.
Even if you can by noral suasion lead the better	 artisans
and the middle classes to see that limitation of the family may
be anti-social (and I believe it might be rossftle), how are you
going to check the unlimited prcxuction of the vJorse stocks? The
'Necinaithusians' as I know fran sad experience - abuses any one
who like zrrjself ventures to criticise their doctrine of liinitiation,
sunless it be accnpanied by the words "of the poor stocks first"
but this abuse is nothing to what one will arouse, if one ventures
to assert that the huge charities providing for the children of the
incapable are a national curse and not a blessing; that the "widow
with seven children all dependat upon her; husband a clerk who
died of conswtion aged 35", and who seeks your aid to get her
children into Peedhain, is really a irrral criminal and not an object
for pity. How can a health degree affect this source of rotteness?
I fear hardly at all. Your only hope is to flress upon the few who
really tend the nation, that the matter is one for legislation, that
although we have got rid of Gilbert's Act, the workhouse and charity
systens can still be sapping our national vigour, when coupled with a
widespread necinalthusianisim due in the main to Bradlaugh - anong the
better working classes.
What then it sens to ma that we need rrost of at the present
time, is sate work in season, satething that will bring hane to
thinking man the urgency of the fertility question in this country.
There is no man, who would be listened to in this matter in the sama
way as yourself. You are known as one who set the whole scientific
treatment of heredity going; no ne has ever suspected you of being
in the least a 'crank', or having 'views' to air. You will be
listened to and it will be recognised that you write out of a spirit
of pere patriotism. There is no one else. I believe of whart this
could be said, certainly no one who would be listened to in the same
way. Let us have (a) kncMn facts of heredity (b) influence of
relative fertility on national vigour (c) actual statistics of birth
rates of different stocks, and (d) proposed rEnedies (only, if the
health degree, tack it onto old age pensions) brought hare to those
who think for the nation.
Always sincerely yours
K. Pearson.
.d 1V
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So, by the very early years of the twentieth century,L Pearson was
a totally convinced eugenist, and, as we shall ,
 see in the chapter devoted
to etjjenics, he was
	 t'	 - eugenics in a irost forceful tone,
frequently ascribing what he saw as an increasing decline in Britain's
ecor*nic and political standing in the world to a decline in the birth-rate
rong so-called 'good stocks' in society.8
At the same tine, Pearson and Weldon were building up the infant
Bicitetrika, with financial assistance fran Galton, and were spending Ic. r-
anrints of energy in ccz±ating what they perceived as the menace of nde1ian
genetics, which was being developed in Cambridge by Weldon' s foier colleaguE
William Bateson. The conflict, this so-called 'biaretric-Merx3elian'
debate r dealt with in a later chapter, occupied rruch of the last six years
of Weldon's life, and it may be thought that his sudden denise in 1906 was
hastened by the over-work that he indulged in during the conflict.
Pearson, of coursecou1d not devote all of his energies to caating
ndelism - though, as we shall see, he gave the ndelians the rough
edge of his tongue on several occasions and rnained Jiriplacibly hostile
to the ererging science of genetics. He was busy in other directions,
developing his statistics teaching for exaile -- which, until 1915 remained
an ecclusively post-graduate exercise, developing the ideas of many persons
subsequently to achieve scientific distinction, or high posts, or both.
Things were no doubt assisted by a grant fran the Drapers' Cartpany wh ck
was made to Pearson's department, starting in 1902, and continued annually
until 1932, at a rate of £500 per
	 82 Fran quite an early stage, Pearson
referred to the section of his applied mathematics departirent responsible
for biaretric work as the 'Bianetric Laboratory'.
The early twentieth century was also the tine of the beginning of
Pearson's involvement in institutionalized eugenic s • As noted, Galton
endowed a 'Eugenics record office' in 1904, by presenting £1500 to the
University of London, which provided roans in Cower Street. Edgar Schuster
was appointed as first research fellow and Ethel Elderton, sister of the
actuary W. Pain Elderton, was made his assistant.
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Fran the earliest date, Pearson was involved in the setting up of
this enterprise. He was a irer of the snail ccmnittee which processed
and xndified Galton's ideas in the week follcMing upon Galton's visit
to put the plan to his friend, Sir Arthur Rucker, principal of the
University of London. ¶L letters fran Pearson to Gaiton shcw their
closeness. In the first, Pearson informs Galton of his place on the
cxmnittee. n the second, he supports Schuster as a candidate for the
fellowship and argues against giving the job to A.D. Darbishire, who,
as we shall see, rked as Weidcxi's assistant whilst Weldon was struggling
against the ndelians, but let the side down by converting to nde1ism?3
7 Well Road,
Hanpstead N.W.
tober 11, 1904.
My dear Francis Gaiton,
I have just been asked by the Registrar of the University
to form one of a xzmdttee consisting of Sir Edward Busk and
Mr Mackinder to discuss with you the form to be taken by your
offer to establish a "Research Fellowship in Eugenics". Of
course I shall be only to glad to help if I can in the matter,
but I write to tell you, as I am not certain that you would
expect to see ite on the ccznriittee. I need hardly say that I
think the suggestion a good one. I think inrrense good can
be done by a careful statistical study of what tends to deterioratE
and to strengthen a nation physically and mentally fran the
standpoint of the individuals fran which it is reproduced.
I Ipe in this sense that Eugenis coven not only a theory of
better breeding, but a study aThb of Kakogenics or of the bad
breedings current at present.
With kind regards to Miss Biggs - may I know when the portrait
will be ready to be carried off. - I am
always yours sincerely,
Karl Pearson.
10
7 Well Road,
Hairpstead N.W.
Dec.2Oth 1904
My dear Francis Galton,
I n very glad that you are Irore satisfied with the three
nn who are nc ., on the list for the Eugenics Fel1ci.iship.
Schuster and Darbishire are the two I kncw anything about, and I
would ]JJe to say quite frankly to you what I think and krxw
about than.
Schuster in many ways would be an admirable candidate. He has
manners, wealth, and sare experience. .
On the other hand I do not think Darbishire would in the
end do the new appointhnt credit. It is perfectly true that he has
good superficial manners and appearance but I do not think he has
any real grit, and I should frankly be sorry if you selected him.
Alwaysyours. affectionately,
Karl Pearson
In fact, Rucker realised sarething of the pcer of Pearson's personality,
and wrote to Galton rec'cxrmand.thg that the research felloc should be
kept separate fran Pearson's bailiwick.8 he consence of doing otherwise
would be that there would be a quarrel;, or Schuster would be daiinated
by Pearson.
Nonetheless, Pearson does seen to have exerted influence, and not to have
been short of ideas for action when Galton was troubled. The letter
reproduced in part be1a, shcws this. Schuster was contalating a nve,
and we see that Pearson was already tafldng with Galton about a
Galton professorship of eugenics' • 85
7,Well Road,
Hanpsted N.W.
October 27, 1906
My dear Francis Galton
This is only an interim letter, because I must really find
out frcin Schuster what his actual wishes are. My impression - but
it may be erroneous, is that he is rather restive at doing no
biological work. He wanted to make experirrents with mice bearing on
the influence of size of families and nutrition..........
Your foundation would be a splendid thing, and, I think, there
is a great future before eugenics. But zrr,j advice would be don't
hamper it. You are going to be with us a long tirre yet, and in
those years many young man will or may care forward. Hooker is no
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doubt an able man, but he is far fran a trained statistician; he
is not in the same class with men like Palm Elderton, Macdonnell
or Yule. If you got him as a fellcw nc subject to a post obit
professorship, there would be little incitement to exertion arid
you would feel rrLich hampered, if he did nothing of mark during
your li.fetime. It would be safer by far to test a number of
younger men, witbout any restrictions as to the future and out of
the group one might rise to great things and be worthy of the
Galton professorship of eugenics!
.e S. •S• ••et• .............. .. S S ••• ••• S S •SS• •• ••
Always your affectionately
Karl Pearson.
Eugenic London
1906 was the year of Weldon's death. But, it was also the year in
which Galton handed over cxntrol of the Eugenics Record Office to
Pearson, enabling him to rni it in conjunction with his Bianetric
Laboratory. David Heron replaced Schust'r, wIx resigned, and the
Off ice was transferred into University College, where it became knn
as the Galton Eugenics Laboratory. As E. S. Pearson has noted, Karl
Pearson was now a very busy
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And so at the beginning of 1907 we find Pearson head of the
Department of applied mathematics, in charge of the drawing office
for engineering students, giving evening classes in astronar', the
director of two research laboratories and the editor of their
various series of publications and of Bianetrika.
This state of affairs continued for just another four years, with
the two laboratories producing a spate of research nroirs in eugenics
4v tM O	 sj. Lon
and biattrics. In 1911, Galton died arid left E45,CXJOfor a Galton
professorship of eugenics, to be offered to Pearson in the first
instance. Pearson accepted gladly, and, aged 54, left the department
of applied mathematics which he had overseen for 27 years. By joining
the Biattric and Galton laboratories, both of which had acquired
funding (fran the Drapers' Ccmpany and the Galton bequest), Pearson was
able to found a new Departhnt of applied statistics around his new
chair. It was the first such department in the anglophone world, and, for
long, served as the premier source of statistical tuition7
Developnent was held up by the first war, which saw Pearson and his
assistants working on ordnance problems. But, by the end of the war,
Pearsn was to be found in charge of a thriving department of applied
statistics, in which eugenic, statistical and biaretrwork were
carried out by Pearsoi?s assistants and research students. 2n honours
• np
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degree in statistics was intrcduced in 1915, thereby opening up
statistic$ as a subject for undergraduate education. In 1920, new
boildings were opened by the minister of health. It was in these that
E. S. Pearson and Jerzy Neyrnan were to collaborate in their own crucial
contributions to statistics, that Pearson, in 1926, was to found a
new journal, nnals of eugenics - 	 known as the Jnna1s of human
genetics - and that R.A. Fisher was to take over the Galton chair on
Pearson's retirement.
ntion of Fisher is just one reminder that this overview of Pearson's
career has been extremaly selective and patchy - for his interaction
with Fisher was of the greatest interest and importance. Nevertheless,
the overview has depicted sare of the outstanding features of the career
of the man who did nest to develop sare of the notions due to Galton,
notably, of course, the ideas of a statistical methcxology for use in the
biological and human sciences, and of an eugenic salvation for British
society.
We have yet to see the full extent of these develojxrents - Pearson' s
statistical ideas, for exanpie, have been reverently mentioned rather
than described. The details of these deve1onents and their rationales
form the subjects of subsequent chapters. So far I have done little ntre
than to sketch out sare of the bones of the story of Pearson and his
biaTetric school, and it remains to trace the influence of these on
the biological and social sciences, and, indeed, to explain all of these
things. Before getting down to this, it is necessary to discuss one
further 'first generation' Galtonian, and to mention sare of the 'second
generation' Galtonians of consequence in the history of statistics.
F.Y. Edgeorth (1845-1926)
There is only a think sense in which ancis Ysidro Edgiorth may
be described as a Galtonian, but he certainly deserves a mentiorlV The
fifth son of a sixth son, he eventually succeeded to the family estate
of Fdgrthstown County Longford, in 1911. The fandly had been established
there by Queen Elizabeth the first. Edgeworth took a first in classics
at Baliol College Oxford. Thereafter, liJe Pearson, he made 1tc*/es in the
direction of a legal carecr, and was called to the bar in 1897. Apparently,
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e law did not engage all of his attention, and, after a spell as a
lecturer in logic at King's College London, he was, in 1891, appointed
to the Drunirond chair of political ecorxy at Oxford. He served as
president of the econanic section of the British Association in 1839 and
1922, acted as president of the Royal Statistical Society and was first
editor of the Econatttc journal.
His major early works were his New and old methods of ethics (1877)
and his Mathnatical psychics 1881. The details of these need not concern
us, but it is worth noting that the Mathtiatical psychics had two parts,
concerned respectively with principles and practice, root and fruit, the
applicability and the application of mathnatics to sociology.'
Edgeworth also porered sate of the philosophical problns of probability
theory, and is particularly fairous for his essay on the 'philosophy of
chance', i'ublished In Mind for 1884.
Edgerth and Galton, therefore, had a certaIn airount in cariron.
Both had an interest in the theory of chance, and both were anxious to
apply mathatical methods to hiinan phenatena. Edgerth reV e. Wec
Galton' s Natural inheritance in Nature, and spoke highly of Galton' s
new statistical approach.90
Qie doubts that they had the basis for a close intellectual relation-
ship, as there is little to suggest that Edgofth' s thought had any
eugenic tinge. Certainly, the two men must have been separated, both
physically and intellectually by Edgeworth's appointment to the Oxford
chair in 18l. But, this notwithstanding, Edgeworth did do sate work on
Galtonian ideas in his long and distinguished career, notably on the
theory of correlation. In 1892, for exaxple, he shaded hcM Galton's
account of the correlation between two variables cculd be extended to
three, four and nore variables. Certainly, by the ti of his death, his
contributions to various areas of statistics were sufficient to lead
Baiiley to write a nonograph on the topic.91
The 'Bianetric school'.
I have passed rapidly over the work of Edgeworth because, though he
was a itost distinguished man, he was not a conscious contributor to the
Galtonian tradition, which matched statistical methods to social biology.
iO
Instead, I wish to pass on to an account of an iiortant aspect of the
influence of Karl Pearson, the leading 'first generation' Galtonian. For,
it was his glory to have created a strong school of statisticians, and it
is in the creation of this school that his chief claim to historical
influence nust reside. As Helen Walker has noted, his develoEzents of
statistical technique were trnendous, but he is better perceived as a
man who rroved the scientific world fran a state of disinterest in statistical
stlies 'to a situation in which a large nutber of well trained persons
were eagerly at work developing new theory, gathering and analyzing
statistical data fran every content field, ccxrpiting tables, and re-
examining the foundations of statistical philosophy.' As Walker notes q 2
His concept of a general nethodology underlying
all science is one of the great contributions to
the world. His laboratory was a world centre in
which iren fran all countries tudied and fran which
they returned to set fires in their cy in harelands.
In what follows, I c r,. hardly attpt much trore than to give a
list of nans and achievamants, trostly with a view to suggesting the sheer
influence and importance of Pearson, whose work will be explained and
analysed in the next chapter. But, even in the course of a brief chronology,
we will be able to see a distinct 'generation effect'. Pearson was a
Galtonian and a bianetrician - frequently, his fornzers had little interest
in social biology, and approximated far Irore closely to the nore xrcdern
role of 'statistician' than to the older role of 'bianetrician'.
G.U. Yule. (1871-1951)
q3Pearson's first major follower was G.U. Yule, son of Sir George Udny
Yule (1813-1886), a noted Indian civil servant. Yule stñied engineering
at University College, and, as we have seen, iret up with Pearson. Fran
1890 to 1892 he worked as an engineer, and thereafter worked with Hertz
until joining Pearson's applied mathematics department. He remained until
1899, wheie'i	 an'istrative job. In 1912 he was appointed
lecJurer in statistics at Cambridge, whence he supervised the appearance
of many editions of his standard text, the Introduction to theory of
statistics. By 1950, this was into its fourteenth edition and had done
39 years of
	
service in introducing many generations of students
to the statistical ideas which Yule had first encountered in 1894 when
he and Alice Lee attended Pearson's first course of statistical lectures.
Yule, unlike Pearson, was an active minber of the Royal Statistical Society
aM. produced a considerable ancunt of original statistical work. He is
especially fantus for his work on neasures of association other than the
correlation coefficient. Yule's defence of these measures, conjoined with
criticism of Pearson's uses of the correlation coefficient, led to a long
long conflict with Pearson after 1905? For the present, we may ignore
this conflict. It is sufficient to note thati?t influential figure Yule
began his work in statistics as a cons.ience of working with Pearson.
W.S. Cossett (1876-1937)
Yule turned to statistics as a consequence of neeting Pearson. The
sane cannot be said of W. S. Gossett, 'Student', for he contacted Pearson
with the hope of obtaining assistance with statistical problns which he
had enccxintered in his ployirent as a scientist in the brewery finr of
Messrs 1rthur Guinness Son and Co. By 1904, he alerted his employers
to the probl associated with interpreting sample data, pointing out that95
flesults are only valuable when the arrount by which they
probably differ fran the truth is so small as to be
insignificant for the purposes of the experiment.'
In 1905, in order to pursue the matter, Gossett net with Pearson, and,
as a consequeixe, became a part-time worker in Pearson's biatetric
laboratory. The nature of Gossett' s practical problen-situation led
him to investigate the behaviour of frequency constants in small samples.
Thus it was that '5tudent' cane to produce his major contributions to
small-sample statistics.
Major Greenwood (1880-1949)
The great rredical statistician Major Greenwood was another product of
Pearson's biczretric laboratory. fe published his first paper in Biaretrika
in 1904. At one tirria, he confessed, he developed 'an alnost schoolgirl
passion' for Pearson. He was arcointed to the appointment of statistician
in the Lister Institute in 1910, the first such post of its kind in Britain.
Jthd, Hogben claims? 7the uptake of statistical methods into medicine was
due in no small measure to Greenwood's pioneer work on large scale trials
to assess the efficacy of prophylactic and therapeutic measures. In 1927,
Greenwood became first professor of epidemiology and medical statistics
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at the London School of Hygiene. In the early twentieth century, be
appears to have canbined an admiration for Pearson's statistics with a
spathy for Pearson's hereditarian social biology. Later on, this regard
for hereditarian Ideas diminished, but his regani for Pearson's statistical
ideas which he had first learned in the biciretric laboratory sens never to
have	 ed.
R.A. Fisher (1890-1962)
It would be wrong to overestimate the influence of Pearson upon Fisher
- though, it would also be easy to underestimate it. Fisher was never a
student in Pearson's biatetric laboratory, but, we know, his entr into
biaretrics and statistics came via his reading of Pearson's work while
still a inathnatics undergraduate at Cambridge. We shall see nore of the
impact of Pearson's• brand of statistic.3 and social biology upon Fiske C in
later chapters, for the nritnt it is worth noting that it was very consider-
able.
Other biaretric workers
I have made considerable play of Pearson' s influence on major statisticians
such as Gossett and Yule because I am irost anxious to establish his
historical significance within the developtent of statistics. In the
chapters which follow, it will be seen that this influence was by no means
confined to people whan we generally categorise as 'statisticians' • We
shall see that Pearson's pratoted statistics as a universal methcxlology
for the social sciences, and with consi&rable effect. For the nxrent,
Mever, it is perhaps a good idea to recall briefly sate of the other
workers who trained or worked in Pearson's laboratories. The list is can-
piled mainly fran a report made to the. Drapers Canpany in 1918 Workers
mentioned therein include Alice Lee, W. R. acDonnel1 (biciitrician), Ernest
Warren (zoo logistj, Rayxiond Pearl (american biologist and bianetrician of
great note), J. Arthur Harris (American botanist), W.F. Harvey (Director of
the Pasteur Institute of India), J.F. Tocher (biciretrician), Gustav
Jaederholm (psychologist and pionee. student of mental deficiency), dharles
Goring (Hane Office financed investigator of the British convict), William
Brcn (professor of psychology at King' s College London), E . C. Snow and
L. Isserlis (flathanaticians), A.M. Carr-Saunders (future director of the
London School of Econanics, H.J. Laski (fairous labour politician) and
1.1;
L.N.G. Filon (inatheaatician	 ). Others associated with
Pearson's laboratories included Julia Bell (medical researcher), Ethel
Elderton and David Heron (eugenists), W. Palm Elderton (actuary),
S. Stouffer (sociologist) and, of course - looking to a later period,
Jerzy Neyman.
These people - in differing degrees - constituted Pearson' s
'bianetric school' • Were we to trace their influence in the deve1opnt
and application of statistical nEthods, we should, assuredly, cane to
agree with Helen Walker's view of Pearson, which was nanely tha
Few men in all the history of science have stimulated
so many other people to cultivate and to enlarge the fields
they had planted.
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chapter 4. Karl Pearson ars3. statistics: the cultural
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Iritreduction
By rxw, saithing of the inortance of Karl Pearson should be
açarent. In the sense outlined, he created the new academic discipline
of statistics, doing so in a context of biciiietry, actively linked with
sches to turn eugenics into an academic discipline. Concurrently)
 he
was a successful philosopher of science - for his Grarrmar of science
went through three editions.
In subsequent chapters, Pearson's influence will be further uncovered.
But, by ni, we have seen enough to realise that the atergence of Pearson
and his biatetric school raises a fasóinating problen for those interested
in the dainics of scientific change. Several obvious historical problems
have rged; rianely those of why Pearson should have responded so favourably
to Weldon when approached, of why bica€try should have led to statistics,
and of why Pearson should have been so anxious to link statistics to eugenics.
This latter integration was always real, and the Departhent of Applied
Statistics founded by Pearson took its work style fran Pearson's inter-
pretation of Galtan' s desires
For Sir Francis there could be no safe progress in eugenics
unless it was based on sound statistical theory, and on
quantitative study of both heredity and envirorurnt. Such
is the essential bond between the two laboratories.
In posing the historical problen of explaining Pearson's statistical
endeavours, a further point should be added - nairely that he constantly
and actively pratoted statistics as a universal methodology, capable not
only of rendering eugenics scientific, but also oJ doing the same for a
calete range of social sciences, including psychology, anthropology,
sociology and cranicustxy. To the end of his days Pearson tphasised
the need to construct a research institute where his 'novel calculus'
should be
	 living forms'. Thereby he meant a range of disciplines
which incorporated, but which was riot exhausted by 'pure' biology. So,
to our list of things to be explained about Pearson must be added his
conviction that statistics offered a universal methodology for the social
sciences, and that it 'was his task to spread the nz calculus.
In	 this chapter, I will atteirt to develop a thesis
of the following sort. Pearson entered willingly into bicznetry when
presented with the opportunity by Weldon, not because of Weldon' s
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exceptional charm or because Pearson was short of projects or of work.
He did so rather because he was an ardent ideologue and philosopher.
He was a leading maiter of the nebulous association of 'social Darwinists',
anxious to provide his Darwinian with a scientific basis and to shoi, that
Darwin and socialism were caipinentary, and not opposed, as frequently
maintained by leading thinkers of the latter part of the 19th century.
His conception of 'properly scientific', articulated in his Grarrinar of
science and elsewhere ) was such as to make it inevitable, or, at least,
highly ]JJely, that biatry' s develoxrent, if at all forthcaning, would
yield a harvest of statistical method.. Statistics, thus formed, enbodied
the central tenets of Pearson's philosophy of science, and, as such was to
be universally recatirended. It was to be applied to eugenics in particular,
for this was a simple consequence of the aforiEntioned social Daxwii1ian
perspective. This perspective and Pearson's philosophy of science were, by
turn, integrated ccrnponents of a world-view constructed by a man attting
to cone to grips with the social and intellectual problns, or 'contradict-
ions' (or what have you) of late-Victorian British society. Thus, by many
and subtle mediations, we may go fran society to science. The thesis ish. VIC4e.l rCC41	 Q/t)developedI caunence wih a section entitled 'Biaretry and statistics'.
After providing intellectual and social background to the biaretric
XrcVTent, I atteitpt to show sanething of the way in which bianetric
probins led to the creation of the statistical techniques for which
Pearson is so fanus, and which were to form the core of the tuition within
his biciretric laboratory and Department of pplied Statistics. At this
stage, the relation between Pearson's philosophy of science and his biometric
and statistical endeavours should start to becane apparent. We should be
able to see by the end of the first section that the form that bicrnetry
took, and its role as the zniñwife of statistics) may largely be understood
via its relations with Pearson' s philosophical views. At this stage too,
Pearson's espousal oftistics as an universal methodology should also
becorre cctnprehensible.
The next section1 entitled 'Science, Socialism and social Darwinian'
addresses the further topic of why it was that Pearson was prepared to be
interested in biology by Weldon ; for, bicxretry was after all, a discipline
devoted to the statistical solution of biological problns. It is one
thing to explain the particular form taken by biaretry and to shcM how it
led to statistics on this account. It is anothcr to explain why Pearson
should have been prepared to enter into biological work. At the time it
.i '"
-,
was not a recognised or honoured path for the mathnatician, and
we may imagine that it did his career prospects little good. Certainly,
his biaretric work seems to have stood him in little stead in his 1897
application for the savir,4an professorship at Oxford The line I shafl
take is that of denying that Pearson ever was prim3rily interested in
biology in its n right. I shall suggest rather, that he was essentially
a social D4nian - that is to say, one who believed that a scientific
guide to social issues could he obtained frcan the philosophy of Darwin,
suitably interpreted. His philosophy of science, I will suggest, enabled
him to look with favour upon this position and also enjoined upon him the
task of providing his Darwinism with a firm scientific footing. Pearson
entered into bianetry, into evolutionary biology, with a view to providg
his ideology with such a scientific bais and with the hope of shcwing that
a truly scientific Darwinism enjoined a nove to state socialism rather than
to the laissez-faire capitalism recamnded by earlier writers on social
Daxwinism.
Hereafter is a third section, entitled 'Scenes fran a Victorian life'
in which I attt to trace the develoirent of the thought which predisposed
Pearson to take up bianetry in the manncr outlined. Here I discuss not only
his tflre in London, but also his earlier days in Cambridge and I-Ieidethcrg,
attrpting to trace the incidents and problems which were thrust upon Kim by
the conditions of his life, and to shcw hcz his responses to these led him
into the 'ptinied' condition which pre-disposed him to respond so favourably
to Weldon and to start upon the major enterprise of his life - the building
up of a biaretric school of social biology and statistics. These explanation
have their difficulties, and these are paraded at the conclusion of the
chapter.
Bicrretxy and statistics
Ci) Background
Bianetry was a construct of the England of the 1890's, and to an
extent to be determined, reflected its background.
We have seen already that, by this time, rather little academic study
of evolution had been carried out. MDst academic work had been in phylogeny,
and workers who suggested direct attacks on the nechanism of evolution -
on heredity and the principles of variation, for example - had to defend
their choices. Certainly, nost of the theories of heredity afloat in the
period in Britain - those of Spencer, Weisrnann, De Vries, Galton, Nageli and
others - were the products of non academics or of foreign academics1
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Statistics, insofar as it was an institutionalised concern, was non-
inathnatica1. The Statistical Society of London, set up in 1838, had
little to do with inathanatical statistics, despite the influence of
Quetelet, and despite the papers of Edgerth and Marshall the econatdsts
in the Jubilee volume for l885
In social thought there are several relevant currents. The 1880's
the onset of social]	 In 1881	 ; Henry George	 cane to
England and prcxtted his views. In 1882 Hyndman founded the Social
Denocratic Federation, and 1883 saw the inauguration of the Fabian Society,
which began issuing its tracts, and marked 1889 with the Fabian essays in
socialism, edited by George Bernard Shaw. This was a non-Marxist group,
that aizred its sights not at the targets of the Ccmmnist manifesto, but at a
state turned socialist by the leadership of intellectuals and scientific
administrators. All of this was played out against a grdng recognition
of the rottenness of urban England, notably of the metropolitan heart.
1883 saw the publication of The bitter outcry of outcast London, excerpted
for W.T. Stead's Pall Mall Gazette, which revealed the conditions of an
urban sub-proletariat7 those who were to feature in Charles Booth's 4fe
and lahours of the people in London as the 'very poor'. ] 890 saw the appear-
ance of William Booth's In darkest England and the way out. 8
 1884, 1886,
and 1887 k large civil disturbances
/t around the sane period, we find Bradlaugh making a
reputation on the strength of atheism, Innie Besant facing prosecution
for issuing a tract on birth control; an active f rethought congregation
at the South Place Chapel; a sprinkling of Cantean positivists, and good
audiences for scientific publicists like Tyrx3all and Huxley:J,O
In the sane CkCLXckeS
	 various forms of social Darwinism were
popular, and Darwin's ideas were invoked to support a]itost every conceivable
form of social organisation. Piridrew Carnegie and the great captains of
1inerican industry may have doted on the laissez-faire philosophy of a Herbert
Spencer, but a Kropotkin, in his work in ?itual aid could also read into11
-the nature the message of the benefits to be derived fran anarchic caubinatio:
Everyone had sane opinion on Darwin and on the relation of his doctrine
of the survival of the fittest to ethics and social policy, even if, like
Huxley, it was to deny the relation's very existence.
In these streams, of rse, there rroved the venerable figure of Francis
Galton, holding aU of the views we have discussed, but not campaigning
actively for eugenics much before 1900. Indeed, before 1900, eugenics was
little nore than a C o4j a to research, but, afterwards, Galton was able
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to deliver his message with sane success - arid no wonder when it is recalled
that at that tirre there was also produced H. G. Wells' Anticipations of
the reaction of mechanical and scientific progress upon huiian life and thouh
which both sold well arid contained the following sentirrentP
It has becare apparent that whole masses of
human population are, as a whole, inferior in
their claim upon the future, to other masses,
that they cannot be given opportunities or
trusted with power as the superior people are
trusted, that their characteristic weaknesses are
contagious arid detrimental in the civilising future,
arid that their range of incapacity tts and
dttoralises the strong. To give them equality is
to sink to their level, to protect and cherish
them is to be swamped in their fecundity.
13As S. Hynes remarks, there is nothing in this passage that Eaderi-Powell
would have boggled at. It is a familiar kind of turn of the century
radicalism, 'mixing Darwin and Nietzsche and the idea of efficiency to
caose a society that would be, in effect, an inhuman machine.' This
inhuman machine was desired by several 'socialists' of the period.
(ii) Intellectual structures
Ncw, we may go on. to consider bianetry itself. Statrents of the
aims of bianetry were camon in the literature, but it may convenierrtly be
regarded as a discipline which applied mathematics to the study of the
var).ations occurring anongst the rnr.±ers of large populations, of their
inheritance and of their responses to the pressures of selection. We have
already seen Weldon' s progranire for biciretric research, heavily endorsed
by Pearson.
The statistical developnts which these biaretric investigations
led to were nicely siutmarised by Raynnd Pearl in his obituary of Pearson-4
1. The method of nrirents first employed siirly as a device
for curve fitting, but in the endEo have far-reaching con-
sequences for the developrent of general statistical theory.
2. The system of skew frequency curves, as a techniqi e for
xriathnatica1ly describing natural phenarena that individually
vary.
3. The developrient of the theory of correlation and its
application to the problems of heredity and evolution.
4 The X2
 test for goodness of fit of theory to observations,
coupled with the mathematical, logical, and statistical con-
sequences and applications that grew out of it.
How, one asks, could it be that the study of biology should have led to
such results? The answer appears to reside in the circumstance that
bicxnetry was a branch of biology which stressed, as it had never been
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stressed before In biology, the iirortance of exact zreasurnt and
of exact description, without theory, of the observable phenarna of
evolutionary biology. In order to see this, let us take a particular
exauple, namely that of the study of heredity - which led to massive
developnents in the theory of correlation. For, as Stouffer pointed15
out, Pearson was the 'perfector of slirple linear correlation; inventor of
imiltiple and partial correlation, of curvilinear correlation, of tetrachoric
and bi-serial correlation' • The appropriateness of a discussion of
correlation is further indicated by the introduction which Pearson offered
to his statistics lectures, showing, as E.S. Pearson has noted, that for him,
it was the idea of correlation which, stood as 'the fundamental illuminating
conception of the statistical calculus'
"The purpose of the mathenatical theory of statistics
is to deal with the relationship between 2 or itore
variable quantities, without assuming that one is a
single-valued mathatical function of the rest. The
statistician does not think that a certain x will
produce a single valued y; not a causative relation
but a correlation. The relationship between x and y will be sate-
where within a zone and we have to work out S the probability
that the point (x, y) will lie in different parts of that
zone. The physicist is limited and shrinks the zone into a
line. Our treatarent will fit all the vagueness of biology,
sociology, etc • A very wide science."
Galton, I have mentioned, developed the notion of correlation and that
of regression whilst studying heredity in man - for, as is now well known,
two generations of human stature follow, in good approximation, a binormal
citstrthution. But, his statistical investigations went hand in hand with
theoretical physiology, with a theory of inheritance based upon Darwin' s
'pangenesis'. Pearson had no taste for a ca-nbined approach. Science, for
him, was the stern business of observation and measurement, and stressed
what we would now term 'operational definition'. The whole thrust of his
approach may be gauged by the following extract fran a key bianetric mEtoir,
of 1896.17
Heredity. Given any organ in a parent and the same or
other organ in its offspring, therthematical measure
of heredity is the correlation of these organs for
pairs of parent and offspring. The • word organ here must
be taken to include any characterüch can be quantitatively
measured.
ears's goal was purely phenarenal theory of heredity which related
organs of parents and children without theoretical mediation of any sort -
e.g., Calton 'S neo-pangenesis. Z nd, given his chosen 'rnathatical
measure of heredity' it is perhaps unsurprising that biatry should have led
to the deve1oinents in correlation theory mentioned above. Let us take just
a couple of exauples, nanly the developnt of ideas of multiple correlation
and of tetrachoric correlation.
Multiple correlation
Pearson's first work on multiple correlation carte in a paper of
1895, his third t1	 tical contribution', written on 'Regression,
heredity and panmixia' .8 it was a paper which was designed to investigate
the claim that the relaxation of selection would put natural selection into
reverse. This view had a certain currency in contrporaxy biological
literature, especially in the work of Weiann. Znd, of course, it had a
certain parallel in Galton' s observation that sons regressed linearly on
fathers with a regression of about 1/3. This suggested to Galton that the
results of selection could never becxite stabi 1 ised, for, if an inpruved
population deviating fran the original mean by x ins, was allcMed to breed
without further selection, it seed rational to suppose that successive
generations would show deviations of (x/3) ins, (x/9) ins., (x/27) ins.,
and so on. Pearson, as we shall see in a later chapter, had a variety of
reasons for hoping to discredit this view. He was anxious to show that the
offspring of Q. long-selected line of offspring would be iirmi.me fran the
tendency to regress constantly to the population mean when selection was
relaxed. He hoped, in short, to show the xer of selection to produce
stable mprcwed races or castes. We shall return to his ntivation shortly
but, for the present, I would )JJe to concentrate on the interplay between
this biological ant>ition and its statistical consequences.
Galton, we have seen, knew 1, to deatwith just two variables at a tine.
He was familiar with the joint (bivariate normal) distribution of parental
and filial statures for exauple. Pearson now, in an attetpt to construct
a rrodel allowing for the consideration of influence of ancestry irore distant
than the izmiate parentage, developed an expression for the joint distribut-
ion of n normal variates, an expression, that is to say, for the n-variate
norma]. correlation surface, expressed, as Eisenhar 0puts it 'in a form that
brought the carputations within the power of tholacking advanced matheniatic
training'. As we shall see in the chapter on the law of ancestral heredity,
the new formula had the following property. If one held that, jointly, the
distribution of say, statures, in several generations of a population was
adequately described by a multivariate normal correlation surface, then,
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granted a knowledge of the various coefficients of correlation r1
(i, j = 1,2,. . . n; ijj), and of the variances of the different generations,
one could predict the expected value for the offspring of any selected
line. That is to say, if one let x1 stand for the filial deviate, x2
for the parental, x3 for the grandparental, and so on, then one could
ccnstruct what we now call a multiple regression correlation giving the
expected value of x1, given any particular set of ancestral deviates
and so on. By these mathnatical neans, the long-continued effect
of selection might be inathnatically simulated. We shall see nre of this
in a later chapter, butthe mnt it should be noted that Pearson' s
contribution to the theory of multiple correlation arose fran his particula
style of attacking the problns of heredity - a style derived fran that
of Galton, but, nevertheless, one differing fran it in significan f ways.
In the sane paper, Pearson shced by a maximun likeJJ.hcod method that,
best value of the correlation coefficient' (C) of a bivariate normal
distribution is given by the formula now said to give the sairple product-
ntiient coefficient of correlation 7
 generally known as Pearson's 'r' 2l
Tetrachoric correlation
Having defined the correlation between, say, fathers and sons as the
'mathnatical measure of correlation', Pearson was faced with the difficult
of knowing how to proceed in cases where there did not appear to be any
normally distributed continuous variable involved. Thus, for exaitq1e, he
had data for sons and fathers in respect of their eye colour, and data
for sires and foals in the case of horses' coat-colours, but was unable
easily to measure the degree of correlation involved. These colours could
not obviously be catpared to normally distributed characters such as
stature. All that one could do was to group the colours into broad
qualitative categories - e.g., in the case of horses, 'bay', 'brown',
'chestnut' etc.
To overcare this prob].en, Pearson introduced the idea of 'tetrachoric'
correlation2.2
 This was a method of calculating the correlation on a
basis of a fourold table
	
which assumed that underlying
the table there really was a bivariate normal distribution of say, the
concentration of sare pigment or other. Pearson's application of this
nEthod in his work, and, in particular, in sare of his eugeni' work, where
he used it to determine the mathcnatical measure of the strength of
heredity for human characteristics such as intelligence, was to lead him
into much criticis and controversy. &it, the point for the present
is that this we11-knn statistical technique for measuring the degree
of association between tw variables was first nxoted in the context of
a typically biatric probln situation - namely that of tackling the
problEn of heredity via a detentination to measure the association between
parental and offspring phenotypes (i.e., simple physical appearances).
I will not pause to give details of the method 1 for these may easily be
read in a standard text - in, for example, W. Palm Elderton's primer of
statistics.23
Other aspects
We see then, that Pearsons' massive develorznents of the statistical
theory of correlation derived fran his idiosyncratic and theory-free
approach to the science of heredity. He wanted, in short, to be able to
give mathatical measures of the strength of heredity and to make
probabilistic predictions about the nature of the progeny of a line of
ancestry without discussing underlying mechanisms of heredity. This
theory-free approach was quite out of step with mainstream biological
practice which was as much interested in the underlying mechanisms of
heredity as in the business of predicting what the next generation x,uld
throw up. This tradition was not esteerred by Pearson. Its followers
were like,24
planetary theorists nshing to prescribe a law of
attraction for planets, the very orbital fonns of
which they have not first ascertained.
It was in this way that the 'advance' of biaretry led to advances
in the theory of correlation. This, of course, is quite consistent
with the circumstance that the mathematics, once embarked upon,
presented problems which had to be taken up - e.g., that of the sampling
distribution of the correlation coefficient. The point remains, however, tk,
the search for a new science of heredity, a part of bicinetry, of a new
mathematical approach to evolution, led to develoirents in statistical
theory of a certain type.
Correlation locms lar in Pearson's rk - much too large his critics
were to say. But, other notable features of his statistics also arose
in a bicinetric context. We find ever'where the same emphasis upon the
production of mathematical ways of describing observable phenanena, and
on ways of checking up on the goodness of the description. Thus, for
example, his first biatric paper was devoted to developing a method 25
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for deciding whether a particular assymetrical frequency curve found by
Weldon when sampling crabs could be resolved as the sum of two normal
distributions. His seccnd paper developed the series of Pearson curves
as a way of describing non-syrmetrical arid unresolvable distributions of
(biological) data. If the correlational part of his work staad fran
a desire for a way of offering thry-free accounts of the connections
between different sets of data (notably those of heredity), then the aim
in this other part of his work seems to have been that of finding ways of
describing any given set of data, notably by fitting curves to it. (Thus,
the method of ntirents.) Not all of Pearson's early statistical developrent
can be seen as the direct outrne of atteTipts to cope with biological
problems. But they can always be seen as nre general developments jibing
with the aims for biology, and, generally, for science, rioted already.
The Chi-squared goodness of fit test 7for example, developed in 19(X), is
rely a good example. It is not that once we knock, Pearson' s aims we are
led instantly to the test. That is where his mathematical genius caine into
play. Rather, it is that, if we understand these aims, we understand his
developing that kind of statistics.
Questions of method
The foregoing remarks about Lianetry' s methodological style may be
supported by going to texts. But, further confirmation for this perspectivE
upon it)tcgether with Ught on the origins of the style may be had fran
Pearson' s methodological writings. These, I have noted, were for the irost
part contained in the three editions of his Grarrinar of science?8 The dais
Ier. advanced is that given the aims and goals of biaretry at the level
of methodology - which we have seen above - we can see why bianetry yielded
statistics. Once one understands Pearson's philosophy of science, one sees
iiTlnediately why it was that bicnetxy had this methodological style, arid
why indeed, it is that his philosophy of science and his statististics irust
be seen as searniessly joined.
In the editions of the Gramnar, we find a philosophy of science which
prefigures some of the viezs of the later logical positivist school. In
a doctoral thesis on this subject, Riddle2Pias discerned three main canponent
nrrely 'riricism, a Kantian hasis on the role of the mind in organisinc
and interpreting sensation, and a Cartesian faith in mathematics as the key
to organised scientific thought'. The Granmar, Riddle notes, is 'largely
an attempt to impress the ideas of Nach upon the fliglish speaking world'.
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Riddle's diagnosis ses entirely correct. Pearson held that
the only sources of knowledge were the data of sensation. Physical
thj ects, other minds, the theoretical concepts of science and so on
therefore had to be seen as logical constructs out of sense data.
r Pearson, the circumstance that thr were constructs was paranunt.
What cannot be known, he stressed frequently, is whether or not these
constructs corresponded to reality. He was nu.ich preoccupied with the
Kantian Ding an sich - the 'thing in itself' - which he portrayed as
falling into the realm of the fruitless discipline of ntaphysics.
We cannot know the Ding an sich, he argued, all we can know are the inputs
of experience, variously refined and cofligated by an active mind. Indeed,
for Pearson, the mind was potentially very active factor in the constructic
of personal reality0
It may be the perceptive faculty itself, which, without being
directly conscious of it, contributes the ordered sequence in
time arid space to our sense impressions. The routine of
perceptions may be due to the recipient and not characteristic of
the material.
The main feature of Pearson's cotos, then, was its sheer unknowability.
All that could finally be asserted was the Kantian claim that,
it is a necessary condition for the existence of thinking
beings that there should be a routine of perceptions.
But, since 'the necessity thus lies int.he nature of the thinking
being' (a non-sequitur, but no matter) ,31.
it Lthe routine? is conceivably a product of the perceptive
faculty.
.7 ny connection, through experience, between the self and the real
rld was highly tenuous. Of the rld outside of sensation, said
Pearson, 'science can only logically infer chaos, or the absence of
the conditions of knowledge'. what then, for him,, could be the rational
goals for science? None other than the discovery of scientific laws,
which described the flow of appearances, or, itore precisely, the
regularities therein discernible. These laws did not explain - for
the 'why' of things was d.n intruitable Irystery - and they could certainly
not explain by referring the observable to the unseen operations of
underlying realities, as was camonly supposed by other scientists,
who referred the visible realm to an invisible realm of atans, irolecules,
and so on • There were no such realities, or, at least, no such knowable
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or guessable realities. All that science could do was to uncover
laws that were sunrnaries of observed regularities, instrurrnts of
prediction. Their rationale lay in their utility; they stepped up
the human survival potential in the struggle for existence, and did this
best when they had the econany and the precision due to expression in
precise mathematical form. Biaretry was the application of this philosophy
to the biological realm. The xnua±iple regression equations used to
predict offspring phenotypes on a basis of knowledge of ancestral
phenotypes were intended by Pearson as the exemplification of true
science, not of a science that mistakenly tried to get down to the under-
lying causes of things. Biczretxy was a natural Pearsonian research prograrm
and, it should now be clear, the statist i cs eterging fran it have to be
seen as the mathematical expression of his philosophy of science. Good
Cartesian that he was, it gave him a mathratical way of econanici '..ly
describing the flow of appearances, in the non-physical sciences. But,
Kantian as he was too, statistics, notably the theory of correlation1
had a greater significance still for Pearson. He felt that, in correlatioi'
theory, he had the makings of a profound philosophical revolution. Kant
had insisted that the world, to be intelligible, rrust, without exception,
conform to a rigid determinism. Pearson clained that Kant had the
category wrong. Experience, to be intelligible, must, and in fact did,
conform to the category of correlation. As seen above 3it was his view
tl'at y was never a single valued function of x, or of x 1 , x2 ,. . . x, for
any value of n. The Universe, possibly the product of the human mind,
could be adequately dealt with only by correlational methods; methods
which recognised and coped with its inherently non-deterministic nature.
Within such a wrld view, the techniques of correlation devEkped in
the biaretric laboratory attained a very high significance. Note, for
exanle, the view of Ethel Elderton, a Galton Laboratory employee, when
discussing research methods for the social sciences.34
What guide can we take to irdLcate the path of true social
reform through such a tangle of cause and effect as we find
involving the relative influence of nature and nurture on
human life? It is not enought to show that results are
associated with this or that factor; we have a vast cceplex
of associated factors, and out of this cceplex we have in saris
way to pick out the trore important and in a certain sense the
fundamental factors. The only effective method by which at
present it seeirs possible to approach such a problea is that of
correlation. Tak ng the social conditions we wish to medify, we
must study their correlation with as many factors as we can
possibly measure. In the choice of these factors, we must of
course be guiCted by the reasonable probability of association
and by the limits of hiiian life and energy. The
correlation of a nultiplicity of factors being knn,
we may justifiably assir that the factors with the
highest correlations are, anng those dealt with by
us the nost 1srortant and then the process of 'partial
correlation' will guide us still further tzards a finaljudgcnt of what fundamantally are social cause and
social effect.
Pearson's statistics, therefore, arose out of his biaretry, whose form
was dictated by his philosophy of science, which, by turn, invested his
statistics with a high philosophical significance - notably as a
f&ematical and sound mathodology for making the non-physical sciences
truly scientific. Lancelot Hogben, I think, spotted this aspect when
he spoke of the 'Pearscnian evangel' which would extend 'mathematical free
grace' to the social sciences, but at Pearson's positivistic price
So far then, I hope to have established that Pearson's style of doing
bianetxy arose directly out of his philosophy of science. (In a fuller
discussion of the effects of philosophy on 19th century mathematical
biology, one could perhaps fruitfully ccxpare Pearson's work with that
of the 1ristotelian D'Arcy Tharpson, and his work on ch arid form.)
The Irethodological style of biaxetry, by turn, may be cited as explaining
biciretry' s	 er to produce new statistical techniques. Vhat remains
unexplained, of course, is Pearson's preparedness to suddenly eritark upon
a life of biologically orientated research when approached by Weldon in
the early 1890's. This matter I will x address.
SCIENcE, SOCl2\LISM ND SCXIAL DINISM
It might be suggested that Pearson' s responsiveness to Weldon needs
little explanation - for, Weldon presented him with a set of stimulating
problems and, of course, Pearson had already said a little on the calculus
of probabilities in his early Gresham 1ectures 7 In response, I would
suggest that the early Gresham lectures do not have the appearance of the
first steps in a career devoted to statistics, and that the magnitude
of Pearson' s response to Weldon suggests strongly that he must have been
strongly predisposed to enter Weldon' s line of country. We should not
forget the ca1ete way in which the uptake of bicxretric problns changed
Pearson' s intellectual life - or, at least, appeared to change it. One
guide to this is given by Pearson's publications. In the official
bibliography of his rrk. 8 the period to 1894 includes 55 itcs listed
in
as 'Literary and historical'. Thereafter, Pearson published only
10 further its so classified. 1894, of course, is the year of
publication of his first biaretric paper. The period after 1894
Jo blio vvpbut
contained 405 further its listed in Pearsois 'Statistical'.
The section headed 'Pure and applied mathtics and ysical science
contains 4 its in the period to 1884 and 32 thereafter - suggesting
a mDre or less uniform rate of production in this area. In short, there
can be few nore amazing turn-abouts in the history of science. It is
this turn about that I now ai3dress, but not before stressing that it
would be wrong to see Weldon ' s role as an overly simple one. For, before
his meeting with Galton, Pearson had already encountered Galton' s ideas
and rcetheds, speaking on Natural inheritance to the Men and %'rnens Club
shortly after its publication in 1889. In his talk, Pearson offered a less
tfulscxne account of Galton's methods
Personally I ought to say that there is, in my own
opinion, considerable danger in applying the methods
of the exact sciences to problens in descriptive science,
whether they be problns of heredity or of political
econarç': the grace and logical econany of the mathematical
processes are apt to so fascinate the descriptive scientist
that he seeks for sociological hypotheses which fit his math-
ematical reasoning and this without first ascertaining whether
the basis of his hypothesis is as broad as that human life
to which the theory is to be applied. I write therefore as a
very partial syrrathiser with Galton's methods.
nd, in his copy of the work, Pearson pencilled in his exasperation with
Galton's style of argunent. On page 30, for example, he catrcented on Ga1ton'
analogical argtmients as follows
It is merely an analogy without any scientific value as
to the kicw still less the
Yet, later on, Pearson recafled that he had interpreted the introduction
to Natural inheritance to mean that41
•.. there was a category broader than causation, namely
correlation, of which causation was only the limit, and that
this new conception of correlation brought pyschology,
anthropology, medicine and sociology in large parts into
the field of irtathematical treatment. It was Galton who first
freed me fran the prejudice that sound mathatics could
only be applied to natural phenarna under the category
o causation. Here for the first time was a possibility
- 
I will not say a certainty of reaching knowledge - as valid
as physical cncwJ'dge was then thought to be - in the field
of living forms and above all in the field of human corKiuct.
Clearly, Weldon acted as a middleman, able to reinterpret Galton' s
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tbought in a manner Irre attractive to Pearson. We have already seen
sarthing of Weldon's positivistic approach to biological problems,
and in this chapter we see that this style, so different to Galton's,
was one that harnonized with Pearson's views.
Darwin and society
It is good to start by recalling that Pearson's philosophy of science was
also a philosophy of life. Just as, say, Karl Popper's scientific
epistnology cais conjoined in various fashions with views on the proper
conduct of life and society, so did Pearson's. Indeed, it would have been
strange if it did not, for there must be sai relation between what one
thiri]'s about the nature and possible scope of scientifIc knowledge and the
ways inwhich one supposes that affairs in general are best directed. Pearson
always made it clear that knowledge ad ethics marched hand in hand.
For him, it was ethical to kncw. Science was the best form of knowledge,
and, when it advanced, irtaphysics and religion retreated, to be replaced
by firmly established positive knowledge, which, being confined to the
phenamena, avoIded the dangers inherent in going beJond the phenanena. The
ideal man for Pearson, the late-Victorian anti-religionist, was the free-
thinker, whan he celebrated in his book the Ethic of freethought4 3 The
freethinker had knowledge, 'truth' in fact. He would have 'asshnilated the
results of the highest scientific and philosophical ]mcMl&lge of the day'.
He would be a sound citizen, trained in science' s 'iirersonal jgement'
techniques. He would be able to assess, for exanple, the views of Weiann
and to cirloy his judgerrent when thinking about the right conduct of society
to its 'anti-social mabers', which would remain an open question until one
knew 'what science has to tell us on the fundairental problems of inheritance'
It was not, however, that a correct knowledge of the continuity of the germ
pla.n wculdr se, illuminate this social issue. The naturalistic fallacy
was a caronent of Pearson's phi].osophy of science.44
ach one of u is now called upon to give a judgerrent
upon an irrinense variety of roems, crucial for our
social existence. If that judgernent confirms measures
and conduct tending to the increased welfare of society,
then it may be termed a meral, or better, a social juagerrent.It follows then, that to ensure a judgerrent' s being rroral,
method arci knci'iledge are essential to its formation. It
cannot be too often iriisted upon that the formation of a iroraljgement - that is, one which the individual is reasonbjy
certain will tend to social elfare - does not depend solely on
the readiness to sacrifice individual gain orcanfort, or on th
inpue to act unselfishly: it depends in the first place on
knciledqe and method. The first demand of the state upon the
iiidividuai is no€ for self-sacrifice but for self-irtrovcitent.
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Fbr Pearson, as for Clifford 5kncM1edge was next to goodliness. But
goodness was linked to the idea of the 'increased welfare of society'.
What was that? nd, why should Pearson have regarded it as a criterion
for noral action?
The resolution of this issue is sIitle once we grasp fully all the things
hinted at in the passage fran the &aitrnar cited above. Take, for exaitple,
the question of what Pearson termad the welfare of society. When we look
at his work, it becares increasingly clear that what he has in mind is not
sanething like the maximisation of happiness, but sanething related to
nh sterner criteria, anongst which are nur±ered itns such as national
survival and suprnacy in the international struggle for existence.
Pearson is kncn to social historians as the key parcter of 'external'
social Dthism - of the doctrine that the correct way of envisaging the
strugg for existence in human affairs is nob at the level of man against
man, bit at that of nation or race against nation or race, with success
in the struggle going to the best equipped and organised group. In the
Graiririar, alongside the episttological doctrines, this is all laid out.
We learn of Pearson's conviction that history46
can never beccne a science, can never becare anything
but a catalogue of fact3. reheared in irore or less
pleasing language, until these facts are seen to fall
into sequences which can be brIefly resumad in scientific
forurnulae. These fonnulae can hardly be other than those
which so effectively describe the reactions of organic to
inorganic and of organic to organic phenanena in the earlier
phases of their developent. The groc.ith of national and
social life can give us the miDst wonderful insight into
natural selection, and into the elimination of the unstable
on the widest and nost iitressive scale.
But, it is not only political history that will receive a n
scientific basis In Darwin's work, for,47
the two great factors of evolution, the struggle
for food and the instinct for sex will suffice to
resume the stages of social developnent.
It is in this context that socialism nerges on the scene, though
Lt is a socialism nore akin to that of H.G. Wellthan those of Narx or
even of Attlee. Pearson attacked violently the idea, ascribed by him
to rnst Haeckel, Herbert Spencer and T.H. Huxley, that Darwin and socialism
were incapatible. On the contrary, he averred, socialism, by which he
neant the 'tendency for social organisation, always praninent in political
carnnjtjes', was a factor of great importance in the evolutionary struggle
for it led to success, on the part of the group that enjoyed this organisati
to suocess in the 'intense struggle which is ever waging between
society and society'. In fact, the lesson of history was the lesson
of socialism, and science xxild ultimately balance 'the individualistic
and socialistic tendencies in evo].ution better than Haeckel and Spencer
sn to have done'. Certainly,49
in the face of the severe struggle, physical arid
carurcial, this fight for land, for food and for
mineral wealth between existing nations, we have
every need to strengthen by training the partially
dormant socialist spirit, if we as a nation are to
be anong the surviving fit.
This new pattern of orgariisation, he considered, in 1892, must 'largely
proceed fran the state' 50
Here it is that science relentlessly proclaims:
A nation needs not only a few prize individuals;
it needs a finely regulated social system - of
which the menibers as a whole respond to each
external stress by organised reaction - if it is to
survive in the struggle for existence.
Socialism, Pearson repeatedly asserted, was a system of norality,
with the state as its central object. The individual, he said,would
have to learn to say, with Louis XIV '1' etat, c' est mci' and even be
prcpared to give 'short shrift and the nearest 1an post' to offenders
against the state.
One could go on, but the gist of things should i be quite clear.
Pearson's doctrines are far fran entirely clear - interestingly, even
Weldon regarded him as a muddled thinker outside of the realm of
mathematics - but included the following positions, held before his meeting
with Weldon and his nove into bianetry.
(i)History is an important subject. But it is to be understood in
terms of the principles of Darwinian evolution. At this stage, it beccznes
a science - a biological detenninism to rival historical materialism.
(ii)In important practice1
 the struggle for existence in history goes on
between group and group, with differing patterns of social nores waxing
and waning according to their power to assist the group in its struggles.
(iii)The ultimate legitimation of norality has to be sought in the
biological standard of group survival. Only with a people attuned in
their outlook, showing Clifford's 'tribal conscience', could there be
built up a society with 'permanent stability'.
(iv) On scientific grounds, therefore, the proper goal for the
rrinbers of a society is the production of 'a finely regulated social
systeni' enabling it best to survive in the struggle for existence,
and to be 'amcng the surviving fit'.
Now, surely, we begin to see why Pearson undertook biattry,
mathematical evolutionary Darwinism, so easily, and why his efforts
to establish eugenics as a discipline nnist be seen as allied to, rather
than as separate frcin his bicrnetry.
Pearson, we see, was an extraie freethinker, who sought after guides
to norality and social policy in the discoveries of science, notably
within the ideas of Darwin. It is no surprise that he wrote with feeling
of the 'ethic of freethought'. In biarvtry, clearly, Pearson could
achieve several agreeable ends. He could produce an explar of the
'metaphysics - free' style of science which was enjoined upon him by his
philosophy, and, at the same tine provide solid foundations for the Darwinisn
upon which he based norality and social policy in general and Pearsonian
state-socialism in particular. Within this state-socialism, with its
emphasis on group fitness and group survival, an interest in and a
ccirruitment to eugenics was hardly surprising. These views may be
supported by a good deal of evidence, in the shape of views openly
proc].aiitEd by Pearson at the tine of his biaretric writings.
We may take, for exanle, the article which Pearson published in
the Fortrightly review for 1894, %ere he attacked Benjamin Kidd' s
successful Social evo1ution 2 Kidd had argued, against Marx in particular,
that all forms of socialism limiting in-group caretition would put an
end to social rogress, a view often linked with the aforementioned doctrine
of 'parnixia', which held that 'without natural selection degeneration imst
set in an certainly as death follows life'. Pearson, naturally, did not
reject the general idea that evolution gave a guide to life, but attacked
the quality of Kidd' s evolutionary premises, which converted 'evolution'
into a 'cant term to cover any n'uddle headed reasoning, which would utterly
fail to justify itself had it condescended to apply the rule of three' -
a fault ascribed to Spencer, Huxley and Haeckel too. Against them imist
be opposed the new bianathematical logic already E!t±)arked on by Galton
and Weldon. As yet, the results of the new approach were only beginning
to appear, but in the meantine, Pearson recamiended the following position4
That until the quantitative Inortance and numerical
relationships of various factors, vaguely group'
together as the theory of evolution, are accurately
ascertained, no valid argument can be based on the
theory of evolution with regard to the growth of
civilised human societies. We must rnain agnostic
as to these prob1ns until the theory of evolution
has been readjusted on its new basis.
Generally, it was 'quite possible that the socialist itovement will
react on biological science as it already has done on econanic science'.
This would be done by the inathanatical investigation of anthropological
data with a V v/ to discerning the 'relative numerical importance of the
several factors of natural selection'. Only when these investigations
were catçlete would it be time to 'talk about the antagonism of socialist
theory to biological laws' • A socialist like himself could express
jndgnt on biological issues because the key questions, in the list
resort, were Inathnatically approachable, and must lead to 'the theory
of evolution becaning a branch of quantitative science'.
Here then is the justification for a mathanatician,
however limited his range, interfering when he
observes biological principles, first stated without
any quantitative theory or statistical bases, and
then adopted as valid arguments in dealing with the
great social problens of our time.
Pearson, by then, had published many articles advocating socialism of
the sort already indicated, which stressed the need for hierarchical
'socialist' organisation to produce success in the struggle between
nations, a success which depended crucially on the Intellectual classes.
s he pit it in 'Socialism in theory and practice, being a lecture
delivered to a working class aixUence' ,55
You must never forget how much of that organisation,
that education, is due to labourers with the head.
Sc* of you may be indifferent to the great iipire
of England, to this superiority of Englishmen, but
let me assure you that, small as in sa cases
is the canfort of the English working classes, it is
on the average large caared with that of an inferior
race - canpared, say, with the abjec± misery of the Egyptian
peasant.
Pearson believed fully, by 1894, that his an work on heredity, fertility
and selection would show, contra Spencer and others, that laissez-faire
society did not eliminate the socially unfit, but encouraged their
fecundity. Only the socialist state, dedicated to national fitness,
- ) v
auld rnedy this. Reading between the lines, we can see, even at
this early stage that Pearson's socialist state would also be an
eugenic state.
The general point of the tie-up, in Pearson's mind, between sociaiismi
historical understanding and bianetry, with 1±e former producing interest
in the latter, may be taken by looking to a letter Pearson sent to the
Nanchester Guardian in 1901, replying to a leader of the previous day,
which had denounced his recent work on National life fran the standpoint
of science 6a gloany ar4 aggressive jeremiad which had presented a 'scientific
view of a nation' , os 57
that of an organised whole, kept up to a high
pitch of internal efficiency by insuring that
its nunibers are substantially recruited fran
the better stocks, and kept up to a high pitch
of external efficiency by oontest, chiefly by
way of war with inferior races, arid with equal
races by the struggle for trade-routes and for
the sources of raw material and of food supply.
This is the natural history view of mankind, and
I do riot think you can in its main features subvert
it.
In his letter, Pearson, anxious to rebut the charge that he was just
another politicafly ignorant biologist turning his rnicrosccpe to the world
of affairs, with the usual disastrous cOnsequences, defended himself in a
series of rhetorical questions (a favourite device of his) which indicated
his own intellectual path to biatEtry. what grounds, he inquired, did the
editor have58
for supposing that I may riot have spent imre years of my
life in historical work than in the study of heredity; that
I may not possibly have lahoured Irore carefully at history
than at biology; that nore of my published work may not deal
wIth the former than with the latter; nay that even my
endeavour to understand sarething of inheritance and of
racial struggle may not have arisen fran my attts to
read history aright? Iay it not be that I am oonvinced that
through the principle of evolution by natural selection
caribined with inheritance, light alone can be thrown on
that maze of wars, novenents, national survivals and
nationdi decays which passes for history in our current
.)
text books? Is it not just possible that a man who
has thought and srk2d in the historical field may
have turned to the biological field because he has
been driven by the force of facts to see that the
keynote to the history of man lies in the struggle
for food arid in the struggle to reproduce, which are
the great factors at the base of all biological
reasoning with regard to the developtnt of animal
life I ask what reason you have for supposing my
history an' outgrowth of 'biological consciousness',
rather than that itrj interest in heredity has arisen
frau my conviction of its bearing on historical studies?
Now, sate of the miDst typical patterns of Pearson's bianetry should
be understandable - e.g. its strong hasis on inheritance (often of
psychical characters) and its constant association with discussions
of the relative fertilities of different groups in the population9
and of the possibility of national deterioration through laissez-faire
in reproduction, leading to restraint on the part of the professicnal
classes and to proliferation on the part of the lowest orders. A truly
Welisian fear! Certainly, Pearson had little difficulty in accepting
tie-ups between soc ial position and natural ability. It was a point
of high signiflcance him°
The general conclusion is that Pearson's interest in bicmetry,
and its heavy emphasis on heredity, was systemnatically r&o ted to his
prior commitment to a certain type of social Darwinism upon which he had
antecedently built a defence of socialism arid an account of the miDral act.
Within this outlook, issues of eugenics rose in a hard, strong fashion.
For, if the struggle between groups was the dynamic of history, and if
morality was the study of agencies making for group surivival in this
struggle, then the questions of eugenics became crucial. In this context,
it became mandatory for Pearson to have a scientific account of evolution,
heredity and selection; for they were the agencies deciding the fates
of nations. A proper scientific approach was aL. ays called for by the
frehinker, and, furtherirore, Pearson was certain that such an approach
'cxild yield results destructive of 'anti-socialistic' forms of social
Darwinism. A great deal, of course, hinged on his readiness to accept
seriously Galton' s principle of the like heritability of mental, moral
and physical characters. But, as we shall see, by the mid 1880's, Pearson
was well disposed to take this view seriously. Having done so, the terms
of his rather cç s-L-e	 philosophy demanded that he pursue it
doggedly.
JThus it is that we understand Pearson's:
	
,5 s response to
Weldon's approach, and his atttçt to construct a new type of biology.
It was a type, a style, dictated by a distinctive philosophy of science,
and one prcductive of statistics. Bic1rtxy was a niany faceted discipline
for its constructor - a truly scientific formulation of the principles
verning society, history and mDralS. Its by-product, statistics, was,
by turn, the correct netlxdology which the freethinker would apply in
all danains when desirous, as he had to be, of scientific ailedge.
BiaTletry, statistics and eugenic.s were seanlessly joined, with one another
and with a philosophy of life.
SCENES Ft4 A VIC1DRIAN LIFE
Introduction
So far, we have seen hcw Pearson's statistics arose naturally frat
the carplex of views he had adopted by the early 1890's - views, that is,
on the philosophy and social functions of science, on history, socialism
and Darwin. In what follcws, I shall undertake to explain hcw it is
that he cams by these potent beliefs by looking at selected episodes in
Pearson earlier life and by seeing him reacting to his Victorian
circumstances.
Caxttridge
To find the roots of Pearson's philosophy of science and social
Daxwinism, we should look back to his student days. t Cambridge, he
was a irnber of King's College, 6 Lhen a small ocimiunity where dons and
students mingled well. Here,
	 :	 ' he mst Robert Parker, the
future law lord, Henry Bradshaw the librarian, Nacaulay the mathanatician
and Oscar Brci .nung the historian. Then, as ever, he looked for a few
close friends, and, in King's was rewarded y, in particular, the friendship
of Parker.
At Cambridge, hcMever, Pearson was not carefree. His 'carmDnplace
book' for 18776 uggests a state of turiroil, which led him to a piece of
self-analysis in which he att)ted to clarify his views on religion
'till I was left with soms definite idea of what religious belief I have
or whether I have any at all'. The answer was vague and rambling, but
shCMed his dislike of Victorian laissez-faire society and his religious
difficu1tLe, not uncarlron anongst young intellectuals in the post-
Darwinian period. Think perhaps of the young Alfred 1arshal1 undeing
a crisis of religious faith in the late sixties, and the parallel
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defecticrs fran Christian.ity anong rrn of the calibre of Jans
Ward, Leslie Stephen, Henry Sidgwick and W.K. CUfford9Parson,
though, unlike Clifford arid ccxrpanions, was not connected with
groups like the Grote Club or the taphysical Society. His was a
lonely vigil, arid, in his book he wrote that be had rejected
Christianity, and uld hold to deism so long as he was in contact
with nature, but not when he saw nn in 'rage and tatters' in towns.
He could not understand why God had not enabled the average man to
read Goethe and Shakespeare and lose himself in 'that heaven of bliss,
intellectual sensualism'. Turning to secular nostrizns, the scene
was juafly poor. Progress, utility and the 'welfare of our race'
were all rejected as possible life-goals. In the end lay the
existentialist's question:64
What am I placed here for, what are my duties, hc'z
shall I kncw thai if there is no revealed religion,
no right, no wrong?
Pearson, in short, was a candidate for philosophy (as had been Clifford
and Marshall before him at a similar period), and his writings of the
period portray him as engaged in searching for sai substitute for the
Christianity he had relinquished. In the language of the t,imeS., he was
searching for a creed, sarthing non-religious on which he could focus
his religious feelings. This cas out everywhere; for exarzple, when
he wrote, to Parker about Carlyle' s Sartor resartus5
You are always blaming ne for my love of the ideal
when it has no application to the practical. .but,
scuehcii, since all nrj religious dogmatic faith fell
to the ground, I feel that I can only be hapq by
adding a mystic ideality to everything and looking
at everything fran a religious point of view. This
does not add to, rather inpeded my practical action,
but it does supply a want I feel. It is this spirit
of the ideal which Carlyle tries to cast over
everything and which delights ne so.
His non-inathEnatical reading at this time was chiefly in British etpirical
philosophy and in German literature - in Goethe, Herder, SchelLthg arid
others. Like Carlyle he was an enthusiast for Goethe's Wilhefln ister.
His concern for philosophy was real enough. In February 1879 he read
Berkeley's wrks, and, at about the same time, again like Marshall before
him, decided to go to Germany to study philosophy - to Heidelberg in fact,
to rk with Kuno Fis1er. With this philosophical interest, sensu strictu,
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was combined an interest in the works of the 'scientific publicists',
Clifford, Huxley and ¶Lyndall 6 Thus, in letters about the HaEckel-Virchaw
debate, we find him proposing Haeckel as the German Clifford, and
referring to the 'old battle' - between science and religion. The main
point, perhaps, is that Pearson appears to have rged fran Cambridge
as sarething of a lost soul - as one with a strong desire for a creed,
for somewhere to focus the religious lirpilse which, on his own acknowledge-
irent, he was highly prone to. His state of mind at the tine is indicated
by verses in a ccttvrnplace boo] 7kept at this period, reJerr 9 t 3'L tj f'
At other times with chosen friend or two
He discussed Nature, God, the right of kings,
Freedan, the rule of many or of sew,
The starry vault and what 	 se are things.
Spinoza' s "Intellectual Lo	 oft rings
Within their ears; they all those theories sound
Of death, life, scx4 with which the springs
Of canplex philosophic thought abound.
They strive to know the All, yet never find firm ground.
2rthur, clearly, is Pearson. And, though no poet, we see in Arthur's
struggles the sorts of difficulties with which Pearson felt himself
cwfronted; problns which, in one form or another, were widely felt
(though often nore precisely put) in the post-Darwinian period. He ?JO,S
a man who need a new philosophy of life.
Heidelberg and London
In Heidelberg, in 1879, Pearson hoped to find this new philosophy,
this new creed as he would have put it. Here, he studied philosophy with
Fischer, and physics with Quincke 8later recalling his experiences, in
seal-autobiographical style1in his New	 9a nodern variant of Goethe's
original, which, despite its deliberately gushing style, tells a great
deal about Pearson and parallels the 'Arthur' verses of the sane period.
These reveal his loneliness and despair, and his decision to turn to
Germany, the 'country of eas' and his love of the German - a love to
be reflected in the change of name from Carl to Karl, and in his occasional
open regret that he had not been born a German. In Germany he sens to
have been prey to an occasional mild nature-mysticism, and to have kept
the canpany of Raphael Wertheirrer, a jewish law student and radical,
who features prominently in the New werther
r.
S
Morbid he shunned his fellcM countrymen,
At best a heartless pleasure-seeking crew.(With irre of vice than virtue to my ken)
Of trusty friends he could but number two:
The first a student of the law, a Jew,
Was atheist, socialist, and loved
State-theories to propound, so false and true.
The second Gaspar, faithful hound, 'who roved
where 'er his master went, beyond all else beloved.
In the New Werther, Werthefltr is portrayed as introducing Pearson
to socialism, saying of the English that they7°
do rt recognise the difference between a French
cczmunity, a Russian nihilist, and a German social
dtrcrat, but brand thEn with a carnon stigma as
subverters of society.
WerthJiter, a social dcrat, insisted that1
We do not wish a revolutionary change in all old
laws and custais; we recognise the truths which
history has taught, that real change is gradual,
and yet also that change is necessary to life. The
violence of sate persons claiming to be members of
the party is due to the ignorant and the vicious
whan the leaders cannot prevent frcxn joining their
banner. You nuist distinguish 'atheder ,ocialismus'
- Marx and Wagner fran 'Gassen &ocialismus', as rep-
resented by Hx1el and Nabiling.
Clearly, Wertheiaer found a convert of sorts in Pearson, who
thereafter proclaimed himself a socialist - though, as we have seen,
his socialism was a form of elitist state-socialism which does not anjoy
much popularity at the rinent. In aU his writings,Pearson conjoined
a desire for change with a fear of anarchy; this has been seen In his
writings on anarchy, which ended with demands for a new society in which
pcer would be related to intellectual capacity rather than to financial
standing. n indication of hcM Pearson's thought on social matters
developed in Germany is given by a paper of 1881 on 'Political econany
for the proletariat' ? 2which attacked traditional political econany and
caripared the 'individualism of Bentham' unfavourably with the 'socialism
of Fichte'. Fichte, it 'wou]ñ seea, played a large part in Pearson's
thinking about politics. We kncM that he 'a.S an author studied by
Pearson, ho quoted with approbation?3
.j ir
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Lastly Fichte arriving at the conception that every
species has its purpose, argues that if, in the
developrnt of mankind, the purpose of the species
man is ever to be realised, so must all individual
forces be united and directed to this one purpose
The state is the real expression of the species, and
its purpose is the purpose of the species. The state
daands the forces of all in,dividuals aliJe and all
their force. Of what use is any force to the state,
if it does not serve the state? The purpose of the
isolated individual is enjoyment, the purpose of the
species is culture. What does not serve the purpose
of the state, does not serve the purpose of culture, the
education of the whole, not even self education, but
runs rankly to weed in barrism. What a gulf separates
the individualism of Bentham fran the socialism of Fichte!
The reader may perhaps ask what is the aim of prefacing so
many opinions to xry definition of the purpose of a state?
Cly this - that a definition frau its very nature cannot
be based on logical proof, and I wish thereby marely to
prepare the reader for nry own view of the matter, which
he must accept or not as he feels its truth or falsehood.
I shall define, therefore, the true aim (i.e. duty) of the
state as the perfecting of mankind. All other ends are
marely auxiliary to this, and this statesmanship. Let it
be noted that I use the tern perfectin and not perfection.
In the new order, traditional political eoonatnj would give way to
a new science that would,
consider the duties of the state in regard to its
ideal - the iiuprov nt of mankind - and since the
irasure of existing culture in a state must approach
rather that of its lowest than its highest xrrers,
to consider peculiarly the duties of the State with
regard to the Proletariat, to examine the state
subjectively - its nost suitable form under given
positive circtmustances , and the relation of the subjects
to the actual executive - will form the political branch
of this science; to examine the state objectively, its
relation and duty to its subjects will fran the ethical
side. All the ordinary categories of political ecolxxny -
capital, labour, land, trade and so forth - must be judged
fran this new standpoint, and I fear not a few of the
results attained will be found to differ fran the mannon-
worshipping doctrines of Ricardo and his disciples.
The nearest extant approach to all of this, said Pearson, was to be
found in Germany, in the t'zatheder-cia1isten, who under Scbmofler,
helped fr Bismarck's social policies?4
 In particular, Pearson
singled out the words of Held, citing his dnands with full approval.
They dnanc1 above all that the pranise, that
the individual man in econanic affairs is ruled
only by egoism be abandoned, and they contest the
principle that man shall unconditionally be ruled
11'J-4
only by egoism as thereby the general welfare s
nost surely advanced. On the contrary they assert
that public feeling is always effective at the sane
time as egoism and shall be so - ethical political
econany. Finally they demand that the econanic man
must also be ccrisidered as a nnber of a state
organism, they rejeet the suggestion of an unusually
valid natural law, and demand that each existingjudicial system must in whole and part be considered
critically as a factor of the greatest iirportance,
in the formation of econimic relations - the politics,
social, historical, judicial standpoint.
It seems, therefore, that, in Germany, Pearson picked up
—an c*.itlook based on the historical tradition; one which is
perhaps best described as Spenglerian - his writings remind one75
of Spengler' s,robation of the 'Prus so-socialistic state', whic h,
is the whole folk, and over against its unconditiorJ
sovereignty both Lthe bourgeoisie and the proletariat!
are merely parties - parties, mirrities; both serve
the carnonalty.
Pearson's writings stressed heavily the desirability of an organic
state, whose ranks and grades were bound by ties of canton purpose.
The citizen, he was to write, must see socialism as a new norality;
he must be prepared to say, along with Louis XIV 'l' etat, c' est Iroi'.
So far, little has been said about Darwin, bot surely, it is easy to see
the links between the social views described above and the external
social Darwinism which Pearson was to adopt. The goal for the state
became survival in the international struggle for existence, and in
this 'external' social-Darwinian view, a hierarchical collectivism,
a socialism could be defended as that which optirnised the chances of
survival. Nrality, similarly, could be tied to the state's good.
It seems surely, that Pearson was first attracted by a variant of German
social philosophy, in an age when the relation between Darwin and
society was a major topic 1 Ue was able to accaiodate his standpoint
within a Darwinian outlook after the manner seen - a manner opposed to
the fl-iglish 1
 individualistic Spencer, which treated of socialism, the
principles of history and many other things too. It was an
acccmnodation swiftly achieved. By 1885, in a paper on the 'wanan's
question', Pearson was writing thus :76
j_ . ,-
It is the canpiete disregaxd of sxualogical
difficulties which renders so superficial and Un-
convincing much of the talk that proceeds fran the
'wctnan 's rights' platform. We have to first settle
what is the physical capacity of watan, what would
be the effect of her nancipation on her function
of race-reproduction, before we can talk about her
'rights', which, are, after all, only a vague
description of what may be the fittest position
for her, the sphere of her rnaximun usefulness in
the developed society of the future.
By 1886, the nove was caplete. In his paper on 'Socialism and
sex', Pearson noted that 'there is a principle lying at the basis
of all grcwth, which was first made manifest by a naturalist' but
which would 'one day receive its nost striking corroboration fran
the scientific historian'. 2nd, in a note, he argued that Herder's
metaphysical philosophy of history r.aturally failed , that 'the
philosophy of history is only possible since Darwin' arid that the
rationalisation of history by the 'future Darwin' would consist in
'the explanation of human growth by the action of physical and
sexualogical laws in varying human institutiions'. A ranantic German
historicism had been replaced by an English, Darwinian one. This
exp.ilsion of metaphysics was, of course largely illusory, about as
real as was the scientificness of Pearson's 'scientific view of a
nation'. (See above). This, however, hardly matters fran the historical
standpoint. What is of interest is the way that Pedrson' s social
Darwinism and its connection in his mind with socialism, which underlay
his nove into bianetry, caine into being.
Why Pearson should have been so ready a convert to genetic
determination of human mental traits is hard to say, though, as an
admirer of Goethe he was certainly familiar with Goethe's view that
there was nore intellectual divergence between the highest and lowest
man than between the highest ape and the lowest man. Certainly
though, given his general outlook, given his rphasis on the socialistic
need to keep up group fitness, the issue was of the highest inportance
for him. He was certainly a good candidate for conversion to Galton' S
secular religion of eugenics.
The foregoing, then, appears to carprise an inçortant part of the
course by which Pearson became the sort of social Darwinist socialist jtr
depicted.	 . Let us turn now to the
-i ",.
estemolo-ica1 cczrponent of his outlook - to the neo-Kantian
instninenta1in which dictated the form of his scientifIc irethodology,
and to his belief that the path to virtue lay through the sort of
science dictated by his epist€tology. Once again, we return to
Heidelberg, where Pearson studied under Fischer, though reading far
nxre widely than Fischer's course demanded. By May 1879, he was
reading Kant's taphysics of ethics, as a follow-up to the
Critique of pure reason which he had ireticulously studied whilst in
Caxtbridge. Parker, interestingly, followed a parallel but lesser
•	 course77
I suppose that I ought to read a lot of Kant, Fichte,
Schelling arid Hegel, but a sword hangs over my head
in the shape of the tripos: I must feed on hope so
far as re9i rig is concerned, and neditate the while,
what a lucky dog you are with your time at your disposal.
By Nay 25, Pearson was able to write to Parker, saying nore about
his work, and rejecting the pDssibility of a iretaphysical foundation
for ethical judgarent78
You are certainly right about the foundation of religion
not being the pure reason, this Kant I th4nk has conclusively
proved in the Kritik der reinen vernuft. In the taphysics
of ethics and the Practical reason, he attiçts to base a
religion on nx)rality, or a belief in God follcws fran the
necessity of noral order in the Universe. This seems to ire
to be thoroughly unsatisfactory. He even contradicts himself
by founding his iroral system on a noral sense (conscience,
which is innate arid universal), which he asserts dogmatically
to exist. Is this innate sense the sane in the cannibal and
the educated man? 1t iS not empirical, according to Kant,
and there is no- question of its developtent. If tlen we can't
found religion on norailty we are left alone with the enotions,
and the feeling of w t, religiosity, and quite enough too.
Clearly, Kant was riot his only interest, for, on June 12, lawrence
Green wrote, apologising that he was unable to give a suitable 'surmiary
explanation' of Hegel. Parker was equally baffled by the German
dialectician:79
Green has told ire that he heard fran you the
other day and that you had just ezrarked in
the mysteries of Hegel: I hope that you have
managed to understand him better than Balfour
succeeded in making ire do in his lectures.
By the 20th., Pearson's ba±flErent had worsened. He wrote to Parker,
telling him of a dinner with F4er at which he planned to tell his
14
mentor that philosophy was a vain pursuit, and that
I feel at a lcrer ebb of despair with regard to the
truth than I have ever felt before in n life.
As to truth itself, it was a dubious affair.80
Then let us consider whether it can be a law of nature.
Does anyone kncM what we mean by this expression, the
nore I have studied science and physics, the nore I
see that we kricw nothing of what we call nature -
of electricity, light and attraction we know nothing.
What is the sense of calling light a vibration? Or
that gravity is a force between particles of matter
varying as the inverse square of the distance! !! The
term was Invented sate hundred years ago to describe
a phenanon which it attenpts to explain ... Besides,
the whole tendency of nodern philosophy since Kant is to
assure us that the so-called laws of nature exist in our
minds, are a logical necessity of our minds which inpress
than on the things in thanselvf.s for they can only observe
things in such relations. Fancy truth a function of that
absurd hurrbug man's mind!
In the following weeks, there was a great deal of discussion of
Hegel and Kant in which the usual difficulties associated with the
understanding of these authors featured strongly. On July 12, for
exanle, Kant is said to be difficult on account of (i) the Ding an
Sich, (ii), the 'want of a binding link between his various mind powers,
such as pure and practical reason, sensibility and understanding',
and (iii), the impossibility of a God whose 'sole existence proof or
reason is norality'. Faced with such difficulties, Pearson decided
tanporarilybandon philosophy; his faith in reason had been 'shattered
by the purely negative results' which he has found in the works of the
great philosophers. Pbrtunately, however,81
There yet remains Natural Science; what the whole 'world -
philosophy cannot teach us through pure reason, perhaps
nature can through experience. What is the good of
pM1oop1is dicussing frelA "il1 if ti'y do not know
how much of the thspositi on of the child depends on that
of its parents; or the human soul, if man is merely a stage
between the primeval 'Kaulquappe and that which we do not know?
These are questions for science to answer. How long they will
take to answer them is also unknowable. Centuries separated
Gallileo and Newton, Newton and Darwin, and until they answered,
it is best that philosophy should slumber.
His hope, he noted, was to go to Berlin to stixly with Helmholtz or
Kirchoff, But, by October, it had perished. He had decided to throw
philosophy and physics to the winds, feeling incapable of ioaki.ng major
contributions to either one. He wx1) study law, and, henceforth, there
w.o be no jiore 'Hegel or Schelling', no 'tore 9ahbling in 'integrals
and disintegrals'. He wo concentrate on a career at the bar.
Here, in the Heidelberg episode, we see again the roots of later
developnents; notably of a 'Kantian' philosophy of science ehasising
the need to extirpate the t) lug an sich fran scientific discourse, in
whatever guise it might appear. Laws of nature are already portrayed
as 'a logical necessity of our minds'. The distate for Kant's ntaphysica
approach to ethics was also- iirortant, and rained; so iraich so that,
in 1883, when reviewing Fischer's Eritik der Kantischen Philosophie, we 8 2
find Pearson speaking well of the critical philosophy, but ill of the
Critique of practical reason. Thinking doubtlessly of the Oxford
neo'-Hegelians, he notes that there is
an entire change of front, the door is to be thrown
open to the whole body of arotionalists, nystics and
netaphysical idealists.
Clearly, Pearson was open to a non-itetaphysical account of ethics,
or, at least, to one that seared non-ntaphysical. By judicious
rnanip.ilation of Darwin's ideas he was able to care up with ethical and
social philosophies which both satisfied the Spenglerian desires which,
we have seen, he acquired in Germany and could be justified by reference
to the findings of science and to the philosophy of science.
Thus were laid the outlines of Pearson's weltanschaung. The idea of
reality as unknowable, and the idea of science as surrniariser of the
phenarena were already there, and would be developed while preparing
the text of Clifford's Can-ronsense of the exact sciencesreading the
rks of Nach as be worked. The historicisin, the naturalistic ethics
and the political ideals would all be integrated within the language of
social Darwinism. The eugenic state would appear particularly attractive
against this backdrop. The passage to bianetxy and statistics linked
with eugenics was a clear possibility.
The foregoing analysis of Pearson is a rather personal one, and
might perhaps be augmented by a xrore broad-scale sociological analysis
proceeding along the sane general lines as Hobsbawm' s explanation of the85
exiergence of the Fabians in late 19th century Britain. Pearson's thought,
after al]jihich stressed the importance of the establishment of a
socialist state governed by highly-trained professionals,6
 was similar
in very general ways to the Fabian progranue. Hobsbawm explains the
aiergence of the Fabiaris by referring to the changing nature of late 19th
century British society - xting on the one hand the collapse of conditions
which made old-style policies of econanic laissez-faire seen a less
attractive option than forirerly, and, on the other, the energence of
a grozing group of superior black coated 'workers by brain', occupying
,as }lobsbawm puts it, a 'nouvelle couche sociale', the natural interests
of which did not agree with those of the earlier 'entrepreneurial'
middle class. These ni men were, so to speak, the forerunners of
Professor Gaibraith' s 'Technostruc€ure', whose natural interest,
Gaibraith suggests, is to take over the running of the large corporations
in a franrk of elitist socialism. Hobsbawm, similarly, sees the
style of professional socialism prcated by the Fabians as giving
expression to the interests of the first British forerunners of the
technostructure •87.
Pearson, qua salaried professional, had an identity of interest with
this group, it might be thought, and may perhaps be seen as providing
support for it in his thinking. Certainly, he provided a view of society
in which the in.bers of this group became depicted as of pararrount
significance, and, via his develofuent of eugenic perspectives, he
gave thar a firm biological rationale for superior status. 2nd, in his
statistics, he might be seen as providing a suitable calculus for such
an elite. In outline then, we can see that Pearson's response to
the conditions of his life was one that reflected the interests of the
social group with whcin he identified. This, by turn, opens the
possibility of explaining the overall pattern of his thought by reference
to social structure and class interest. It is a possibility te which I
shall return in the final chapter, which, inter alia, discusses the
prcznise and the difficulty of such an explanatory tack.
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Introduction
So far, the biological side of bianetry has hardly surfaced 11as I
have mentioned it irst1y in its role as the midwife of statistics.
But, it did have a very rca]. and strong biological aspect, and it is
not too nu.ich to claim that in constructing their new mathematical and
biological discipline, Pearson and Weldon saw themselves not as c1i rg
to an existing repertoire of approaches to the central problems of
evolutionary biology in the broad sense, but rather as displacing then -
as replacing thEn with a Irore properly scientific alternative. Every-
where in the biatetric literature we find references to the creation of
a new style of biologist, who would be capable of deploying the new
mathematical tools of the bicinetricians' trade. Weldon, in particular,
was an active crusader arrongst biokgists, and, shortly before the
formation of Biaretrika, wrote to Pearson that:1
The contention that 'nurrders mean nothing and do not exist in
nature' is a very serious thing, which will have to be fought.
Mast other people have got beyond it, but nost biologists have
not.
There can be no doubt that Pearson and Weldon, in the pages of Biaiietrika
and within the walls of the biaretric laboratory, saw themselves as
starting a new biological xrovement. They were striving to change the
course of British biology and to install themselves as helmsmen.
Clearly, they cud not succeed in their arrition, and a central reason
for their failure was their defeat in a long and bruising encounter with
another school of British biologists - the Mendelian 00, which
gathered strength about the central figure of William Bateson in Cthridge
in the early years of the 20th century. Bateson's 'victory' was not
total, and the bianetricians did not disappear without exerting sane
influence in the area of evolutionary studies. What this influence was
we shall shortiy see, as this chapter is devoted to a study of the farrous
'Bicxretric-Mendelian' debate which was such a notable feature of early
20th century British biology. It was a debate in which the Mendelians
advocated and sought to establish the new Mendelian genetics as biological
orthodoxy, and in which the bionetricians bitterly opposed Mendeism.
The debate has at least three sorts of interest
	 There is,
firstly, the fascination of the arguments deployed and of the theories
advocated. Then there is the historiography2 which the debate has
generated: different historians have offered different and inconsistent
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explanations of a set of 'historical facts' about which they seen
largely agreed. Finally, there is the issue of the influence which
the bicuetricians managed to exert on the develorinent of biology
despite their defeat in the encounter with the advocates of Mendelian
genetics.
In the renainder of the chapter these topics.
find a place. Thoughts on the third are scattered throughout
the chapter and are brought to a head later in the work - after we have
seen nxre of the work of R.A. Fisher.
The chapter has three carponents, (i), a 'standard' chronological
acoount of the debate; (ii), a discussion of rival historical inter-
pretations, and (ili), an attrpt at arbitration and synthesis. No
applogies are offered for introducL.1g historiographical issues, for
historical analysis is not chronology and 'the facts' do not speak for
thEnselves. Finding the best interpretation or explanation of the facts
is the business that makes history a thrilling theoretical enterprise.
The debate
(A) The facts of the case
We may ooirnence with the career of the father of English Mendelism -
William Bateson (1861-1926)? He was the son of the master of St. John's
College Cambridge, who, by turn, was the son of a Liverpool merchant.
William was extrately unhappy at school, but, on entering Cambridge
found a new life in the study of biology under the 'new wave' of
biologists whose appearance had been ushered in by the appointment of
Michael Foster to the Trinity praelectorsbip of physiolcgy in 1870.
Bateson did well, and graduated with a first class degree in 1882,
specialising in zoology. Thereafter, he went on to do research, follcing
the daninant Cambridge pattern of phylogenetic rtorphology which was then
so heavily prcnoted by men like Mam Sedgwick and F.M. Balfour In his
work, Bateson sought to thrcw light upon the origins of the vertebrates5
through a study of Balanoglossus, a worm like creature shiing a notochord
in its proboscis which has a larval form that is free swinming, ciliated
and shows reserthlances to the Echincderrns. This animal, and allies,
Bateson placed in a special class which he called 'Hariichorda'.
Balanoglossus he hoped, might 'betray the secret of chordate and hence
vertebrate origins'. He produced work that was very well received when
p.blished in 1884, 1885 and 1886, but which also telegraphed to the reader
1
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a growing ccnviction on Bateson's part that his discipline had the
nost insecure of foundations Interestingly, at the time when he was
p.irsuing these early studies in Cambridge, Batesan was close to the
man w1 was subsuently to beccire his greatest adversar3 - namely
W.F.R. Weldon, whc!n I have already discussed in sate detail. At the
w
time of Weldon' s death, Bateson wrote in letters(of his bitter-sweet
feelings for WeldonJ
I owe a great deal to him. It was through the
chance of meeting him that I first became a
zoologist, and afterwards through him that I got
my first start with Balanog].ossus.
"Until the tine - about 16 years ago - when his
mind began to embitter itself against ire, I was
Irore intimate with him than I have ever been
with any one but you.
"... If any man ever set himself to destroy another
man's work, that he did to ne - and now suddenly
to have one of the chief preoccupations of one's
mind withdrawn, leaves one rather "in irons", as
sailors say.
and,
'To Weldon I owe the chief awakening of my life.
It was through him that I first learnt that there
was work in the world which I could do. Failure
and uselessness had been my accepted destiny before.
"Such a debt is perhaps the greatest that one man
can feel towards another; nor have I been backward
in owning it. But this is the personal, private
obligation of my own soul'.
By 1886, plainly, Bateson was thinking about: the need for a new style
of evolutionary biolcgy - one disciplined by a 'fuller understanding of
the lawa of growth and variation'. And, his work for the next few years
took him into just this area, climaxing in 1894 81n the publication
of his ater1a1s for the study of variation. His rejection of the
traditional seems to have cost him dear. Weldon' s job did not go to him
when Weldon left for the chair of zoology at Unv,firsity College in 1890,
and Bateson heard that this was because he had taken up a 'fancy subject'
- I.. e., the study o the very basic processes of variation which, he
considered, would have to be fully understood before discussions of
evolution could be sensibly pursued Bateson was left with just his
fellowship, supplemented in 1892 when his college, St. John's, appointed h
steward.
.. p.
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The publication of the Materials was a major event. For the irost
part it catalogued variations seen in living organisms, but its
introduction and conclusion packed a particular sting. Here, Bateson
laubasted traditional Daxwinians, attacking on two fronts. On the
one hand 0he	 i.ke their use of anbryology, arguing that it had
'provided us with a magnificent body of facts, but the interpretation
of the facts is still to see', and that, as things then were, any one
engaged in Daiwinian phy].ogeny was 'at liberty to postulate the occurrence
of variations on any lines which may sgest thanselves to him, a liberty
'which of late has been freely used.' On the other, he accused them of
having failed to establish their 'utilitarian view of the building up of
species' - i.e., the view that each feature of an organism could be
construed as advantageous to its bearer.UJ½nd he naz advanced thc view
that the differences between species were abrupt and discontinuous, and
that, for a variety of reasons, it made sense to suppose these due to
discontinuous variations - a view directly opposed to that of the
Darwinians, wbo saw the differences between species as the product of the
long selection of the small variations shcin by all the inanters of large
populations. Bateson proposed another view. The traditional view, he
said, had overestimated the plasticity of the organism - seeing it as
putting out small randcn variations in all directions, which natural
selection would assess for utility, thus pressing the organism into close
adaptation to its environment. Batesca-i, by contrast, opposed high
plasticity, and ehasised the power and the autonar' of the process of
variation, which he now saw as capable of yielding, at a stroke, new
organisms discontinuously related to existing forms, but still well-
functioning. For him, it was not necessary to suppose every feature of
an organism present on account of its utility: for, when a new form
was produced discontinuously, it would stand or fall as an entity.
Natural selection would ban it or let it pass 2
 If we were to take a singi
exanple of the sort of thing that Bateson had in mind, we might consider
the ti, I Ip with all its parts in fours, arising as c. variation of parent
tulips, . whose parts were present in triplicate. The variation, he
noted, was czxt1ete and perfect.
.1-el,
liere, I have merely scratched the surface of Bateson's thought
on variation. It is worth noting that he supported his views in two
ways. lie hadet of arguments for the iirpssibility of continuity
in evolution, resembling in part the remarks of another opponent of
selection, T.H. Huxley, who, before the Origin, had put matters nicely
when he asked rhetorically,13
who has ever dreamed of finding an utilitarian
purpose in the forms and colours of flcwers, the
sculpture of pollen grains and in the varied
figures of the frond bf ferns.
This level of ostensive argument was uncrpinned by a rich though
vague theoretical orientation 4 Stiining frct his early period, when
he had to consider the evolutionary origin of itetaiieric segmentation
in aniiia1s, Bateson had been naich irrçressed by a number of ideas - by
the idea of sretry in organisms, D the idea of repetition of parts,
by the idea of variations in these being due to 'definite changes in
the mechanical rlaUons of divW.ing parts', and by the idea of resem-
blance between the patterns exhibited by organisms and those due to
natural, mechanical and rhythmical processes. All of this went hand in
hand with a vibratory theory of inheritance, based on a biological
analogue of the vortex theory of the atcz, which was to lead Bateson
into long non-acceptance of the chrarosaw. theory. The general style
of his thought at this level is caught in the following extract fran his
Problems of genetics. Thj work was published in the 20th century, but
work by Coleman shcizs that the style of thought which it embodied dated
fran a ita.ich earlier period?5
Attempts have lately been made to apply irathematical treatment
to problems of biology. It has saretirres seemed to ire that it
is in the gearetrical phencxnena of life that the rrost hopeful
field for the introduction of mathematics will be found. If
anyone will catrare one of our animal patterns, say that of a
zebra's hide, with patterns known to be of purely mechanical
production he will need no argument to convince him that there
must be an essential similarity between the processes by which
the two kinds of patterns were made and that parts at least of
the analysis applicable to the mechanical patterns are applicable
to the zebra stripes also. Patterns mechanically produc... od are of
many and very diverse kinds. One of the nost familiar examples,
and one presenting sate especially striking analogies to organic
patterns, is that provided by the ripples of a mackerel sky, or
those made in a flat sandy beach by the wind or the ebbing tide.
With a little search we can find anong the ripple-marks, and in othe
patterns produced by simple physical means, the closest parallels
to all the phenomena of striping as we see them in our animals.
The fo1ng of the stripes, the differentiation of two 'faces,'
the deflect ions round the 1iiüs and so forth, which in the body
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we knci..z to be phenatna of division, are amron both to
the mechanical and the animal patterns. We cannot tell what
in the zebra corresponds to the wind or the f1az of the
current, but we can perceive that in the distribution of
thepigments, that is to say, of the chrcaitgen-substances or
of the ferments which act upon thea, a rhythmical disturbance
has been set up which has preduced the pattern we see; and I
think we are entitled to the inference that in the formation
of patterts in animals and plants mechanical forces are operating
which ought to he, and will prove to be, capable of rriathnatical
analysis. The cararison between the striping of a living
organism and the sand-ripples will serve us yet a little farther,
for a pattern may either be formed by actual cell-division, and
the distribution of differentiation coincidently determined, or -
as visibly in th4agmentation of many animal and plant tissues -
the pattern may be laid dn and the pigmext (for exaxrçle) dist-
ributed through a tissue across or independently of the cell-
division of the tissue. Our tissues therefore are like a beach
anposed of sands of different kinds, and different kinds of sands
may shcM distinct and interpenetrating ripples. When the essential
analogy between these various classes of phencinena is perceived,
no one will be astonished at, or reluctant to admit, the reality
of discontinuity in Variation, and if we are as far as ever fran
kno.ing the actual causation of pattern we ought not to feel
surprised that it may arise suddenly or be suddenly imdified in
descent.
All of this nust have been unsyrrathetic to Weldon, who, we have seen,
had moved fran Cambridge to London in 1890, abandoning also the Cambridge
phylogenetic approach to evolution in favour of a new statistical approach
based on Galton's mathematical techniques. But though Weldon abandoned the
Cambridge style of research, he could have enjoyed but little fellci
feeling for Bateson, who had also defected - but, ^o to speak, to a
different country. For, as we have seen, Wd1on was a strict Darwinian,
in the sense that he believed evolution to proceed via the action of
natural selection upon the small continuous variations displayed by
all the methers of large intercrossing populations. It was this Sort
of Darwinism that Bateson opposed, and, as may be sunnisei fran the
quotation above, he was not nore favourably disposed to Weldon's research'6
ty. This, in best Pearsonian manner, stressed the concentration upon
appearances. Bateson, by contrast, wanted to understand the underlying
biological processes by which variations were produced. He never got very
far in his quest, but we can at least see that it really was his quest,
and that it could lead him into making canparisons between biological
£ 'Sq.
processes and such physical processes as the passage of a vortex dn
a stream or the patterns on Chiadni plates. So, if we look at Weldon
and Bateson in the early 90's, we see that each had rejected aspects of
traditional norphology arxl that each had gone on to sty the process
of evolution directly: but the style of study and the views on the
process which they were developing were inccitpatThle. One further
example of the difference in their thinking is given by the use which
they made of the biological notions of adaptation and fitness. Bateson
was in the habit of arguing that, in many cases, the differences between
species were such as to make it implausible to suppose that the species
In question represented the termination of a series of forms, each nerging
iiiçerceptibly into its predecessor and successor and with each one having
a slightly better degree of adaptation than its predecessor 7 The argunent
was always poorly put, and was frequently unclear, but it shcs Bateson
thinking in terms of fitness and adaptation. These, interestingly and
significantly, were just the concepts which Weldon was anxious to eliminate
frcan the new biartrical bIology-8
Knowing that a given deviation fran the itean
character is associated with a greater or less
percentage death rate in the animals possessing
it, the importance of such a deviation can be
estimated witlout the necessity or inquiring how that
increase or decrease in death rate is brought about, so
that all ideas of 'functional adaptation' becane
unnecessary.
Weldon, of course, was not alone, for he had recruited Karl Pearson
to his cause, and, together, they were working upon the develorirent of
the research prograirine outlined in Weldon' s manifesto reproduced an p. (3
We shall see Ircre examples of the style of work that the biaretricians
were engaged upon as the account progresses, but, for the nrimant, it is
good to note that the approach to heredity which they favoured was one
that was essentially phenotypic, and which concentrated upon the establish-
lent of laws governing the inheritance of continuously varying characters.
The 'ideal type' of law which Pearson and Weldon sought, and which they
were wont to refer to as the 'law of ancestral heredity', for example,
was one of the following sort
= a,x, + a2x2 + a3x3 +
where, as E. S. Pearson has put it 9 'x is the expected deviation for the
off spring fran the irean ohis generation, x1 is a linear function of the
j-Jq.)
deviations of the two parents, x2 a similar expression for the four
grandparents and so on.'
	 central problEn, to be discussed in
the follewing chapter, on the 'law of ancestral heredity', was to
find the proper values for the coefficients a 1, a2 etc. in different
cases - e.g., height in man, coat colour in horses and so on.
A clash with Batesonwho saw the proper unit of evolutionary advance
as the discontinuously varying individual, was, unsurprisingly, not long
in aidng. Hostilities opened in 1894 when Weldon reviewed Naterials2°
unfavourably in Nature, discounting Bateson' s arguments for discontinuous
variation. Bateson, Weldon considered, was in danger of confusing
genuinely discontinuous variations with variations that found a proper
place in the 'tii1s' of continuous freuency distributions. In 1895 a
similar argument was pursued when Bateson and Weldcn? 1found themseives
on opposite sides in a controversy concerning the origins of the
cultivated Cineraria. Thiselton Dyer bad argued that it was the product
of selection. Bateson denied this, arguing that it was the consequent
of bybridisation and sporting. Weldon entered the fray on Dyer's side,
and accused Batesan of 'want of care in consulting and quoting the authori-
ties referred to'. Thereafter cane an acrijiDnious exchange of views22
concerning the paper of 1894 in which Weldon, under the izrrimatur of
the Royal Society 'Cczunitee for conducting statistical inquiries into
the ieasurable characteristics of plants and anlirals' claiit to have
dionstrated the existence of a selective death rate cwCffgst the con-
tinuous variations in 1frj breath' shn by Plynouth crab.3 Bateson
was anxious to shcM that Weldon had hot given a genuine exarrple of
Darwinian evolution in operation, and wrote copious letters to Galton,
chairman of the caimittee. In consequence 7
 Galtan me roan for Batesan
on the carmittee, along with several other traditional biologists.
Naturally, the new, enlarged caimittee was entirely split, containing as24
it did, dynamic advocates with very different ideas about what carrying
through its pirposes actually entailed. In the event, Pearson and
Weldan resigned in 1900, and their resignations sre follcMed by Galton' s.
This left the ccrinittee in the hands of its Irost dynamic nnber - nanely
William Bateson, whose relations with the biaretricians took a further
turn for the worse in 1900 when Bateson prepared a paper critical of 25
pearson's wrk on 'halx)typosis' to which we shall return), which was
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printed before the object of its criticism bad been published by the
P4Yyal Society. Pearson responded with a paper 'On the fundanntal con-
ceptions of biology', which he published in the newly-f orrred Biontrika.26
Bateson offered a response, but Pearson would not allc,w it into Bicfretrika
unless it was reduced to 6 pages or less, and, in conseguence, Bateson
circulated privately a privately printed paper on 'Variation and
differentiation in parts and thren, which he caused to be set up
after the manner of a Biartrika article?7
1900, of course, was also the date of the rediscovery of Mendel' s
ideas by de Vries, Correns and Tscherinak2 and Bateson, who had been
thinking along lines which were similar to those being followed by De
Vries, was able to see a great future in the new Nendelian genetics.
He errbraced it fervently, particularly as it offered a picture of unit
characters, integrally inherited, which jibed nicely with his views on
variation and evolution. Within the ndelian franerk he could see a
way of explaining, via nutation, the creation of new, discontinuous
variations, and via the doctrine of the purity of the ganEte, the non-
blending inheritance of those variations. He gathered a group of workers
about lthnself which contained, at various tirres R.C. Punnet? (future
Jrthur Balfour professor of genetics at Cambridge University), Miss E • R.
Saunders, a botany lecturer at Newnham College, Captain C.C. Hurst (author
of Experiments in genetics, 1925), Leonard Doncaster (author of Heredity
and noted cytologist), R.P. Gregory (who died at a tragically early age),
R.H. Lock (author of Recent progress in the study of variation, heredity
and evolution), Miss Sollas, Miss Ma.rryatt and others. The work of the
Bateson group was published, at first in the p5pQ3gf the evolution
cairnittee, and later, in the Journal of genetics, founded by Bateson and
Punnett in 1910.
Thus, by 1902, the t groups had their own bases - London and Cambridge
their ci platforms - Biatetrika and the Reports, and were gathering
followers. Now the debate entered its hottest phase. Weldon, in
Biorretrika, attacked the Mendelian& work in rong language, accusing
the nde1ians of making ad hDc adjustzrents to their theoriesof falsely
cia.1iing that heterogeneous groups - e.g. round or wrinkled peas - could
be regarded as hairgeneous, and of maintaining the principle of the purity
of the gante in the light of refuting evidence. The tenor of the
conflict was so fierce that, at the British Association neting for
1904, the well-founded expectation of a blazing row between Weldon and
the ndelians attracted nre than a full house 2
 Those who sought a
gladiatorial spectacle were, it ses, not disappointed - even though
they frequently had to sit on the window ledges. Weldon was able to
make sane good points against the Mendelians, though he lost face when
his student A.D. Darbishire recanted his opposition to Mendelism and
went over to the eny 3 (We have seen that Pearson was keen for Darbishire
not to work in Galton' s laboratory.) In on€ celebrated incident, Weldon
was able to discredit sare work of Hurst's by reference to the breeding
records in the General studhook, but Hurst hit back with a reference to
Form at a glance, which indicated the spuriousness of the supposed counter-34exanle.
I have not entered into details of the various arguments, as these
have been nicely recorded by W. Provine in his recent work on The Origins
of theoretical population genetics, and because the argiEnts rather
lose their interest when one acknowledges, as the late Liire Lakatos so
bril]iaritly pointed out, that the structure of scientific theorising and
of inter-theoretic debate is not such as to allow for any instan
refutations along the lines which Popper in sane of his incarnations
sens to suggest? 5
 But, it is well worth mentioning, the Bateson group
had a number of explanatory successes (though the bic*tetricians tended
to see these as consequent upon the introduction of opportunistic assump-
tions into genetics), notably in the area of epistasis, the recognition
of intennediate daninance and of linkage (which the Bateson group 'saw'
in teriis of 'coupling' and 'repulsion') 6 Bateson, interestingly, was a
firm opponent of the chrcvsare theory (i.e., the theory that Mendelian
factors were physically localised in the chrarsanes), and would not grant
formal recognition to the chraTosane theory until the twenties - that is
to say, until ten or nore years after the etergence of the dynamic I'brgan
school of geneticists in the U.S.A7
Similarly, I have not bothered to place Bateson's work against the
].abours of foreign geneticists, not for chauvinistic reasons, but because
this has already been done in other works. But, it is useful to note38
that the period 19CC) to 1920 saw such work as (a) De Vries' 'nutation
theory' (b) Johannsen' s work on 'pure lines', and (c) the irgence of the
'Morgan school' in Zmerica and its develojinents of cytogenetics to the
1c
point where chrcsczne mapping - i.e. the practice of assigning a particulai
dwcnosc*rk location to a particular factor - became feasible. A very
readable account of these develoFztnts may be found in the recent
publication of the Open University on the history and social relations
of genetics.
We].don died in 1906. Before Weldon's death Pearson had not reacted
to the new genetics in quite so a hostile manner as Weldon. But he
had been generally unreceptive to Bateson s Ideas on evolution before 1900,
and, after 1900, he was unreceptive to the new genetics. He did not attack
the r1e1ians with the sane force .as Weldan had done - except when
?ndelians atteirpted to invade his favoured preserve of eugenics, as, for
exan!ple, when the ?znerican eugenist Davenport claimed that mental defect
was a Mendelian recessive and was pilloried by the astute Pearsors for his
pains 39
 All in all, he showed a continuing preference for the study of
heredity via his own statistical techniques, which he saw as having a
broader applicability than Mendelian theory and s 'having nothing whatever
to do with any physiological hypothesis.'
Mter Weldon' s death, Pearson gave more time than previously to eugenics,
and when he was able to set up his 1cpthEnt of pp1ied Statistics in 1911,
kept Mendelians out of the department. He also seaiis to have been
resjxnsible for the rval of Davenport and of Raymond Pearl fran
editorial positions on Bictretrika on account of their Mendelian sympathies
Naturally, therefore1
 Pearson kept Mendelian genetics out of the pages of
Bianetrika - even though this was a journal for the 'statistical study of
biological problems' and, as we now realise, Mendelian genetics was a
subject eminently suited to the incorporation of statistical methods.
Pn iirortant consequence of his distte for Mendelism, therefore, was
that, in Britin at least, the leading institutional repository of
statistical expertise was kept separate fran Mendelian genetics. Nowadays,
of course, the mathematical study of heredity and evolution is the
inathnatica1 study of Mendelian genetics and of the evolution of Mendelian
populations. This new style of work, in Britain at least, had to arise
fran the labours of men who were not Pearson's uncritical disciples - men
like J.B.S. Haldane and R.A. Fisher who were familiar with Pearson's work
without being canmitted to it, and who were able to establish themselves
institutionally so as to be free fran Pearson's danination. Ironically,
Fisher was to ucced Pearson in the Calton chair on his retirement in
1930, and J.B.S. Haldane was the first incunent of the Weldori chair of
biaitry. So, in the long run, the desire of the founder bianetricians
for a mathariatical science of heredity and evolution which did not
encaass ?ndelisrn was frustrated even wi i the institution whers the
desire had been nurtured.
So far, I have given very little by way of precise illustration of
the arginents deployed in the biatr1c-ndelian debate, other than
to sumarise Weldo& s objections and to mention, Iirlicitly perhaps,
Bateson's hope that, given experiments enough and time, the rndelian
explanatory schematism could be extended so as to encarpass all the
pherxirena of heredity. This is because other historians, notably Provine,
have recorded the events with precision and skill. But, there is roan
for a ip1e of vignettes which express satthing of the different aspects
of the debate. The first concerns sflly a paper cc*itained in the short-
lived Mendel journal, written by '7rdent Nendelian' - possibly Bateson
himself - whose general tenor and imagery tells us something of the passion
arca]sed in the debate. The second concerns Pearson's zn investigations
of Nendelism and his rather amazing rejection of his n results. Both
episodes tell us a good deal about the nature of the debate in Britain.
(a) 'ardent Mendeliari'
Here, amidst the fine phrases, we can see sathing of the Mendelians'
hopes of extending their analyses so as to include the continuous variation
studied by the biartricians. The polemic is written with a verve and
wit that constantly eluded their opponents
There exists a Guild of very active and strenuous students
which is known to science and to others as the Bianetrical
School. Its devotees and exponents are noted for the
number and diversity of their pilgrimages and expositions,
for they are prepared to apply mat1ematical methods to
any problem, ranging fran the infiqtely little in the
realms of Biology and Pathology to The infintely great
in the stellar daiains of Astronaiiy.
It is true that when at last, after a weary journey
over thorny paths, they reach the temple of their respective
pilgrimages, the reception extended to them is not always
gracious. For the gods of 2natat', Biology, riedicine,
Astronany, and, we regret to say, even sai of those of
Mathematics, do not always anoint the pilgrims with unctious
and fragrant cintzrents, for too often that which is expected
by than to be balm is rendered escharotic by the gods.
p'r
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With regard to the orgarilsation of this Guild we are
led to infer, on the analogy of the maxim of "your corn
in rrj bushel," that the Biometrical School is organised
on the lines of a field army, and that its constitution
catprises at least a supreme "field-marshal," a "staff-
corps," and a "rank and file." We believe at the
nDbilisation of this scientific a.ntty martial law was pro-
claimed, and that it has not yet been reclaimed. We may
further infer, therefore, that the discipline of the arn'
is very severe, and perhaps this may thrci saie light
upon the constant reappearnace of the figure 0.5 in
relation to the size of sate of its artillery equijirent.
We believe further, fran certain information which the
dispatches of the "Field-marshal" reveal, that the
army has also its ambulance corps, consisting of "higher
—consultants" and "general practitioners." We have not
the slightest doubt that such a militant organisation has
urgent need for an ambulance branch, arid that its duties
must be incessant. 7th, when we review the many battles
with the gods in which it has been engaged, and we recall
their dIsastrous results, we find an explanation of the
ananaly, that whereas other armies are content with
"general practitioners", the biatetrical one finds it neces-
sary to retain "higher consultants".
In sate resFxects It is a very fine anry, and it is
certainly am izrosing one upon parade. It Is led,
off icered, arid manned by men of transcendent intellect,
of whan any country may be proud. It is an army which
in sate danains may have achieved sate eminent victories
for truth: but in other danains we are afraid our
judgeirent carpels us to say it has but obscured the
topography arid geography of the country of its invasion
by the stroke of battle, produced by the burning of its
"correlation" gunpowder, and tht it has failed to eapure
the Temple of Truth by the errqs of its strategy and the
ineffectiveness of sate of its %'eapons of attack.
Cposed to the Biaretrical ann'J is the Mendelian.
Ibre recent in origin, less martial in organisation, but
very vigorous, the Mendeliari axmy has already turned
the flanks and pierced the centre of the older one
opposed to it. For signs of surrender on one wing,
and of retreat, very skilfully covered, on the other, are
visible in the biaretrical ranks. The broken centre,
encouraged by the boldness arid coolness of its eminent
Field-M3.rshal - who like the kings of old personally fights
on the battle-field - is making a rally on the high grounds
to the rear. These hills are marked on the Mendelian
map as very rugged and difficult of ascent, not to be
rushed by brilliant cavalry charges, but not impregnable
before the persistent slcw, and methodical onslaught of
a courageous and patient infantry; they are named the
hills of "Masked Segregation". On the bianetrical map
they are marked as impregnable, when once occupied and
entranched, and are named "Continuous or Fluctuating
Variations", or, in their nore recent maps, as
"Intenrediates".
The great battle of the future is that which will be
fought along this rugged range of the "Intermadiates".
The task of the Nendelian army is to take it. And,
already in the plains below its brigades are beginning
to deploy, and are making those initial dispositions
which indicate that the assault is being preared.
At the sax tine, far away on the enemy's flank, in
the valleys of Copenhagen, a great turning xrvnt
is being developed, and the brigades of the "pure
lines" are preparing for their march along the dip-slope
of the range, in onder to strike the Biartrical army
in its rear at the narEnt when the main ndelian army
unfolds its frontal attack up the rugged face of the
escarprEnt.
(b) Pearson and continuous variation
Had '1rdent r1elian' but known it, the problem of giving a
Z4endeLLan account of continuous variation was well under its way
to solution at the hands of the biartricians themselves. In what
follows, I will discuss Pearson's work in that field, as it illustrates
very nicely the extent of the biarEtric disdain for ndelian genetics.
It helps one to see the extent of an historical problem whose resolution
may offer useful insights into the sorts of considerations that can enter
into the minds of leading scientists when evaluating a new theory.
We may start by briefly recalling the problem of continuous variation.
Pearson and Weldon, and indeed Galton too, had found that populations
frequently offered a Gaussian distribution when considered in respect
of sate suitable dirrension - e.g., human stature. They bad also shown
that fathers and sons, brothers and brothers, nephews and uncles and
so on, were connected by a series of correlation coefficients - a
finding, we have seen, which was made first by Galton.
	
bad
estimated the correlation between father and son in respect of human
stature to be about o	 An obvious problem for anyone wishing to
advance the claims of Mendelian genetics to be a universally applicable
sch of genetics was the problem of showing that it could both account
for the existence of nouna]. distributions of variation in populations and
for the observed correlations linking relatives.
Pearson addressed this issue in a paper published in 19049 Using
simple cbinatorial algebra he explored the consequences of the
following Mendelian mx1el. He supposed that, say, height, depended upon
the state of n Mendelian loci. At each locus three genotypes were
possible, nrely AA, Aa and aa. He supposed daninance to be ccirVlete,
so that if we regarded each locus as determining one or no units of
stature, the contributions would have been as follows
Mor.a	 lunit
aa	 no units.
By supposing that, in the population as a whole, the relative frequencies
of the two alleles A and a were both equal to ½ each at every locus, he
was able to show that the im,del, ur4.,er a supposition of random mating, led
to expectations of (i) a normal distribution of stature, whose mean and
variance ranained unchanged fran one generation to the next in the absence
of selection, and (ii) linear correlation between relatives, with the
father-san correlation in particular, taking the value 1/3. The value of
n was found to be irrelevant, so far as the correlation coefficient was
concerned. In practice, as noted, the observed value was closer Lo 0.5.,
and, noreover, the value of the coefficient had been found to vary fran
organ to organ, and fran species to species.
Clearly, there were two ways in which such a result could be
• interpreted. One might say that it was confirmatory of nde1i'because
the main qualitative features of the situation had been explained - and
on the basis of a particularly simple nodel at that. On the other hand,
one might stress the difference between observed and predicted values
for the correlation coefficients connecting reli,tives of different degrees,
and argue that the discrepancy added up to a refutation of Mendelism.
Pearson unswervingly took the latter course, thereby laying the foundations
for what was to be a long lasting belief that Mendelism and continuous
variation were incompatible. He was very severe.44
Unfortunately, even such a general pure gamete theory as
we have here dealt with, while leading to results which form
a special case of the law of ancestral heredity, is not suf f-
iciently elastic to cover the facts. The lesson to be learnt
from the present investigation is, however, that there is no
essential repugnance between any of the main results of the
biaxetric school and a theory of the pure gamete, but on the
contrary, it is perfectly possible to test such theories by
bianetric methods. We may fairly ask anyone who propounds
in future a Mendelian or pure gamete formula as a theory of
heredity to rarber that it involves in itself definite laws
regulating the reproduction of a population mating at random,
and that it is incumbent upon the poJ-poser to test whether or
not such laws are consistent with what we already know of the
inheritance statistics of such .populations. When we rnernber
that deducing all the effects of such a formila within the whole
field of inheritance will aJnost always form a very laborious
piece of mathanatical analysis, there seems a touch of scientifii
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irresponsibility in propounding an irmnse variety of formulae
to suit one or cther special case, and theircdifying or with-
drawing them when they are found to fail in another.
rtunately, however, Pearson's associate G.tJ. Yule was able to see45
that Pearson's irodel was a rather restricted one, and, in a paper delivered
in 1906, pointed out that ware Pearson to relax the two assurrtions (a)
that the relative frequencies of A and a factors were ½ and ½ at each
locus, and (b), that daninance was total, then, indeed, observed
correlation values could after all be accounted for within the Nendelian
sch.
Pearson, by now already at odds with Yule ov.,er Yule's criticisms
of other sections of his work, did not respond izrrrEdiately, but did
return to the matter	 in 1909, writing in the46
first instance against a paper writ cen by Weldon' s foxr assistant
A. D. DarlxLshire, who, as noted, had defected to the Nendelian canç.
And, in one of the papers written in that context, written, it should
be noted, after Hardy had proved the "Hardy-Weinberg law', Pearson took
up saie of Yule's suggestions, and was able to derive results supplanting
those of the 1904 paper. He showed in particular, that in the case of
total dcminance, the expected correlation between son and parent would be
equal to (q/ (l-iq)), where q is the relative frequency of the recessive
allele a. In the case that we take q = ½, we have the expected correlatior
taking the value 1/3, which is the value gotten in the 1904 paper, though
the range of values obtainable by allowing q to range fran 0 to 1 stretches
fran 0 to ½. Pearson also showed that, in the case that there was no
daninance, i.e. when the enotypic value of Aa was intermadiate between
that of A and that of aa, then the expected value for parent offspring
correlation was , a value which was independent of the value of q.
One might have expected Pearson to have responded to his new results
by acknowledging that his earlier objections to Nendelism had been
overcare. But he did not. Instead, he made a point of denying that
Mendelian genetics allowed for intermadiate dcmiriance, and suggested
that this point prevented the reconciliation of Mendelian theory with
observation
i72
There is, however, I venture to think, another aspect of
these results which is rthy of fuller consideration.
Narrely, the fairly close accordance ncz shown for the first
tirre to exist between the ancestral ganetic correlations
in a Me1ian population and the observed ancestral sanatic
correlations shows that the accordance between garretic and
scznatic correlations is for at least certain characters
possibly xrre intimate than is expressed by the absolute law
of daninance. If (Aa) were a class, or possibly on a wider
detexminantal theory a group of several classes marked by an
individual scxnatic character - not invariably identical with
the sciiatic character of (A.A.) - there would be little left
of the contradiction between biaretric and Mendelian results
as judged by populations sensibly mating at raridan. It is
the unqualified assertion of the principle of daninance which
appears at present as the stunbling block.
His assessnent, therefore, appears to be one of a man held back fran
accepting Mendelism because the Mendelians continued to make an
'unqualified assertion of the princle of daninance', thereby ensuring
that the high values for ganetic correlation could not be interpreted
as phenotypic correlations. This, one might think, was the reason why
Pearson held back and allowed the title of syrithesiser of biaretry and
Mendelism to go to R.A. Fisher, who offered a catprehensive account of
the relations between Mendelian genetics and continuous variation in
his fanous paper of 1918 'On the correlation between relatives on the
supposition of Mendelisrn inheritance'. But, this se€ns improbable, for, as
early ai as 1902, in reply to one of Weldon' s Biaretrika articles, -
Bateson, in his Mendel 's principles of heredity:A defence, a 'work well
known to Yule and Pearson, made a great point of denying Weldon' s
allegation that Mendelism involved a 'law of daniriance'48
The whole question of whether one or other character
of the antagonistic pair is daninant, though of great
iitortance, is a logically subordinate one. It depends
on the specific nature of the varieties and individuals
used, sanetirres probably on the influence of the external
conditions and on other factors we cannot here discuss.
There is as yet no universal law here perceived or declared.
In 1909, in his Mendel' s principles of heredity, Bateson reinforced the
point, pointing to 'many cases where daninarce is imperfect', cases, he
felt, that were quite consistent with his favoured 'presence and
absence' theory of gcrie-action (or, nore precisely and less
anachronistically, Mendelian factor-action) 9
In cases where the pure dciriinants are recognab1y distinct
iran the heteroz gous dcininants, it must naturally be supposed
that tvv 'doses' of the active factor are required, one fran
the paternal, and another fran the maternal side, in order to
17:;
We can be quite certain that Pearson had heard of this stance,
as there is extant a letter to him fran Weldon, dated August II, 1903
in which Weldon asks Pearson to consider 'Bateson' s suggestion that
in cases of blending inheritance the units are many and daninance is
"absent indefinite or suppressed" (Defence - p.115)'.
All of this suggests that the matter of daninance was, so to speak,
merely a front, an objection under which Pearson cxld publicly shelter
while in reality indulging in a distaste for I4endelism which had much
deeper roots. So deep Indeed did this distate run that when, in 1916,
Pearson was called upon to referee for the Royal Society the paper by
Fisher which is ncz regarded as having finally reconciled continuous
variation and ndelian genetics, he wrote a nost unenthusiastic report,
suggesting finafly that5'
'Whether the paper be published or not shcxild depend on
rx1e1ian opinion as to the probability that Mendelians
will accept in the near future a multiplicity of independent
units not exhibiting daninance or coupling.
The result of this, as we shall see, is that Fisher' s paper was not
published until 1918, and then in the Proceedings of the Royal Society
of Edinburgh. When Fisher sent Pearson a copy of the work in its
published form, he still responded that 'I am afraid that I am not a
believer in cumulative Mendelian factors as being the solution of the
hereditary iizz1e' ?2 Fisher's work is no'.i generally regarded as a work
of genius, and as a magnificent contribution to genetics. Clearly,
the biaretric animus against the new Mendelian genetics went very deep
indeed.
Finally, before going on to consider the interpretations of this
debate which have been offered by various historians, it sens proper
to say a little nore about Bateson. He went on to a well-deserved
reputation as establisher of the English Mendelian tradition, as the
n who defended the embryonic discipline of Mendelian genetics fran
the onslaughts of the biaretricians who, clearly, were intent on
discrediting the Iviendclian enterprise. After years of financial
insecurity at Cambridge, he took up the position of director of the
newly forned John Innes Institute for Horticultural esearch in 1910.
R.C. Punnett, his assistant, was then able to take up the Arthur Balfour
chair of genetics wI-'en it was created by anonynous donatioi in Cambridge
in 1912. As I have alr&.dy mentioned, Bateson, was a hostile critic
of the chrcziosczt theory (i.e., the theory that nde1ian factors are
located on the chrarvsais) until 1921, writing, for exaIr1e, in a review
of The mechanism of Mendelian heredity by the great AmericansMrgan,
Sturtevant and Bridges, that54
it is inconceivable that particles of chranatin or of any
other substance, hc,e'r carplex, can possess those powers
which nust be assigned to our factors'.
Even after 1921, he se to have been little attracted to the
chraroscue theory upon which so nuch American work had been based, and
which had the power to explain the phenarna known to Bateson as
coupling and repulsion, telling the cytologist Dar1ingjôn that, as
far as chraroscar theory was concerned, he 'hated it' but supposed
that 'we ha to accept it all now' .55
(B) Interpretations
These, briefly, are sara of the main 'facts' of the history of the
fairous biaretric-Mendelian debate, of the history of an episode when
the bianetric school of Pearson and Weldon came into conflict with the
English Meridelians, and, in the process, lost in their atterrpt to become
generally recognised as the leaders of a new wave of biologists equipped
with the proper approach to the problns of evolution and heredity.
These facts raise a genuine problem of historical interpretion, which
may be expressed in several ways. We might say that the problem is
that of explaining why, given a camxnly available pooi of data and
information, Bateson and his colleagues should have beocirie ardent
Mendelians, while Pearson and Weldon did not, becaning in fact, in
their differing degrees, hostile critics.
Another way of foirLiulating the problem might begin by suggesting
that, in science as in life, different people have different goals -
they differ, along several dimensions perhaps, in respect of the type
of theory which they desire to see established, and, unsurprisingly,
are unreceptive, at least at first, to theories 'which are incartpatible
with their desires. Given the carplex relations which, in logic, hold
between theory and evidence in science - i.e., given, as Lakatos has
put it, that theory arid evidence cannot easily be forced into a two
cornered fight - the uolders of different approaches may quite
rationally sustain their approaches for a long tiit in the face of
£ei
a rival research prograime. Hence, in this view of things, the
historical problan beoirs that of excavating the desires of the two
groups, and, if possible, explaining why the two groups should have
differed thus.
When addressing the foU .iing interpretations of the biattric
Nen1elian debate, it should be rnbered that the pcer of Mendelism
to explain a wide variety of genetic phenareria was not born with
Meixielian theory. Mendel himself, could explain very little, and
even T.H. Morgan was a non-Mendelian before iio 6 Similarly, in
&igland, scepticism was the or4,r of the day. E.B. Poulton, for exaitle
-writing in 1908, noted that many observed results threw 'doubt upon
the extent of the application of Mendel' s principles', and, in 1907,
3. arthur Thartpson noted the existence of 'many exceptional results in
Mendelian inheritance which suggest that the purity of the gairetes is
riot so thorough-going as the theoretical Mendelian interpretation
suggests.'57
During the period we cover here, Mendelian genetics was a research
prograime which could explain only a small part of all hereditary
phencrnena. It was surrounded by countless apparent refutations.
Naturally therefore, the explanations which we shall review concern
mainly the imrortant but neglected issue of why, in its etbryonic
phases, a research prograIm may look good and potentially fruitful to
one group, bit unattractive and wrongheaded to another.
Currently, there are perhaps three main explanations on offer,
which I will very briefly outline, apologising in advance for any
oversimplifications. 	 -
(1) psychological
The first is due to William Provine who offers what might be called58
a psychological approach, stressing the iitportance of interpersonal
relations. The biaretric-Mendelian debate is said to exemplify an
historical pattern contradicting 'the current popular conception
of science' - presumably the brands of folk-eniricism found in the
introductior to text books.
Provine argues that, although 1 in logic1 'Pearson and Weldon might
have argued that Mendelism supported Darwinian evolution', they did
not do so because Bateson had made the 'obvious connection between
ndelisrn and discontinuous evolution'. ?rid, 'in reaction, the
biczitricians viewed ix1elisrn as a threat'.
But, why should this connection make Pearson and Weldon fight
shy of ndelin? A part of the answer is given when Provine
cites corresponde.nce59in which Bateson praises Pearson as able and as
bard-orking, and iirplores him not to becane alienated fran 'the
work that is caning' on personal grounds. With Weldon though, things
were different:
as between him and ma It is too late. . .At different
timas, as perhaps you know, we have each tried to renew
our intercourse if not friendship but it caite to nothing
and it is no use trying again.
To which Pearson replied that,
I do not readily make friends, and when I say a man is
a friend I itean I have tested the strength of his affection
in the graver matters of life, and aim prepared to do for
him and accept form him anything that one human being can
or will do for another.
Ind, says Provine, this clash illuminates the debate, for, 'it is
evident that personality clashes were as izrortant as scientific
argunents in sustaining the conflict. If Weldon had adopted Mendelian
inheritance, instead of opposing it, Pearson' s attitude to Mendelisrn
might have been different.' 60
Provine' s ncdel, it appears, is one of initial disagreerre.nt over
continuity in evolution producing escalating bad feelings, transferred
to Pearson, upholder of continuity and friend of Weldon. This, perhaps,
pushed the continuity/discontinuity issue into the centre of an acadnic
feud, with the bianetric attitude to Mendelism becaning warped by its
having first appeared within the en' camp. Bad ter is seen as
distorting the rational path.
(ii) Sociological
A second approach is due to Barnes and MacKenzie, who deploy
'sociology of knowledge' approach, hoping tha-r.b, j to stir up the
historians. In practice, their approach extends only to Pearson and
Batesan. They too see the continuity/discontinuity issue as crucial,
as the core issue about which the debate hinged. Many of the individual
disagreents in the debate, they argue, 'ultimately reduced to clashes
between continuous and discontinuous views of evolution'.
In particular, it is said of Weldon and Pearson that 'since
they saw that nde1iam required a discontinuist, inutationist theory
to supp1nt it, they regarit as unpranising to say the least'.
Bateson as we kncz, was favourably disposed to ndelism because he saw
it as catipinting his disaDntinuist views. For Barnes and MacKenzie,
g*.e Q.ICp okOi, p'bt(4M v.c)M +b r,c QJ-
explaining why, given access to camon data and arguments, one side
should have strongly favoured a continuous and the other a dis-
continuous view of evolution.
They discuss Provine' s account, but reject it on the grounds that he
- failS to explain the initia], parting of the ways with Batesan
nb wish to go on to explain why the bo sides took up their character-
istic stances by relating these to 'theories or hypotheses about the
incidence of beliefs'. 1nd, in a series of arguments, which seck to
epitanise the position of uodern phiiosophers of science, which they
attack, they conclude that the only satisfactory explanatory pathway
for the historian is to explain belief in terms of sathing other
than belief; they ask the historian to explain Ehe intellectual stances
of the scientists by reference to social rather than to intellectual or
psychological factors. (My n view is that philosophers of science,
concerned only with theory testing, even when ac]cncii1edging the Duhem-
Quine thesis, have neglected to think about what makes a certain research
prograxm attractive to a given man or group thereof. ) 62They ask,63
What primary social factors may determine different
response to the same arguments, or the selection of
different pathways from the vast nuiier of intellectual
Ioves which a scientist is always in a position to make?
What is to count as a social factor is not made clear, though,
in practice, their papar seeks to link
	
tits' socio-political
outlooks with their attitudes to continuity/discontinuity.
Expanding a thar due to Coleman 4 Barnes and MacKenzie portray
Bateson as an exponent of 'conservative thought', manifested for thea
in his elitist views arid origins, his regard for a crypto-feudal social
ord,pr, for canpulsory Greek4for 'idealist' physics as practiced by
Maxwell, Lanir, Lodge, Crookes arid others. This tradition, Coleman has.
argued, may be seen as inclin3 Bateson to reject genetic materialism
(the chrarvsat theory) in favour of genetic idealism (i.e., the
vibratory theory of inheritance, analogous to the vortex theory of the
atom.) Certainly, Bateson was a raitçant, if incoherent advocate of
ianti-egalitarianism, suspicious of any notion of human progress.
Always fearful of the 'lawyer-politician type', Bateson even
reacted against the eugenics itoverent, noting, with his fine,
patrician, sneering style that:65
Broadcloth, bank balances and the other appurtenances of
the bay-tree type of righteousness are not really essentials
of the eugenic ideal.
Baying reviewed a range of Bateson's writings (all fran his later
life), Barnes and MacKenzie suggest that66
his early discontinuous view of evolution accorded well with
his social and political prediictions, quite apart fran
its offering an alternative to a Darwinism which 'hued all
too closely to the blig1ed atanistic individualism of the
utilitarians'.
Pearson, by contrast, is portrayed as representing a very different
tradition. Barnes and MacKenzie point out that this son of an up.zardly
socially mobile barrister had interests in evolution which, fran the
start, were those of a late-Victorian social theorist. They argue.
that his social Darwinism, his naturalistic ethics and his much broad-
cast advocacy of the gradual evolution of British society towards an
elitist and collectivist state, based upon science in general, and upon
eugenics in particular, ma1 him as a man of a different stair? to
Bateson: as satne much nearer to the Fabians, as a non-conservative
thinker whose thought was permeated by 'ideas of continuity and
gradualism'. This view may be supported by looking to his many essays
on socialism, econanics, Darwinism and eugenics.
Not denying that other factors 	 operatE.' (of which, itY)re
belch,) in the case of Pearson, Barnes and MacKenzie see this stress
on gradual, non-revolutionary progress and on social continuity in
Pearson's thought as one disposing him towards a continuist inter-
pretation of evolution, and they argue as follows:67
Since these very presuppositions played an important role in
the social and political thinking of the protagonists, and there
is a clear continuity betw een what we would regard as their
scientific and their social thought, the conclusion is in-
escapable that their differences were sustained by concerns
'external' to science as we would define it, and must ultimately
be grounded by reference to sociological determinants.
Polorization around the continuous/discontinuous dichotany
was one kind of mediation between these determinants and natural
science.
Their overall conclusion is tiius:6
Suitwarizing, we can claizn to have shown that the Mendelian
biaietrician dispute cannot be understood in isolation frcin
the cultural and political context of late-Victorian Britain.
As the work of many historians has shown, there was an
iiiortant link in the thought of this period between the
belief that society was and should be in a state of gradual
progress. We have characterised this link as a route via
which general social factors influenced scientific debate.
Similarly, we have shown how a view of evolution stressing the
inportarce of (inpredictable) discontinuities was congenial
to a conservative vision of society and polanically convenient
to those who shared it.
(iii) Philosophical
In a p.'oliSkt paper I have discussed Pearson's reactions to
&idelisin, and have sought to explain it reference to his
philosophy of science and the conclusions he drew fran it.
Pearson, as we have seen, was the author of a philosophy of science
which cathined sate ntdern doctrines - e.g., the basis of knowledge
in sensation, the unkncwability of the thing in itself, the conception
of scientific laws as 'econanical surrrnarisers' of observed routines
in the passage of sensations, the necessity to eliminate metaphysics
fran science and its inability to count as knowledge - with strong
Kantian overtones. He was a man who would suggest that,69
the perceptive faculty may in itself determine largely
or in part the routine of our perceptions
He was, in short, a neo-Kantian instrumentalist.
He was, of ccvrse a neo-Kantian instnjnentalist who contributed
massively to the developrent of irodern statistics, putting great
atasis on the theory of correlation, which, as noted, was a major
feature of bicinetry. But, in the theory of correlation, he saw
himself as advancing his Kantianism as well as his instrumentalism.
For, he claimed that Kant had it wrong. Experience did not conform
to the category of cause and effect, but to his new category of
correlation. The world, he said, was inherently indeterininistic,70
and could be properly described only via the use of correlation method
No phenanena are causal; all phenarena are contingent, and
the problen before us is to measure the degree of this
contingency, which we have seen is between the zero of
independence and the unity of causation. That, briefly,
is the wider outlook we itnisL now take of the universe as
we experience it.
•iO'i
Fran this prniss, he derived (invalidly) the conclusion that
rx theory Kuld adequately cope with reality unless the classes
of entities it posited were heterogeneous ones, shiing variation
about a mean. Thus, for exarrle, we find him writing to Ga1ton,tha*
i Nay 21st. I lecture to the Philosophical Club ... on,
'The possibility of a wider category than causation'. This
lecture starts fran the idea that no two physical entities
are exactly alike, e.g., not even t atans are precisely
identical. They fonn a class with variation about a mean
character. Hence even in physics the ultimate basis of
knowledge is statistical - the category is of course correlation
not causation.
Irx1, later on, we find his extending this principle to Mendelism.72
What if saneness and persistence be merely a relative
distinction? What if the attapt of sane biologists to
replace vital variation by 'unit' characters be really a
retrogressive change, and the persistency and absence of
individuality to which they appeal as canparable with
cheical changes be ultite1y a false analogy, because the
sameness of chemical theory is a statistical theory.
These views were first expressed in print only after the turning
of the century and the advent of Nendelism. But, what makes then
iiortant is that by then they already had a place in Pearson's
biological thought - in his theory of hciiotyposis, to be explained
in the next chapter.73
My explanation therefore, of his rejection of Nandelism, has
been two-fold. I have attributed it to (1) his general distate
for theory (Mendelisin posits real underlying 'factors'), especially
in cases whre, as in early Nendelism, it cannot cleanly explain
(or 'describe') all the phenaiiena, arising fran his instrurrentalist
and anti-metaphysical stance, arid to (ii) his 'Kantian' views on
hatogeneous classes, which ruled out Mendelian theory in particular.
For, the classes posited in that systan did not exhibit variation
about a mean point. All of their nEn.bers were identical, except
when, by sate quanturn-junip-like event, a mutation occurred. To Pearson
who claiired that, in this respect, physics must learn fran biolcgy
and that even, say sulphur atcxns should be seen as a class showing
variation, statistically arranged about sate mean class-value,
Mendelism was unattractive. It was inconsistent with the fruits of
philosophy.
Barnes arid I4acKenzie have also noted Pearson's instrurtentalism
thaigh not his "Kantianisin". This they tend to ttrihite to his
radical status, to his progressive carnitment to a society based
at hard, firm, objective scientific knowledge. We are dealing
with the propcynt of the Ethic of freethought, wix) saw science
as the root to sound citizenship in the ircdern, progressive,
'socialist', eugenic state.
(c) Arbitration and synthesis.
These are sate positions, which we may examine shortly. To
start, however, there are sate points of information which go a long
way towards torpedoing, for gcod and all, the notion that there ever
was anything that might with profit be called the biatetric-.ndelian
itroversy, and which help clarify the nature of such dispute as
really did exist.
(1)
I would like to produce this clarification via a listing of
relevant points, which are as follows:
(1) Though the 'biaretric school' was a large one - in the sense that
many people trained in Pearson's laboratories, it would seea that miny
of the 'genuine' biologists anongst these trainees did not follc.w
their leaders in the matter of hostility to ndelin. We have
already seen the exarrple of A.D. Darbishire, who recanted after
serving briefly as Weldan' s assistant, and who went on to work as a
lecturer in genetics and to write his book on Breeding and the ?4endeli
discovery. To the case of Darbishire nst be added those of C.D.
Davenport, whose career canbined eugenics, biaretrics and nde1ism74
- for he became doyerr - of the American eugenics rrovnent - and of
Rniond Pearl the distinguished American bianetrician who did not
follow Pearson's strong anti-Mendelian pathl 5 As a cons&juence, Pearl
was sacked fran his editorial position on Biaretrika. Indeed, airong
the 'genuine' biologists on Pearson's staff, only David Heron ses
to have maintained a long-lived opposition to Mendelism. At this
stage it is also appropriate to mention G.U.Yule, who, on several76
occasions) argued publicly that observed biaretric results could indeed
be explained within the Nendelian explanatory scheinatism.
(2) The 'Nendelians' showed analogous in-group differences, but
jo't-
of a different order. Sarre of these have already been noted,
particularly the matter of the chrcirosczne theory which Bateson
rejected, but which other man - like Doncaster and Lock - accepted77
whole heartedly. re relevant in the present context is the matter
of views on discontinuity in genetics and evolution. Here, it sens
to ire, there has been a great deal of confusibn engendered, of which
sarre is due to the ?ndelians thEnselves, and sare to historians who
have atttçted to docunent and explain their views. To clarify
this matter, I would like to distinguish between two separate
doctrines of discontinuity in the 1!endelian cairp, which I shall refer
to as 'Discontinuit;' and 'Discoritinuity.
'Discontinuity is sinply the doctrine that all forms c! var-
iation, barring the sorts of genuinely environnental 'fluctuations'
uncovered in the work of Johannsen and others l 8would be shown to be
controlled by a number of ndelian factors, which whether of large
or small phenotypic effect, were discontinuous in the sense that they
did not blend in heredity. One expression of this was Bateson's
early scheme for explaining Gaussian variation along Meridelian
lines. Another was a passage in the works of 'Ardent Nendelian',
who held that:79
Our present knowledge renders it easy for
us to conceive of the existence of segregation
without their being any obvious manifestation
of its existence.
This being the case, it is hardly surprising that Meridelians like
Lock responded favourably to Yule's claim that Gauian variation
and Mendelism were quite caTatible It was a consequence of the
doctrine of 'Discontinuity' that this should be the case.
'Discontinuity' is a separate doctrine - which was never very
clearly spelled out and never very well developed. It is the
doctrine that, in general, evo1utionachanq was brought about
by large discontinuous variations, subsequently inherited in the
Mendelian fashion. This was a doctrine nore strongly supported by
Bateson and his colleague Punnett than by other British M3ndelians,
and, as I have noted, arose ftoin a belief on the part of Bateson and
Punnett that it was implausible to regard the contorary distribut-
ion of species with their distinguishing characteristics as the
r
I.
outa of series of gradual changes fran fox having marginally
less to forms having irarginafly Itrre 'adaptation' or 'fitness'
on account of these changes. In these circumstances, it was
slitpler to suppose that change was due to sudden large discontinuities,
often of no great adaptive benefit. Punnett expressed nicely the
feeling of relief that such a doctrine could offer when he wrote that
it released the biologist81
fran the burden of discovering a utilitarian
notive behind all the multitudinous characters
of living organisms.
'Discontinuity therefore, was a doctrine based on objections
to a view of nature in which all change and diversity had its
utilitarian side and raison d' etre • It was the biological eçivalent
of a denial that all features of, say, human culture1could be
explained in tenns of advantage conferred upon their exponents. It
was, as I have said, not a doctrine which sens to have been strongly
held by all British Mendelians.
(3) Ncw crs a point about Pearson arid Weldon - the high crmand
of the bianetric school. For, it sens that they were not so united
in their thinking as might be supposed - though, of course, they
were hostile to 'Discontinuity , a doctrine which their positivistic
reduction of terms like 'adaptation' made it hard for them even to
appreciate. The text of Weldon's book on heredity, (see appendix)
unblished on his death, reveals that his interpretation of the
biaretriciaris' major scientific formula - the law of ancestral
heredity - was quite different to Pearson's. Pearson, we have seen,
denied it any physiological interpretation, and, in his life of
Galton, went on, quite unconvincingly, to attribute a siniilar view
to Galton. But Weldon did favour a physiological interpretation,
based on Galton's 'stirp' theory of inheritance, in its turn, a
developrent of Darwin' s 'pangenesis' 2 s te Narrais has noted, thi&3
differed form the Mendelian view in the following crucial respect.
For a Nendelian, only one or to alternative traits is made available
to an offspring by a parent. For the Galtonian, however, 'the
peculiarities of each ancestor may be preserved, in potentia, in each
successive generation'. Weldon, we find, interpreted Pearson' s
ancestral law thus, seeing its coefficients as giving the proportions
in which 'daninant elanents which are distributed anong the individuals
i8..
of a generation and detennine their visible characters, are derived
fran the dczninant detenninants of parents, grandparents and rerrote
ancestors'. Weldon, it appears was a Galtonian, and we can certainly
interpret his characteristic objections to ndelin in this light.
In a paper Incanpiete on his demise, he sought to display ndelian
results of breeding experiments as due to important, but special
ca&es of the Galtonian theoretical set-up, and not to the correctness
- of the Mendelians' ontology. Full documentation is given in Appendix
(ii)
Finally, I would like to offer a neci perspective on the debate,
utilising the information of the various parts of this paper, and
giving particular attention to Barnes and MacKenzie's Important
attaipt to interpret the debate in accordance with the canons of the
sociology of knowledge.
The debate was started by Weldon and Bateson, and came to a head
over the issue of continuity versus discontinuity in evolution. But
it had a deeper root in the research prograrrmes of the two workers,
although the precise nature of these is hard to reconstruct • Eateson'
main aim appears to have been to understand the mechanical causes of
pattern and variation within the organism. Coleman's work and
Bateson' s own Problems of genetics make this fairly clear. The
writing is obscure, but there is little reason to doubt that
Bateson' s early position, steaming fran his atteats to explain
metameric segmentation, differed little fran his later one.
Discontinuity was embedded in a rich theoretical matrix, leading,
as we have seen to analogies with mackerel skies, chladnl. plates,
and so on. When these analogies were app'eciated, said Bateson,
'no one will be astonished at, or reluctant to admit, the reality
or discontinuity in variation' Thus we can begin to understand
his remark of late life that Mendelism had been saiiething of a
diversion. To the very end, Crowther relates, Bateson was frstrate
by his inability to discover the causes of variation, which always
appeared 'mysterious'. Weldon' s thought is also opaq1e, but
in his case too, the issue of continuity versus discontinu was tiec
in with broad-ranging theoretical beliefs - in the propriety of a
mass, statistical study of evolution, and in a Galtonian theory of
heredity, which, at the end of his life, was lec1thg him to articulatE
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principles of daithiance relevant to his Galtorilan quest by
discussion of recent work in regeneration and developnent.
Clearly, a great deal was at stake in the debate between Bateson
and Weldon, which was one between an idiosyncratic ridelian and
the follower of a non-Nendelian, rival, physiological theory of
heredity, surrounded, in its proposer's mind, by a rich variety
- of tl-xughts on research goals and style. The fact that all of
Batesan' s group did not share all his views can be seen by looking
to their works. Doncaster, for exarrle, was an early follower of
the cbraiosane theory5
'Pearson, as I have noted, and as Pearson make clear himself in
a letter to the Manchester Guardian 86	 entered biology
as a social Darwinian. Unsurprisingly, he focused on continuously
varying characters, and had little to say on major biological issues
like, say, speciation. He appears generally hostile at all t.iirtes to
saltatory theories of evolution, but not in a. striking way. He was
an attested instrunentalist of neo-Kantian tendencies whose philosophy
of science had been foriti at an early stage - in 1879, whilst a
Heidelberg student, I would suggest 7 His instrunentalism was built
into his biosocial research progranne, frequently described as non-
theoretical.
His instrunentalism, as noted above, was accaranied by a
curiously derived doctrine of heterogeneous classes, demanding
even that, say, sulphur atcTns, vary about sa nean. His opposition
to Neridelism was milder than Weldon's, passive rather than active,
and is best described as one of disapproving scepticism laced with
conteipt for the undoubtedly ad hoc Iroves made by sare ndeliaris.
In Pearson, I suggest, we have a third man with a third research
prograinte, shaped and guided by the various directives indicated,
which, collectively, prejudiced him agamst theory in general and to
theories of the Iendelian type in, particular. His views on correlatioi
show him engaged in a broader research prograrn'ne than his biaretric on
in which he argued for universal indetenninacy and the desirability
of mathematical statistics as a universal scientific irethodology.
Meix3elism conflicted with these cosmic aithitions.
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I suggest, therefore, that we can better understand his reaction
to relism in these terms than in tenns of the supposedly socially
mediated objection to evolutionary discontinuit proposed by Barnes
arxi MacKenzie. There se little doubt that he was hostile to
saltatozy evolution, but there is little reasan to suppose that this
ild have prejudiced Kim against nde1ism, for he knew that Mendelis
and conti.nuity in variation were caratible. The discontinuities of
the Mendelian nultifactorial approach are small, small as one likes,
and hardly the biological analogues of social revolution. If this
were Insufficient, there rnains the doctrine of varying atatis
mentioned above. It is hard to suppose that this may be understood
in texms of a tie-up between a belief that society should be in a
state of gradual progress and the belief that natural processes were
triform, slow and continuous - especially when we have an apparent
strong counter-exanle in the shape of Charles Lyell the geologist,
the urifonnitarian par excellence, whose views have recently and
convincingly been related to his conservative outlook by Michael
Bart1x)laTw? 8 Similarly, the attt to ground Pearson's philosophy
in social factors, via a suggestion that his concerns were simul-
political and epistelogical seems besides the point, partly
for reasons discussed below, partly because there was no general
connection in late Victorian society between liberal progressivism and
a Pearsonian style of positivism.
Hence, in this view, the biattric-Mendelian debate reduces to the
interactions of three powerful academics: tvo of them joined by stron
personal and ambiguous intellectual bonds. The pupils of Pearson
and Weldon did not see incaratililities between Mendelism and
bianetric results because they were unencumbered by the background
cami1ents of the leading men.
This, of course, just describes sate main prograntnes and the
background assurrptions built into them. We are still faced with
the issue of explaining	 the canbatants should hav.e advanced
with enthusiasm, the sorts of research prograrrites which they did
advance. Here, perhaps, the explanatory strateqy of Barnes and
MacKenzie may assist. This, at first sight, appears to be a
strategy of sha'zing that, in selected cases, the basic propositions
of a scientist's research program may be displayed as especially
attractive to him on account of a certain hantony between these
propositions and the attitudes, aims and goals associated with
his social situation and relationships. (flius, for example, we
'ould be unsurprised to find a pacifist opposing accounts of
- nature arhasising its innately pugnacious aspects.) In fact, however,
Barnes and MacKenzie's position is interestingly stronger. They argue
that it is only by explaining intellectual positions in terms of
'social' factors that an infinite regress within historical explanation
can be avoided.89
At the end of it all, we still have to ask
why the opposing sides E&bstained conflicting
sets of beliefs. We nay know rrore about the
controversy but we are as far fran explaining
it as ever. However much we study what is
bdlieved we cannot expect to lay bare 	 it
is believed. For this we must go beyond the
beliefs thanselves, and relate the controversy to
theories or hypotheses about the incidence of
beliefs.
They go on to insist on social explanation as the only way to
cut the regress, dinissing the other main possible strategy for
so doing which they perceive - nanly that of distinguishLng between
rational and irrational beliefs and explaining them differently -
on philosophical grounds. Whatever the iterits of these grounds, their
detection of a possible infinite regress within the process of explain-
ing beliefs or attitudes towards a nec.z theory by the citation of other
beliefs is clearly ireritorious..
The question, however, is that of whether genuinely social explain-
ations can be adduced in such a form as to cut the regress. It sews
doubtful that they can, at least for cases relevantly similar to the
present one. This can be seen by focussing in upon Barnes and Mac-
Kenzie 's treatmants of Bateson and Pearson, putting aside for the
itinent the doubts previously expressed concerning the possibility of
explaining Pearson's rejection of discontinuity and his rejection of
Inde1ism with one and the sane explanatory factor.
Here we have tw nen who developed socio-political outlooks quite
out of harrtony with the traditions of their backgrounds. Bateson,
it appears, did fall into a conservative and aristocratic outlook
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But this was not the natural path for a scion of St. John's College
Caz±ridge, described by Crather as the hec1rjuarters of the 'spirit
of the liberal rentiers' - who was to fall out with Sedgwick of
Trinity (headquarters of the 'Conservative landed aritstccracy',
and who was the son of a noted liberal?1
Pearson, siiri1arly - the son of a lawyer and a fellci of King's
College Canbridge - was hardly following follcing any well laid
dawn tradition or persons of his background when he espoused the
causes which he did espouse.
The point, surely, is that, though we may do sterling work in
explaining why one scientist finds a research prograime attractive
and plausible by showing hanronies between the research prograime 's
core intellectual content and hi..i broader social, political,
philosophical or other orientations, we have hardly provided a social
explanation and thereby cut the feared explanatory regress if these
views are not the natural views for persons of the types involved, but
are, rather, sets of views which they have gone out of their way to
adcipt. In the cases of Pearson and of Bateson, we are dealing with.
man who deliberately recruited themselves into new views, not in the
least bit natural for nen of their social position. Since it is
these views which are presented as explainers of Bateson' s and Pearson'
scientific positions, their citation does not perform the desired role
of sccial explanation - i.e., that of severing an explanatory regress.
For, we have still to provide a social explanation of why Pearson
and Bateson should have taken up these socio-political views. Barnes
and NacKenzie seem aware of this problem, but have, apparently, no
answer beyond a general view that the sorts and styles of socio-
political thinking which individua].s are prone to recruit themselves
into are loisely constrained by socio-econcziic factors. Thus,92
There need be no necessity in the chain of
affiliations which make up an individual
biography. But the links in the c1ain, the
affiliations themselves, must be selected fran
given possibilities. Primary social and econanic
causes, in changing the nature and distribution
of institutionalised belief, change the range of
these given possibilities.
This is intcresting, but not very helpful. For, suosing that
we produced a good, convincing theory about the ways in which
1E9
'primary social and exnanic causes' change the range of possible
affiliations for the actor, then, unless the niirer of affiliations
allo1 at any tine can be shown to be small, and each possible
affiliation be shown to be a tightly drawn one, there would seen to
be little chance for anything approaching the strong hard form of
- social explanation which Barnes and MacKenzie look for. In proportion
as the nuner of possible affiliations be large, or, insofar as the
affiliations be loose ones, then the plausibility of claiming that the
sorts of perspectives used by Barnes and MacKenzie are genuine social
explanations seem to diminish. Take Person as an exaiple: if we
suppose that the late 19th century contained a 'progressive' group,
generally believing in sl.z and gradual social change, then, ..nless we
kno q that the group was extrenely zealous about discontinuity, we shall
find the explanation of Pearson's rejection of Mendelism on the basis
of such ireitership unsatisfying. For, we hav2 seen that the knew that
I?endeli&n and apparent continuity were quite caipatible. Similarly,
unless the joining of such a 'progressivist' group was fairly norma].
under the circumstances, then the explaining of Pearson's choice of
affiliation sens to raise all the probl€ms which social explanation wa
invoked to alleviate. Neither of these things seen to be the case.
It is not that the general xrcdel which Barnes and MacKenzie seem
to prcxtote (i.e. that of possible thtellectual grouping being
loosely constrained by ecorKlnic and social conditions, and of meitersh
in one of these groups inclining the scientist to wish to pratte one
type of theory rather than sate other) is at all inplausftle. It is
rather that, at present, we have no good theory of restrair, and that,
if the present exanpie be typical, Irrbership of such groups seens
insufficient to explain reactions to quite calicated scientific idcas
Furtheritore, when dealing with a snail number of scientists, all of the
Cairbrñge fellc-s of approxinately the sane period, the task of explainS
ing why each of then opted to join a different intellectual group can
be extrerrely difficult - and, certohnly, not easily done via social
explanation. Possibly a psychoanalytical approach ould be better uncle
such circumstances, but, again, the problem is that there appears to
be no suitable theory extant.
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P2PEDDC	 . THE WTIONIE FOR WLDC7 'S OPPOSITION '10 MENDELISM
In the body of the CM p r, I have suggested that Weldon' s opposition
to Mendelism was based upon idiosyncratic considerations - notably
a carinitnt to a Galtonian theory of inheritance. In this appendix,
I will briefly mention the main thrusts of his opposition to ndelism
and will show how they relate to his theoretical position.
First, let us consider the objections to ndlism. The crucial
was eibedded in Weldon's claim that,93
The fundamental mistake which vitiates all work based on
ndel 'S method is the neglect of ancestry, and the attempt
to regard the whole effect upon offspring, produced by a
particular parent, as 'lue to the existence in the parent of
particular structural characters; while the contradictory
results obtained by those who have observed the oUspri,ng
of parents apparently identical in certain characters show
clearly enough that not only the parents themselves, but
their race, that is their ancestry, must be taken into
account before the result of paring them can be predicted.
Typically, Weldon claimed that Mendel' s work on peas gave,94
an admirable illustration of the effect produced by crossing
a fi pairs of plants of known ancestry; but while they
sI this perhaps better than any similar evperiment, they
do not afford the data necessary for a statement as to the
behaviour of yellow-seeded peas in general, whatever their
ancestry, when crossed with green-seeded peas of any ancestry
1nd, this went hand in hand with an objection to ndelian
doctrine that the extracted recessive was gametically pure, and with
a claim that, in striking instances, it was improper to regard, say,
'round' and 'wrinkled' peas as forming t classes each of which was
quite distinct fran the other and was genetically harogeneous. Exanpia
were provided fran breeders' records and fran breeders' seed stocks.
In the extract fran Weldon' s unpublished book reproduced below,
we begin to see the sorts of theoretical considerations which underlay
and mz)tivated this sort of objection to 1ndeli&iYt The extract
speaks eloquently for itself, though I have added emphasis to what
I consider as inportant points, together with corrmentaxy in the form
of notes. Possibly the central point is De Marrais' point that,
for Galtonians,95
the pectuflarities of each ancestor may be preserved,
in potentia, in each successive generation.
whereas, for Nendelians, only one of two alternative traits may
be made available to the offspring by a parent. We see this
reflected in Weldon's discussion of the Galtonian sch, which he
obviously endorses, when he writes that,96
a particular elnent achieves daniriance partly through
being iiore vigorous than its irrmediate caretitors, and
partly through the unknown conditions under which the
struggle takes place.
The thrust of his research was to uncover the laws which
governed the outcare of this struggle - see for exarrple, the
interpretation given the 'law of ancestral heredity' in the
text.
The only detailed working out of Weldon's ideas was presented in
a posthunus paper, constructed by Pearson on the basis of notes left
by Weldon?We can see in this work sarething of the basis upon which
Weldon's hostility to the idea of the purity of extracted recessives
was based. The full refinements of the theory, due, one iJTagines,
largely to Pearson may perhaps be disregan1ed for the nunent, in favour
of looking at one of the simtpler cases envisaged by Weldon.
In Weldon' s schare for heredity, it was supposed that a
given character would be controlled by a nurrber of determinants, located
on a pair of hclnDlogous chxurvsaTes. Let us consider the case when ther
are just two determinants. And, with Weldon, let us consider the result
of crossing markers of two 'pure' races - an 'allogenic' race with
four 'allogenic' determinants (two on each chrarosane), say AMA;
and a 'protogenic' race, with four 'protogenic'
	
rminan, say aaaa.
Crossing the two would yield a hybrid race, each of whose
mnbers had a pair of chrarosats - one with the determiriantal
constitution AA, and the other with aa.
Now unes the crucial itove, the great difference fran Mendel 's
sch. Weldon envisaged the reduction division as a process of
the fusion of chrarosanal contents - giving AAaa - followed by the
formation of haploid genii cells, of different types, whose frequencies
were obtained by a process of random pair-selection of determinants frail
the detenninantal set AAaa. Siiile combinatorial arithmetic shows that,
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in this case, the germ cells of different constitutions (gametes)
would be fonred in the following ratios.
Gametes with two
	
Gametes with one	 Gametes with two
allogenic deter- 	 allogenic, one 	 protogenic deter-
minants. (AA)	 protogenic deter-	 ininents (aa)
minant (na)
1	 :	 4	 :	 1
Arid, on crossing, we get the following array produced
zygotes with
4 allogenic
determinants
1.
zygotes with
3 allogenic,
1 protogenic
determinant.
8
zygotes with
2 allogenic,
2 protogenic
determinants
18
zygotes with
1 aflogenic,
3 protogenic
determinants
:	 8
zygotes
with 4
protocden.ic
determinants
1
If we group the first two classes, arid the last two, then we have
a 1:2:1 ratio. Jnd, as Pearson wrote in his exposition of Weldon's
ideas:
This case is of peculiar interest; we get absolutely the
Mendelian percentages, if the sanatic character follows the
preponderance of a given pure race determinant, using prepound
erance here in a simple numerical sense. Further, the
protogenic 25 per cent, would apparently breed true to the
sanatic character of the pure protogenic race, if the sanatic
character of the balanced heterozygote were, as is occasiorafl
asserted to be the case, indistinguishable fran that of the
protogenic race. The peculiar suggestiveness of this result
lies in the exact ?ndelian properties arising on a sirrle
view of daninance apart fran any hypothesis of the pure gamete
There exists a latent allegenic determinant in the heterogenic
chrczrosaie of a large percentage of the 25 per cent, with
dcminant protog tc character. This, if judicious cross-
breeding were adopted, might be rendered manifest in sare, if
only a all number, of the grandchildren of the offspring
of the hybrids.
I take it that what Pearson was suggesting, on behalf of Weldon,
that here was an instance in 'which a set of a set of individuals, seen
by the r4endelians as genetically hangeneous, were in fact genetically
heterogeneous - though, as he noted, this 'if judicious cross-breeding
were adopted, might he rendered manifest in sare, if only a nafl
number, of the grandchildren of the offspring of the hybrids'. This, I
take it, is a reflection of Weldon' s general suspiciousness of the
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1ndelian view that extracted recessives were genetically identical
to the inbers of a pure-breeding recessive strain.
Futher de eloFzrnts of Weldon' s theory were obtained by
increasing the rninber of determinants held to control any given
character, giving an interesting range of ratios. The train details
are fairly easy to foflcw, and were laid out by in Pearson's
exposition. But, the point which retains after even so brief an
exposition (certainly all that is needed for present purposes) is
that Weldon 's opposition to ndelisrn xmist be understood in terms
of inheritance. There is little reason to suppose that Pearson himself
or anyone else, put iru.ich faith in this theoretical approach. He was,
on his zn admission, assisting Weldon with the theory at the tiii of
Weldcxi' s death, but, as he retiarked, his contribution was 'solely the
nathematical analysis'.
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PPE!'1DIX 2 The Esher letter (see note 53)
••.......... ..................e............................
2,Tilney Street,
Mayfair W.
March 7th. 1912
Dear Vice — chancellor,
Towards the end of last year there was a meeting' at
Mr.Balfour's house in Carlton Gardens of a few representativez
members of the University of Cambridge interested in the
subject of genetics. The meeting had under consideration a
short paoer written by Mr. Balfour in July 1910 which dealt
with the endowment of the study of genetics in the University
of Cambridge. As a result of that meeting I em glad to be
able to inform you that a generous benefactor, who stipulates
that his name shall not be mentioned, has placed in my
hands a swn of twenty thousand
	 pounds (12O,000) for the
purpose of endowing a professorship at Cambridge in
connection with the experimental study of heredity and
development by descent.
It is stipulated that the new chair shall be called the
Balfour chair of genetics.
There are two more subsidtzary (sic) conditions which I am
to place before you for your consideration.
(1)That the first appointmerrt should be made jointly by
the Prime—rdinister and Mr. Balfour.
(2) That the regulations governing future appoin-trnents
to and functions of the chair shell be submitted through me
to the anonymous benefactor before the endowment fund is
placed in your hands.
I am able further to state that our generous benefactor
is willing to furnish such funds as may be necessary to
provide and equip a small station at Cambridge for the use
of the professor should such a course be considered desireble
after careful examination of the methods likely to be most
satisfactory for the purpose of research in the domain of geneti
I remain,
yours sincerely,
Esher.
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Chapter 6.The rise ar fall of the law of mcestra1
her1ity.
2P2
Introduction
In the work so far1 the 'law of ancestral inheritance' has put in
several appearances, though, in the main, in two contexts - (i) the
work of Galton himself, and (ii), the work of the biattric school, whoc
presented this 'law' as the prnier research finding of
biczitry in the area of heredity.
So far, there has been no satisfactory historical account of the
'rise and fall' of this 'law', a state of affairs which I hope to
wnedy in this chapter. I shall examine the fate of this piece of
scientific work at the hands of four workers - Galton, Pearson, Weldon
and Fisher.
Galton's work
We have seen that Galton was the first to formulate what was to be
nand, by others, the 'law of ancestral heredity'. As we have seen, it
was the product of a spurious derivation fran data collected upon the
inheritance of height rong the English middle classes - that is to say,
data on the distribution of continuous variation. The law, as derived,
stated that ancestral contributions of different degrees of ancestry in
the direct line went as 1/2,1/4,1/8 etc. That is to say, it claimsd that
we might best predict an individual's height by adding to the mean height
of his generation a ccxnposite deviate formed by carounding 1/2 the deviate
his Inidparent, 1/4 the deviate of his midgrandparent, 1/8 the deviate of his
inidgreatgrandparent, arid so on)
The law, as ernployed1was applied to discontinuous attributes (e.g., eye-
colour in men and coat-colour in hounds). In this case it was interpreted
to mean that the canposition of a family would be best predicted by assuming
that 1/2 of the array would follow the parents (i.e., 1/4 for each parent),
that 1/4 would follow the grandparents (i.e., 1/16 for each grandparent)
and so on, in a manner analogous to the continuous case? Calton ' s law,
therefore, had a number of puzzling features (none of which se€sns to have
stirred up criticism). We have seen already that its derivation was invalid
arid that it was nsteriously applied to discontinuous situations, though
derived in a continuous context. I nust now add that the law was given a
realistic interpretation by Galton, but a rather vague one. We are told,
for exait1e in the penultin'.ate chapter of Natural Inheritance (1889)
that the 'personal heritage from either parent is one qJarter, therefore,
as the total heritage is one half, it follows that the latent elements must
foflor,, the sarie law of inheritance as the personal ones.' The elements
referred to are never very precisely described, but judging from other
passages in Galton' s works, there can be no dotht that he thought of them
as real entities whose unseen behaviour governed the observable characLers
of human (and indeed all) organisms.
ear's deve1oçznnts
(a)lntroduction
Pearson scans first to have enuntered Galton' s statistical work when
he read Natural iiheritance preparatory to givhg his talk on Galton to the
Men and Warren's Club in 4arch 1889. In his discourse, Pearson asserted
that long-continued in-breeding among gifted stocks would eradicate the
tendency to regression to the mean found by Galton in the population 't
large5
 (or, at least, the middle class population at large). Shortly we
shall see that it was this desire to show that regression could indeed be
overome by long good-breeding that drove Pearson to conduct investigations
into the law of ancestral heredity.
214
ordingly, he was anxious to show that there were scientific
)unds for his belief that regression could be overcome by
ig good-breeding, and, as we shall see, this desire was to
the motivating force for his work on the theory of multiple
relation (as already mentioned in chapter 4) and, thereby,
the development of his distinctive, and entirely non-Galtonian
sion of what he christened 'Galton's law of ancestral heredity'.
Ls motivation is clearly displayed in the extract from
1889 talk on 'The laws of inheritance according to Galton'
)roduced below.
The general conclusion one must be forced to
by accepting Galton's theories is the imperative
importance of humans doing for themselves what
they do for cattle,if they wish to raise the
mediocrity of their race. Wise sexual selection
would soon divide any nation into two parts,for
either of which Galton's theory might hold, but
not for both taken together....I am not
advocating a return to group or even close
intermarrying, but a far more careful sexual
selection on the part of those members of the
community who have a large deviation physically
or intellectually from mediocrity, ought in
itself to tend to differentiate the community
and upset satisfactorily the laws of heredity
which Galton has based on chance, or what is
practically promiscuity of sex.
seems clear that he thought that a long period of continued
breeding by an elite could eliminate the tendency to
rression based, as he put it, on Galton's assumption of
omiscuity of sex' - i.e. data mixing long-selected and
elected lines.
Pearson appears to have been aware of the faults inherent in Calton' s
law fran the beginning of his researches inth heredity. He set to work to
nixIify the ].aw and to prcsent it in defensible fashion, concentratinjT,
no doubt because of his interests in human evolutionary questions, on
metrical. characters.	 C\
In this investigation, his main tool was the 1tnox:ina1 probability
distribution. Just as Galton had noted thaL two generations of human
height could be well described by a binorrnal surface of probability, so
Pearson assuird that n generations of a particular human d.imsnsion (e.g.,
height or intelligence) could have its joint distribution adequately
Rodelled by an n-normal probability distribution: naxtely
/	 c',.
•	 r7-	 -	
-	
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with (i,j, = l,2.3......,n) 	 R = I ceid
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where R.,. is the (i,j) cofactor of p..
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The consequence of assuming this distribution which is of crucial
izriport to biaretry is that, if the deviation fran the ireans of n-i variates
X2 ,X3 ,X4 etc. ass'.me the values x2, x3 ,x et, then the distribution of
will be noimal about a irean (neasured fran the general, unconditional
nean of X1)
E(X1 J
	x2x3x41.....x) 
=
	
C.
with variance	
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¶Lpically, Pearson might interpret the variates X11 X2 , X3 etc., to stand
for the values of sare dinension (e.g., the height or intelligence) in
offspring, midparents, midgrandparents, inidgrandparents and so on.
Accordingly, he readily accepted the conditional expected offspring nean
as a predictor of offspring value, given values of midparents x2 , x3 , x4 ,. .. ,
(b) Events of 1895
Pearson's first irrve in this direction is to be found in his seminal7
1895 paper 'Regression, heredity and panruixia'. Like Galton, he assurred
that correlation coefficients could be sii1y multiplied together
to yield values for other correlations; supposing, e • g., that the
correlation of an uncle and his nephew might be obtained by multiplying
together the correlation values for afather arid a son and for two brothers.
In particular, he assuned that ancestral correlations would proceed asf,	 etc.. But, when the correlations take these values, the
regression equation (ii) reduced to
-:--- =
which, to Pearson, suggested that 'an exceptional father is as likely
to have exceptional children if he cares of nediocre stock as if he cares
fran exceptional stock'. This he found a surprising result, as it in effec
denied the existence of ancestral (other than parental) influences. This,
of course, went against his earlier expectation that interbreeding anong
the gifted, pursued over several generations, would nullify the tndency to
regression found by Galton in the general population. In 1895, he had to
admit that, while the result was a surprise, 'I cannot see hci it is to 1e
escaped so long as we assume the normal distribution of frequency, which
9npt. I
appears in so many cases to be a close approximation to fact'
The surprise lay not simply in the apprent incorrectness of the
assunption of ancestral contributions, but also in the olutionary
consequences of this incorrectness. It seemed to foU, that, if a
population were to be 'improved' by selection, then there would be a
reduction of the 'inprovEnent' with each generation - for, each successive
generation would have only the fraction of the 'inprovnt' shcn by
the preceding generation.
There were ways out of this awkward consequence. 9 Pearson considered
the possibilities that evolution might operate through either snooth or
discontinuous jinrs in the 'focus of regression', that is to say, through
jumps in the real value fran which the deviation ricould be measured.
Hever, despite his suggestion that the 'determination of the focus of
regression for sate organ in selected datstic ducks for several generations
and canparisons withthe means for wild and general darestic ducks would seem
a possibility', he did not resort to experimentation, but instead decided
to question the Galtonian assumption that correlation coefficients could
be nultiplied together. 1O a result he was able, in his 1898 ' new
year's gift' to Galton, to attack the problem of refurbishing the law
of ancestral heredity in a new and nore prcanising fashion.11
(c) 1898 and a 'new year's gift'
Introducing the refouns of 1898, Pearson related that the occasion,
tIx)ugh not the cause of his doubting the principle of multiplicability
of correlation coefficients was Galton' s recent successful application
of his ancestral law to data for the (discontinuous) coat-colours of
hounds. Furtheritore, wrote Pearson,12
After sate correspondence with Nr Galton and an endeavour
on iwj part to represent his views in my cm language, I have
care to the conclusion that what I shall in future call
Galton's law of ancestral heredity, if properly interpreted,
reconciles the discrepancies in 'Natural Inheritance arid between
it and my iriemair of 1895. It indeed enables us to predict a
piori the values of all the correlation coefficients of heredity,
and fonns, I venture to think, the fundamental principle of
heredity fran which all numerical data of inheritance can in
future be deduced, at any rate, to a first approximation.
The paper was mathematically ccn1ex, but corptua1ly straightforward.
Pearson interpreted the variates X1,XjX3 etc. as standing for the values
• (iii)
-
Civ)
of sare metrical character in offspring, xnldparents, midgrandparents, and
so on. Then, assuming that (1) ancestral correlations dininish in a
geimtrica1 series, (il), that mating was randan, and (iii) that the
considered character was uncorrelated with fertility, he went on to
investigate the truth conditions (under these assuntions) for two forms
of Galton 's law: a strong form, which may be written,
± 'I-i)	 =	 ) X)	 -. )
(73 j.
and a weak form, which may be written
'Ci-')	 (
U	 1
where
1.
_
Equation (iii) is just Galton's n law in sophisticated form. Equation
(iv) is a more general form, where it is no longer assured that the
coefficients conform to just a single series (1/2,1/4,1/8 etc.), but that
they conform to sane series which is such that;'3
If an individual had Inidparents of the sama deviation fran
racial type right away back, i.e., if H, = H2 = .... = H1
= ... = H , we should reasonably expectithu also to have
deviation H.
The truth conditions for (iii) and (iv) were discovered to be as
foflows. The strong form of Galton's law required that midancestral
correlations should run as 0.3. 0.15, 0.075 etc.. The weak form had
parallel implications, suniiarised in the table belcM. ((= 1)
is, of course, the strong form of the law).
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Cd) A ne'i century and a ne.q
 interpretation
In 1898 Pearson was unwilling to assert the universal truth of Galton's
form of the law (i.e., en. (iii) ). He noted that the value of 0.3
for parental correlation which Galton's form of the law indicated was,
ceteris paribus, harirrnious with the value extracted fran observational
data. But, on balance, he concinded that itore data were needed in order
to decide 'how far Mr Galton' s law needs to be irodified.' He thought it
'a priori improbable' that (iii) would cover all cases of the inheritance
of normally distributed characters, for'4
I should imagine that greater or lesser inheritance of ancestral
qualities might be a distinct advantage or disadvantage )
 and we
should expect inheritance to I subject to the principle of evolution.
This difficulty would b to sane extent net by introducing a
coefficient which I?opose to call the coefficient of heredity,
and consider as capable of being ndif led with regard to both
character and race. As such a law would cover Mr Galton' s case,
there does not seem any objection to using the nre general formula,
until it is found that the strength of heredity is the sane for all
characters and races. Of course, it may .wel] be arjued
heredity is sanething prior to evolution ,iid	 denined' by
it. If this be.. so, its absolute fixity for all organs and races
ought to be capable of observational proof.
Howevr, by 1900, Pearson appears to have thanghis mind. For, in
the Granmar of science (his major work on methodology) which ws reissued
in that year with new chapters on evolutionary biology, he argued that
there was now supporting evidence for the conclusion that 15
whenever the sexes are equipotent, blend their characters and mate
panganxusly, all characters will be inherited at the sane rate.
Such a result could hardly be. attained if evolution itself had
produced heredity. It suggests that heredity, like variation, is
sarething fundamental to the vital unit, and is not a product of
evolution itself. Environment, largely influencing organs and
characters, may fictitiously reduce or increase heredity, if the
offspring be not reared in the same environment as their parents;
hcvgany and other fonns of sexual selection sensibly alter the
pangamic values of the correlation coefficients; but these
mxlifications of heredity are only apparent, and provide no ground
for the assertion that heredity is the product of evolution itrelf.
Since Pearson makes it clear that the rate referred to is that
connoted by taking )'= 1, it appears that, by 1900, he was an advocate
of the position that, ceteris paribus, all continuously varying characters
would be inherited according to Galton's o form of the law, namely
Y ___
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This is a rrarkable shift. It ?s a shift fran a fairly weak claim -
nanly that all characters are inherited accatxling to the law with sai
value of , to the extrly strong position that all characters follow
just one version of the law (i.e., that which is in?lied by taking = 1).
Together with this claim goes the assertion that, whenever this is not
the case, we shall be able to find the cause for the apparent discrepancy
in the form of divergences fran certain stated cxnditions - e.g.,
divergencies fran randan mating. Even nore interestingly, It Is now c1aind
--that 'heredity, like variation, is satething fundamental to the vital unit,
and is not a product of evolution itself.'
Before discussing the significance of these remarks, a brief revi
of the logical structure of the law of ancestral heredity and of its
apirical content
	 in order, Let us catirence with an
atterrpt to understand precisely what it was that the. law asserted, focusing
.on its 'strong' form - i.e., the form given by equation (Il). First of
all, let us see how it did appear to overcare the problem posed to Pearson
by Galton's observation of a tendency to regression observed antng the
popilation generally.16
Let us consider the case where, starting with the exceptional offspring
of unexceptional parents, one selected (in the sense of allowed to breed)
for I generations, only those individuals which showed a deviation of k
units fran their generation's mean. Assuming that all ancestry before
the onset of selection was mediocre, and that the variance of each
generation was the same, it followed, by Galton' s law, that the offspring
in the (n+l) th. generation would have a deviate of,
K (½+++... +4) = K l-)
If selection was then relaxed, and in-breeding caffnenced, the next
generation would have a diviate of,
= K (1-) units
and the one after a deviate of,
= K(l_)units.
91:;
and so on.
The offspring would always show the same deviate as had the generation
before selection was ceased. There was, it seaned, no need to suppose,
as had Galton, that new, stable races could arise only when a sport - an
exceptional individual whose posterity regressed to a new racial mean -
was produced by variation.
There are difficulties associated with this result. The first is
connected with the notion of characters measured as deviates fran the
mean character for their n generation. It seans that in order to make
any predictions about the outccine of a process of selective breeding -
cases where, by definition, there would be no general population of
offspring, but only the offspring of selected parents - one would have to
assune that, if there had been no selection, the population would have
gone on reproducing itself with the same mean fran one generation to the
next. Otherwise it would be impossible to decide whether an individual
one intended to breed frau exhibited a deviation of 1 or not. All that
one would know would be the absolute value of the character in question.
The second difficulty concerns the range of applicability of the law.
Pearson's version of Galton' s law predicted that the standard deviation of
all arrays would be equal to ô
	 or to about 89% of the standard
deviation (0) of the offspring generally. Within these arrays there should
be forms nore extrEie than their parents, which, in theory, could be bred
frau, and so on - leading autc*atically to the nergence of nore and nore
devia forms.
Was this really the case? Or had Darwin's critic Fleaning Jenkin been
correct when he had asserted that, after a few gations of selection, 17
'no further perceptible change can be effected'? As far as I have been
able to ascertain, the biaretricians did not discuss this crucial problem
in print - though Weldon, te shall see, did have thoughts on the matter.
(e) Harotyposis
Returning to the main line of the narrative, we xtuist ask why it is that
Pearson's views so increased in boldness in, or about, 1900. It seans
clear that the change is intimately bound up with the develortrnt of his
theory of harotyposis, which he related that he was engaged upon during
the sunirer of l8998 This theory was a very carplex work, but, for present
purposes, a brief outline of salient points will sufficei9
Here, the notion of the 'undifferentiated like organs' put forward
by an individual plays an iitortant role, and, as a paradigm, Pearson hM
In mind the leaves of a particular tree, which are continuous in their
dimensions arid which are not differentiated according to function.
The notion is intuitively understandable (red blood corpuscles, and scales
fran a noth's wing are other exarr!ples), though, as Pearson's rival,
William Bateson was to suggest (in a rather forceful manner), perhaps not
entirely clear and distinct?0
Pearson was impressed by his thsexvation that the variability (standard
deviation) of the undifferentiated like organs put forward by an individual,
when measured with respect to any dimension (e.g., leaf breadth) was
generaflv between 80 and 90% of the variability of the dimension in the
species as a whole. This seems to have been the origin of his belief that
variation was in sane way fundamental to the vital unit. His Grarr!riar of
science indicates how his thought advanced fran this observation to the
consideration of gametes as exauples of undifferentiated li organs, and
then to the investigation of what this iitiplied.21
Now, if we consider sexual reproduction, we find the male
individual producing a number of male reproductive cells, the
male gametes, and the fanale individual a number of saewhat
different reproductive cells, the female gametes. Each individual
gives a group of gametes of a given individual type arid given
individual variability. The conjunction of two gametes, male
and female gives what has been termed the zygote or stirp, the
origin of a new individual. . . .A group of offspring fran the same
parents are n,ot all alike, because the conjugating gametes are
taken, let us assume for the present at random, fran two groups,
all xennbers in either of which are not alike. The variability
auong brethren in thus seen as a direct corollary to the law
according to which any individual puts forth a group of undiff-
exentiated like organs • The investigation of the relation between
the law of individual growth arid the variability of brethren is
too cciiplex to the given here, but the point to be insisted upon
is this: the resriblance between brethren, or, indeed, any pair
of relatives, is a consequence of the reseirblance, that is the
degree of correlation, between undifferentiated like organs in the
individual. Allow for environment, allow for growth, and yet the
parts of an individual are not identical. hat is the bathmic
influence which produces this variability? We can demnstrate the
existence of this variability, we can describe it quantitatively,
but the	 of it is as much a mrstexy as the 	 of the law of
gravitation.
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This line of thinking was much developed in Pearson's 1901 paper
on the theory of hcirotyposis, where he was led to predict that the
degree of correlation between undifferentiated like organs in the
individual was responsible for, and would be equal to thgrrof
thvispde
ua1-to the degree of correlation between brothers. flnpirical
investigation gave substance to this expectation, for, in 1900,
he was able to write:22
Is the correlation between pairs of undifferentiated like
organs in the individual the same or nearly the saire for
all forms of life? If so we have ascertained quantitatively
as ccztiprehensive a law of gro .ith for living organisms as
-..he law of gravity for irolar masses. My researches on this
point are riot yet caplete, but they indicate that the
follo&'ing law is true. The degree of resth1ànce between
undifferentiated like organs in the individual is nearly the
same for all forms of life, and its mean lies between 0.4 and
0.5. We shall speak of this result as the law of grcth of
like parts.
and, in 1901, he was able to claim that?3
The mean of twenty-two hautypic series is found to be sensibly
identical with the mean of nineteen fraternal series. Lote
that the correlation between the undifferentiated like organs
of the individual was referred to by Pearson as 'harK)typic
corre1ationJ
which, given that there was no relation between the 'relative s1sr1icity
of the organin and the intensity either of its variability or its
hcrotypic correlation', led him to believe that?4
there seans.ground for supposing that hatrtyposis (and therefore
heredity) is a primary factor of living forms, a condition for
the evolution of life by natural selection, and not a product
of such selection. If the mushroan, the bet.ch and the poppy
shcw approximately equal hattyposis, it sens well nigh
iir!possible to consider it as a factor of life, increasing with
advancing evolution.
In other words, it would sei that, byl9(Y3, Pearson believed that he
had found a fundamental and innate tendency of living organisms;
namely the tendency to produce undifferentiated like organs which had
a high variability and which obeyed a 'law of grocith' to yield hczrotypic
correlations of about 0.4. Sperms and ova, he suggested, were also exairples
of undifferentiated like organs, and, via the theory of hcitttypois, was
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led to expect that the halDtypic correlation between the gantes of the
individual was responsible for, and equal to the correlation between
brothers. This equality was arpirically confirrred, and values of about
0.4 were found for both coefficients in a wide range of types of data.
Since it was Galton's law with = 1 which predicted a fraternal correla-
tion of this value, Pearson cane to suppose that it was this version of
the law which, ceteris paribus, governed the inheritance of all continuously
varying characters. As such it was a principle of traly 'Newtonian'
inp)rtance?5
 Galton' s law now took the centre of the stage as the
expression of the consequences of one of the host basic, innate and
Wsterious of biological processes. Here of course we hare the biological
version of Pearson' s generalised statistical cosirology. Unfortunately,
taking the centre of the stage may lead to embarrassnent, and thence to a
tactical retreat. So it was with Pearson's contention that all characters
were inherited according to Galton 's law withy = I.
(f)Mdifications of 1903
By 1903, he had observed sets of ancestral correlations which,26
though conforming to a geatric series, did not conform to one which
connoted either the coefficient series 1/2,1/4,1/8 etc., or, indeed,
any coefficient series
	
'	 etc. which surrmed to unity. With
the abandonirent of both the stroVig and the weak form of Galton's law as
universal truth (Pearson did not decide to retain either form by denying
the ceteris paribus clause built into the law) went the abcndonrrent of
the expectation that the relaxation of selection, and the comnenceirent of
in-breeding would yield population stability. In the cases studied
(eye-colour in man and coat-colour in horses) the correlation values
were such as to lead to the expectation that 'after selection ceases
a very slow regression sets in, which would be hardly perceptible without
very definite quantitative Ireasureinents for the first three or four
generation s of inbreeding' •27
M3re generally, by 1903, the whole face of the law of ancestral
heredity was much changed. Pearson now made it clear that he no longer
held that he had discovered 'the single stateint which embraces the whole
field of heredity', and which must prove 'alnost as epoch making to the
biologist as the law of gravitation to the astronaner'. Instead, he
c)4 ,
rx athasised that there was no real 'law' at all, but, rather, that
there were many benefits to be gained fran using the inathanatics of
niiltiple correlation to make predictions in the sphere of hereditary
data. Thus we find Ithn arphasising that:28
The law of ancestral heredity In its nost general form is
not a biological hypothesis at all, it is sirrply the statant
of a furidarrental theoren in the statistical theory of multiple
correlation applied to a particular type of statistics. If
statistics of heredity are thanselves sound, the results deduced
fran this theoran will ranain true whatever biological theory of
heredity be propounded.
and that;
The law of ancestral heredity as founded on the theory of
multiple correlation involves no biological theory of regression.
The term regression has unfortunately been taken fran statistical
theory and interpreted in a biological sense. In statistics the
regression is always to the nean of the foreknown character.
Further, if there be a number of cognates, we can a priori, i.e
before quantitative analysis, riot state the total aniounts they
will contribute to the predicate will or will not indicate a
biological regression.
Again, In l909 Pearson offered a similar, but now nore explicit
epitcxnisation, stating that 'the law of ancestral heredity is art)raced
in the following statanents':
(i)In a pop.ilation breeding withcut assortative mating the
regression line for offspring on any ancestor is linear.
(ii)The correlations between offspring arid successive grades
of ancestry form a progression diminishing geanetrically as
we ascend to distant grades; and
(iii) The general relation of an individual to his ancestry can
be closely expressed by the multiple correlation formula.
This appears to have been his final stance on the subject, publicly
defended as late on as 1930.
So far then, it would sean that the law of ancestral heredity went
throigh an amazing series of developrents. Galton never referred to his
formula by this nane, which was coined by Pearson, who, by turn, seans
to have varied its designation with high frequency. The results so far
may be expressed in tabular form:
Pearson2nd (1895)
5th (1903 etc)	 Pearson
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Interpretation	 author
1st (1889)	 Galton
reference	 coefficients
continuous +	 ½4I^ etc.discontinuous
characters, Also
genetic particles.
continuous	 no 'ancestral'
characters. No	 coefficients at
discussion of
	 all.
genetic particles.
3rd (1898)
chctracters. No	 I	 zdiscussion of	 various values in
Pearson	 continuous	 I 2ny series where
genetic particles. 	 ferent cases.
4th (1900) Pearson	 continuous
characters.
Reference to
basic processes
of han3typosis.
continuous
characters.
No reference
to genetic
processes.
½4,¼ etc.
"Best" geatric
series of coeffic-
ients that can be
fitt1 to the data.
21S
This might be t1ugnt to be the final word 1
 but we still have t
further interpreters of the 'law of ancestral heredity' to consider,
nanly W.F. R. Weldon and Sir Ronald Fisher.
W.F.R. Weldon
Weldon, we have seen, was engaged upon the construction of a
physiological theory of heredity along Galtonian lines in the early years
of the 20th century, at tiire 'when it seems that Pearson was rather
discounting any biological interpretation for the 'law of ancestral
heredity'. Weldon' s notes 3&ntain the following revealing passage,
which, i .dng by context, seers to serve both as an exposition of Calton 's
viEis and as a statant of stpathy thereunto. What is particularly
interesting i s the way in which Weldon seems to have assuted that Pearson,
like himself, interpreted the coefficients of the law of ancestral heredity
as referring to calrits of genetic particles.
In all these cases he found that the facts of inheritance could be
expressed by supposing that the daninant elEnts, which are distributed
anong the individuals of a generation and determine their visible
characters, are derived fran the dczninant determinants of parents,
grand-parents and rrore rte ancestors, in proportion to the terms of
a geaetr1cal series whose sum, representing the total heritage of the
generation, is unIty!'
1The series originally proposed to represent the proportions in which
the ancestors of different degrees of rcroteness contribute to the
characters of a generation is the series
½ + + ¼ + ..... etc.,
the parents together conLributing one half the total heritage, the grand-
parents one quarter, and so on. This series was given only as a first
approximation to the result of observations which were nz and not
sufficiently extensive to give accurate values for the various terms.
The subsequent work of Pearson and his pupils makes it necessary to change
the actual values, ti-ugh it only confirms the staterrnt that the form of
the relation between the characters of one generation and those of its
ancestors is closely given by coefficients of correlation and reqrssion
which form a gecmetrical series, the terms of which are nearly the same
2i
for a nber of characters in Man and in several of the lcMer animals.
The form of the series thus established is the essential point of Galton' s
work, and is all we need ttend to for the nxtEnt, leaving the question
of the actual values of the terms for description
This general line of thinking was also proposed in weldon' s lecture 32
of 1905 on 'Inheritance in animals and plants', where he discussed
ITechanical nodels for the production of correlations. I will not discuss
these here as it is a matter to which we will return in the chapter on
psychology. Rather nore interesting, perhaps, in any case, is the line that
Weldon' s thoughts seen to have taken on the topic of the limits to variation.
We have seen, in an earlier section, that the biaxtricians had surprisingly
little to say, in public at least, on the matter of the amiount of change
which they expected might be produced by the continued selection of
organisms in the 'tail' of a normal distribution. The mathematical xrwxlel
which they adopted, if taken seriously, se1 to indicate that in
t1 -4A.
theory at any rate, the, say, tallest methers of a population, 1 interbred,
would always produce even taller children, who could be bred to produce
yet taller individuals - and so on. This, of course, was a point which
opponents of Darwinism had long denied, .ince at least the date of Fleaning
Jenkin's revi of the foiir edition of the Origin of species 1Darwin
himself, evidently1 had been disccmforted by this point, and was able to
respond fl-i a manner that seaied to pin hopes on what might happen after
a very long period had elapsed.33
In order that any great anount of xrccUficatian in any part
should be effected, a variety when once formed imist again,
perhaps after a long interval of time, vary or present
individual differences of the same favourable nature, and
these must again be preserved, and so onwards step by step.
Seeing that individual differences of all kinds perpetually
recur, this can hardly be considered as an unwarrantable
assumption.
Weldon, it seeais, was attracted by the idea of constantly irodifying genetic
particles. This was a mechanism which would enable him to overcame Jenkin' s
objection, though, of course, it offered, in itself, no very precise
answer to the question of the natural limits to which a population might
be predictably changed by continued selection. We see in the extract below,
that Weldon, like Pearson, seans to have favoured a doctrine of innate
variability to one of harogeneous classes, punctuated by occasional
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34thscontinu.ities.
t If the determinant elenEnts, which this view of the mechanism of
transmission postulates, are supposed to pass fran one generation to another
without any other variation except that involved in the asstutption of
the daninant or the l atent condition, then a very inportant limit to the
range of possible variations is introduced, because the only characters
which can be supposed to appear airong the individuals of a generation
are those produced by mixing the characters of the ancestors in various
proportions; any really new character can only air by
 the occurrence
of sane disturbance which either introduces new de€erminants or leads to
an abnormal change in the characters of those already present, so that the
appearance of a new character must on such a view be ascribed to a process
other than that of normal inheritance, leading to a "mutation" or "sport".
If, however, the characters of each determinant may be assurred to vary to
any extent, hciever slight, during its transmission frau one generation to
another, a gradual production of new characters..
	 may conceivably
result fran a normal process of inheritance, and the necessity for invoking
a new process to account for their appearance will not arise. (e tp.0 i
R.A. Fisher
We have seen that Pearson appears finally to have steered away f ran
giving his formalism any biological interpretation. Even in 1930, in a long
paper on'A new theory of progressive evolution', published in the lmnals of
eugenics, he was to be found asserting, quite correctly, that 'the law does
not depend upon any irethan.thn of the germ plasm'. But, in the meantime, the
world had not stood still, and R.A. Fisher - the future Sir Ronald Fisher
36
- had been at work. We shall return to him and his work in the chapter on
eugenics - but, for the nornent, it Is worth noting that in his frroi...s paper
of 1918, "On the correlation of relatives on the supposition of ?ndelian
inheritance', he shc'zed that observed correlations between relatives could
be explained in a ?ndelian fashion. Now, as Pearson noted all along, the
coefficients of the ancestral law (e.g., ½,1/4, 18 etc.) - which governed
mid-ancestral deviates - were functionally related to the sirrple correlation
coefficients linking father and son, grandfather and grandson, and so on.
Fisher, therefore, was able to shcM that the law of ancestral heredity was a
consequence of inde1ian genetics - or, at least, that a law of that çieral
form was • To this matter we shall return 4i CckpW 7
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Chapter 7. Eugenics as a popular nxvrnt ,would-be science
ai midwife of science: the case of R.A.Fisher.
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Introduction
In several of the six preceeding chapters the topic of eugenics has
appeared. We have seen for exanpie that eugenic ideology was an
important factor in the thinking of the pioneers of biarctry and statistics.
This chapter is devoted entirely to the British eugenics noverrent in the
period prior to 1920, and looks at this novernent and its influences under
three headings.
I begin by discussing what might be tenred the 'popular' side of
eugenics - by describing and analysing the tide of eugenic thought that
flowed in Britain in those early years. In the second part of the analysis
I shall examine the Qork of the Galton Laboratory under Pearson, who
saw his organisation as offering a rational and scientifically sound
alternative to the popular Irovertent, an alternative which could supply the
nation's governors with a scientifically based set of guides to policy in
vital social matters. Finally, I shall turn to the effects of these eugenic
institutions upon sciences other than the ould-be science of eugenics as
'developed by Pearson. The areas where the influence was greatest were
genetics and psychology, and, as the next chapter is given to psychology,
I shall here look at genetics, focusing in particular on the rk of that
seminal figure Sir Ronald Fisher.
Eugenics as a popular iiovernent.
It is gratifying to note that the British popular eugenics irovernent
ks begun to receive the attention of historians. Mst notable in the
field is G.R. Searle's recent nDnograph on Eugenics and politics in
Britain, 1900_1914..1 The existence of this literature has the happy
effect of making it possible to briefly describe the salient features of
the novernent, secure in the knc.z1edge that a great deal of detail resides
in the sorks of Searle, and also of Lyndsay Farrall, author of a distinguish
doctoral thesis on the English eugenics noverrcnt.2
We have already seen that Galton was long a eugenist, but that he did
not take to the public platform nuch before the turn of the century.
Before that turning point, it does not make xrnich sense to speak of an
organised eugenics novertent in Britam, though, as always, several figures
who were 'ahead of their tines' can be uncovered. One such is William
Rathbone Greg the essayist who, in 1868,3published on the 'Failure of
"natural selection" in the case of man', arguing that society had reached
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a state in which the 'unfittest' were surviving. This was a state of
affairs which he deplored, and he wrote with feeling of a better society
in which 'all candidates for the proud and so1am privilege of continuing
an untainted and perfecting race should be subjected to a pass or
cxitpetitive examination.' Interestingly though, Greg, unlJJe Galton,
was a believer in the inheritance of acquired characters. Consequently,
his schanes had not the wholly Calvinistic tinge typical of Galton's ideas,
which made so much play of doctrines of the genetically elect. This cates
out clearly in the passage fran his essay reproduced below - a passage
that reveals Greg to have been of vfevi. very different fran Galton's.
I cannot see why - when the rking-classes are educated
in sane proportion to those 'ow above them, and possess
property of their own, - whether in acres, or consols, or
shares, as they assuredly may do, and soon will - they
should not becare so provident and so well-conditioned,
that they will be no unfit fathers for caning generations.
For we must never forget that it is not poverty, but
squalor - not a hard life, but insufficient nutriirent
- not strenuous bodily exertion, but excessive and
exhausting toil - that disqualify man fran transmitting
a sound physical and marital constitution to their off-
spring. A sanif led city population and a well-fed
agricultural population may be not only a wholesane
but a necessary element to share the functions of paternity
with the irore elaborately prudent and cerebrally over-
developed classes higher in the social scale.
In this respect, Greg's thought reserrbled that of other noted late
19th cei\tury social cattientators - and, indeed, as we shall see, also
that of many 20th century eugenists - carinentators such as, for exarnpl e,
the eminent econanist Alfred Marshall, who wrote of the London poor in 1884
tha
even when their houses are white.ashed, the c!ky will be
dark; devoid of joy they will tend to drink for excitenent;
they will go on deteriorating; and as to their children, the
irore of them grow up to manhocd, the lc er will be the average
physique and the average irorality of the caning generation.
Ind, in a sinilar vein, we may find Charles Booth's collaborator Liewellyn
Smith arguing that5
It is the result of conditions of life in gredt tcmis,
and especially in the greatest town of all, that muscular
strength and energy gradually get used up; the second
generation of Londoner is of a lcr .zer physique and has less
power of persistent vrk than the first, and the third
generation (where it exists) is of lower than the second..
'I have mentioned these two writers as (1) they are good examples
of the fear of urban degeneration that existed in late 19th century
Britain anong middle class social theorists, and (ii), they show
that anong this fradion of the intellectual classes at any rate,
sate version of the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters
was a ccimonplace. This, as we shall see, opened the possibility of
sinultaneously blaming all sorts of conditions - poverty, insanity etc. -
on 'defective germ plasm' whilst at the same time maintaining that poor
environment was the cause of that defect. They could thus require
limediate eugenic measures with long-term hopes for environmental reform.
If we turn to leading 19th century British biologists we find nc
massive enthusiasm for Galton' s views. Darwin was aware of Calton' s views,
and, indeed, once wrote to him a nost congratulatory letter on Hereditary
genius. He was, in general, in favour of there being a high fertility artong
the 'fit' section of society, but could not bring himself to support
Galton' s view that human stock-breeding was the only genuine pathway to
human progress. In his Descent of man, for example, he depicted Galtonian
'genetic' progress as less important than the progress brought about by 6
'a good education during youth whilst the brain is imp es lb , and by
'a high standani of excellence, inculcated by the ablest and best men,
ex±odied in the laws, custans and traditions of the nation, and enforced
by public opinion.' Darwin was a much broader man than Galton, it should
never be forgotten;was the Least dogmatic of men. The differences between
the two may be nicely gauged by cciiparing Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle with
Galton's book on his travels in Tropical South Africa.
Galton net with no nore success with Alfred Russell Wallace, whose views
on the evolution of the mind make him one of the nost fascinating of all
the great Victorians. Wallace, in general, was sympathetic to the idea
that breeding should be done predaninantly by the gifted. But, in his
view, this would arise as a consequence of a transition to socialism. In
such a systn, equality between the sexes would one into play, and in
consequence, ren would choose not to allow themselve s to becane
impregnated by the lower sorts of men.7
I have made these various points because they indicate again the
exceptionality of Galten. Hardly anyone in late 19th century England was
prepared to join Galton in his 'religious' quest for human progress via
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stockbreeding methods. If Galton' s eugenic views were to becc&ne popular,
then they would have to be ircdif led so as to becczre acceptable to a
group with views on society that were a great deal less idiosyncratic than
Galton's. This, we shall see, is what happened in the early 20th century;
when a new band of Galton' s supporters differed fran their master in
several points.
aSPtoiC
	 8Galtonj stepped onto the public platfonn in 1901 when he gave the Huxley
lecture at the AnthropolQgical Institute, speaking on 'the possible improve-
merit of the human breed under existing conditions of law and sentiment'.
In this address, Galton made a rough equation between levels of 'civic
worth' and social class and stressed the need for higher levels of breeding
fran those classes judged to be of higher civic worth. Repeat perorntances,
so to speak, were then given to the Sociological Society in 1904 and
There is little point in analysing these talks, as they all carried roughly
the same massage - namely the message of possible human progress (or, at lea
of Jnglo-Saxon progress) brought about by a two-pronged strategy. One
prong, saneUirs called that of 'positive eugenics', advocated measures to
raise the fertIlity of the classes of greatest civic worth. The other,
saitiis called 'negative eugenics', advocated measures to stEn the
fertility of the classes of lowest civic worth. Galton, in general, was
much irore enthusiastic about positive than about negative eugenics. His
philosophy, fran the beginning, was not one that focused upon the 'problem'
of the supposed proliferation of the unfit.1° It was a distinctly Utopian
philosophy which looked forward to painless progress. We have seen aLready
that Galton backed his hopes with his purse, setting up the Eugenics Record
Office in 1904, and leav tng ironey to install Pearson as professor of
eugenics in 1911.
As Galton' s long life reached its conclusion, it seemned that his views
were at last beginning to be taken very seriously, for in NovemTtber 1907, a
meeting of nbers of a 'Moral Education League' and of others so interested
in Caxton Hall , led to the setting up of a 'Eugenics Education Society'.
This still survives, though under the shorter designation of 'Eugenics
Society.' I have not found out much of interest about the M,ral Education
League, bit point out that Edwardian England was a considerable place for
the emergence of societies given to the protection of other people's norals.
Those who have read Edward Hyne,5' Edwardian turn of mind will find
nothing out of place in the existence of such an institution. Dr
J.W. Slaughter was elected provisional chairman, and Mrs Gotto, a
lady of force and charm, was elected secretary. In early 1908 the first
annual general neting was held, and shortly thereafter, the society
gained instant publicity by becariing engaged in a campaign to stop the
- Laidon County Council fran closing certain hoste1s, thereby turning
numbers of 'inebriate winen' onto the pavent and, doubtless, onto the
streets too. In 1910, a journal1
 the Eugenics review)was launched, and
was able, shortly afterwards, to report the proceedings of the first ever
International Eugenics Conference, held in 1912, in the University of
Laon, with Major leonard Darwin presiding.13
 Recruitment to the Society
was brim:, and, as Searle notes, 'by 1914, membership had risen to 634,
and there were affiliated branches in Belfast, Birmingham, Haslerere,
Liverpool and Oxford, as well as other discussion groups, as in Brighton'
The ittership of the Society was rcarkable on two counts - firstly,
it contained a number of distinguished persons, drawn fran the professions
ratherLfran the aristocracy or fran the cattnercial classes. Secondly,
the ndership contained a very high proportion of nen - perhaps
unsurprising given that eugenics was, at hoart, about giving birth.
To illustrate the first point, I have recorded be1cz the nanes of the
office-bearing mnbers for 19 13-14 Wanen were proportionally ITore
nutrous anong the non-office holding Iners.
a.
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In the pages of the Society' s journal we can trace its concerns.
We find articles discussing the birth rate and whether it was producing
too many persons of the 'l?ss fit' sort, we find art.ic1es on heredity,
on the nature-nurture issue, and on the possible hereditary origins of
alcoholism, poverty, mental illness and criminality. In practice, these
foilcMers of Galton, who persuaded Galton to becae honorary president
in 1910, were naich preoccupied with the ideas of negative eugenics, and
with the prospect for negative eugenic solutions to these prob1ns. A
fairly typical sentinent was that expressed by the 'Ccarmittee appointed to
consider the eugenic aspect of poor law reform', when, in 1911, it claimed
that 'a great part of pauperism lies outside the operation of normal
econanic processes', and this because paupers were frequently persc1ts strick
with hereditary degeneracy. The sane carinittee looked forward to the
day when state-segregation had led to the extinction of the thousand or so
family 'stocks' that made up a hereditary degenerate class.
In practice, the utterances of the Eugenics Education Society seen to
have led to alnost no concrete results in the form of legislative change.
Here, of course, the British scheae differed mightily fran the Jmerican,
where forcible sterilization soon gained a place on the statute hooks of a
number of States, often to the accatpaniment of approving rds fran
praninent geneticists1.7
 Indiana effected a sterilization law in 1907, and, b
1926, twenty-three states had follcMed suit. If the eugenics nxvrent did
have a finest hour in Britain, then it came in 1913, when there was passed
a nental deficiency act, which cane about as follarjs. In 1904, there was
set up a Royal Catinission into the Care and Control of the Feeb1e-Ninded)8
cactly why it was then set up is unclear, though Searle instances the
influence of prison and poor-law authorities who were able to discern that
considerable fractions of their clientelle were not of goal mental
developmenti 9
 The evidence given by experts suggested strongly that the
condition was an hereditary one, and the ccnTnissioners suggested that
a degree of segregation (to prevent procreation) should enter into the
solution of the 'irental deficiency' problea. The mentally defective were
also presented as a major prob1n in the 1909 Reports of the poor-law
Carmisianers. The minority report, for example, noted that, in 1906, the
wrkhouses of Eugland and. Wales contained 11,151 persons 'certified to be
of unsound mind', arid calculated that
23t
the total nurrier of rrentally defective person
na.., residing j n the ordinary wards of the
General Mixed Workhouses of the United Kingdan
xrust anount to rrore than 60,000.
This, the ccarmissioners indicated in no uncertain tones, was scandalous.
The various reports gave rise to hopes of legislation, and we know that
Winston Churchill was anxious to cease what he saw as the rapid decay of
the nation hj restricting these persons further and by sterilizing them,
possibly with X-rays. Governirent action, Iwever, was slow to cane,
andas only after the Eugenics Education Society and the National
Association for the After-Care of the Feeble-Minded banded together for
lol±ying purposes that, in 1912, the government produced its mental
deficiency bill which allowed for the setting up of n provision .or the
segregation of the mentally defective. However, it was not until 1914 that
the legislation received the Fyal Assent, and, by then it had been gelded
by the reival of its 'nost eugenic' can onent, the clause 17, which allowed
for the feeble minded to be restrained when it was judged 'desirable in
the interests of the camainity that they should be deprived of the
21
opportunity of pro aeating children' • But, as Searle remarks, it was
nonetheless a piece of legislation that did owe a great deal to 'the
eugenists' demands for the curbing of the multiplication of the unfit.
In the event, it would seem, the passage of the nta1 Deficiency Act was,
in Britain, the high-water mark of eugenic legislation. The first war
interrupted the eugenics novnent as it did so many other things, and,
by 1920, membership had slipped to 494. The consensus anong historians
is that the eugenics ffi cwe ett weakened steadily after the first war,
though there is roan left'i t.classification of the nature of the weakening
- whether for example, it was just in mnbership of the Eugenics Education
Society, or in its 'ini.luence' or in both. 22
Here then, we have a brief picture of the popular eugenics iroveirent in
Britain prior to 1920. It spent sare of its energies in the advocacy of
'positive' eugenic Iroves, in, say, advocating tax-advantages for the fertile
nErrbers of the professional middle class, xit its main concern seems to have
been focused on negative eugenic issues - on crime, on alcoholism and so
on, and on the possibility of reducing these by the restriction of 'unfit
germ plasm'. Needless to sayfarl Pearson was implacibly hostile to the
popular side of eugenics, and it is not hard to sympathise with him.
For, just at the time when he was atteting to establish eugenics as a
science, based on his new statistical mathodology, he was faced with
the uprising of a pcpular irovenent, which, one could be certain, uld
be classified by the public mind as the central focus of eugenics.
Consequently the fate of eugenics as a science could perhaps be endangered
by being so associated. One feels that it was rather like the biaretric-
Nendelian business all over again. ich as the novelty and authority of
biciretry had been challenged by the nergence of a 4endelian school, so,
now, the new uld-be science of eugenics being developed in the Galton
Laboratory was being denied its pole position by the erergence of a popular
novemant. The minute-book of the Cambridge University Eugenics Society24
contains a copy of an undated letter of Pearson, to the Titres, in which
he wrote with feeling of the way in which eugenics had been turned into
'a subject for Iiiffoonery on the stage and in the cheap press', and went
on to ccxriplain that
We are treated to 'eugenic' marriages and to '
babies and the 'eugenic' plays which have nothing
whatever to do with the problen of race-welfare;
officials of eugenic societies suthiit to being
interviewed with regard to well-ordered babies, and
arone who stands wholly apart fran such absurdities
may wake one norning to find his narre associated with a
'eugenic' baby, whose very existence he has never heard
of.
Eugenics, as he had feared, was rapidly degenerating into a topic for the
poseur and 'ongressbumler', but 'years of patient work in medico-sccial
observation, in genetic experiirent, and in careful study of family history',
he claiirEd, were needed before
the laws of eugenics as a science can be dogmatically stated.
Here then, in brief at least, we have the English eugenics novarnt
as it existed in the first twenty years of the century. It does raise,
I think, a number of interesting questions for the social historian.
On the face of it, we have the phenarenon of Galton acquiring an organised
following in this period, which did manage to exert sare political influence
Churchill, it sens, described himself as a eugenist (adopting a Galtonian
neologism) and G.K. Chesterton thought It xrth writing a book on genics
and other evils. The novenent, it ses, lost sawhat in influence after
the first war. We are faced therefore with the questions of why Galton
acquired a following only after his 70th birthday, for a cause he had
advocated since 1865, and of why, after flourishing in the pericd prior
to the first war, popular eugenics thereafter went into scnething of
a decline. Then, of course, there is the issue of why it is that British
eugenists were never able to pass the sort of sterilization legislation
that appeared in the United States.
In this work, which focuses on the history of science in Britain, I
shall leave this last and nDst interesting q aestion to one side. The other
questions I will tackle, but in an inccmplete manner - and with the same
excuse. Wnat I hope to do in the remainder of this section is to briefly
outline the answers to these questions deployed by the historians of
British eugenics, and, by criticising t1n, to shc .i that they are far fran
satisfactory and to indicate that work still remains for the social
historian.
All writers on the eugenics uov&rient appear to agree on at least two
propositions, namely (i), that the eugenists were drawn predaninantly
frau the professional middle class, notably fran the medical profession,
and (ii) that the age of eugenics - i. e, the period fran the turn of the
century to the outhreak of war - was one suffused by an ideology of 'nationa
efficiency', by a feeling shared by Fabian and Capitalist alilce that Britain
was falling behind Germany in the struggle for world leadership, and that
this could be countered only by measures that would strengthen the flagging
lnperial race. Interestingly, one of tl'e effects of the Boer War reverses
was to focus attention not sirrply on the incaetence of generalship but
also onto the possibility of there being an ongoing decline in the standard
of man available for recruitment into the ranks.27
 The suggestions led
to an official inquiry which found that there was no evidence to suggest
any such decline, but, it would seem, a carrron sentiment of the period was
one to the effect that the inerial race was declining and that this was
due to an ingrcing cancer of fast-breeding degeneracy. Shortly, we shall
see hcyq
 Karl Pearson responded to and fed these fears.
Ithen writers on the eugenics noverrcnt have atteited to irobilize these
facts to explain the rise of the Irovement, they have becare a little
vague. Lyixisay Farrall and Donald MacKenzie,8
 for exarr1e, have described
the eugenists as engaging in 'middle class radicalism' and in 'middle c)ass
ideology' respectively. Middle class radicalism is said to have reigned
by Farrall because the eugenists had nothing to gain perscnally fran their
234
advocacy of eugenics, whereas Nackenzie sees the eugenists as advancing
their i interests in t ways: (1), directly, by arguing for, say,
reduced taxation upon the middle classes, and (ii), indirectly, by
donstrating to the ruling or capitalist class that they (the professional
inickile classes, and, in particular, the fractions thereof whose claims
to status relied on scientific knowledge) were the people equipped to deal
with the social threat posed to the capitalist order by the existence of
an urKlisciplined and frequently unemployed fraction of the working class
that was supposedly grcMingthe great cities of Britain. Its existence
and extent, of course, had been recently uncovered by statisticians lJJe
Booth and Rcntree.
Farrall does not offer a strong explanation of the post-war failure
of the eugenics novement. Mackenzie argues that, after the first war, the
threat to the capitalist order began to ca fran a very different direction
- namely fran an organised labour Irovement - and, accordingly, that the
traditional program of negative eugenics backed by the eugenists no
longer offered capita]. a solution for its problems. Thereby, it is said,
the invement lost in influence and began to becczr an increasingly academic
novenent. Searle explains the demise of the eugenists' influence by
referring to a range of factors, including increasing academic specializatio
in the post-war period (which rent the synthesis that eugenics had once
represented) and the realization by scientists that 'the mechanism of
inheritance airng hiznan beings was nore catplex than had once been claimed'
- a factor which cooled the enthusiams of would-be eugenists. 	
tS prete4%
There is no denying that a central feature of the eugenics novernt was,(
of middle class professionals offering biological solutions to apparent
flaws within the caiosition and behaviour of the would-be 'imperial race'.
We are, after all, ciealing with the ThiglancDof couting for boys - with
all Its imperial enthusiasms - and of Kipling. But, once we get beyond
this, we run into the vaguenesses incorporated into Mackenzids and Farrall'
explanations. Farrall is doubtless right when he suggests that eugenic
propagandising brought no direct benefit to the propagandiser. In this sens
then, the eugenists might be described as indulging in 'middle class
radicalism' - but this does not explain why they did it. Mackenzie seems
to offer an explanation by suggesting that being a eugenist brought a profit
in the shape of increased status for one's social class (in this case,
nth9tile aria professional). In his view then, eugenists were short-term
altruists, but lang-term self seekers. While not gaining personally,
they presented social problans and solutions thereto in a eugenic manner
as their so doing gained favour for their class fran a ruling capitalist
class. When eugenic nostrurns became inappropriate ideological weapons for ti
capitalists, the steam went out of the eugenics rti3vatnt which fell in
estean anong the professional middle class.
It is hard to know quite what to make of the explanations given of
the rise arid fall of the eugenics novanent. It certainly does sean to be
the case that, in the period prior to the first war, there were fears afoot
that the 'inperial race' was slipping. Lord Bosebuxy,o less, spoke of
'a perpetual lowering of the vitality of the inperial race', and there were
wide-spread desires to get the 'rotten apples' fran the social barrel.
C the other hand, it seans unlikely that a small social 'residuum' was
perceived by the capitalists as a leading threat, when the years 1911-12,
for exan!ple, saw strikes 'arrong seamen, dock and transport workers, and
a general railway strike Similarly, it seans likely that fears about the
decline of the imtperial race must sisrly have been arrested by the war, whici
itself, was hardly eugenic in its consequences. After all, it was the great
race-rival, the Germans, that had been overthrown. Added to this, as
factors that should be explored, there ov surely the changed values, the
destruction of old certainties that eventuated fran the war. We are into thc
period of the Waste Land. A possibly typical example of these cultural
changes is F.A.E. Crew,2 the noted geneticist, whose article of 1918 is
perhaps the nost civilised and eloquent piece ever to appear anong the
dreary pages of the Eugenics review: its style and spirit rartind one of
George Orwell. After denouncing Pearson, Galton, Bateson and Spencer
as being on all fours with Haeckel and Treitschke, he argued against
siirplistic and biological interpretations of society which so many
eugenists had peddled
We believe that equality of opportunity has discovered
unsuspected capacity, and that the average man can
aoquire the average mental attainments of the classes,
up to this, tent the intellectual. Of these matters,
youth may kncw Irore than its masters, for it was youth
that went through the fire in Flanders.
As to Searle's suggestion3 that increasing cxp1exi.I3
	
in genetics was a
major factor in the fall of eugenics, it ranains for evidence to be
produced. As we shall see, however, sai leading geneticists were able
to survive the war with eugenic fervour undiminished.
One point does need to be stressed. I have mantioned at an earlier
point that Weismarin' s views on herediry - which denied the possibility of
the inheritance of acxuired characters - becama pratinent in Britain in
the nineties. Wesmann and Spencer, for example, fought many rounds over thi
issue in the periodical literature of the nineties3.4 But, there sens little
chance of ascribing the growth of the eugenics novemant to the growing
acceptance of Weismann's views. In the first place, there is a point of
logic, namaly that acceptance of the theory of the continuity of the germ-
plasm does not 	 se ccxrmit one to acribing, say, variance in IQ to
genetical rather than environzintal factors. But, rrore flrortantly, we find
that many leading eugenists did not believe in the inviolability of the
germ-plasm. Take, for example, the ideas of A.F. Tredgold the leading
neurologist,who was a key withess before the Royal Carmission on the care
and control of the feeble-minded.35
the causes of germinal variation, whether retrogressive
or progressive, are very imperfectly knoi, and there
is urgent need of their study... My cn observations
have led ma to the conclusion that they are to be found
in the environment, using this term in its widest sense,
and that the psychopathic diathesis which reaches its
culmination in amentia is, at the beginning, dependent
upon disease or disorder of the matabolism induced by
external causes arid faulty nodes of life.
Tredgold, interestingly though not untypically, demanded short-term
segregatj-an to stop the propagation of the mentally defective, but,
concurrently, he also stressed the inportance of making those environmental
reforrns that would stop the further production of defective germ-plasm.
Eugenics as a would-be science.
I have noted that Pearson, once he had assned control of the
Eugenics Laboratory, set to work to establish eugenics as a science,
as the	 social science, based on the rock-hard foundations of
statistical method. Eugenics, it might be said, was seen as having
normative features, for it could act as a guide to policy. Karl Pearson
was quite firm on this point when enlightening undergraduates.36
C)')".
Of one thing, hQwever, I feel sure, that no judgrent
will lead to lasting social gain which is reached by
appeal to the Erotions, which is based on inaduate
kiowledge of facts, or which collects data with the
view of supporting any preconceived opinion. In short,
on all these grounds we see that what is needed is the
academic judgenEnt. You cannot settle such essential
problems of society as alcoholism, tuberculosis, marital
defectiveness, or the changing status of en, by oratory
in the market-place. I claim that these things Iraist be
studied in University laboratories, where Oxford shall check
the results of Caithridge, and London correct both of them,
if need be.
Pearson, evidently, was expecting a proliferation of eugenics laboratories.
Let us now see what the academic discipline of eugenics caprised in London,
and whether it eschewed enotions and 	 preconceived opinions.
The works of the Galton Laboratory were contained in four sets of
publications. There was a 'inenoir series', a 'lecture series', a series
entitled 'a).lestions of the day and fray' and the aninous 'studies in
national deterioration'. After 1920, of course, there was also the
1nnals of euger c s, but this takes us beyond the general limits of this stud
• In general, the science of eugenics sought to show that a wide range
of human conditions were due predaninantly to nature rather than to
nurture. This was a preconceived opinion. Mare specifically, the eugenists
tried (i) to show that Britain was in danger fran a growing super-fertility
of the least desirable elenents of society, (ii), to denonstrate the high
heritability of mental characters such as intelligence, (iii), to show that
various medical and social problems, such as tuberculosis, alcoholism,
criminality and insanity were due to bad heredity rather than to bad
environment - and that they should be dealt with accordingly, and (iv),
that Iv endelian analyses of human heredity were often wrong.
In what follows, I shall seek to indicate sare of the general lines which
the endeavour of eugenics took when addressing these issues. I shall
look firstly at items (i) and (ii) above, and secondly at item (iii), and
will suggest that the availability of sophisticated statistical methods
was frequently over-ridden by siir1e failures in logic.
() Intelligence, nurture and social decay.
The first main thrust in the e.stablishmant of scientific eugenics cane
in Pearson' s 1903 Huxley lecturn the 'Inheritance of the Inenta]. and mzral
characters in man, and its ccztparison with the inheritance of physical
.57
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.43
46
.54
.49
•51
.49
•	 9')
characters.' The argunnt 1eloyed to shcM that intelligence was bred,
not taught, was as sizple as it was bad, and may be schnatised as follows.
PrEniss (1)
Several physical characters, height for example, have a normal
distribution. It may be assurrd that eye-colour depends on sc
rrmally distributed quantity.38
Premiss (2)
The correlation between brethren for such characters is
approximately 0.5. ,xact values given belowj
;I•	
TABLE III.
Inheritanc of t1i PhysiczI haraders.
School Observations on Children.
-. . -	 -.	 -	 Correlation.
Character.
. -.	 .	
_._•	 '	 •	 -.
..	
.	
. 4	 Brothers.	 Sisters.	 Brother and Sister.
Health	 .:	 •• l	 52 -	 51
Eye Colour	
• : •••	 -••	 54 -	 52
Hair ,,	 ...	 -...	 62	 •57
3.CHair Curliness; 	 :..-	 ..	 •&o .:	 ..
Cepbaiio Index	 . ...	 ...	 .49	 ' .54
Head Length ..	 •-...	 50	 •43
	
• Read Breadth.:. ...	 ...	 59	 62
Head Height ... '...	 . ...	 55	 52
Mean .	 .... .-	 .54	 .53..
Athietlo Power -	
...	
.. j 	 •72	 I
remiss (3)
It is reasonable to asstm that intelligence, as measured
by teachers' assesnts is also normally distributed - as are
other psychical characters.
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Praniss (4)
The correlation between brethren for such characters
is again about 0.5. (see table below).
- -	 TABLE IVT
-	 Inheritance	 Mental Characteristics.	 C
Gn Children..
	
	 	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Priiiss (5)
The Value for eye-colour is unaffected by environnntal
factors. It is, says Pearson, irplausible to suppose otherwise.
1st conclusion39
(Because of L5) and (2)) 'I am canpelled to conclude that
- the environmental influence on physical characters, however
great in scme cases, is not to a first approx.in'.ation a
great disturbing character when we consider coefficients
of fraternal correlation in man'.
Image removed due to third party copyright
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2nd Conclusion 40
The near equality of correlations for mental and noral
characters means that, 'we are forced absolutely to the
conclusion that the degree of res1ance of the physical
and mental characters in children is one and the same.'
Certainly, the argument, as developed, is not entirely clear, but has the
foliowing thrust. A bcsic Idea is that the observed correlations between
relatives are controlled by the relative forces of heredity and environment.
In the case of eye-colour, iinnunity fran environmental pressures is
guaranteed by the nature of the attribute in question. Hence the
corre] ation In this case gives a neasuie of the degree of resnblance
produced by heredity acting alone. Mother basic ideas is that of
coincidence. Eye colour and other characters have the same correlation.
TO assii that the correlations in other characters were due to balances
of heredity and environmental factors yielding always correlations of about
0.5 is outrageous and ad hoc, so it makes sense to suppose that the uniformit
of cDrrelations is due to like causal forces operating - in this case, the
forces of heredity alone. We shall return to these points, but, for the
miient, consider the extended conclusion drawn fran this. 41
If the conclusion we have reached to-night is substantially a true
one, and for my part I cannot for a nunent doubt that it is so, then
what is its lesson for us as a cxrinunity? Why simply that geniality
and probity and ability may be fostered indeed by hams envlrorirrient
and by provision of good schools and well &uIpped institutions for
research, but that their origin, like health and muscle, is deeper
dn than these things. They are bred and not created. That good
stock breeds good stock is a carnonpiace of every farmer; that the
strong man and warian have healthy children is widely recognised too.
But we have left the noral and mental faculties as qualities for whici
we can provide amply by bane environment and sound education.
It is the stock itself which makes its hare environment, the educatiox
is of small service, unless it be applied to an intelligent race of
men.
Our traders declare that we are no rnach for Germans and 7mericans.
Our men of science run about two continents and proc lain the glory of
foreign universities and the crying need for technical instruction.
Our politicians catch the general apprehension and rush to heroic
rdies. Looking round inpassionately fran the calm atnosphere of
anthropology, 1 fear there really does exist a lack of leaders of the
highest intelligence, in science, in the arts, in trade, even in
politics. I do sesn to see a want of intelligence in the British
merchant, in the British professional man and in the British workman.
But I do not think the rcmcxly lies solely in adopting foreign methods
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of instruction or in the spread of technical education. I believe
we have a paucity, just now, of the better intelligences to guide
us, and of the ircderate intelligences to be successfully guided.
The only account we can give of this on the basis of the result we
have reached to-night is that we are ceasing as a nation to breed
intelligence as we cUd fifty to a hundred years ago. The mentally
better stock in the nation is not reproducing itself at the same
rate as it did of old: the less able, and the less energetic, are no
fertile than the better stocks. No scheme of wider or ncre thorough
education will bring up in the scale of intelligence hereditary
weakness to the level of hereditary strength. The only remedy, if
one be possible at all, is to alter the relative fertility of the gooc
and the bad stocks in the caxnunity. Let us have a census of the
effective size of families anong the intellectual classes now and a
ccxrparison with the effective size of families in the like classes in
the first half of last century. You will, I feel certain, find, as
in the case of recent like censuses in J½merica, that the intellectual
classes are now scarcely reproducing their own numbers, and are very
far fran keeping pace with the total growth of the nation. Caare
in another such census the fertility of the nore intelligent working
men with that of the uneducated hand labourer. You will, I again fee
certain, find that grave changes have taken place in relative fertilil
during the last forty years. We stand, I venture to think, at the
mnencarent of an epoch, which will be marked by a great dearth of
ability. If the views I have put before you to-night be even approx-
imately correct, the remedy lies beyond the reach of revised educat-
jonal systems; we have failed to realize that the psychical charact-
ers, which are, in the nodern struggle of nations, the backbone of a
state, are not manufactured by hare and school and college; they are
bred in the bone; and for the last forty years the intellectual
classes of the nation, enervated by wealth or by love of pleasure,
or following an erroneous standard of life, have ceased to give us in
due proportion the men we want to carry on the ever-growing work of
our enpire, to battle in the fore-rank of the ever intensified strugg:
of nations.
I not let ne close with too gloany a note. I do not merely state
our lack. I have striven by a study of the inheritance of the mental
and mural characters in man to see how it arises, and to know the
real source of an evil is half-way to finding a remedy. That remedy
lies first in getting the intellectual section of our nation to
realize that intelligence can be aided and be trained, but no trainiric
or education can create it. You must breed it, that is the broad
result for statecraft which flows fran the equality in inheritance of
the psychical and the physical characters in man.
It seems to ne that there are at least two confusions here.
(1) That is presumably significant about the eye-colour correlation is that
it is invariant. The correlation coefficient linking parent arid offspring
in respect of eye-colour,it seems reasonable to suppose, does not change with
enviroruental change. But, Pearson' s data give his no grounds to attribute
a similar invariance to the coefficients for intelligence and other psychic
characters. Yet, without this result, his data 	 k&ck	 eugenic
significance. (2) Even if such an invariance were established, it uld not
in the least foflew, as Pearson appears to have t1,ught, that the best way
to boost national intelligence was by breeding. Correlation coefficients
cmect deviations fran the xrean, but say nothing about the itean. Logically,
it is quite possible that father-son correlations in respect of height are
the sarre new in Britain as 300 years ago. In the msantime, average stature
has increased, but due to better conditions, not to selective breeding fran
the tallest Elizabethans.42
A third difficulty may aLso be nentioned. This is that the correlations
in questizri were derived using Pearson's tetrachoric method, enbodying the
dubious assxrp.ion of praniss (Z) that eye-colour has an underlying normally
distributed basis. Yule pointed out in his papers that Pearson's data gave
little or no reason to suppose this assumption true.43
Here then, we see sc,thing of the loose way in which the acadnic
eugenis were prepared to put their argunEnts. Above all, we see the
message they wished to impart - national decline was due to too much breeding
by the stupid and too little breeding by the intelligent. The high
'heritability' of intelligence shcwed hew serious a carplaint this could be.
Pearson's views, it sens, cut tU LCL with the Interdepartmental
Carinittee appointed in 1905 to inquire into the 	 physical deterioration
of the British people. They announced that
'the Ccrrrnittee have not been able to obtain
decided confirmation of this new.'
It was possibly in order to rebut this view that Pearson' s lieutenant
David Heron set to work to produce the first of the 'Studies in national
deterioration', namely the influential rrIDir '( the relation of fertility
in man to social status and on the changes in this relation that have taken
place in the last 50 years', which appeared in 1906. This addressed the issue
of whether or not the mast fertile canponent of the population was 'the
better or worse portion' of the cmunity.
But, who were the 'better or worse' portions of the aimiunity? What were
the indices of standing in this respect? Heron, of course, had to operate
within the bounds laid dcn by data aireedy collected - in this case, tho
contained within (i) the Peport of the Registrar General, 1901: (ii), the
( A
Census of England and Wales, 1901. (iii) the Report of the Medical Officer
of Health of the County of London for 1901, (iv) the Report of the Registrar
enera1 for 1851, and, (v) the census of England and Wales for 1851.
Within the categories offered by these stern, Heron took as his
indices of qua1ity±e follcMing statistics, gathered for every London borough.
(A) '0falth and education'
(1)The nurrer of professional neri per 1000 occupied males.
(2)The nurrer of fia1e darstic servants per 100 fanales aged
15 and upwards.
(3)The nuniber of fnale daistic servants per 100 families.
(B) 'Of poverty and lack of culture'
(1)The nurrer of general labourers per 1000 occupied males.
(2)The number of pawnbrokers per 1000 occupied males.
(C) 'Of thriftlessness and poverty'
(1) The number per 100 in each district living xrore than 2
in a roan.
(2)The number of deaths in each district of children under 1
year per 1000 births.
With these statistics, gathered for every London borough at the two periods1
Heron could begin the autanatic and systanatic application of the mathod of
correlation coefficients learned fran Pearson. Pn example of his data is
given below, for the year 1901. It will be seen that, of all the London
boroughs, Hanpstead - then as zxw, favoured by the University College profess-
oriate - was clearly the rst superior as judged by Heron's criteria; a
veritable paradise, a land running with professional man and fuale darQstic
servants.
The correlations obtained are unsurprising - except in one respect - that
of cancer.
Heron considered the correlation between the birth rate per 1CX) married
n between 15 and 54 in each district and the follcwing factors, maasured
over all the boroughs. The results were as follciws:47
Factor	 Correlation
A(1)See above	 -0.781 +051
A(2) -0.764 ±054
B(l) "	
-0.517 ±095
B(2) "	 0.660 ±.073
C (1) 0.697
C (2) 0.500 +.097
	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	
Typicall statistics from Heron's 1906 Stud y
 in national
deterioration.
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The conclusion, Heron said,	 apparent
In those districts where the professional classes are itost nwnerous
and where many dastic sei:vants are kept, there the married watn
have fewest children. The relation is an exceedingly close one and
is obviously nost significant.
iere labour is of the l y.zest type, where poverty leads to the
pawnbroker and forces the child at the earliest possible age into
q(iiployirent, there the married ren have itost offspring.
The worse the sanitary conditions under which the people live,
and the worse their physical and mental health, the higher is the
birth rate.
In all, said Heron, his statistics deonstrated that in every case,
socially and physically undesirable features were correlated with the
intensity of the birth rate. 1s intortantly,
The wives in the districts of least prosperity and culture have
the largest families, and the ntrally and socially lowest classes
in the carimmity are those which are reproducing thenselves with
the greatest rapidity.
This state of affairs, Heron could not but deplore: and what made it worse
was that the relationships between physical and social degeneracy on the
one hand, and fecundity on the other appeared to be deteriorating. Heron
sought to dronstrate this. A preliminary nove was to 'purify' his statistic
by taking account of the different age-structures anong the wives living
in the different boroughs. This, in a sense, was not an essential irove,
as all that really mattered fran the eugenic standpoint was the general
productivity of the different caronents of society, and not whether
differentials were due to earlier marriage anong the lower classes alone,
or to earlier marriages and a generally higher rate of fertility. This
new statistic could be obtained by the method of partial correlation,
allowing Heron to calculate the correlation between birth rate and the
various social factors already alluded to in the different boroughs for
waren of constant age. This could be done for the two periods - 1901 and
1851, with the following results. (The gross 1total, correlations are given
in the first table, the partil coefficients in the second).
The first table indicated a tendency for correlations to double over the
period. and, as Heron noted,
244a.
TABLE IX. Comparison of Correlations of Birth-rate and Social Status in
1851 and 1901.	 -
	
	
TABLF X. Effect of mean age of wives on coefficients of correlation in
1851 and 1901.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Tables taken from Heron's 1906 Study in nation1 deterioration.
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The causes which lead the poorer stocks of the camnmity
to reproduce at a greater rate than the better stocks
have increased in effect during the last fifty years
by nearly 100 percent.
The partial coefficients (though calculated on a partly
	 basis)
seated equally frightening to Heron. For, as he put it.
Every one of the 1851 correlations is now reversed in sign.
In other words, if the influence of social status on age of
wives had been of the same intensity as in 1901 it would havi
nore than accounted for the observed correlations between low
social status and high birth rate.
What Heron meant by all of this was that
seaned to have changed over the period:
the sources of correlation
In 1851, the taking of wives
of constant age gave correlations between fertility and social position
(in the london boroughs as a whole) that were in a 'favourable' direction.
The generally 'unfavourable' nature of the correlation coefficients was due
to the different ages of marriage of sien in the different boroughs.
The poor married early, and, so, could keep at the business of procreation
for longer than the professional classes, but not, it seed, at an
inherently higher rate. By 1901, however, the partialling out of age as
a factor indicated that there still renained significant correlations between
social conditions and fertility - and that these were in the 'wrong' dlirectic
s Heron said,
we have to deal with a reduced fertility in the nore cultured,
the iiore prosperous, healthy and thrifty classes of the camiunity
which canrot be accounted for by the variation in the mean age
of the possibly reproductive wives.
The final section of Heron's report was a typically eugenic document.
It first of all stressed the need for the establishment oj further
1xreaucracy to collect the statistics which would enable the eugenists
to pursue further their vital invetigations. It stressed that there was
a nuch higher birth rate anongst 'undesirable' as opposed to desirable
eleaents, saying that,
The relationship between inferior status and high birth rate
has practicaily doubled during the last fifty eirs, and it
is clear that in London at least the reduction in size of
families has begun at the wrong end of the social scale and is
increasing in the wrong way. I have brought forward evidence
to show that the birth of the abler and nore capable stocks is
decreasing relatively to the mentally and physically feebler
stocks.
Physical and nental characters, tendencies to health
and disease, intellectual and manual capacities are
undoubtedly inherited.
A higher net fertility is shown, under at any rate the
present social conditions of a large city, to be very
markedly correlated with nest undesirable social factors.
These points, he claiiri119
 'indicate sources of national deterioration
which the statesman and social reforner nn.ist be prepared to consider,
and consider quickly.'
The central weakness in Heron's rk, of course, was that it assed
a correlation between, say, natural innate, genetically determined
intelligence and social position. It assuned that the professional man's
T pAdII%tM
skill was possible only(becae the professional man was genetically
st.erior. It assuted that the poor man' s fertility was serious be'ause
poverty was a neasure of innate, genetically determined ability. Karl
Pearson, under an extrnely favourable light might be supposed to have
offered sate evidence that ability was hereditarily determined, but no
one had yet shown any tie-up between lower-classedness and poverty and
innate lack of intelligence. It was an assunption, not anything that had
been dtorxstrated, and, as far as I can see, was an assuitption whose
dubious status was never repaired by the acadanic eugenists. Their main
attetpt was perhaps the Eugenics Laboratory neir nuther 18 of 1913,
'On the correlation of fertility with social value. A coopercitive study',
produced jointly by Pearson, Ethel Eldeiton, .Irry Barrington, Gertrude Jones,
Edith La MDtte and Harold Laski(who, in his early days, was a keen eugenist)
This, however, suffered fran the same limitations as the Heron study — for
it assimed, ceteris paribus, that wage-rates varied as eugenic rth. Yet,
this was a proposition which remained to be shown.
In conclusion, there are a few points that can usefully be made concerninc
the academic eugenists' attacks on the issue of the heritability of
intelligence and on the aif41ct.of the relation between intelligence and
fertility; one of these Is a logical point, and the others are historical.
In the first place, it seems clear that the standards of arcjunent deployed
were frequently low, the use of schisticated mathanatics notwithstanding.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that the academic eugenists perceived
themselves as socialists arid as pioneers in a new style of social science.
Pearson could contrast himself with the Fabinns, regretting the day when a
section of the pre-Fabian Brotherhood of Caxrrn Life 'preferred the Fabian
policy of discussing to that of practicing socialism' •51 That the
eugenists saw themselves as potential exercisers of power is made quite
aarent in many tracts, ich frequently contath sentiuents similar
to the following.52
I claim - not for the old sociology with its philosophical and
verbal disqpisitions - but for the new xedioo-social data and
the new calculus of correlation, a recognised place in science:
a right to speak in th.future with sar authority in matters
of social refonn, and even on points of supr national welfare.
I believe that the day for acting merely on a consensus of opinion
based on rlieibnc.L O enotional appeal of a political or philanthropic
character is passing by.
Thirdly, it is worth noting that the eugenists' tradition of stressing the
dangers of a differential fertility between social classes seems to have
had quite an iitpact. One has only to look at the Report of the Royal
CclTmission on population in 1948 to see that the matter of differeLltial
fertility was still seen as inportant, with evidence as to this importance
taken fran Godfrey Thanson, R.A. Fisher, Cyril Burt and others. A xiore
Jimediate Jirpact was made upon British psychologists, and will be discussed
in the next chapter.
(b) The eugenic analysis of social problems.
The basic style of eugenic analysis has already been seen - nanely that
of calculating correlation coefficients and interpreting then. But, to
acquire a better ccinprehension of this style of procedure, it seems sensibl
to examine the work of the eugenists outside of the specialised area of
intelligence. Assuredly, there is a wealth of potential exanple. The
eugenists worked on alcoholism incurrring the wrath of Maynard Keynes arid
Marshall the econornists 4
 on insanity, on eye sight and on many other
topics. As an exanpie, however, I would like to take the case of
tuberculosis. This is a particularly enlightening example, as it shoe's
the eugenists' ccmnitthent to dealing with the issues of the day, or, as
they would say, the 'questions of the day and fray'. For, in 1911, the
National Insurance Act made a great step, by providing for Ironey to be set
aside at the rate of 'one penny per insured person in the United Kingdcm'
for use in tuberculosis research.55
 Indeed, the Medical Research Council
owes its origins to governirent considerations of the problems of
tuberculosis in 1913. Tuberculosis therefore was in the air in 'tore senses
than one, and, Itoreover, the air nuist have been laden with the scent of
possible research grants. Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, the
acadanic eugenists published a tract on 'Thberculosis, heredity and
environment in 1912'. This as it transpired, was the first of several
publications on tuberculosis < archetyPal one. In the paper, Pearson
argued that published statistics for the cure rates produced by the
then expanding sanatorium treatirent of tuberculosis gave56
no evidence that this treatment is producing marked
results; they supply no refutation of the position
that the fall in pthisis LPearson ' s term for pulnonary
tuberculosis/ is due not to the reduction of infection
but to the deve1oExnt by heredity of a racial inmunity.
Pearson, it seats clear, was offering a Darwinian explanation of the
steady fall in the death rate fran tuberculosis which, by 1912, had been
continuing for many years. But, this was not the main thrust of his
tract, intriguing though it be. The bulk of the tract was dedicated to
shcwing tha. there existed in the population hereditable levels of
susceptibility to tuberculosis - in other words, tht an individual's
developing the disease or not depended largely upon his hereditary
susceptibility to succumb to the supposedly anal-present bacillus.
This was done by offering statistics which shci,ed that husbands were
far less likely to have infected wives than infected offspring. This,
as usual was shown via the method of tetrachoric correlation, and the
result was interpreted to mean that heredity was a greater determinant
of the tuberculous condition than was environment.
The practical conclusion followed inexorably:57
Everything which tends to check the multiplication
of the unfit, to atphasize the fertility of the
physically and mentally healthy, will pro tanto
aid Nature' s method of reducing the phthisical death
rate. That is what the eugenist proclaims as 'the
better thing to do', and El, 5(X), 000 spent in encourag-
ing healthy parentage would do ITore than the establish-
inent of a sanatorium in every township.
Now, the whole subject of the decline of tuberculosis rewains a
fascinating one, though ndeni writers58sean to accept both that
susceptibility is hereditary and that the decline has been due to
environmental iiprovarents rather than Darwinian processes. But, what
is significant here is that the eugenists made again one of the loose
inferences which we have seen already in a different context - namely
2t9
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that one may infer fran the circumstance that condition x iS).,1±e
best way to enhance or to reduce the level of x in the popilation.
This might be called the 'eugenic fallacy', and we find that it was
repeated tine and again.59 Eugenic fervour consistently bettered (or,
perhaps, battered) logic.
At this stage I propose to say no nre about the acadnic side of
eugenics except, of course, to make the usual incantations about the
need for 'further research' into its developent and influence. Just
what this influence has been is hard to say, but it is easy to suppose that,
for example, recent investigations into the possibility of hereditary
criminality lie in a direct line of descent fran the work done by
tharles Goring, on behalf of the Haie Office, in Pearson's laboratory.
This work, published as The English convict: A statistical study
discredited Lanbroso' s view that there was a distinctive criminal
Iiysiogany, and advanced with evidencehe view that criminality was
restricted to 'particular stocks or sections of the xzlTnunity'.
igenics as a midwife of science.
There is little profit in discussing whether or not acadenic eugenics
ever constituted a science. If it did, then it was defective in parts.
Ibre profitable perhaps is the investigation of the effect of the eugenics
ixvernent on other branches of 'genuine' science • This was considerable,
though not overwhelming. It deserves attention as it is a priv fade
exanpie of 'external' idlogical considerations shaping the course of
scientific develoinent, a state of affairs held by saie to be of interest.
A first point concerns the scientific nbership of the Eugenics
Education Society - for it was certainly high. Pn indication of this is
given6 b the nnbership of the 'General Carrnittee' which helped organise the
1912 International Congress; this included Francis Darwin, Havelock Ellis,
Sir Janus Barr, R.C. Punnett, .7rthur Schuster, A.F. Tredgold and W.C.D.
Whetham. A full list of 'scientific' eugenijsts would be an extreaely
lengthy one. Interestingly, it was not simply netropolitan scientists who
joined. The sixth annual report6 f the E.E.S. shows that the Birmingham
branch had as a vice-president Sir Oliver Lodge, and we knci that the
Liverpool branch numbered Cyril Burt the psychologist and the future
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Sir Charles Sherrington, Britain's nost distinguished europhysiologist.
An active London irnber was A. M. Carr-Saunders, future director of the
London School of Econanics.
Fran all of this, one might expect to find the eugenics nvEnent having
sane impact upon the scientific work of sane of its Irknbers, with, perhaps,
biology, psychology arid social sciences being, a priori, the best places to
63look. I have decided to leave social science on one side, though there are
many interesting and correct rarks on the relationship between eugenists
and sociologists in Professor irams' excellent
	 the Origins of
British Sociology.
I will address the relations between eugenics and psychology in the
next chapter, which is dedicated to tracing the fate of bicaitric methods
when passed onto the discipline of psychology. In the final part of this
chapter, I shall examine the relationship between eugenics and genetics,
focussing for reasons that will becams obvious, on the work of R.A. Fisher.
The relations between the eugenics Irovmsnt arid the British pioneers
of Mendelism seen, on the whole, to have been characterised by a guarded
friendship. Works on genetics by those pioneers - like, for exanpie R.H.
Lock - frequently contain a mention,6 r even a chapter, that discusses the
possible benefits to be derived fran the rational application of the new
genetic knowledge. On the other hand, these same works also tend to stress
caution, arid a typical note was struck by R.C. Purinett in 1912, when, at
the International Eugenics Conference 6 he warned the asseshled delegates thai
Except in very few cases, our knowledge of heredity
in man is at present far too slight and too uncertain
to base legislation upon.
But, if a benign scepticin was the rule1 it IS worth noting that Bateson,
the doyen of British 1ndelism, was extrarely hostile to the eugenic
enterprise. This was not because Bateson doubted that men differed in
abilities on an hereditary basis, nor because he was an egalitarian, it was
because he had a fine, aristocratic disdain for the eugeniss themselves.
Bateson was an ardent anti-derrocract, capable of writing
	 that
The aim of social reform nnst be not to abolish class,
but to provide that each individual shall so far as
possible get into the right class arid stay there, and
usually his children after him.
Progress, in his view, was due to unusual men
25L
It is upon itu.itational novelties, definite
favourable variations, that all progress in
civilisation and in due control of natural
forces must depend. Hz will they fare in
a socialistic carmunity?
These man, he felt, were not ones that recamerded thanselves
to the eugenists. Bateson was a talented artist arid a recognised
connoisseur who becama a trustee of the British seum, arid he
allied hiitiself with the bohanian artist. The eugenists, he felt,
were bent upon eliminating such bohnians, they were man who shared
the paer spirit of the Jnrican proliftiti.onists. 	 68
though each of us has his personal predictions we can
only make rough estimates of the worth of the several
types arid of their value to the world.	 antitative
reckonings are still very far off, and maanwhile we
iaist remain content with aca&ic aspirations, praying
only that in that day humanity may riot be measured by
the scale which would be appropriate to a Charity
Orgarilsation Society or a Board of Guardians, who I am
told are able to distinguish the deservirLg fran the
undeserving poor.
R.A Fisher was of a very different stamp 9 For a start, he was not a
biologist by training. He was the youngest of eight children and the
son of a partner in a distinguished firm of auctioneers and of a &)licitor's
daughter.	 an an early state he shcized mnathnatical preciousness and
xioved on fran Harroi School o Gonville and Caius College Carrridge,
graduating with distinction in 1912 in the mathematics tripos. He was
a non-canbatant in the first war, as he suffered fran very poor eyesight,
and spent the duration as a mathemnatics master in a number of English
public schools. He married in 1917, and, in 1919, took up the post of
statistician at Rothamsted Experisrentàl Station created theil by its
director, Sir John Russell. Here he stayed until 1933, developing his
distinctive school of statistical thought, and purlishing several highly
influential works, such as his Statistical mrethods for research workers
of 1925. lie was elected a feU of the Royal Society in 1929, and, in
the follcwing year, published his fanous Genetical theory of natural
selection which is often depicted as having repaired the rift between
Darwinian selection and Inde1ian theory which appeared in the works of
man like the evolutionary discontinuist Bateson. In 1933, he assumad
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the Galtan chair at University College, and held this until 1943, when
he took over the rthur Balfour chair of genetics at Carrridge. On
retireient fran this, he went + work at the University of Ide1aide,
dying, in Australia, in 1962. In short, he had a long and extraordinarily
distinguished career that led him to a knighthood. Like Pearson he made
massive itributions to statistics, arid, like Pearson, allied this
statistical eertise to the study of biological enanena. Unlike
Pearson, he appears to have been a political conservative, and, whereas
Pearson was fond of denouncing religion, Fisher seems to have aroved
of it, being known for detailed scriptural knowledge and for regular
attendance at chapel. Like Pearson, he was prone to write with harshness
and acerbity about those with whose views he was out of syrrpathy. Pearson
was scuetiznes on the receiving end.
It has for long been known that Fisher's entrance into statistics
cams about through his reading Pearson's papers while he was still an
undergraduate - and he published his first paper 'On an absolute criterion
for fItting fr&juency curves' in 1912. This was just the first of a long
series of statistical papers that were to gain him at first the friendship,
and 1 later on, the ei1g tty of Pearson. In this work, Ixever, I will not
attempt to discuss Fisher's statistical work, particularly as it has been
the subject of historical and logical analyses by many distinguished
writers.
What I do want to concentr upon is Fisher's early work in genetics,
and it will be renrbered that his first contribution in the field ias
his paper of 1918 on 'The correlations between relatives on the supposition
of Mendelian inheritance'. This it will be recalled, ca1eted that
Meixielian analysis of noimafly distributed continuous variation which had
}y 'en j'-rr by	 and which ha" been heavily criticised by Pearson.
Generally, Fisher is seen as the man who showed conclusively that Mendelism
could cope with the known facts of continuous variation, c.nd his 1918 paper
is usually seen as a work of genius - which it undoubtedly is.
Naturally, we ha now to ask the sarre question about Fisher that was
posed about Pearson in chapter four. Why should Fisher have beccine involved
in biology, in genetics, when he was a mathematics graduate? As I have
stressed, at the period, there were no career openings for matheiaticians
With biological concerns, and the caination of Mandelism and mathematics
might be thought especially iwprapitious, given the anti-Mendelian stance
of Pearson, the pc&erful leader of the biaretric school. It seems highly
improbable, therefore, that Fisher was trying to advance a career by
turning to Mendelism.
Scire writers have noted a boyhood interest in biological matters,
but, until Fisher's papers becane available, it is hard to say much alxs.it
this that is of any miiient, and it seems eminently Irore sensible to
attart to connect Fisher's genetical labours with other factors that can
be better documented, notably with his life-long ctxnent to eugenics,
which is perhaps Irost conveniently observed in the/five chapters of his
71Genetical theory of natural selection, where eugenics and genetics are
nobilised to account for the very rise and fall of great empires. As
early on as 1926, Fisher had published no fewer than fifteen papers in
the Eugenics review and was becaning a leading nrder of the Eugenics
Fucation Society.72
Fisher's first rroves in eugenics came while he was still an undergraduate
at Canbridge, when, in 1911, a group of undergraduates approached Professor
Inge, Professor Punnett and W.C.D. Whetham with a view to forming a
University Eugenics Society. The Society was formed, and, with the
assistance of iren as eminent as John Maynard Keynes and Lord Rayleigh,
began to hold meetings. (ie of the earlier talks was due to Fisher, who,
in 19U, gave a paper on 'Heredity', in which he cczipared arid contrasted
bicmetric and Mendelian methods and looked forward to a synthesis of the
two schools in the interests of eugenics. In his taaJ 3 Fisher shcMed
himself familiar with the work of Bateson and Pearson, and quite capable
of dealing with technical issues in Mendelism such as intermediate
daminarice. In p3rticular, he dcronstratcd an acqu'intance with Pearson's
1903 Huxley lecture. Sathing of the depths of his carinitment to eugenics
may be gauged fran another address, of l912 in which he urged upon his
atdience that they were the 'agents of a new phase of evolution', whose
mission it was to spread abroad 'not by precept cnly, but by exair1e, the
doctrine of a new natural ability of worth and blood'. In these phrases,
Fisher did little nore than to prefigure later eugenic utterances, which
shcw him as advocating incare-relateci family a1lo r ,ances, the restriction
of professional oortunities to the offspring of professionals, and the
view that eugenic strategies alone could prevent the fall of great
civiisations .'
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It seans therefore, that there is every reason to suppose that
Fisher's entry into	 was a consequence of his conversion to
the eugenic philosophy. After all, the problea tackled in his great
paper of 1918 was outlined in 1911 in the Cantridge Eugenics Society,
and, iroreover, the paper was first presented to the Royal Society of
London by the eugenist Whetham. When the paper was withdrawn, after
adverse criticism fran Punnett and Pearson,6 who acted as Royal Society
referees, it was another leading eugenist - Major Leonard Darwin - who
advised Fisher to persevere and have his work published under the auspices
of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
Now, if all that could be said about Fisher's paper in this respect was
that it arose out of eugenic concerns, we would, I think, still have a
significant result - a good case of Internal develorirents being due to
'external' factors. But, I consider, and I would like to suggest, it
sears possible to make a stronger connection than this between Fisher' s
ideology and his work as represented in the 1918 paper.
To appreciate this, it is first of all necessary to understand the key
problan facing serious eugenists in the early 20th century. They were in
the position of wishing to clain that the only effective forms of social
policy were based in selective breeding. This, by turn, was the conseq1ent
of a faith )
 that In human affairs, nature dattinated over nurture. Clearly,
they needed to establish a truth of this central dogma. Now, we know
Fisher to have been a keen student of the attaripts made to establish the
point, and that, after Galton, the man who did the nost in this direction
was Karl Pearson.
Fisher, as noted,was aware of Pearson's work. But, judging fran a
paperThelivered to the Eugenics Education Society at about the same tiire
as the publication of the 1918 paper, he was highly critical of Pearson's
78
strategy. This, indeed, was a rather unsophisticated one, which frequently
took the hitherto unmentioned form of the presentation of two columns of
observed correlations - one said to give the 'Strength of nature', and
another said to give the 'Strength of nurture'. The first gave correlations
like that between filial and patenral stature, the other gave correlations
like these observed, in restricted areas of data, between 'keenness of vision
and hare environment' or between 'iroral state of rents and refraction of
offspring'. The average value for the 'nature' correlations was about 0.5
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whereas the average value for the 'nurture' correlations was about 0.05.
The conclusion to be drawn, Pearson suggested, was that it was 'quite
safe to say that the influence of the environment is not one fifth that
of heredity and quite possibly riot one tenth of it'. Ind, nreover,
what we might see as typically Fisherian consequences were seen to flow
fran this.
Hard envirornt may be the salvation of a race, easy
environment its destruction. If you wiU think this
point out in detail, I believe you will see the
explanation of meny great historical nDvnents.
Barbarism has too often triimphed over civilisation,
because a hard environment has maintained, an easy
environment suspended, the force of natural selection
- the power of the nature factor.
Now, tliough Fisher endorsed Pearson' s conclusion , he was dissatisfied
with the argunentation that led to it, and, I wish to suggest, there is
a very strong connection between his dissatisfaction with the argument
and the very shape taken by his 1918 paper.
Here it becanes necessary to mention the nature of the 1918 paper.
Its novelty did not lie in its having shown the consistency of ndelism
and observed bianetric results. Rather, it lay in Fisher' s analysis of
*ienotypic variance into a nunt)er of fractions - into environmentally
caused variance, into variance due to additive genetic effects and into
variance due to daninance effectsYHis analysis offered the prospect
of carrying out resolu4ions of observed variance into the different
fracticns. This was because he was able to construct a series of
equations expressing these fractions as functions of correlation values.
Thus, for example, he showed that when there was no assortative mating,
the difference between the fraternal and the paternal correlation offered
a quick way of estimating the various fractions. When assortative mating
was allowed for, things became nre carlex - but the same general pattern
held.
Application of the nz calculus to Pearson's data suggested that the
variance within the data for stature was due aiirost entirely to genetic
effects. As Fisher put it,
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n examination of the best available figures for
human reasurnts shows that there is little or
no indication of non-genetic causes. The closest
scrutiny is invited on this point, not only on
account of the practical importance of the predaninant
influence of natural inheritance, but because the
significance of the fraternal correlation in this
connection has not previously been realised.
Clearly, Fisher felt that he had shown the eugenic point to be
correct - nature daiinated over nurture. rx1, fran an accanpanying
paper, it beozres clear that he saw his new dronstration as filling
the gaps in Pearson's work. For, it will be recalled, Pearson had
operated by caaring the magnities of two sorts of correlation
coefficients. The correlations jtasuring 'nature', however, had a value
of only about 0.5. 1nd, since the variance of the array of sons due to
fathers with a given value was still (1 - r2) that of offspring in
general, Pearson' s proof serd to leave approximately 75% of the
observed variance unaccounted for. Thus, said Fisher, the road was left
open to the anti- eugenist to,82
point to a dozen causes to which height or shortness
is catTronly ascribed, such as regular athletic exercise,
or accidental illness in childhood, and it would be
difficult tb' prove without a specially designed investig-
ation for each alleged cause that these do not contribute
the important proportions of the total. The task of
ascertaining the importance of the environment in this
way is an endless one, since new environmental causes
could be suggested, each nore difficult than the last
to define, measure and investigate.
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Here, it seems to me, we have it. Fisher, those work was all
along stimulated by his connections with leading eugenists like
Whetham and Darwin, saw his work as an enterprise which could do
away with the need for this endless series of analyses of particular
environmental features - for, had he not offered a method for
evaluating the total effect of environment factors? His work was
little short of an eugenic triumph. It was so, not because it
sIied that Mende1i and biaiietric results were ccxrpatible - which
had been done before, even if not at such a level of sophistication.
Rather, its merit lay in the way in which it shied that a Mendelian
approach could resolve the longest-standing difficulty for the eugenist.
The consequences of this, I wish to suggest, is that we should desist
frau se.Jng Fisher's early work as primarily a contribution to 'pure'
genetics, as a major staging post on the route to a neo-Darwinian
synthesis. We should see it rather as a stunning contribution to
eugenics. That is all I will suggest for the nannt, though, were irore
space available, the tracing of intimate connections between the eugenic
problem situation and the construction of theory would be fruitful.
Incther point worth follcMing is Fisher's use of his method - for he was
shortly to be involved with Hogben9..n a prototypic version of the Jensen-
Lentin debate over heritabilitQ4 Here too, there is space for further
discussion of the relation between science and idedlogy. For the rroznent,
though, I want simply to suggest this significant restructuring of the
historical perspective in which this landmark of genetics should be seen.
Fisher was bringing Mendelism to the aid of eugenics. This, probably,
was the nest significant development sired on genetics by eugenics.
It was this paper of Fisher's that was to provide the basis for modern
discussions of er tab
	
, so frequently irobilised in atterrpts to
shci that intelligence is due predaninantly to genetic factors. In
Britain, the greatest ployer of Fisher' s genetics was the psychologist
Cyril Burt, also a fervent eugenist, whose work I shall discuss in the
next chapter.
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Intro&xtion
We have seen that Galton invited the formation of a new psychological
discipline - a discipline of 'differential psychology' that would address
issues such as the nature of intelligence, the relation of intelligence
to simple mental functions that were easily tested, and, above all the
questions of the social distribution of intelligence and of heritability
We have seen also, in the previous chapter, that Karl Pearson and his
bianetric workers did a certain anount of 'work on the heritability of
intelligence, 'work that eiodied certain rather dubious asstmptions about
the correlation of intelligence with class.2
It transpires that these psychological interests were taken up by
Britain's professional psychologists in the years prior to World War I,
and, rroreover, that the psychologists who entered this field were identical
with the psychologists that studied and adopted the biaretric methods
dev&ped by Pearson's laboratory. In fact, it does rather seen as if
psychologists took up bicznetric methods at about the same time as the
biological cxmiunity was rejecting then - and this is a feature which
persists to the present, for the correlation coefficient (for example) seeme
still to enjoy a place in the psychological literature which it never has
achieved in the literature of biology.3
This being so, at least two interesting questions arise. One wonders
whether, in adopting Pearson's statistical methods, these psychologists
also adopted the distinctive philosophy of science which, we have seen,
Pearson' s statistical methods were intended to encapsulate. Secondly,
one 'wonders whether the undoubted eugenic interests of these psychologists
directed and shaped their work, and, above all, whether it ever distorted
it - in th2 s..nse of ic ding them to claim levsls of scientific support
for their ideas which were grossly out of line with justified levels.
This, of course, is an awkward matter to assess, but it does seen reasonablE
to allege excessive ideological bias if one detects either (a), the deployiner
of crucial arguments containing nuithing non-sequiturs, or (b), the suppressic
or systaatic doctoring of evidence.
Early days in British differential psychology
In 1900, Britain did not have a large body of professional psychologists
Esnployed in government or private institutions, or in universities'
then the British Psychological Society was formed ira 1901 at a meeting
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of 'a new breed of psychological specialists working in laboratories,
which, hcMever small, possessed an identity of their awn', there
existed a mere haixiful of university posts. It was only in 1897 that
the Cbridge University psychological laboratories caine into existence,
and, it was in the sane year that Professor Sully persuaded the authorities
at University College London to start a psychological laboratory in London
- where, of course, oan-Robertson had long held the Grote chair of mind
and logic: what was new was the idea of psychology as an ezpiricai and
experimental science to be clearly separated fran the less ezrirical pursuits
of philosophy. The new psychology represented a break fran the old anti-
cipirical view, which had linked psychology with philosophy and had led the
Cambdge authorities to turn dawn Venn' s and Waxd' s proposal for a 1aborator
in 1877 an the grounds that the psychophysical investigations they intended
to pursue therein would 'insult religion by putting the human soul. n a pair
of scales'
Ncw, in a work of this nature, a long review of the personnel and
institutions of British psychology would be out of place, doubly so as the
existence of Professor Hearnshaw' s Short history of British psychology, makes
such a review redundant.6
 what I plan to do is to consider the work of the
handful of psychologists who, in one way or another, took up Galton's problen
using Pearson's methods, and to use these analyses to answer, for a limited
sairple, the questions raised above. I snail focus centa1ly upon the work
or influence of three men; Charles Speannan (l&Z -4S), William MacDougall
(1871-l938 and Sir Cyril Burt (l8T3-l3 ) Others whose work will be
mentioned are William Brawn
	 the pioneer psycharietrician, and Sir
Godfrey Thanson -
	 khe distinguished developer of mental testing and
of the methodology of factor analysis.
Charles Spearman and the doctrine of 'g'.
It is fitting that we caiinence with Charles Spearrnan who eirployed
Pearson' s biaretrical methods in work which argued that there was a very
real thing which tests of intelligence measured namely 'g', or, as it was
saiethiires put, a 'central factor' in intelligence. Speannan, with sane
justification, was able to claim, fran 1904 onwards1 that his conception gave
the answer to the question of what it was that the Frenchman Binet' S-2
1)
'hotchpot' of tests really ireasured, claiming, in so doing, that the
batteries of tests invented by this distinguished man in response to a
call fran the minister of piblic instruction anxious to find good ways of
diagnosing those in need of special schools, measured 'g' itself, but
nore by luckhan by judgetent. The concept of 'g' has had a long life.
Eysenck speaks Irost favourably of it in the Inequality of man, where
his review of its various defences and of the nxxlifications it has under-
gone, leads him to ccrripare SpeaimaA4with John Dalton. Both man, says
Eysenck, fathered extrarely inportant conceptions. In both cases the
original conception has been changed, but the credit accruing to the
authors of the conceptions rains nonetheless. Interestingly too, in his
recent 'rational reconstruction' of the nature-nurture debate as to the
hereditary or environmental origins of intelligence, Peter Urbach icDlates
as one of the key clains of the hereditarians the proposition that 'all
individuals possess a general mental capacity called "general intelligence"
which enters with sate (and varying) degree into all the diverse types of
cognitive activity' Finally, in this general context, it may be mentioned
that Spearrnan was to hold the first chair of psychology at University College
(see below for details) and to be succeeded by Sir Cyril Burt. We shall see
that Burt made his early reputation by writing papers that focused upon
Spearman' s notion of 'g'.
Spearman, then, is a riost fascinating subject. He fascinates in his n
right,	 . but also	 by virtue of his use
of bicitetric methods and his interest in intelligence. He is the great early
thinker about the nature of intelligence, and we can learn a great deal by
examining his life and work, especially in the light of the two central
questions posed in the introduction to this chapter. In discussing Speanrian,
shall ask to what extent his adoption of biczretric methods led him to adopt
Pearson's neo-Machian philosophy of science and to what extent his work on
intelligence was directed by his eugenic persuasions, indicated as they were
by his meiribership of the Eugenics Education Society and by his writing for
the Eugenics review.
The theory of 'g'.
Before proceeding to discuss the conditions of production of the theory
of 'g' and the interpretation which Speannan put upon it, it ses wise to
review the theory itself. This, roughly speaking, was a theory about the
nabire of human mental ability, though
	 it had several
2S
16
ref innts. Speannan wished by his work to overthrcw three views of rrental
ability which he considered to be widely held. rry were what he tenrEd the
'nonarchic', the 'oligarchic' and the 'anarchic' views. The nonarchic view
held that every individual was possessed of a distinct level of an unitary
intelligence, which entered with equal force into whatever he was engaged
upon. It was the sort of doctrine which led man to declare that, had he
been so directed, Newton could have produced draira the equivalent of
Shakespeare's, and vice versa. It found reflection in Carlyle's clalin that
• Qin, Luther, Johnson, Burns: I hope to make it appear that these are all
originally of one stuff, that only by the world's recognition of them, arid th
shapes they assume are they so 1niasurably diverse1. The oligarchic view
held that there were several independent ability factors or 'basal powers'
- such as, for exaTrple, reasoning, rrenry, judgament, discrimination etc.
It was held that if an individual had a good judganent, then the judgtent
would be good wherever it was applied: but the claim of independence also
asserted that an individual' s possession or endowment
	 of a good
udgeinent gave ro clue whatsoever to the level of, say, his nøtory.
The anarchic view held that there were a very great nuiter of independent
factors, and that each of these developed in the individual quite independent:
of all the others.
In place of these three perspectives, Spearrnan wished to put a two factor
theory of IrEntal ability. If the political analogies are to be further
extended, then one might say that Spearn'an, in matters constitutional, was a
constitutional rronarchist. For, as we shall see, his view was one of
taered ironarchism.
17This perspective upon things was first presented in 1904, in the 1rnerican
journal of psychology. This, at the time, was the obvious place to publish,
as the British journal of psychology had hardly begun - it was the premier
anglophone journal. There, Speannan sout to establish a theorem of
intellectual unity, expressed as follows:
a] 1 branches of intellectual activities have in caiion
one fundamental function. . .whereas the remaining or
specific elements of the activity seem in every case
to be wholly different fran that in all the others. The
relative influence of the general to the specific
function varies in the ten departments here investigated
fran 15:1 to 1:4.
2c3
what was claJ.nd was that all of one's mental processes involved a
central unitary factor 'g', which was taken up in all mental activities
and tasks to sate degree. Each activity also involved a specific ability,
unique to that activity. Thus, the key notion was as follo r,js: there was
a central factor 'g' entering into afl mental activities. But the level of
performance manifested by the individual in any test depended not only upon
the level of his possession of 'g', but also upon the level of his possession
of the specific factor unique to the activity in hand. Different tasks
depended upon 'g' to differing degrees, with highly intellectual activities,
stxth as mathnatics and classics, shc .zing very heavy dependence 9 MDreover,
the level of the central factor could vary fran individual to individual, and
could be determined by giving suitable tests° The 'hotchpot' nature of
the Binet tests, Spearrnan claimed, had the beneficial effect that advantages
due to possession of a high level of sate specific abilities were cancelled
out by the subjects' having to perform also in tests for which their specific
abilities were low. A rough analogy to all of this might be obtained by
supposing that, in respect of physical performance, it might be possible to
isolate a factor of 'general strength'. Then we might find that some athletic
performances were highly governed by the mdi ua's level of general streng't
whereas others reflected it less closely, and involved to various degrees
the possession of special faculties independent of general strength.
Possibly, trountain walking might reflect general strength rather closely,
while shooting might reflect it rather little, being dependent upon, say,
the specific ability of good eyesight to sate large degree. Once again, men
might be expected to differ in the degree to which they possessed the factor
of general strength.
(o.) Hierarchies of correlations.
In the table below (table 1) we see the intercorrelations obtained between
the scores of the nrbers of a group of students in a number of tests set
up or uonitored by Spearrnan. The tests, as r' be seen, range fran mathenatic
to sensory discrimination, and the various figures give the correlation
coefficients connecting the scores of a group of subjects in the various
tests. Thus, for exarrple, the figure 0.83 gives the measure of correlation
between performance in classics and performance in French. The data, it
should be noted, were 'corrected', using the methods devoped by Spearxnan
21for dealing with heterogeneous material. Now, if we suppose, as did Spearmnan,
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Lable 1. Based on Spearman'S 1904 paper, as reproduced in Brown and
rhomson's Essentials of mental n'easurement.
'Fi g . 1. Taken from Spearman's 1912 Eugenics review paper, 'The 
heredity
of abilities'.
Image removed due to third party copyright
Image removed due to third party copyright
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that test results are determined by two factors - by a 'general' factor,
tested in different degrees by different tests - and by a factor specific
to the test in hand, and that the distribution of specifics is an independent
one (i.e. that an individual' s having one specific in good measure is no guid
as to the degree of his possession of any other factor) then we would expect
just the hierarchy of test scores here depicted. That is to say, the
correlations may be arranged so that they fonn a table everywhere d.indnishing
as we irove fran left to right, and fran top to bottan.
	 reover, if we take
any two adjacent columns, or, any two adjacent rows, we find that the ratio
between adjacent elnts is always the s for all pairs of elnts in
any two columns or any two rows. These expectations can easily be derived
fran the theoretical assunptions by using the calculus of partial correlation
notably as developed by Pearson's one-time pupil, George Udny Yule (1871 -
1951). The c3erivation is given in the appendix to the chapter.
This expectation of a hierarchy was the main ooservable prediction of the
theory: the issue of whether data did give a genuine hierarchy, and, not
less than that, the issue of whether there weren't other theories that
predicted the same result, were ones that covered the pages of psychological
journals for many years2.3
 In particular, it is worth noting Godfrey Thanson' S
assertion that a hierarchy was predicted by a variant of an 'anarchic'
theory of mind. Thanson was so enaiured of this point that he continued
to develop it even in his Factorial analysis of human ability.24
The interpretation of 'g'. (a) In general.
At first, one might suppose that 'g' was intended by Spearman just as a
statistical abstraction, perhaps owing its irrportance to the predictive
utility of measures of a person's 'g', and to the applicability of the
same in a range of administrative techno1ogie,.
	 Spearinan, and his
students after alJ, did do a great deal of mental testing. But, this would
be a very circumscribed view of 'g'. For, when we look at the way in which
Spearman first introduced 'g' in his 1904 paper, and at his later writings on
the subject, including a twenty-year debate with Godfrey Thanson, it becanes
clear that at no tine did Spearxnan ever subscribe to an instrumentalist
philosophy of science. Rather, it sens that 'g' found a rich interpretation
in an interesting, though unclear, theory of mind and brain. It seens likely
too that Spearman' s caning to work on 'g' and his way of developing the
notion may not be prop. erly understood in isolation fran his personal
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ethical beliefs, or fran his participation in sate of the strong
i&)logical currents of his period. The rnairider of the Sc-Hoh is
devoted to discussing the interpretation and historical genesis of 'g'.
(b) Ethical relations and interpretation
To understand the interpretation of 'g' and its genesis, it is useful
to start with a consideration of what is known of Spearman's early
developnent. His papers have not been located, and we have therefore to go
upon what he himself recorded in his brief autobiographical article. He
was the product of the English upper middle classes, and, on leaving school,
went into the army as he was undecided as to what career he should follcyr.
The arir'-, presumably, was thought a suitable destination for one so afflicted.
Spearman was an officer who went on to staff college, and doubtless received
a good education. He remained a soldier until 1897, when he went to Leipzig
to study with Wundt, the pioneer of experimental pcychology. For his
military years, which he considered wasted, Spearman was to write that he
nourned 'as bitterly as Tiberius ever did for his lost legions'. His spell
in Germany was interrupted by the outhreak of the Boer War, and he returned
to act as staff officer in Guernsey for the duration. In 1902, he took his
Ph.D. in psychology fran Leipzig, and stayed on in Germany until 1906, studyir
brain physiology, but finding its attacks on the mind-problem unsatisfactory.
In 1907 he was appointed reader in psychology at University College Lcridon,
in succession to William MacDougall. And, in 1911, on the retirement of
Carveth Read, he took the professorship. In 1928, he was able to separate
psychology fran philosophy at University College, which he did with a view
to integrating psychology with other enpirical scientific disciplines.
At University College, he had a series of distinguished pupils and was able
to achievo for his Lcndon school a darilnant place in British psychology.
Finally, he was succeeded by Cyril Burt.
The obvious question raised by Spearman's career is that of why, in 1897,
the military man turned psychology student. This he did at a period when
there were a)nost no posts in psychology, and certainly the number of
academic posts in Britain could be counted on the fingers of one hand.
A first answer to this question appears to lie in Speannan's self-confessed
early and secret devotion to philosophy. This went back to his tenth year,
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becaning acute in his fifteenth year. The precise nature of these
thoughts is un recorded, but Speaan records that they were generafly
accaranied by an 'intense stirring in an ethical direction such as highly
enotianal yearnings for the good of all mankind'. In the any, Spearrnan
continued with private readings in philosophy, becaning convinced, as he pit
it, that if ever a genuine advance was to be made in philosophy it uld care
mainly by way of psychology. 1nd, starting upon psychological readings, he
encountered at first the works of Locke, the Mills and Dam - generally
described as associationist philosophers. To this school he reacted
violently, finding their ideas crude and erroneous. But, this was not all,
for, lie wrote;27
My conviction was accanpanied by an errotional heat which cannot,
I now think, be explained on pirely intellectual grounds.
The main source of this heat I take to have been - little as
I admitted this at the time - of an ethical nature. Sensualism
and associationism tend strongly to go with hedonism, and this
latter was (and is) to ire an abanination.
Znowledge of these feelings tcMards associationisu gives sate help when
trying to understand Spearinan's work. We find that he responded to
associationism with a strong desire to construct psychology anew by
producing principles or laws2 zhich would do for psychology what Newton' s
laws did for physics. The result of this desire was the production of three
noegenetic' laws which allegedly described the processes whereby the mind
could generate new itens of kncwledge through an active pcwer of perceiving
new relations between items given in experience. History has not dealt
kindly with these laws. The leading historian of British psychology has
written thus :29
Speaxinan's noegenetic scheme was not without its points.
It recognised the creative potential of mind, which had
often been neglected; at a tre when the 'Gostait' ideas
were becaning fashionable, it kept alive the analytical
approach; it proved of sate value in intelligence test
construction. But as anything ]JJce a definitive and final
account of cognition it was hopelessly jejeune.
The precise nature of these laws need not detain us, but, being laws
expressing the active power of the mind, they appear to put Spearman into
the same intellectual canp as men liJe Stout and Ward, who, in a general
reaction against the 19th century doctrines of scientific naturalism, attacked
associationist psychology by insisting that mental life was a far nore active
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and creative process than associationism had a11cMed° This, perhaps, was
a fairly characteristic feature of the continential psychology to which
Spearman had been exposed, a psychology, that is, which had strong Kantian
influencesBut, in Britain by all accounts, it was a recent departure, whose
beginnings were perhaps nost clearly marked by Ward's fanous Encyclopedia
BLtannica k of 1885. WiUiam MacDougall, another refugee fran associationism
noted this trend in Spearman's psychology when, in his Energies of xrn, he
wrote that32
Speantian repudiates the tendency to make psychology
wholly subordinate to, a mare branch of, mechanistic
physiology.
Speannan has forcibly raninded us that irental life is
an active process; that irental activity involves,
fundamentally and in all its phases, the grasping of -
relations, relations of t.e and place and causation,
of likeness and difference, of magniture and intensity
and quality, and many others; that any account of our
mental life which does not fully and frankly recognise
this activity is very inadequate and rJ.sleading.
Spearman believed in an active, synthesising mind, and eventually felt
able to bring together his work on 'g' with his work on noegenetic laws.
This he did by identifying 'g' as the individual' s power or energy for
carrying out noegenetic synthesis It was perhaps a measurcnent of the
horsepcier' of the individual's active mind. The public utterance of
this identification came fairly late in Spearman' s career, but it does
sean pretty clear that saiething of this sort had been in his thoughts fran
the earliest phase of his work. For, other points apart, we find that, fran
an early stage, 'g' is identified as a measure of mental ergy. Everywhere
in Spearman's wk we find the idea of 'g' as standing for a level of energy,
energy which, he sens to have thought, would turn out to have sane sort of
physiological reality, though he was at pains to stress that,
there is no reason why such energy should have rrore than
a broad analogy to anything of the kind that has been
suggested hitherto.
Simultaneously he was not ultimately much troubled at the prospect of
being unable to find a suitable physiological energy in the brain, for,36
should the worst arrive arid the required physiological
explanation renain to the end undiscoverable, the mental
facts will nonetheless rnain facts still. If they are
such as to be best explained by the concept of an
underlying energy. . . . it will have to be regarded as
purely mental.	 -
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Ind, his hope, all along7 appears to have been for a ndel which erployed
an engineering analogy, and which depicted the cortex of the brain in each
individual as having a certain constant energy level, to be identified with
the level of 'g'. But, within the cortex, there would be shown to exist
certain groups of neurons, the analogues of engines, which would take up the
general energy of the cortex when a specific function was enbarked upon.
Here then was a possible physiological nel for the t-factar syst.
The general energy of the cortex stood for 'g' and the efficiency of the
specific engines measured the individual's specific abilities. High
performance in any test could be due to a good 'g' and an averagely efficient
engine specific to the task, or, it might be due to an average 'g' and a
particularly efficient specific engine. Xntal testing would determine which.
The fuil range of Spearman' s thoughts in this area cannot be dealt with
briefly. But, it is well to note that, in talking about energy, he was
far fran being cczpletely out of step with the general trends of psychology
at his period. There is, to take a faxnus example, the case of Freud whose
unpiblished Project for a scientific psycho1ogy 7written in 1895, deployed
a hypothetical model of the mind in which a great range of ixrortant mental
events were interpreted in terms of the f 1CM of energy between neurons.
Freud too was vague, deliberately, about the possible nature of this energy,
thinking it probably similar to chanical or to electrical energy, but ref errir
to it, not as 'g', but as 'Q'. A quick perusal of Spearnian' s works reveals
references to a great many writers who discussed the possibility of mental
energy and its possible physiological bases, including, for example, Iehmarin,
whose thoughts on the possible interconvertibility of mental and bodily
(physical) energy were taken very seriously by Spearman 8
 re generally, we
find frequent references to 'energy' in Galton' s works, which, we know,
Spea.rman read nost avidly - (though Galton, perhaps, had in mind a less tech-
nical conception than, say Freud). M3reover, if we look to Spearman' s
predecessor at University College, William MacDougall, a one-time student of
Sherrington, we find him, in 1902, attting to explain various phenanena
of attention and consciousness with a nidel that allowed for 'neurin', a
hypothetical form of energy, conceived on the analogy of a fluid, which,
in the brain, flowed fran areas of high to areas of low potential9
Diffexences in t1erament, for example, were seen by MacDougall as connected
with differences in synaptic resistence to the flow of neurin. Perhaps it is
not surprising then, that ?acDougall wculd later write a book entitled
The energies of men, and, in line with Speannan' s general orientation,
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we find in NacDougafl (another opponent of associationist psychology),
a much nore aggressive critic than Speaxiren, who took his criticisms
further, and could be found writing that the observed unity of conscious-
40
ness was,
a unity of a unique kind which has not analogue in the
physical realm, and that cannot properly be regarded as
consisting of elerrents, units or atans of consciousness,
put together or canpounded in any way; consciousness cannot,
therefore, parallel anyt Lng in the nervous system, which is
ccrosed of discrete units; it must be sarething sui generis.
Spearman, then, it would seen, in orpany with many other psychologists of
his period, was not at all favourably inclined tc .zards the ixistrurrentalist
philosophy of science pratoted by Pearson, and around which Pearson' s statist-
ical methods had been built. 'g' had a very rich and non-positivistic
interpretation in the eyes of its author. Certainly, current texts seen to
ignore this aspect of Spearman' s thought, and, in these books he res
across as a pioneering factor analyst, a man searching for statistical
factors capable of serving as effective instruments of prediction and
data surrinarisation. 41He also appears to be much closer in spirit to Pearson's
3 &p'c.f	 **. &.cMideash,than closer inspection reveals to have been the case.
(c) The politics of intelligence.
So far only one caronent of the social relations of 'g' has been dwelt
upon. &it were one to ask what it was that made the conception a thing of
value to its author and to its supporters at the tune, then a full answer
ild have to review not only the factors already seen, but also the strong
stream of eugenic ideology which flcwed briskly in England in the first
years of the 20th century.
The father of the eugenics irovement, as we have seen, was Galton
himself, whose work articulated a thoroughgoing biological interpretation
of social phenarena by stressing the power of nature over nurture, and
by arguing, with sate enirical backing, that one could assess people for
their overall levels of 'natural ability' or 'civic worth', arid that these
levels were determined by heredity rather than by environmant 2 e was in
a strong sense the father of differential psychology, one of the first to
conduct systematic testing of large nurrbers of people with a view to finding
n Pf -,
the differences in faculties that persisted in the population. Intriguingly,
the 1uQrican pioneer of differential psychology Janes NcKeen Cattell, found
favour with Galton after being told by the pioneering German psychophysicist
Wundt that his ambitions for a differential psychology4 re ganz J%InericanischE
The continental tradition represented by Wundt, had less interest In the
differences between man, and sought instead for the universal features of
inix. s we have seen, in Galton 's thought, class differences tended easily
to becane interpreted as hereditary differences in 'natural ability', and
this was an ever-present tendency axwng the nnbership of the Eugenics
Education Society, which, with its predaninantly professional nbership,
had a particular interest in that which gave the professional man his status
and claim to position in society - i.e., not land or capital, but skill,
training and educated ability. uong the rrnbership, as we have seen,
there was a treirendous interest in the fortunes of this able class, and
freuently exoressed fears that it might be declining proportionately in
the face of superior reprcxluctive efficiency on the part of the lower classes.
Speanian fits in well with this general pattern of concerns, which, it
should be noted, inclined other psychologists such as MacDougall and Burt to
join the society. PDr, we find that, as an enthusiastic reader of Galton' s
'works - notably of Galton's Hereditary genius of 1869 - he and his wife becan
nalt)ers of the Eugenics Society before the first war. Now, within the societ
there were, of course, many shades of opinion, both as to theory and to
preferred policies, and we have no reason to suppose that Sparman 'would have
espoused the hard-line views of, say, a Major Leonard Darwin - who denied
that anything other than wealth could serve as a guide to a man's genetic
worth - or of a William Danpier frietham (the future Sir William Darrpier) 'who
would restrict opportunities to the lower classes in order to give the
professional classes the confidence to breed freely, in the knowledge that
positions would be available for their off spring' 5 However, it is quite clear
that a significant source of the value with which Spearman invested his work
cane fran what he perceived as its social lirplications and applications, and,
above all, fran its possible eugenic connections.
The ort of problem which he was pleased to claim that his work resolved
is that posed in hunDrous form in the cartoon reproduced 	 (Fig. 1)
The cartoon is taken fran Spearman's 1912 paper on the 'Heredity of abilities
and was one he borrowed fran the Daily Mirror (then, as now, a lcw-brow and
popular paper). The cartoon, whose location gives an indication of the faire
which eugenics achieved in Edwardian Eugland, poses the classic problem for
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eugenists. For, having abandoned Spencer's view that only the envirornt
should select in favour of selecticn by caitnittee, the eugenists were faced
with the probln of choosing what features they thought were desirable enough
to be bred. for. As the ma±ers of the eugenics society were a fairly well-
group, it seeas unl.thely that the issuc of choice was one that could sp]J
then asunder, but, at all ev,ents, an 'objective' criterion was required
were their opinons to be presented as irore than sectional interest. Spearman
se&ns to have considered that, by his authoring of 'g', he had solved the
problen - for 'g', which, it wifl be recalled1was supposed to exist in
differing degrees in different individuals, provid) a single objective
scale	 and a unidimansional one at that - on which everyone
could be canpared. M3reover, as he wrote in another paper, in the British
journal of psychology, the concept of 'g' and the possibility of objective
testing which it raised, made it sen,49
not altogether chiniaeric to look forward to the tine when
citizens, instead of choosing their career at aluost blind
hazard, will undertake just the professions really suited
to their capacities. One can even conceive the establish-
merit of a minimum index to qualify for parliamantaxy vote,
and, above all, for the right to have offspring.
Spearman, over many years, was ardent in the defence of his theory of 'g'.
This theory, or the 'theory of two factors' as it is sanetimes known, was the
subject of a vast and extended debate, particularly between Spearman and
Sir Gx3frey Thomaon, the noted psychcirtrician. Thomson was particularly
anxious to show that Spearman's dronstration of the existence of a hierarchy
altongst test sires could not be taken as strongly confirmatory of his two-
factor theory, because it was a siuple matter to show that a rival 'anarchic'
theory of mind led to exactly the sare prediction. If one assumed that the
mind contained an indefinitely large number of independent units or 'bonds',
arid that different tests represented randan samples of these bonds, albeit
of different sizes, then the laws of probability alone were sufficient to
guarantee the production of a hierarchy. There was no need to suppose, alor
with Spearman, that there was such a thing as a general factor. Now, the
debate between Thomson and Spearman went on for many years. The literature
generated in this debate was massive, and, it is worth noting that when,
in 1931, Helen N. Walker published her Studies in the history of statistical
method, she felt obliged to include a chapter on 'The theory of tx factors'.
Possibly she felt so obliged as she was a professor of education at Teachers
College, University of Coluithia?0
 And, as the ubjcct was long, and slightly
out of line with the rnainder of her book, she simply gave a useful annotated
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bibliography of forty-two itans, which, in large measure, recount the
struggle between Tharson' s 'sanpling theory' ind Spearrnan' s 'two-factor'
theory.
In her introduction, Walker suggested that SpearTnan' s theory was one
of the nost striking illustrations of an educational and psychological hypo-
thesis which has been defended and attacked alnDst solely by statistical
argutnts. This was no doubt true, but what is yverlooked is the source
of Speaxman' s furious defence of his theory. For, why should he be so
anxious to defend at such length a theory which, in Popperian terms was rather
a poor one - for, as we have seen, it made just one real prediction, also made
by the rival theory?51The answer to this riddle, doubtless, lies in the rich
interpretation which Speaxman gave to his conception, in the central role
that it played in a psychology in which (in Speaxman' s opinion) the entire
range of all cognition whatsoever, as regards both form and material, would
appear to receive its definite and final boundaries 1 and in its place in
Spearman's and other's eugenic and social-reformist thinking. Speaxrnari could
not let his concept of 'g' pass into extinction without at the same tine
jeopardising the continued viability of these other, distinctly non-statistics
aspects of his thought and work. He was, it should now be obvious, a great
deal xrore than the prototypic factor-analyst that holds his name in so many
nodern texts.
In suinnary then, we can see that Spearman saw saie of the value of his
work as residing in its power to resolve eugenic problans. There is no
denying that he was a maer of the Eugenics Education Society and that he
wrote for its organ the Eugenics review. In these writings we find him
stressing that the theory of 'g' 52
appears to make possible, for the first tizre,
meaningful and reliable mental measurements,
a matter in which previous researches have been
graveiy defective.
Therein, we find him arriving also at 'a conclusion of fundamental inirortance
for eugenics', namely that
though unquestionably the develont of specific
abilities is in large measure dependent upon
environmental influences, that of general ability
is a]imost wholly governed by heredity.
But, we find very little of such writing in Spearman' s work, all of which
suggests strongly that he was much rrore iirpressed by the xer of his theory
to resolve what he took to be outstanding problans in the psychology of
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cognition than by its eugenic potential. This certainly is a view which
is consistent with the raniniscences of Steverison 4 a pipil of Speannan' s,
who recalls that when Spearinan was succeeded by Cyril Burt at University
College London in 1931 there was a feeling of 'let down' arrong sate
psychologists as Spearman was considered to be 'theoretical' and 'scientific'
in a 'pure' sense, whereas Burt was perceived as 'practical' and as 'applied'.
Indeed, if there is one area of possible 'bias' in Spearman' s work, one
suspects that it may lie in overstrong claims for the proven existence of
the clean hierarchy of test score correlations implied by the theory of 'g'.
We have seen after all that the results published had been subjected to
correction: possibly there is roan for a careful consideration of Speannan' s
claims in this direction, }*at, given the rnarks above, it sens prthable
that any 'irregularity' along these linas should be ascribed to xtetaphysical
rather than to eugenic zeal.
MDst i.nterestingly, Speannan ' s adoption of Pearson' s bianetric methods
did not connote an approach to science based upon the positivistic philosophy
which Pearson had intended his bianetric methods to encapsulate. In
Spearnian' s work, Pearsonian methods were deployed to support ideas of 'psychi
energy' - ideas for which there was no place in Pearson's philosophy.
At this stage, I would like to leave the case of Charles Speaxman and
go on to those of William Mac1)ugall and, especially, Cyril Burt. In my
treatment of Spearrnan I have, of course, mentioned his twenty-year debate
over the theory of 'g' with Sir Gzdfrey Thanson. It sens appropriate that
sate further explanation of this debate should appear, and though this
chapter is not the place for a lengthy analysis of the debate, it does seen
to me that there is roan for a brief sketch of Thanson' s position, which,
acoordingly, is contained in the appendix to the chapter where a variant
version of Udriy Yule' s exposition of the manner in which the theory of 'g'
leads to the expectation of hierarchy also finds a place. For the present,
however, let us look briefly at the early career of Cyril Burt.
Willin 4acDougal1, Cyril Burt and the psychology of eugenics.
No English psychologist, present or past, enjoys the renown of Cyril
Burt, whose work has recently been heavily criticised by Leon Kamin, in his
polnica1 Science and politics of IQ which shows convincingly that Burt' S55
published work on twin-studies contains improper data. Burt is known as a
hard-line hereditarian, as a man who desired 1as strongly as Galton ever did,
to shcw that in matters of intelligence, that heredity darilnated over environ
rnent. Indeed, the general outline of his life' s work has been neatly
surmarised by his bicgrapher L.S. Hearnshaw, who insisted that:56
His work can be regarded as a working out of the prograim,
first envisaged by Francis Galton, for a psychology of talent
and character, rooted in evolutionary biology and genetics,
and recognising the importance of individual differences, and
quantitatively based. Towards the establisbrtent and application
of such a psychology Burt worked with undeviating consistency.
There is a single thread of purpose uniting his first publication
in 1909 and his last posthurzous papers published in 1972.
Clearly, in what remains of this chapter, I cannot discuss the whole of
Burt's career as a psychologist, but, as a man who employed bicxretric
techniqj.ies in the pursuit of a Galtonian psychology in the period prior to
the first war, he is a natural object of
Cyril Burt was the san of a doctor who, interestingly, had a gre&
regard for Francis Galton. The young Burt was dependent on scholarship
successes and entered a leading public school on the basis of examination
performance, thereafter running away with the school prizes. Later he won
further scholarship to Jesus College Oxford, where he took classics -
basically because no science had been taught in his school. At Oxford he
took only an average degree, possibly because he had given his heart to the
study of psychology under William MacDougall, then precariously situated in
Oxford as Wilde reader in psychology. At Oxford, Burt cane into contact with
Karl Pearson who cane to talk on 'correlations and lines of closest fit', herE
too, he first encow1ftj4 Biaretrika.57
On graduating, Burt was awarded the John Lcckscholarship, which enabled
to work abroad, and, in 1909, he was appointed lecturer in psychology
in the University of Liverpool5 n the departhent of physiology then run by
Charles Sherrington. To this he helñ until 1912, when e
he took up the post of educational psychologist to the tcndon County Council
- the first post of its kind ever. In 1924 he was appointed professor of
education in the University of London, and, in 1931 he succeeded Speaxman
as professor of psychology at University College, becaning the first
psychologist to be ]cighted in 1946.
The psychological work which established Burt as a leading figure5as
his paper on 'Experinental tests of general intelligence', published in
1909, but on the basis of data which he appears to have collected whilst stiL
the pupil of wicDougall in Oxford. It is on this early, career-establishing
work that I wish to focus. It was this work, after all, which gave Burt the
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first step up along the steep road to knighthood.
In the introduction to his work, Burt plainly acknowledged the dobt
he azed to Galton, whcm he perceived as having first introduced the notion
of 'general intelligence'. But, irre to the point, he indicated that he
hoped to shorn which tests would give the best estimate of a person's 'generc
intelligence', doing this in a series of exerimental investigations carriec
out upon boys fran (a) an Oxford elementary school, arid (b) an Oxford
preparatory sch?ol, in 1907 and 1908 with the assistance of J.C. Flugel.
-The boys at the e	 ere of lower middle class origins,-whereas the
boys fran the preparatory school were the scions of the Oxford professoriat
aix of other persons fran equivalently ranking fractions of the professiona:
middle classes.
In his research, Burt subjected the boys to series of tests which, in
his views represented
as far as possible the various main aspects and levels
of mental process.
, These included sensory tests, such as 'discrimination of two points upon
the skin', n-otor tests such as tapping arid card dealing tests - in which
the subjects had to deal cards into five hands as quickly as possible -,
sensori-irotor tests of the alphabet - finding sort, association tests in wh
the subject had, for exanpie, to trace over a pattern seen only in a mirror
and, finally, tests of volutary attention in which the subjects had to shor
- wbat'rate they could accurately record simple information with
which they were supplied.
Burt, of course, was interested in intelligence, and, as he put it
To determire the degree to which the various tasks might 	 28
be	 C1L.LS.Lc.4L.	 L.	 . L
it was necessary to obtain an independent estimate of the
relative intelligence of the reagents tested. For this,
recourse was had at the conclusion of the experimental part
of the work to their headmasters, their teachers, and their
schoolfellcis, who undertook to draw upon on the basis of
their general experience of the examinees independent lists,
grading them in order of General Intelligence.
These lists were drawn up then, in the3ight of schoolmasterly experience,
and then, by using Spearnian's 'fool-rule' inethof determining correlation,
Burt was able to come up with figures indicating the degree of association
between these estimates of relative intelligence and the r. &c.ings shcizri by
the reagents in respect of the various tests.
Burt found that the level of correlation alt&ed with the nature of the
test, noting that63
Of the twelve tests, six furnish coefficients below .50 and six
furnish coefficients above .50. The former six - the simple senox
and motor tests - are thus of little use in the npirical diagnosis
of intelligence. 1inong the latter six, no single test, at any rat€
in Its present form, can be claimed as a self-sufficient instrument
for measuring and detecting ability in individuals. But they indtc
the direction in which such a test may hopefully be sought.
Paricularly promising are the four new tests. Of these Mr McDoujL
'Dotting fla chine' seems to be the most scientifc.
(MacDougall 's dotting machine was used in the attention tests). But, he
clai1Ted,'	 amalgamated series of test results, gotLen by 'making a grand
average of the six gradings fran those that give coefficients above 0.5 and
arranging the boys accordingly. we obtain a
correlating with the headmaster'
-	 a
order to the extent of .85 at the elementary school and .91 at the preparatc
Thus, he concluded, by means of 1alf a dozen tests,
we are able independently to arrange a group of boys
in .an order of intelligence, which shall be decidedly
more accurate than the order given by scholastic
examinations, and probably more accurate than th'
orc1jr given by the master, based on personal inter-
course during two or three years, and formulated with
unusual labour, conscientiousness and care.
here then, it seems, Burt was advancing the claims for a method of intelligc
testing with rio literary or cuitural content, and, this done, he was able
to develop a strong eugenic line. Previous workers, Burt argued, including
Karl Pearson among this group, had failed to establish 'the growing belief
90'
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that the innate characters of the family are Itore pOtent in evolution
than the acquired characters of the individual'. His work, hciever,
sened of a irore decisive nature, for it indicated that the preparatory
school boys gained superior marks in all tesLs bar the two tests of
sensory discr.irrdnation based upon the discrimination of weight arid of two
point on the skin. Hence, Burt concluded
wherever there are correlations with intelligence,
there (so far as we can discover) - 	 --
-	 -	
CJrVdc- cdf.
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boys of superior parentage are thenselves superior.
Moreover, at the sound, tapping, matory, mirror,
alphabet, arid dotting tests, the preparatory boys
are superior even to the cleverest section of the
elaiientaxy boys.
Now, argued Burt, since the lower middle class boys all enjoyed reasonable
standards of nourishment and environment, it was itplausible to attribute
the observed differences between the two groups to such factors: nor could
they be attributed to practice or to several other possible explanatory items.
64The conclusion was straight-forwardly Galtonian
We may conclude that the superior proficiency
at intelligence tests on the part of the boys of
superior parentage, was inborn. Arid thus we seen
to have proved marked inheritability in the case
of a mental character of the highest 'civic worth'.
Intelligence, in short, was shown to be 'inherited to a degree which few
psychologists have hitherto legitimately ventured to.maintain'.
This, then, was the general tack of Burt's first major piece of
research, which, as we can see, was, ab initio designed so as to resolve
the question of the relation between social class and innate intelligence.
As it was the piece of research which propelled him into his long and
influential career, and as it both employed bianetric (or statistical) metho&
and helped develop the discipline of differential psychology, it is
interesting to consider how and why Burt came to do this work.
The answer appears to lie in the connection with 4acDougall, who, as we
have seen, was Burt:' s first, Oxford, psychology tutor. Several sources seen
to indicate a scenario in which MacDougall, alarmed by reports of growing
fertility on the part of the lower orders, took steps to Sko' 4 the
seriousness of this state of affairs by coirndssioning work intended to
establL h that class and genetic worth were indeed correlated. Evidence
for this canes fran at least three sources, of which two are articles by
Burt and the third is NacDougall' s work National welfare and national decay
(1921).
In National welfare, MacDougall wrote of the proposition that65
the social stratification which exists in modern
industrial cainities is positively correlated
with a corresponding stratificatioi of innate moral
and intellectual quality.
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tjiat it was the assumption which lay at the root of 'eugenic propaganda',
and that, by virtue of being an assumption, rather than a proven proposition,
it gave eugenics its 'greatest weakness'. But, he also recalled,66
two of my pupils (Mr C. Burt and Mr H.B. Eglish) made the
first contributions... toward filling the gap.
In Burt's czin writings, the sama account aprs. In his Intelligence
and fertility of 1952 he clain that his work of 1909 had originated in
a suggestion of William NcDougall, itself consequent upon Heron's work
on birth-rate differentials 67
Ce of Karl Pearson's fellow-workers, David Heron, had recently
published considerable evidence demonstrating that the birthrate
differed widely with differences of social level, that of the
professional classes being less than half thatof the so-called
wor king classes. It was therefore arranged that two groups of
children, representing these two contrasted social classes, should
be examined. Canp&te age-groups (12.0 - 13.0 years) were chosen
(i) from a well-known preparatory school (the Dragon School), where
the pupils were sons of Iren eminent in the intellectual professions
(bishops, professors, scientists, civil servants, etc.), arid (ii)
•	 Iran an elntaxy schcol, where the parents were local tradespeople
•	 and working zien, not so ill-paid, however, as to lead to serious
handicaps fran poverty or poor health.
In a paper of l95l 8Burt mentions also that there had been established,
in 1905 a camiittee of the anthropological section of the British Association
which 'drew up a schene for a carehensive survey, arid a sub-committee was
set up to consider the inclusion of psycho1ogica measurEments'. MacDougall
., p:rcr%V, &WI
was the chainnan of this sb-camitteehiinself as engaged upon a 'sociologica:
survey of the nation's man power'.
So, it seems that there is fairly strong evidence to suggest that Cyril
Burt's first entry into psychological research came in context of an attempt
by the eugenist MacDougall to counteract the 'weakness' in contenorary
'eugenic propaganda' - namely the circumstance that potentially alarming
statistics, like those provided by David Heron, were based upon the mare
assumption that the social order reflected an innate biological ordering of
men in respect of inherent 'natural ability', 'civic worth' or what have you.
If this assumption were not made or denonstrated, then all of Heron's
warnings, as noted, would instantly fall to the ground.
In .onc1usion therefore, it would seem that MacDouga1]ias an active
eugenist keen to show the heritability of intelligence and to denonstrate
the truth of the eugenic assl.mption that the social order ref lect.ed an under-
lying biological order. Burt, it seems clear, was commissioned to do this
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rk for him, and, on the strength of having established (i) a correlation
between the rankings given by certain tests and by headmasterly estimates
of intelligence aiiongst t groups of boys, and (ii) an overall higher
level of marks on these tests anongst the scions of the upper professional
classes, asserted the inborn superiority of the upper class boys. Thus he
might be seen to repair the 'weakness' of eugenics, thereby, no doubt,
gaining the good will of NacDougall, Galton and Pearson, whose views, Burt
noted, were solicited when the question of appointing an educational psychol-
ogist to the London County Council was ntoted.
The question of whether or not Burt accepted Pearson's philosoy of
science when adopting his biartric methods is hard to settle fran his
early &ork, though later writings, particularly on the results of the
application of factor analytic techniq'.es, suggest not. The question of
idelogical bias in Burt's early rk is perhaps the nre interesting one,
for, as we have seen, it was done in a welter of eugenic sentiments. One
must, of course, be careful to avoid luputing to the early Burt the same
sorts of excesses which, Karnin has alleged, are typical of his later pericd.
But given the nature of Burt's evidence as provided in his 1909 paper, it can
reasonably be suggested that the uwe to a categorical assertion of the
innate superiority of the higher-class boys just is an assertion that is a
great deal stranger than that demanded by the evidence or allowed by the
structure of the argurrnt. For, surely, fran the iact that upper class boys
do better in tests giving rankings closely resth1ing the headmasters'
rankings (where each headmaster ranks only his own boys) is a thin premiss
fran which to advance to conclusions of innate superiority. It is a doubly
interesting point as the 1909 paper marks the first step of a long career
in which Burt sought, time and again, to show a cause and effect relation
between IQ and class - with IQ far more a cause than an effect. This claim
of a causal relation was to be very widely disseminated, and so, whatever
the merits of the claim, we must surely learn to see the interaction of
Heron, I'1acDougall and Burt before the first war as one that was possibly
of the greatest importance in the formation of semi-popular thought on the
nature of social class in Britain. I use the qualification 'possibly',
because, as I have already noted in the case of Pearson, we cannot
J.nitdiately infer fran a view's wide dissemination to its having had a
ccimensurate ilr!pact.
Conclusion
insofar as any general conclusions may be drawn fran the core of
this chapter, they are as follow. Biattric rrethcds seen to have been
raarkably well-received anong that section of the British psychological
carmunity that studied intelligence and the distribution of individual
differences. In fact, whereas the biologists Irore or less rejected
biatetric methods - especiafly as illustrated by the various guises taken
by the correlation coefficient - they were well-received anongst the
psychologists, and were given praninent places in menuals of methodology,
as, for example in the Essentials of trental measurnent, first produced
in 1911 by William Brown, a one-tine student in Pearson' s laboratory, and
put through successive editions by Brown with the assistance of Godfrey
Thanson. Such methods rnain popular today, especially as illustrated by
journals such as Psychornetrika, though it is interesting to note the omrent
of iJdny Yule, writing in 1921, that7°
Statistical methods, I say, should be regarded as
ancillary, not essential. They are onl y essential
where the subject of investigation is itself an
aggregate, as a swann of atoms, or a crowd. But
there the subject is the individual, not the aggregate
of individuals as such. This being the case, statistical
methods are only necessary in so far as experiment fails
to attain its ideal, the ideal of only pennitting one
causal circumstance to vary at a tine. And it should
always be the aim of the expe:rimenter not to revel in
statistical methods (when he does revel and not swear)
but steadily to diminish, by continual flnprovanent of
his experinental methods, the necessity for their use
and the influence they have on his conclusions. Stat-
istical methods are not only ancillary; they are, to
the experimenter, a warning of failure.
y.&e,I have already noted, bad already shozn signs ot deviating fran Pearson's
views when, in the early years of the 20th century, he staged an attack
on Pearson' s indiscriminate loynent of the correlation coefficient.
Don Mackenzie ha shown that these reactions and others were in haxnony
with Yule's general outlook on life and society.
Secondly, it sens that in sore instances, develoixnent of the Galtonian
tradition of psychology was attended fran the earliest nrziont by a high
level of eugenic zeal - as in the case of Burt and MacDougall. But in other
instances, as for example, in the case of Spedrman and 'g', the zeal sens to
288
have been distinctly nore philosophical. Certainly, it is worth
pointing out that a fascination with biatric methods did not
invariably go hand in hand with a predaninantly hereditarian outlook, a point
illustrated by the work and thought of Godfrey Thanson (scir aspect of
whose works are discursed in the appendix to this chapter) and William
Brown, Thanson' s colleague who on one occasionthat Spearrnan' s general factor
was due to environmental conditions.
Appendix
In this apperidJx, I first offer a slightly irodified version of Yule's
s1ile dnstration that Spearinan's theory does lead to the expectation of
a hierarchy of the sort described in the text, and then, to illustrite the
reference to Godfrey Thanson's sanpling theory, I also offer a brief
indication (but no rigorous discussion) of the way in which this rival
theory containing no central factor also led to the expectation of an
hierarchy. The whole Thasan-Speairnan debate is a subject for separate
treaimnt; here I can hope only to give a flavour of the pro positions.
7 Spearman, the theory of 'g' and the conse quent hierarchy.
Let us suppose that a and p are two mental tests - eg., sitting a latin
exam - and that g is the general factor. Then, in Yule' s notation,
is the correlation that would be observed between the test scores of people
having equal g levels. This equals,
-
But, the independence of the secific abilities brought into play in tests
a and p guarantees that the level of g is the sole cause of correlation
between a group's scores in a and its scores in p. Hence, by Spearinan' S
must take the value zero.tneory, the partial correlation
Hence,	 =
Similarly r = 
rb0 . r3
Hence
rj	 bp	 rb
n r
It is an obvious consequence that if the last equation i .j true of any
four of the tests, then a 'hierarchical' arrangnt of the correlations bet-
ween scores xru.ist be possible, and, noreover that adjacent ners of
column i and column (1+1) in such a hierarchy will always have the sane ratio.
Similarly with the rcMs.
(This derivation is based very closely upon that given in W.Brown and G.
T1rison, Essentials of nntai jneasurnt, cambridge, (192]), ç • 165 - 166).
7 Thanson, the sanpling theory and consequent hierachy.
Thanson developed his sampling thebry, which does not contain a central
factor 'g' or anything like it fran 19fonwards. The version, , nore
precisely, the sketch of a version given beneath is based on his
discussion in the Factorial analysis of human ability, 5th edn, 196L
We are to suppose the mind to consist of a large number of 'bonds', and
that each test randanly sanpies a certain fraction of these. Let us call
ourst1 test2 . . . . . test1 and iirplicity, take the four test-example.
Then if we let 'P2' 1')3 f stand for these fractions, and N for the
whole pooi of bonds, then the number canton to the first t tests' will nost
prcbably be P1P2N', and so on.
Now, in virtue of a theoren proved by Weldon, the correlation between
tests will be	 =	 T? P !\(	
- VP
Accordingly, in any tetrad in a table of test-score correlations, we have
quantities like the following	 3
•1 ç ç3	 ___
and, as Thson pointed out, 'the tetrad difference is rrost probably
This, of course is a sufficient condition for hierarchy in Spearman' s sens
Now, the precise nature of the 'bonds' was left rather vague by Thanson,
thought he suggested that they might be seen as having an 'all or none'
action like neurones. Though not a zealous hereditarian, Tharson insisted
that his theory did not ccrrinit him to the view that all nen were equal.
9(1
i the contrary, the sampling theory uld consider men
also to be samples, each nn possessing saia, but not all,
both of the inherited and the acquired neural bonds which
are the physical side of thought. Like the tests, scne
men are rich, others poor in these bonds. Sane are richly
endcMed by heredity, sate by opportunity arid education;
sate by both and saie by neither. The idea that men are
samples of all that might be, and that any task samples
the powers which an individual man possesses, does not for
a Iranent carry with it the consequences asserted of equal
correlations and a hun3rum mediocrity alrong hurten kind.
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chapter 9. Conclusions :probls in historical exkntion.
')	 ,
We saw in the second chapter that Galton made innovations in
several areas. He invented eugenics, studied the inheritance of
contirnusly varying characters, made strides in the deve1opint of
statistical theory, speculated on Intelligence and pioneered mental
testing. For him, all of these activities were facets of a single
unified prograirme of social reform arid scientific innovation.
It is not too much to claim that Galton set in train a distinctive 'Galtoniar
tradition', sinly because men of the renown and influence of Karl Pearson,
Ronald Fisher and Cyril Burt, who developed particular aspects of Galton's
thought were also caimitted to similar unified prograimies of scientific
innovation and social reform. On the other hand, the identity of concern
between these men and Galton must not be overplayed, for, while Galton,
Pearson arid Fisher were all keen eugenists for example, their social
ideals varied considerably nonetheless. One (Galton) had an utopian ideal,
a second (Pearson) was a state socialist, and a third (Fisher) wanted a
better deal for the professional classes within traditional society.
Pearson denounced the established church, Fisher was punctilious in matters
of chapel attendance. Perhaps then, it is best to say that there was a
Galtonian tradition in the sense that these and other intellectual
leaders worked on prograrruies sIzing family resatblances.
Surrounding and interacting with these leading figures, of wham, in
our chosen period, none outrariks Pearson, were several followers pursuing the
sane line as their superiors. David Heron, perhaps, is the best example
of these. At a stage rExved is another mere interesting fraction of
scientists, carosed of men like W.S.Gossett arid G.U.Yule who engaged with
the scientific work of the Galtonians but without sharing any strong
allegiance to the social imperatives of the Galtoni.an tradition. Yule
worked in statistics and genetics, but with little obvious ccnrnitnent
to the eugenic philosophy that guided the career of his superior Pearson.
Consequently, intellectually and geographically, they separated. kich the
same may be said of W.S.Gossett, whose work in statistics, as noted,
was a response to the problns of the brewing industry rather than to
the difficulties of evolutionary biology or eugenics. Others fitting
into this third category of Galtonian, thoughperhaps irore loosely, are
Weldon himself and Spearman. Weldon sens to have cared little for
eugenics, but was a Galtonian in the sense that he used and developed
Galton' s statistical nethcds when advancing his biological work.
9flF
Spearinan had scme eugenic allegiances and refined Galton' s notion of
energy (though, of course, the notion was hardly specific to Galton) but,
again, we have no reason to suppose that the social iiperative was
a daninating force in his work. It does seen however that things were
otherwise in the case of Cyril Burt.
With the passage of tine the loosening of the tradition increased, to
the extent that, at the present tine, professional statisticians have
no oiinitmant to eugenics at all - though, of course, a ccxracted but
'integrated' Galtonian tradition still persists in the form of
psychologists given to statistical nethods and Fisherian genetics
ixuiring into the possible biological bases of class arxl race-differences
in I. Q.. Thus they sanetirres continue, in effect, Galton' s 1869 inquiry
into the 'cararative worth of different races'. Scirgetimes these
investigations are surrounded by a rather Galtonian rhetoric, sanetines
not.
In all events, we may surely agree that whatever be the utility of
talking about 'traditions' in general, and about the 'Galtonian tradition'
in particular, the followers of Galton - whether whole-hearted, half
engaging, or 'passing through' - were a Irst influential and inortant
set of Den: collectively they were nost fecund in the developient of
sciences which have had a considerable social and cultural Impact. Of none
is this irore true than Pearson, who, as we have seen, made massive contribution
to statistics, intellectually and institutionally, who provoked Fisher' s
iiiortant forays into genetics, and who provided differential psychologists
with their statistical methodology.
It remains to inquire whether the knowled. of the scientific process
aoguired in this study leads to any general conclusions.Much as Darwin
inquired whether there were not true general statennts which might be
made about the countless organic changes involved in the history of
life,so one wonders whether sane true general statenent might not energe
here too.
In my view, it does not.But, there is at least one observation of
general applicability which seems contrary to received wisdan (a loose phrase
admittedly) about the scientific process.It is that, in one way and
another, different sorts of non-erirical considerations appear to have
played a crucial role in the develOp-rent of science.We have seen 1
 anongst
other exaqDles, Galton arid his utopian quest;Pearson's dedication to
a Nachian philosophy of science arid to a form of state socialism built about
a refonted systan of ethics; Bateson' s anti-materialism and anti-utilitarianism
Fisher's eugenicism; MacDougall' s and Burt's desire to repair faults in the
fabric of eugenic propaganda, and Spearman' s wish to counteract an
ethically unattractive associationistic psychology. It is besides the
point to insist that these scientists could have done these things with
sate different and 'Irore pure' iotivation, for this, assuredly, is how
things were.
The range of these non-empirical considerations is a large one. There is,
for exairple, a world of difference between, say, NacDougall ' s desire
to repair eugenic propaganda and Pearson's desire to establish a Machian
philosophy of science. But, what they have in carir is that they dictated
to the scientist that which was desirable and intere .sting. They dictated
which points cane to be seen as problem and which solutions thereto
would be the ncst desirable. There is no doubt, for example, that Cyril
Burt sincerely wished to show that the preparatory school boys were
innately superior to the elentary boys.
At various points I have attpted to discuss whether such values becaire
daninant or not - e.g., whether, for exauple, Burt's desire got the
better of him, in the sense of leading him on to assert conclusions with
a degree of force that was unwarranted by the available e'I'idence. I think it
clear that, on several occasions, values did becane da'ninant in the sense
outlined,but will not pursue this matter here as the plausibility of
such judgernents depends upon 	 making certain assiurptions about the
nature and possibility of confirmation in science, and this leads into a
whole area of philosophical inquiry and Controversy which it would be
injudicious to open up at this juncture.
But if it be established, and I hope that it has been, that many
crucial developrents in the grcMth of the sciences discussed in this work
hinged crucially upon the scientists concerned having corrniitted
thetiselves to various non-atpirical propositions, we must ask at least two
further questions - (1), hcw have these propositions been incoxporated, if at
all, in the science of the aforementioned scientists?; arid, (2), how are
we to explain these scientists' having aoguired their various cammitirents
to these non-empirical propositions?
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n outstanding exaile of the first sort is Pearson arid statistics.
He, it is clear, created statistics as a matheaatical methodology that
would incorporate his Machian philosophy. But, when the statistical
methods were alied by other scientific workers, as, for example by
Spearman, they were made to function in an entirely different way. This
seans to reinforce a point that sociologists of knowledge have not always
stressed - namely that leaders arid followers may be amazingly different
in their interpretations of what they are doing. It may be the case, for
exanpie, that Kepler would not have discovered his laws unless he had been
a neo-Platonist, but, it is quite possible at a later stage to adopt the
laws without the rteoplatonism. There is, it would seatt, only a very thin
sense in which the mDn-eipirical propositions that notivate a piece of
scientific work becarie incorporated into the very scientific concepts arid
theories to which they lead. If there is a counter-example to this
principle anong the works studied, then, perhaps, Spearrnan' s notion of
'g' cares close to fitting the bill • For, it would sean, one can hardly
allcw the existence of such a factor without allowing for the possibility
of a linear ordering of men in terms of something like 'overall ability'.
(ki the other hand, one does not, unlike Speaxman, have to see this as a
desirable or even as an interesting result.
The second question is the Irore serious, as it brings us straight to a
major problea in the explanation of scientific change - namely that of
whether we can explain the scientists in question holding to their
respective non-izical cctinitnents by looking to, say, the social
structures of their times. The significance of the question is obvious.
for, were it possible to explain scientific develoiirents thus in sate
very strong sense, then the often - assurred hierarchy of the sciences
would be overthrown. Biology arid psychology would be reduced to sociology
rather than vice-versa. The response I wish to give is not such a
revolutionary one, but, rather to suggest that, in certain important cases
at least, we can discern a significant manner in which advances In science
may be viewed as dendent to sate degree upon prevailing social structures.
As before, let us consider the case of Karl Pearson.
Now, Pearson' s ncn-pirical views, which, we have seen, guided his
scientific course, may be seen as harnonising with the natural interests
(or, at least, with one possible set of natural interests) of the professions
middle class of which he was a nrer. There is a sense, Hobsban has shown,
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in which, in the late 19th century, professionaL middle class persons
were able to draw up a social blueprint in which they would play a significant
and estered role - that presented to then by Fabianisrn. Such persons were
growing in number, did not derive inccits fran land or investnnts, and
lived in econanic conditions that sapped belief in laissez-faire.
Certainly, Pearson's non-npirical views, as illustrated by his advocacy
of eugenic state socialin dcininated by those with scientific knowledge,
hanrnised with these Fabian interests. His views, then, were not totally
aberrant; rather, they fitted in with and, doubtless were reinforced by,
the views of other influential middle-class professionals. And, if this
be the case, one rray surely argue that Pearsc&s scientific work just cannot
be understood in isolation fran its social context. To this extent then,
we might talk of the 'social determination' of science.
On the other hand, of course, this is a very feeble sense of 'deterininiation'
Certainly, it does not add up to claims that either (i), Pearson's scientific
interests were rigidly fixed by his social position, or (ii), that the
eventual sucjess or failure of his theories was dependent on social structure
rather than upon irical data. To maintain either (i) or (ii) would
be iirossible, for, on the one hand, not all of Pearson's social peers
did the sort of work which he did, and, on the other, as we have seen,
Pearson himself was obliged to admit that the data did not allow, for
exarr!ple, the universal application of the strong form of his interpretation
of Galton's law of ancestral heredity.
Finally, and quite generally, this study may be of use when considering sara
of the issues which are currently receiving attention in the pblic prints
- issues relating to the role of various non-airical factors in science,
notably, though not exclusively, in the context of current debates over
Sociobiology. Sir Andrew Huxley, for exanpie, in his recent (1977) address
to the British Association, has spoken of the need for an absolute divorce
between science and politics, and for an acknowledgnt that there is a
real and iiportant distinction in science between 'actual evidence' for
thries on the one hand, and 'irore indirect inferences which are appropriate
only for suggesting new apporaches to the solution of the problan in hand'.
The issues raised by Sir Andrew are too canpiex to be tackled properly
here, which, in any case, is an inappropriate locus, but we can at least
see that, in important historical practice, the progress of science has
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been due in part to persons of unclisg ised pelitical and ideological
persuasions, whose ork was guided by these persuasions. We can also
see that, as int case of Bateson and genetics, the early survival of a
necz theory in the face of apparent ancxnalies has been due to its espouser' s
carinithnt to what Huxley would regard as 'broad unifying principles'
as imich as to 'actual evidence'. Clearly, there is still a great scope far
discussions of the proper and appropriate roles for politics, ideology and
xrtaphysical principles in science. It is hoped that the st.ies contained
in this essay will serve as enlightening foci in such discussions.
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